

## HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES.

FRIDAY, March 17, 1916.

The House met at 11 o'clock a. m.

The Chaplain, Rev. Henry N. Couden, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Infinite Spirit, Father of all Souls, we would approach Thee in the beauty of holiness, that we may worship Thee in spirit and in truth, that our souls may be vitalized and unified into one purpose by the loving touch of a heavenly Father.

Our little systems have their day;  
They have their day and cease to be;  
They are but broken lights of Thee  
And Thou, O Lord, are more than they.

Thou hast opened the door to opportunities, which invite us to enter in. Efficiency is our task. Give us the courage of our convictions, that we may fulfill our destiny in a faithful service to our fellow men, guided by the light of truth. In Christ Jesus our Lord. Amen.

## THE JOURNAL.

The Journal of the proceedings of yesterday was read.

The SPEAKER. The word "occupied" in the Journal, in the reference to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. RODENBERG], ought to be "control." With that amendment, without objection the Journal as read will stand approved.

There was no objection.

## LEAVE TO PRINT.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members of the House have leave to print remarks on the bill H. R. 12766, the Army reorganization bill, confining their remarks to the bill.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. HAY] asks unanimous consent that all Members shall have the right to print their remarks—

Mr. MANN. For five legislative days after the conclusion—

Mr. HAY. Yes; for five legislative days after the passage of the bill.

The SPEAKER. For five legislative days after the passage of the bill, and the remarks to be confined to the bill itself. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

## EXTENSION OF REMARKS.

Mr. HICKS. Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the RECORD on the subject of the shellfish industry.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from New York [Mr. HICKS] asks unanimous consent to extend his remarks in the RECORD on the shellfish industry. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

## POSTAL SAVINGS SYSTEM.

Mr. MOON. Mr. Speaker, the bill (H. R. 562) to amend the act approved June 25, 1910, authorizing a Postal Savings System, has been returned from the Senate to the House with amendments. I move that the House disagree to the Senate amendments and ask for a conference.

The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report the bill by title.

The Clerk read as follows:

A bill (H. R. 562) to amend the act approved June 25, 1910, authorizing a Postal Savings System.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. MOON] asks unanimous consent that the House disagree to the Senate amendments to the bill and ask for a conference. Is there objection?

There was no objection; and the Speaker announced as the conferees on the part of the House Mr. MOON, Mr. FINLEY, and Mr. STEENERSON.

Mr. STEENERSON. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for five minutes and explain one of these new propositions.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. STEENERSON] asks unanimous consent for five minutes in which to explain one of these amendments. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. STEENERSON. Mr. Speaker, I want to call the attention of the House to the new section, numbered 18, on page 12 of the bill H. R. 562, as amended in the Senate, which reads as follows:

SEC. 18. That hereafter the Postmaster General may establish, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, one or more branch offices, nonaccounting offices, or stations of any post office for the transaction of such postal business as may be required for the convenience of the public.

This provision, it is true, went into the appropriation bill last year, but the bill failed to become a law. The proposition was

recommended by the department and submitted to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads, and was voted down, for the reason that it is a revolutionary proposition.

It looks very innocent on its face, but it amounts to this, that the Postmaster General can abolish some fifty-odd thousand post offices and annex them as substations to the principal offices that he may select. It is proposed by some to make the county a postal division under this bill, and the First Assistant Postmaster General stated in the hearings that he would have authority under the law to establish one post office in each county of the United States and have all the other offices as substations.

Now, there are 533 first-class offices, 2,139 second-class offices, 6,248 third-class offices, and 47,460 fourth-class offices in the United States. If that plan as proposed should go through, it would be possible—and it is evidently the intention of the department—to make one post office in each county. There are 3,000 counties in the United States. You would therefore abolish something like 55,000 or 56,000 post offices and make them substations and make the postmasters superintendents of substations. Of course they would be under the civil service, but it would create that many vacancies to be filled, whether they appointed the old postmasters as superintendents of substations or selected new men. There is no question about the effect of this proposition. At the hearings, on page 128, before the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads the matter was gone into very thoroughly, and the chairman asked several questions. I read:

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL C. ROPER, FIRST ASSISTANT POSTMASTER GENERAL.

## BRANCH OFFICES.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe you testified to everything except this matter on page 47?

Mr. ROPER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you about this matter:

"Hereafter the Postmaster General may establish, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, one or more branch offices, nonaccounting, for the transaction of any post-office business which may be required for the convenience of the public."

What is meant by that statement in there?

Mr. ROPER. We find in the operation of the Postal Service that we could give more satisfactory service if the Postmaster General had greater leeway in the matter of establishing stations than under the present law, which requires that the villages, towns, or cities shall have not less than 1,500 population and be located within 5 miles of the post office to which the proposed station is to be attached.

With the expanding postal service we are able to give to these outlying communities better facilities, as by establishing such stations we are able to extend the delivery service to such communities in many instances, and in many cases, by tacking on such outlying communities to the larger postal district, to give more satisfactory supervision. That is, the station would fall under the general supervision of a man more experienced in handling postal affairs. This measure also would add materially to the convenience and economy of distributing supplies and keeping in general touch with the smaller locality. It is a matter which would naturally be very gradually administered. We are now, as you know, under the law, gradually bringing such districts under this superior supervision when the conditions justify it. We are simply seeking here a little more leeway in the administering of the station feature.

The CHAIRMAN. It is your purpose in establishing a nonaccounting office to extend the jurisdiction of the main or central office beyond 5 miles, you say, the limit in taking in these nonaccounting offices?

Mr. ROPER. We are removing the limitations and leaving that to administration.

The CHAIRMAN. So that if at the county seat one county has a large town and you saw fit to do it you would take in the post offices of the adjoining county?

Mr. ROPER. We could make the unit what good administration proves to be the best.

The CHAIRMAN. Whether it was 5 miles or 100 miles, you make it what you saw fit?

Mr. ROPER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that intended to apply to anything except fourth-class offices?

Mr. ROPER. The legislation sought would make it broad enough to apply to other offices.

The CHAIRMAN. To make it apply to other offices—first, second, and third class offices?

Mr. ROPER. To make it apply to any offices where the administration of the service showed it necessary, practicable, and best for the service and the people affected.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, for instance, at Indianapolis, where you have a post office, you could make all your second, third, and fourth class offices subordinate to the Indianapolis office that you saw fit in the State of Indiana?

Mr. ROPER. Of course, the object of this is to create practical units. It would have to be determined from experience in handling this service what the most workable and satisfactory units would be.

Mr. STEENERSON. Did I understand the answer to be in the affirmative?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. That would have the effect of putting under civil service all the offices you saw fit to put under the control of the chief office, would it not?

Mr. ROPER. Under the present civil-service law it would have the effect of making the postmaster of the office consolidated eligible for classification as station superintendent.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that would be satisfactory to the people to have their first, second, and third class offices all subordinate to another first-class office; to have no postmasters, excepting superintendents, appointed under the civil service for them?

Mr. ROOPER. I could hardly see how the people would recognize any difference at all, because the station would carry the same name as the offices heretofore carried, and it would carry all the facilities, too.

Mr. BEAKES. They would get city delivery, would they not?  
Mr. ROOPER. In many instances they would get city delivery, and in all instances they would have better supervision. The offices would be more readily checked up than now, and the cost of auditing accounts would be materially reduced. The losses by burglary would be reduced, for the reason that the stock of stamps would be replenished from day to day by the central post office.

The CHAIRMAN. The postmaster, however, would be just as apt to come from some other town as that one, would he not?

Mr. ROOPER. It would make it possible to establish an interchangeable personnel in the service.

The CHAIRMAN. And civil service throughout?

Mr. ROOPER. Civil service throughout.

Mr. MADDEN. This would put the Postmaster General in position to appoint one postmaster in the county, would it not; and would put all the other post offices in the county as nonaccounting offices, subject to his jurisdiction?

Mr. ROOPER. If the county should be the unit.

Mr. MADDEN. It would make it possible?

Mr. ROOPER. Yes, sir.

Mr. MADDEN. That would reduce the number of accounts to be kept in the general office from, say, 60,000 to 3,000, that being the number of counties in the United States, would it not?

Mr. ROOPER. Yes, sir; it would very materially reduce the work here.

Mr. MADDEN. It would make the tenure of office of the men who are now postmasters, in every case except those that would not be changed, permanent?

Mr. ROOPER. The Postmaster General has already recommended the classification of postmasters of the third and second classes.

Mr. MADDEN. It would introduce a system similar to the system we have, say, in the big cities, like New York and Chicago. For example, we have 2,500,000 people in Chicago, and we have 1 postmaster and 52 post offices, in effect, because we have 51 stations outside of the post office, over each of which there is a superintendent presiding.

Mr. ROOPER. From an administrative standpoint, we look upon the entire county as an enlarged city.

Mr. MADDEN. Surely. And you believe that this suggestion is a suggestion in line of good administration for the department, do you not?

Mr. ROOPER. I do.

Mr. MADDEN. I am inclined to agree that it is myself.

Mr. COX. What is your judgment as to economies it would bring about, cost of administration, and so forth? Would it lessen or increase them?

Mr. ROOPER. I think anything which adds to the efficiency of operation necessarily results in economy, and in this we would certainly have very material efficiency added to the service.

Mr. COX. Have you any data or compilations along that line showing the approximate amount that would be saved to the Government if a plan of that kind should be worked out?

Mr. ROOPER. I have no data except the information relating to localities which have become stations during this administration, compared with the operation of those stations prior to the time when they were stations.

Mr. MADDEN. I could illustrate one or two cases myself, Mr. Cox. For example, Chicago to-day has about 200 square miles of territory. Before the annexed outside territory came in we had 37 square miles of territory. With each new annexation we brought in one or more post offices, over which postmasters presided. After annexation the post office with the postmaster was discontinued. The post office itself was continued as a station with a superintendent. The salary of the superintendent was probably not in any case more than one-half the salary of the postmaster before it came in.

Mr. ROOPER. Not less than two-thirds and in some cases more. The minimum salary paid to a superintendent of a station is \$1,200. As the majority of offices consolidated with larger offices are of the third and fourth classes, consolidation usually results in an increase in the salary of the postmaster of the discontinued office. Although when larger offices are consolidated the postmasters of the discontinued offices suffer a reduction in salary, they are compensated for this by being made secure in their positions.

Mr. MADDEN. I would not think it was that much. Perhaps it may be. I would not undertake to say certainly. But I think it is agreed by everybody that the service rendered by the superintendent of the station is infinitely more satisfactory than the service rendered by the post office as such before the annexation.

Mr. COX. Right in that connection you have found from experience out there that there has been a great economy in the way of saving of salaries?

Mr. MADDEN. Oh, yes.

Mr. COX. Now in the way of supplies and reports backward and forward, have you any estimate of that?

Mr. MADDEN. They all make their reports to the postmaster of the city of Chicago and he makes his report to the Postmaster General, which only makes one account from Chicago between the general office and Chicago, whereas if we had the 52 post offices we would have 52 reports and 52 sources of supplies.

Mr. COX. And the department here would be running 52 accounts with 52 postmasters in the city of Chicago?

Mr. MADDEN. Yes, sir.

Mr. COX. Whereas now it is only running one account?

Mr. MADDEN. That is right. That is what will happen all over the country if this provision recommended by the Postmaster General be adopted.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had just one office in each State you would have 48 accounts?

Mr. MADDEN. Yes, that is true.

The CHAIRMAN. And if you had only one in the United States you would only have one account. That is the logic of that.

Mr. STEENERSON. About how many officers would there be if this new provision were enacted into law? Could you give an estimate?

Mr. ROOPER. I would state, Mr. STEENERSON, that these units would have to result from experience in operating the service. I mean the size of the units would have to be determined from experience. It would be impossible to advise in advance just how large or how small those units should be.

Mr. STEENERSON. It has been suggested here that there are 3,000 counties in the United States, approximately, and there are approximately 60,000 post offices now.

Mr. ROOPER. Yes; 56,000 post offices.

Mr. STEENERSON. So it might reduce it to 6,000?

Mr. ROOPER. There are sometimes several important municipalities within one county. That might make it necessary to have in some counties several units, but there would be a great many counties, no doubt, in which one unit would answer.

Mr. STEENERSON. Probably in the majority?

Mr. ROOPER. Probably in the majority of the counties of the country.

Mr. STEENERSON. Right here I should like to have you give the substance of the law now as it is on the subject, so we can compare it with the proposed provision.

Mr. ROOPER. I will insert it in exact terms and ask the stenographer to insert the law.

Mr. STEENERSON. We should like to have your version so we can understand how it is interpreted.

Mr. ROOPER. It simply gives to the Postmaster General the right to extend the service of these large communities so as to take in communities where the population is as much as 1,500, and where such communities are within a radius of 5 miles of the post office to which it is to be attached.

Mr. STEENERSON. You might insert the exact language.

Mr. ROOPER. It is as follows, Postal Laws and Regulations, which is the law:

"SEC. 249. The Postmaster General, when the public convenience requires it, may establish within any post-office delivery one or more branch offices (stations or substations) for the receipt and delivery of mail matter and the sale of stamps and envelopes; and he shall prescribe the rules and regulations for the government thereof. But no letter shall be sent for delivery to any branch office contrary to the request of the party to whom it is addressed.

"2. No station, substation, or branch post office shall be established beyond the corporate limits or boundaries of any city or town in which the principal office to which such station, substation, or branch office is attached is located, except in cases of villages, towns, or cities of 1,500 or more inhabitants not distant more than 5 miles, as near as may be, from the outer boundary or limits of such city or town in which the principal office is located."

Section 252 of the Postal Laws and Regulations:

"2. No post office established at any county seat shall be abolished or discontinued by reason of any consolidation of post offices made by the Postmaster General under existing law \* \* \* : *Provided, however*, That this provision shall not apply to the city of Cambridge, Mass., or to Towson, Md., or to Clayton, St. Louis County, Mo."

Mr. COX. I wish to ask you a question in that connection. Practically the plan that you are seeking to have incorporated here is now in force in the large cities, is it not? Only one post office, and all the rest of the stations accounting to the post office?

Mr. ROOPER. Yes. We have now, of course, the service in that respect organized by municipalities, as you say. Then we have around these municipalities certain communities which have been tacked on for the purpose of giving them city delivery service.

Mr. COX. In what cities do you have this kind of service in force?

Mr. ROOPER. In nearly all of the large cities.

Mr. COX. Your idea now, if I gather it, is to simply enlarge and to extend that service out over the State, or out over the United States?

Mr. ROOPER. We are asking authority to do that when it seems to be in the interest of the service. There are no fixed units in our minds at this time, and I doubt whether you could fix uniform units for the entire country. You would have to deal with the conditions as they exist.

Mr. COX. Under your present system of only having one accounting officer in the cities, practically, like Chicago, there is no question but what we have better service under the present system than we would have if we had 52 different offices, is there?

Mr. ROOPER. I think that we have absolutely uniform testimony that the service is superior.

Mr. COX. Is superior?

Mr. ROOPER. Yes.

Mr. COX. \* \* \* I suppose the same system in force in Chicago is in force in New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and St. Louis, is it not?

Mr. ROOPER. Certainly. In Boston we have about 80 stations.

Mr. MADDEN. You go outside of the city of Boston?

Mr. ROOPER. Yes, sir; we take in municipalities like Cambridge, the university city of Boston, Brookline, Chelsea, etc.

Mr. MADDEN. For example, we have some stations in Chicago with as many as 200 men, I think one at least, and I think the superintendent of that station, which is the Canal Station, gets about \$2,200 a year, if I am not mistaken.

Mr. COX. As postmaster he would get \$4,000?

Mr. MADDEN. From 160 to 200 men would be a big post office, would it not?

Mr. COX. It would; surely.

Mr. MADDEN. You can imagine what he would get if he was postmaster.

Mr. COX. Take the State of Indiana, with Indianapolis as the center, and it is nearly the center of the State. Would it be your idea to gradually work the plan out over the State so as to make Indianapolis the accounting office for the whole State of Indiana?

Mr. ROOPER. That would not be my idea. That would be too large a postal district.

Mr. COX. Too large a territory?

Mr. ROOPER. If you will permit me to give an offhand opinion, I should say that, as a rule, the counties of Indiana would constitute about as large districts as would be found practicable for this purpose.

Mr. COX. That would mean 92 postmasters in the State of Indiana, and the remainder of them stations?

Mr. ROOPER. Probably we would have to make exceptions to that and deal with these large municipalities as separate districts.

Mr. COX. But in rural communities, where you have 1,000 to, say, 3,000 inhabitants, you would make one town in each county the accounting office and the rest of them to be served from there?

Mr. ROOPER. The county, or part of county agreed upon, would constitute the unit, and in that unit there would be one accounting office and the others would be stations of that office.

Mr. COX. The head of the accounting office would be the postmaster for that territory?

Mr. ROOPER. He would be the postmaster for that territory.

Mr. COX. And he would be an appointed officer?

Mr. ROOPER. Yes, sir.

Mr. COX. And the stations would be under civil service?

Mr. ROPER. Stations would be under civil service.

Mr. RANDALL. Gen. Roper, in the matter of auditing the accounts of the 52 stations of the Chicago post office it was to be shown in the record the amount that is saved to the department at Washington on that account. Is it not the fact that the accounts of those 52 stations will have to be audited in the Chicago post office instead of being audited here, and would it not cost as much to audit them there as in the Post Office Department in Washington?

Mr. ROPER. We find not. That is a question for the auditor to answer, but it seems to me that the auditing can be done much more expeditiously and much more economically by these accounting offices. The former is very important, namely the expedition. We have been, as you know, for a number of years endeavoring to lessen the period between the transaction and the audit in order that we might get in closer touch with the transactions of the post offices of the country with regard to the handling of our funds.

Mr. MADDEN. So you keep these accounts—

Mr. ROPER. I can see no other way in which it can be made and kept current the postal accounts.

Mr. RANDALL. I refer only to expenses. It strikes me that you are better equipped in the auditor's office here to audit accounts than you would be in Indianapolis or Topeka or any such place as that.

Mr. ROPER. I am unable to see why these districts could not be made just as effective, through their knowledge of local conditions, as we are in the auditor's office in Washington; but a more important feature than you have mentioned is getting this auditing on a current basis and checking and protecting the revenues of the Government.

Mr. ROUSE. This only could be applied to presidential offices, could it not? For instance, if you had a county without a presidential office in it, you could not establish this provision, could you?

Mr. ROPER. Oh, yes.

Mr. MADDEN. Yes; because it would make it presidential. If you take the receipts of the whole county, it would make it presidential, do you not see?

Mr. ROUSE. But could you do that? There are a number of counties, take, for instance, in the mountains, where you have nothing but fourth-class offices; some in other sections that are not mountainous; for instance, Mr. Cox's district.

Mr. MADDEN. But if you took the aggregate receipts of all fourth-class offices in that county, that would make one presidential office.

Mr. ROUSE. But that is not contemplated, is it, General?

Mr. ROPER. We have endeavored to ask you here for legislation that will permit us to work this out in the most feasible and practicable manner. I can not undertake to say to you now just what experience will show to be the most practicable unit.

Mr. ROUSE. Let me get back to that original proposition again. I referred to Mr. Cox's district, which is not fair. But I will take my own district, for instance. I live in a county that has not a presidential office. I know of one town in the county, the county seat, with less than 200 people. It has a fourth-class office. There is not one presidential office in the county. The nearest presidential office to my home is 15 miles away, at Covington, Ky., in an adjoining county. Could Covington be made the accounting office and all the offices in my home county get their mail by star routes? Could they be made to account to the Covington office under this plan?

Mr. ROPER. As I have stated in answer to Mr. Cox's question, I feel now that the county is as large a unit as we would want to deal with, and, even in a county where there are several municipalities, that county might be subdivided into further units.

Mr. AYRES. Under this plan the second and third class post offices come under the same plan, and the fourth class being under civil service.

Mr. ROPER. The Postmaster General has already recommended the classification of the postmasters of the second and third classes, and this would naturally result in classifying the offices that would be consolidated with the accounting office.

The CHAIRMAN. If there was only one first-class office—

Mr. ROPER (interposing). There might be some counties where the office might not be rated as a first-class office—might be rated second class.

The CHAIRMAN. Say the program for change put the second and third class offices under civil service; presidential offices would only be first class?

Mr. ROPER. Yes; really the approval of the recommendations that the Postmaster General has made accomplishes that.

Mr. RANDALL. Would it not be possible and would it not be the policy of the department to establish a number of small stations and rural routes where fourth-class postmasters have been discontinued on account of the establishment of rural routes? Would it not be possible to restore service, to get the same accommodations that the fourth-class post office formerly afforded, by establishing small stations?

Mr. ROPER. As I say, we no doubt would find through experience that such conditions as you mention would arise, but in advance of any experience along this line I could not say whether the suggestion that you have made would be considered or not. It might be.

Mr. MADDEN. If this suggestion should be adopted and the county was made the unit, or whatever was made the unit would be made large enough, the unit would be made large enough so that the postmaster appointed for the unit would be the first-class postmaster. It necessarily would be a first-class post office, because the receipts within the unit would be large enough to justify his appointment as such.

Mr. ROPER. In answer to the chairman, I have just said that I presume that would be the case in most instances, although there are some small counties, no doubt, where the postmaster would not be ranked perhaps above the second class.

Mr. MADDEN. But there would not be anything below the first and second class?

Mr. ROPER. First and second class offices.

Mr. MADDEN. And all fourth-class postmasters would be done away with and superintendents of stations would take their places?

Mr. ROPER. No; they would not be done away with. The fourth-class postmaster would simply become the superintendent of the station or clerk in charge.

Mr. MADDEN. That is what I say. He would not be a postmaster any longer, but the superintendent of a station?

Mr. ROPER. For all intents and purposes he is a postmaster.

Mr. MADDEN. Suppose he is a postmaster; what would be the basis of pay for the fourth-class postmasters?

Mr. ROPER. You are here providing a scale in this bill for the payment of station superintendents.

Mr. MADDEN. But that scale generally does not go as low as the salaries of those fourth-class postmasters?

Mr. ROPER. The lowest salary we could have would be an \$800 clerk, the entrance grade.

Mr. MADDEN. That is too much to pay these men, is it not? Suppose the man's salary as fourth-class postmaster amounts to but \$200 or \$300; are you going to put him under civil service and pay him \$800?

Mr. ROPER. You understand we have different kinds of stations where that might result in establishing not a classified but a contract station, with a clerk in charge receiving a salary as low as \$50, based upon the business of the station, the same as is now done in large cities.

Mr. STEENERSON. I think there are probably 25 post offices in my district where the postmaster's salary is less than \$50 a year. Would their salary be raised under this plan, or would it be reduced?

Mr. ROPER. In all probability the salary of such postmaster would remain the same as at present. We probably might not disturb your district at all, if it were not in the interest of better service for your district. The object of this is to improve the service, and if we could not get better service through the plan here suggested we would maintain the present service.

Mr. STEENERSON. But the suggestion made by Mr. Madden, that in counties where there are no second-class and no third-class offices, no presidential offices, that all the offices might be consolidated so as to form a presidential office; that is not contemplated by this, is it?

Mr. ROPER. No; he used the word "might."

Mr. STEENERSON. But it might not. As I read this proposed law, you would not have any such authority. You would have to change your language in this provision if you were going to do that, because this proposed language only authorizes you to consolidate with some existing third or second class office or first-class office. I do not think you can create or consolidate offices in a whole county and make that kind of office a presidential office.

Mr. ROPER. I will read the language:

"That hereafter the Postmaster General may establish, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, one or more branch offices, nonaccounting offices or stations, of any post office for the transaction of such postal business as may be required for the convenience of the public."

Mr. MADDEN. That would give him the right, then, Mr. Roper, to appoint a superintendent of a station where it was justified instead of a postmaster, or it would give him a right to establish a contract station where he would not be justified in appointing a superintendent of a station.

Mr. ROPER. Yes; or maintain the present system.

Mr. MADDEN. Yes; either one.

Mr. ROPER. Yes, sir.

Mr. BEAKES. Would there not be economy in the shipment of supplies from Washington to the central post office instead of to the several post offices?

Mr. ROPER. I will answer for the Fourth Assistant on that. In my opinion it will effect very great economy in that respect, but a greater economy than even the one you have mentioned would be the better care of supplies.

Mr. BEAKES. I was going to speak of that.

Mr. ROPER. Better supervision.

Mr. BEAKES. Has not the department found that these offices have no use for a great many of the supplies, and would they be likely to get those supplies if they asked for them from the central post office?

Mr. ROPER. Not only that, but this central postmaster could deal more equitably with the demand and conditions of these other offices accounting to him than probably could be done from Washington.

Mr. BEAKES. Would it not be possible to work out a scheme which would preserve the local communities by allowing them to keep the name of the post office while putting them on the station basis?

Mr. ROPER. That is what I intended to say in the outset. It is our idea not to disturb the name, not to infringe on the pride of the community which it may have in regard to its name; to give the community everything it now has, and a superior service to what it now has.

Mr. STEENERSON. You spoke of a sentiment of the patrons. Now, in these recent considerations, for instance in Boston, have you consulted the sentiment of the people?

Mr. ROPER. The consolidations in the Boston district were made in the administration immediately preceding this.

Mr. STEENERSON. Have you heard of any dissatisfaction?

Mr. ROPER. There was some dissatisfaction growing out of what would appear to have been a too rapid consolidation. We have in Boston about 80 stations, and the previous administration absorbed a great many large communities. Among them was Lynn, the large shoe-manufacturing community adjacent to Boston. In the case of Lynn some protests were filed, which we carefully investigated, and after due investigation reached the conclusion that Lynn should be kept as a postal district to itself, and we therefore have removed Lynn from the station classification made under Mr. Hitchcock's administration, and it is now a separate postal district. We discovered, Mr. STEENERSON, that Lynn was a better district to itself. We have other offices consolidated with Lynn.

Mr. STEENERSON. How was it about Cambridge?

Mr. ROPER. In the case of Cambridge I know of no special opposition.

Mr. STEENERSON. And you have never heard of any?

Mr. ROPER. I would not go so far as that, Mr. STEENERSON, because I should have to refer to department files for positive data.

Mr. STEENERSON. When was that included as a substation?

Mr. ROPER. We have made no consolidation in and around Boston during this administration.

Mr. STEENERSON. They were all made before?

Mr. ROPER. Before my connection with the Postal Service.

Mr. STEENERSON. But under the same law now in operation?

Mr. ROPER. Under the law now in operation. We have not disturbed that district except as to Lynn—

Mr. STEENERSON (interposing). You then retained Lynn as an independent post office?

Mr. ROPER. Yes, sir.

Mr. STEENERSON. If a similar discontent among the patrons of the office existed in Cambridge you would reestablish that?

Mr. ROPER. We would consider it.

Mr. STEENERSON. You would give them the same show you gave Lynn, would you not?

Mr. ROPER. We endeavor to treat all alike.

Mr. MADDEN. We have some outlying territory outside the city limits of Chicago—Argo and Mount Greenwood. You probably recall some correspondence on Mount Greenwood?

Mr. ROPER. I do.

Mr. MADDEN. The people at Mount Greenwood would be very anxious to have a station established there and have the delivery made from

the Chicago post office rather than to have a separate post office established. So far the department has not been able to give them the Chicago delivery, so they get their mail by rural delivery. The sense of the people is to the effect that they would prefer to have Chicago delivery than to have a separate post office.

Mr. ROSEN. We have a very interesting illustration at North Kansas City. North Kansas City is a community that has developed very rapidly within the last few months, because of the establishment of large mail-order business in that community, but it just happened that the population is not 1,500, and consequently we can not extend the desired facilities to that community under the present law.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further on this matter? The other matter you felt you wanted to discuss in executive session?

Mr. ROSEN. The Second Assistant is here, Mr. Chairman, with a statement in answer to certain requests made by Mr. Madden the other day, and I shall be glad to give way to him and not keep him here, if he wishes to make his statement at this time—

And so on. There is no question but that this authority is broad enough to abolish all the post offices in the United States except one in each new division, which might be one in each county, and in some cases, where the counties are small, they might abolish all the offices in two or three counties and make one central office covering them all, and make the other offices substations of the principal office.

It is the most revolutionary proposition. The committee voted it down, but now it has gone on in another legislative body as an amendment to this postal savings bill without one word of comment or debate. [Applause.]

#### LEAVE TO EXTEND REMARKS.

Mr. JOHNSON of Washington. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the RECORD, with regard to the Puget Sound customs district.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Washington asks unanimous consent to extend his remarks on the Puget Sound customs district. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

#### THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H. R. 12766) to increase the efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States. Under the rule, I do not know that it is necessary to make that motion—

The SPEAKER. The Chair thinks it is.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H. R. 12766) to increase the efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States.

The SPEAKER. The Chair selected the gentleman from Tennessee [Mr. GARRETT] to preside over this Committee of the Whole, and in his temporary absence he will appoint the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. LLOYD] to take the chair until the gentleman from Tennessee arrives.

Mr. HAY. I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. GORDON].

Mr. GORDON. Mr. Chairman, the subject of national defense is one that has received the attention of the Congress and the President of the United States perhaps more than any other one question in our history.

I desire to confine my remarks upon this bill largely to a consideration of our own means of national defense, as contrasted with Switzerland and some other nations. For information upon the technical subject of our legal establishment, as affected by the provisions of this bill, I would prefer not to be interrogated, but would request Members to direct their interrogatories to the distinguished chairman of the House Military Affairs Committee [Mr. HAY], who, I believe, knows more about the Military Establishment of the United States than any other living man.

The framers of the Federal Constitution were great men, learned in the history of free governments, and they undertook to establish upon this continent a free Republic that would endure for all time against dangers from without and dangers from within.

One of the most distinguished writers of English literature, Sir Edward Creasy, in his great work, *Fifteen Decisive Battles of the World*, in describing the battle of Marathon, in which about 20,000 free citizens of the Greek Republic successfully defended against an invasion of more than 100,000 Persians, composed almost entirely of regular soldiers, speaks of the conduct of the free Greeks in that great and historic battle in these words:

According to old national customs, the warriors of each tribe were arrayed together; neighbors thus fighting by the side of neighbors, friend by friend, and the spirit of emulation and the consciousness of responsibility excited to the very utmost.

This is the fundamental idea underlying the formation of our State militia. Every citizen of the United States between

18 and 45 is described in the statutes enacted by Congress as subject to military service, and they are enrolled by the constitutions of most of the States as members of the National Guard, thus qualifying them for the performance of the most sacred duty of the citizen of a free State and of our great Republic.

The Constitution of the United States, in providing for the national defense, confers upon Congress the power—

To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions.

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

Pursuant to that authority, the Committee on Military Affairs have sought to frame this bill to increase the efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States.

Like most subjects of general public interest, the question of national defense is now being discussed throughout this Union by many who know very little about the subject, and my observation has been that those of our citizens who know the least are the ones who talk the most. [Laughter.]

We are told in speeches and newspapers that what we need in the United States is the Swiss system; but, following the remarks of many of the gentlemen advocating the Swiss system, we are constrained to believe that they know very little about that system, because the Swiss constitution, like that of every other nation upon the continent of Europe, contains a provision authorizing compulsory military service; and because there are some well-meaning gentlemen in this country, largely Army officers, who want Congress to enact a compulsory military-service law, we hear these heated advocates of the Swiss system exhibiting their lack of knowledge of what that system provides.

The first provision of the Swiss constitution, providing for national defense, is Article XIII, which reads as follows:

The Confederation shall have no right to maintain a standing army.

That is a provision which is not contained in the Constitution of the United States, because the framers of that great instrument felt and believed that in this great Republic that prohibition was unnecessary. It is only fair to say, however, that many eminent men in that convention did advocate such a prohibition as is contained in the Swiss constitution.

Thomas Jefferson, who was then in Paris as our minister to France, advocated such a prohibition in his correspondence with James Madison, who is known in history as the father of the Constitution; and Mr. Madison himself, in that convention, said upon that subject:

As the greatest danger is that of disunion of the States, it is necessary to guard against it by sufficient powers to the common government; and, as the greatest danger to liberty is from large standing armies, it is best to prevent them by an effectual provision for a good militia.

Your committee believe, and submit for the consideration of the House, that the powers of Congress to legislate upon that subject have never been exhausted.

The constitution of Switzerland on national defense reads as follows:

#### CONSTITUTION OF SWITZERLAND.

##### ARTICLE 13.

The Confederation shall have no right to maintain a standing army. No Canton or Half Canton shall, without the permission of the Federal Government, have a standing force of more than 300 men; the armed police are not included in this number.

##### ARTICLE 18.

Every Swiss is bound to perform military service. Soldiers who lose their lives or suffer permanent injury to their health in consequence of Federal service are entitled to aid from the Confederation for themselves or their families in case of need.

Each soldier shall receive without expense his first equipment, clothing, and arms. The arms shall remain in the hands of the soldier, under conditions which shall be prescribed by Federal legislation.

The Confederation shall enact uniform provisions as to a tax for exemption from military service.

##### ARTICLE 19.

The Federal Army shall be composed: (a) Of all the cantonal military corps. (b) Of all Swiss who do not belong to such military corps but who are nevertheless liable to military service.

The Confederation exercises control over the army and the material of war provided by law.

In cases of danger the Confederation shall also have the exclusive and direct control of men not included in the Federal Army and of all other military resources of the Cantons.

The Cantons shall have authority over the military forces of their territory, so far as this right is not limited by the Federal constitution or laws.

##### ARTICLE 20.

The laws on the organization of the army shall be enacted by the Confederation. The enforcement of military laws in the Cantons shall be entrusted to the cantonal officials, within the limits which shall be fixed by Federal legislation and under the supervision of the Confederation.

Military instruction of every kind shall be under the control of the Confederation. The same applies to the equipment of the troops. The furnishing and maintenance of clothing and equipment shall be within the power of the Cantons, but the Cantons shall be credited with the expenses therefor according to a regulation to be established by Federal legislation.

## ARTICLE 21.

So far as military reasons do not prevent, corps of troops shall be formed from soldiers of the same Canton.

The composition of these bodies of troops, the maintenance of their effective strength, and the appointment and promotion of their officers shall belong to the Cantons, subject to the general regulations which shall be issued to them by the Confederation.

It will be observed by reference to article 21 that the people of Switzerland have embodied in their organic law the fundamental idea of our State militia or National Guard, except that they have more closely safeguarded the control of the Cantons—which correspond with our States—over the appointment and promotion of officers than our own Constitution restricts the powers of the States over their own militia, because immediately upon calling forth the militia, under the Constitution of the United States, for either of the purposes therein specified, the President becomes Commander in Chief, and as such is authorized to control the appointment of officers in accordance with his conception of the best interests of the efficiency of the military service, subject to such legislation as Congress may have enacted on the subject.

The constitution of my own State of Ohio declares that—

Standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and shall not be kept up, and the military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power.

Jefferson and Madison were not alone in their views upon the subject of the danger to free governments of a large standing army. I might quote from nearly every President of this Republic upon that subject, and will in the RECORD insert many observations made in official communications to the Congress by Presidents of the United States upon the question. In his sixth annual address to Congress on November 19, 1794, George Washington said:

The devising and establishing of a well-regulated militia would be a genuine source of legislative honor and a perfect title to public gratitude. I therefore entertain a hope that the present session will not pass without carrying to its full energy the power of organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and thus providing in the language of the Constitution for calling them forth to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection, and repel invasions.

And in his Farewell Address, September, 1796, the Father of his Country said:

We will avoid the necessity of those overgrown military establishments which, under any form of government, are inauspicious to liberty and which are to be regarded as particularly hostile to republican liberty.

The second President of the United States, John Adams, in a letter to Thomas McKean, June 21, 1812, said:

The danger of our Government is that the general will be a man of more popularity than the President and the Army possess more powers than Congress.

The people should be apprised of this and guard themselves against it. Nothing is more essential than to hold the civil authority decidedly superior to the military power.

In his first annual message, December 8, 1801, Jefferson said:

A statement has been formed by the Secretary of War, on mature consideration, of all the posts and stations where garrisons will be expedient and of the number of men requisite for each garrison. The whole amount is considerable short of the present Military Establishment. For the surplus no particular use can be pointed out. For defense against invasion their number is as nothing, nor is it conceived needful or safe that a standing army should be kept up in time of peace for that purpose. Uncertain as we must ever be of the particular point in our circumference where an enemy may choose to invade us the only force which can be ready at every point and competent to oppose them is the body of neighboring citizens as formed into a militia. On these, collected from the parts most convenient in numbers proportioned to the invading force, it is best to rely not only to meet the first attack but, if it threatens to be permanent, to maintain the defense until Regulars may be engaged to relieve them. These considerations render it important that we should at every season continue to amend the defects which from time to time show themselves in the laws for regulating the militia until they are sufficiently perfect. Nor should we now or at any time separate until we can say we have done everything for the militia which we could do were an enemy at our door. The provisions of military stores on hand will be laid before you that you may judge of the additions requisite (p. 317).

On December 15, 1802, in his second annual message, Jefferson said:

No change being deemed necessary in our Military Establishment, an estimate of its expenses for the ensuing year on its present footing, as also of the sums to be employed in fortifications and other objects within that department, has been prepared by the Secretary of War, and will make a part of the general estimate, which will be presented to you.

Considering that our Regular troops are employed for local purposes and that the militia is our general reliance for great and sudden emergencies, you will doubtless think this institution worthy of a review and give it those improvements of which you find it susceptible (p. 333).

In his fifth annual message, December 3, 1805, Jefferson said, after advising preparation for coast defense:

In the meantime you will consider whether it would not be expedient for a state of peace as well as of war so to organize or class the militia as would enable us on any sudden emergency to call for the services of the younger portions, unencumbered with the old, and those having families. Upwards of 300,000 (population, 5,308,483—1800) between the ages of 18 and 26 years, which the last census shows we may now count within our limits, will furnish a competent number for offense or defense in any point where they may be wanted and will give time for raising Regular forces after the necessity of them shall become certain; and the reducing to the early period of life all its active service can not but be desirable to our younger citizens of the present as well as future times, inasmuch as it engages to them in more advanced age a quiet and undisturbed repose in the bosom of their families. I can not, then, but earnestly recommend to your early consideration the expediency of so modifying our militia system as, by a separation of the more active part from that which is less so, we may draw from it when necessary an efficient corps, fit for real and active service, and to be called to it in regular rotation.

On February 25, 1808, Thomas Jefferson said in a special message to Congress:

The dangers to our country arising from the contests of other nations, and the urgency of making preparation for whatever events might affect our relations with them have been intimated in preceding messages to Congress. To secure ourselves by due precautions an augmentation of our military force, as well regular as volunteer, seems to be expedient. The precise extent of that augmentation can not yet be satisfactorily suggested, but that no time may be lost, and especially at a season deemed favorable to the object, I submit to the wisdom of the legislature whether they will authorize a commencement of this precautionary work by a present provision for raising and organizing some additional force, reserving to themselves to decide its ultimate extent on such views of our situation as I may be enabled at a future day of the session to give you. If an increase of force be now approved, I submit to their consideration the outlines of a plan proposed in the inclosed letter from the Secretary of War. I recommend also to the attention of Congress the term at which the act of Congress of April 18, 1806, concerning the militia, will expire and the effect of that expiration (p. 429).

On November 29, 1809, Madison said, in his first annual message:

I should be failing in my duty in not recommending to your serious attention the importance of giving to our militia, the great bulwark of our security and resource of our power, an organization the best adapted to eventual situations for which the United States ought to be prepared (p. 46).

On January 3, 1810, Madison said in a special message:

The act authorizing a detachment of 100,000 men from the militia will expire on the 30th of March, next. Its early revival is recommended in order that timely steps may be taken for arrangements such as the act contemplates.

I submit to the consideration of Congress, moreover, the expediency of such a classification and organization of the militia as will best insure prompt and successive aid from that source, adequate to emergencies which may call for them (p. 463).

In his second annual message, December 5, 1810, Madison said:

The improvements in quality and quantity made in the manufacture of cannon and small arms, both at the public armories and private factories, warrant additional confidence in the competency of these resources for supplying the public exigencies. These preparations for arming the militia having thus far provided for one of the objects contemplated by the power vested in Congress with respect to that great bulwark of the public safety, it is for their consideration whether further provisions are not requisite for the other contemplated objects of organization and discipline. To give to this great mass of physical and moral force the efficiency which it merits and is capable of receiving, it is indispensable that they should be instructed and practiced in the rules by which they are to be governed.

Toward the accomplishment of this important work, I recommend for the consideration of Congress the expediency of instituting a system which shall in the first instance call into the field at the public expense and for a given time certain portions of the commissioned and noncommissioned officers. The instruction and discipline thus acquired would gradually diffuse through the entire body of the militia that practical knowledge and promptitude for active service which are the great ends to be pursued. Experience has left no doubt either of the necessity or of the efficacy of competent military skill in those portions of an army in fitting it for the final duties which it may have to perform (pp. 470 and 741).

In his third annual message, November 5, 1811, Madison recited that England was making war on our lawful commerce, and recommended that the United States be put into an armor and attitude demanded by the crisis; advised—

filling the ranks and prolonging the enlistment of regular troops; for an auxiliary force to be engaged for a more limited term; for the acceptance of volunteer corps, whose patriotic ardor may court a participation in urgent services; for detachments as they may be wanted of other portions of the militia, and for such a preparation of the great body as will proportion its usefulness to its intrinsic capacities.

Nor can the occasion fail to remind you of the importance of those military seminaries which in every event will form a valuable and frugal part of our Military Establishment. The manufacture of cannon and small arms has proceeded with due success, and the stock and resources of all the necessary munitions are adequate to emergencies. It will not be inexpedient, however, for Congress to authorize an enlargement of them.

On September 20, 1814, President Madison, in his sixth annual message, described the progress of the war with England, and said:

To meet the extended and diversified warfare adopted by the enemy, great bodies of militia have been taken into service for the public

defense, and great expenses incurred. That the defense everywhere may be both more convenient and more economical Congress will see the necessity of immediate measures for filling the ranks of the Regular Army, and of enlarging the provisions for special corps, mounted and unmounted, to be engaged for longer periods of service than are due from the militia. I can earnestly renew, at the same time, a recommendation of such changes in the system of the militia as, by classing and disciplining for the most prompt and active service the portions most capable of it, will give to that great resource for the public safety all the requisite energy and safety (pp. 534, 535).

In his seventh annual message, December 5, 1815, Madison said:

Notwithstanding the security for future repose which the United States ought to find in their love of peace and their constant respect for the rights of other nations, the character of the times particularly inculcates the lesson that, whether to prevent or repel dangers, we ought not to be unprepared for it. This consideration will sufficiently recommend to Congress a liberal provision for the immediate extension and gradual completion of the works of defense, both fixed and floating, on our maritime frontier; and an adequate provision for guarding our inland frontier against dangers to which certain portions of it may continue to be exposed, and I can not press too much on the attention of Congress such a classification and organization of the militia as will most effectually render it the safeguard of a free State. If experience has shown in the recent splendid achievements of militia the value of this resource for the public defense, it has shown also the importance of that skill in the use of arms and that familiarity with the essential rules of discipline which can not be expected from the regulations now in force. With this subject is intimately connected the necessity of accommodating the laws in every respect to the great object of enabling the political authority of the Union to employ promptly and effectually the physical power of the Union in the cases designated by the Constitution (p. 551).

In his eighth annual message, December 3, 1816, Madison said:

As a subject of the highest importance to the national welfare, I must again earnestly recommend to the consideration of Congress a reorganization of the militia on a plan which will form it into classes according to the periods of life more or less adapted to military services. An efficient militia is authorized and contemplated by the Constitution, and required by the spirit and safety of free government. The present organization of our militia is universally regarded as less efficient than it ought to be made, and no organization can be better than a classification which will assign the foremost place in the defense of the country to that portion of its citizens whose activity and animation best enable them to rally to its standard. Besides the consideration that a time of peace is the time when the change can be made with most convenience and equity, it will now be aided by the experience of a recent war in which the militia bore so interesting a part (p. 561).

In his sixth annual message, December 3, 1822, Monroe said:

The Military Academy forms the basis in regard to science on which the military establishment rests. It furnishes annually, after due examination and on the report of the academic staff, many well-informed youths to fill the vacancies which occur in the several corps of the Army, while others who retire to private life carry with them such attainments as, under the right reserved to the several States to appoint the officers and to train the militia, will enable them, by affording a wider field for selection, to promote the great object of the power vested in Congress of providing for the organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia. Thus by the mutual and harmonious cooperation of the two governments in the execution of a power divided between them, an object always to be cherished, the attainment of a great result on which our liberties may depend can not fail to be secured. I have to add that in proportion as our regular force is small should the instruction and discipline of the militia, the great resource on which we rely, be pushed to the utmost extent that circumstances will admit (p. 758).

In his seventh annual message, December 2, 1823, Monroe said:

The Military Academy has attained a degree of perfection in its discipline and instruction equal, as is believed, to any institution of its kind in any country. (Described effectiveness of national armories.) The manufacture of arms at the national armories and by contract with the department has been gradually improving in quality and cheapness. It is now believed that their quality is now such as to admit of but little improvement. The completion of the fortifications renders it necessary that there should be a suitable appropriation for the purpose of fabricating the cannon and carriages necessary for those works.

I transmit a return of the militia of the several States according to the last reports which have been made by the proper officers in each to the Department of War. By reference to this return it will be seen that it is not complete, although great exertions have been made to make it so. As the defense and even the liberties of the country must depend in time of imminent danger on the militia, it is of the highest importance that it be well organized, armed, and disciplined throughout the Nation. The report of the Secretary of War shows the progress during the three first quarters of the present year by the application of the fund appropriated for arming the militia. Much difficulty is found in distributing the arms according to the act of Congress providing for it from the failure of the proper departments in many of the States to make regular returns. The act of March 12, 1820, provides that the system of tactics and regulations of the various corps of the Regular Army shall be extended to the militia. This act has been very imperfectly executed from the want of uniformity in the organization of the militia, proceeding from the defects of the system itself, and especially in its application to that main arm of the public defense. It is thought that this important subject in all its branches merits the attention of Congress.

In his second annual message, December 5, 1826, John Quincy Adams said:

Under the resolution of Congress authorizing the Secretary of War to have prepared a complete system of cavalry tactics, and a system of exercise and instruction of field artillery, for the use of the militia of the United States, to be reported to Congress at the present session,

a board of distinguished officers of the Army and of the militia has been convened, whose report will be submitted to you with that of the Secretary of War. The occasion was thought favorable for consulting the same board, aided by the results of a correspondence with the governors of the several States and Territories and other citizens of intelligence and experience upon the acknowledged defective condition of our militia system, and of the improvements of which it is susceptible. The report of the board upon this subject is also submitted for your consideration.

In his third annual message, December 4, 1827, John Quincy Adams said:

Among the subjects of deep interest to the whole Union which have heretofore been recommended to the consideration of Congress, as well by my predecessors as, under the impression of the duties devolving upon me, by myself are the formation of a more effective and uniform system for the government of the militia. (Page 458.)

On February 26, 1829, John Quincy Adams transmitted a report from the Secretary of War, with the inspection report of Bvt. Maj. Gen. Gaines for the years 1826 and 1827, relating to the organization of the Army and militia of the United States. (Pages 995 and 996.)

In his first inaugural Jackson said:

Considering standing armies as dangerous to free governments in time of peace, I shall not seek to enlarge our present establishment nor disregard that salutary lesson of political experience which teaches that the military should be held subordinate to the civil power. The gradual increase of our Navy, whose flag has displayed in distant climes our skill in navigation and our fame in arms; the preservation of our forts, arsenals, and dockyards, and the introduction of progressive improvements in the discipline and science of both branches of our military service are so plainly prescribed by prudence that I should be excused for omitting their mention sooner than for enlarging on their importance. But the bulwark of our defense is the national militia, which in the present state of our intelligence and population must render us invincible. As long as our Government is administered for the good of the people and is regulated by their will; as long as it secures to us the rights of person and of property, liberty of conscience and of the press, it will be worth defending; and so long as it is worth defending a patriotic militia will cover it with an impenetrableegis. Partial injuries and occasional mortifications we may be subject to, but a million of armed freemen, possessed of the means of war, can never be conquered by a foreign foe. To any just system, therefore, calculated to strengthen this natural safeguard of the country I shall cheerfully lend all the aid in my power.

In his fourth annual message, December 4, 1832, Andrew Jackson, after describing the defeat of the incursions of the Sac and Fox Indians, said of the militia:

Our fellow citizens upon the frontiers were ready, as they always are, in the tender of their services in the hour of danger. But a more efficient organization of our militia system is essential to that security which is one of the principal objects of all Governments. Neither our situation nor our institution require or permit the maintenance of a large regular force. History offers too many lessons of the fatal result of such a measure not to warn us against its adoption here. The expense which attends it, the obvious tendency to employ it because it exists, and thus to engage it in unnecessary wars, and its ultimate danger to public liberty will lead us, I trust, to place our principal dependence for protection upon the great body of the citizens of the Republic. If in asserting rights or in repelling wrongs wars should come upon us, our regular force should be increased to an extent proportioned to the emergency, and our present small Army is a nucleus around which such force could be formed and embodied. But for the purpose of defense under ordinary circumstances we must rely upon the electors of the country. Those by whom and for whom the Government was instituted and is supported will constitute its protection in the hour of danger as they do its check in the hour of safety. But it is obvious that the militia system is imperfect. Much time is lost, much unnecessary expense incurred, and much public property wasted under the present arrangement. Little useful knowledge is gained by the musters and drills as now established, and the whole subject evidently requires a thorough examination. Whether a plan of classification remedying these defects and providing for a system of instruction might not be adopted is submitted to the consideration of Congress. The Constitution has vested in the General Government an independent authority upon the subject of the militia which renders its action essential to the establishment or improvement of the system, and I recommend the matter to your consideration in the conviction that the state of this important arm of the public defense requires your attention (pp. 1116-1117).

In his seventh annual message, December 7, 1835, Jackson said:

Occurrences to which we as well as all other nations are liable, both in our internal and external relations, point to the necessity of an efficient organization of the militia. I am again induced by the importance of the subject to bring it to your attention. To suppress domestic violence and to repel foreign invasion, should these calamities overtake us, we must rely in the first instance upon the great body of the community, whose will has instituted and whose power must support the Government.

A large standing military force is not consonant to the spirit of our institutions nor to the feelings of our countrymen, and the lessons of former days and those also of our own times show the danger as well as the enormous expense of these permanent and extensive military organizations. That just medium which avoids an inadequate preparation on the one hand and the danger and expense of a large force on the other is what our constituents have a right to expect from their Government. This object can be attained only by the maintenance of a small military force and by such an organization of the physical strength of the country as may bring this power into operation whenever its services are required.

A classification of the population offers the most obvious means of effecting this organization. Such a division may be made as will be just to all by transferring each at a proper period of life from one class to another and by calling, first, for the services of that class, whether for instruction or action, which from age is qualified for the duty and may be called to perform it with least injury to themselves

or to the public. Should the danger ever become so imminent as to require additional force, the other classes in succession would be ready for the call. And if, in addition to this organization, voluntary associations were encouraged and inducements held out for their formation, our militia would be in a state of efficient service. Now, when we are at peace, is the proper time to digest and establish a practical system. The object is certainly worth the experience and worth the expense. No one appreciating the blessings of a republican government can object to his share of the burden which such a plan may impose. Indeed, a moderate portion of the national funds could scarcely be better applied than in carrying into effect and continuing such an arrangement and in giving the necessary elementary instruction. We are happily at peace with the world. A sincere desire to continue so and a fixed determination to give no just cause of offense to other nations, unfortunately, affords no certain grounds of expectation that this relation will be interrupted. With this determination to give no offense is associated a resolution equally decided, namely to submit to none. The armor and attitude of defense afford the best security against those collisions which the ambitions or interests or some other passion of nations not more justifiable is liable to produce. In many countries it is considered unsafe to put arms into the hands of the people and to instruct them in the elements of military knowledge; that fear can have no place here when it is recollected that the people are the sovereign power. Our Government was instituted and is supported by the ballot box, not by the musket. Whatever changes await us, still greater changes must be made in our social institutions before our political system can yield to physical force. In every aspect, therefore, in which I can view the subject I am impressed with the importance of a prompt and efficient organization of the militia. (Pp. 1389 and 1390.)

In his eighth annual message, December 5, 1836, Jackson said:

It appears from the reports of the officers charged with mustering into service the volunteers called for under the act of Congress of the last session that more presented themselves at the place of rendezvous in Tennessee than were sufficient to meet the requisition which had been made by the Secretary of War upon the governor of that State. This was occasioned by the omission of the governor to apportion the requisition to the different regiments of militia so as to obtain the proper numbers of troops and no more. It seems but just to the patriotic citizens who repaired to the general rendezvous under the circumstances, authorizing them to believe that their services were needed and would be accepted, that the expenses incurred by them while absent from their homes should be paid by the Government. I accordingly recommend that a law to this effect be passed by Congress, giving them compensation which will cover their expenses on the march to and from the place of rendezvous and while there; in connection with which it will also be proper to make provisions for such other equitable claims growing out of the service of the militia as may not be embraced in the existing laws. (P. 1474.)

In his third annual message, December 2, 1839, Van Buren said:

I can not recommend too strongly the plan submitted by the Secretary of War for the organization of the militia of the United States. Page 1754.

On January 8, 1838, Van Buren sent a special message to Congress with evidence showing the invasions of the United States by armed men from Canada, the seizure of the steamboat *Caroline*, killing of her crew and passengers, and sending her over Niagara Falls. The governors of New York and Vermont were requested to call out sufficient militia to repel the invaders.

In a special message, June 1, 1841, John Tyler said:

For the defense of our extended maritime coast our chief reliance should be placed on our Navy, aided by those inventions which are destined to recommend themselves to public adoption, but no time should be lost in placing our principal cities on the seaboard and the lakes in a state of entire security from foreign assault. Separated as we are from the countries of the Old World and in much unaffected by their policy, we are happily relieved from the necessity of maintaining large standing armies in times of peace. The policy which was adopted by Mr. Munroe, shortly after the conclusion of the late war with Great Britain of preserving a regularly organized staff sufficient for the command of a large military force, should a necessity for one arise, is founded as well in economy as in true wisdom. Provision is thus made, upon filling up the rank and file, for the introduction of a system of discipline, both promptly and efficiently. All that is required in time of peace is to maintain a sufficient number of men to guard our fortifications, to meet any sudden contingency, and to encounter the first shock of war. Our chief reliance must be placed on the militia; they constitute the great body of National Guards, and inspired by an ardent love of country, will be found ready at all times and at all seasons to repair with alacrity to its defense. It will be regarded by Congress, I doubt not, at a suitable time as one of its highest duties to attend to their complete organization and discipline. (Pp. 1901 and 1902.)

In his fourth annual message, December 5, 1848, Polk said:

One of the most important results of the war into which we were recently forced with a neighboring nation is the demonstration it has afforded of the military strength of our country. Before the War with Mexico, European and other foreign powers entertained imperfect and erroneous views of our physical strength as a nation and of our ability to prosecute war, and especially a war waged out of our own country. They saw our standing army on the peace establishment did not exceed 10,000 men. Accustomed themselves to maintain in peace large standing armies for the protection of thrones against their own subjects, as well as against foreign enemies they had not conceived that it was possible for a nation without such an army, well disciplined and of long service to wage war successfully. They held in low repute our militia and were far from regarding them as an effective force, unless it might be for temporary defensive operations when invaded on our own soil. The events of the late War with Mexico have not only undeceived them, but have removed erroneous impressions which prevailed to some extent even among a portion of our own countrymen. That war had demonstrated that upon the breaking out of hostilities not anticipated, and for which no previous preparation had been made, a volunteer army of citizen soldiers equal to veteran troops, and in

numbers equal to any emergency, can in a short period be brought into the field. Unlike what would have occurred in any other country, we were under no necessity of resorting to drafts or conscriptions. On the contrary such was the number of volunteers who patriotically tendered their services that the chief difficulty was in making selections and determining who must be disappointed and compelled to remain at home. Our citizen soldiers are unlike those drawn from the population of any other country. They are composed indiscriminately of all professions and pursuits—of farmers, lawyers, physicians, merchants, manufacturers, mechanics, and laborers, and this not only among the officers but private soldiers in the ranks.

Our citizen soldiers are unlike those of any other country in other respects. They are armed, and have been accustomed from their youth up to handle firearms, and a large proportion of them, especially in the western and more newly settled States, are expert marksmen. They are men who have a reputation to maintain at home by their good conduct in the field. They are intelligent, and there is an individuality of character which is found in the ranks of no other army. In battle each private man, as well as every officer, fights not only for his country, but for the glory and distinction among his fellow citizens when he shall return to civil life. The War with Mexico has demonstrated not only the ability of the Government to organize a numerous Army upon a sudden call, but also to provide it with all the munitions and necessary supplies with dispatch, convenience, and ease, and to direct its operations with efficiency. The strength of our institution has not only been displayed in the valor and skill of our troops engaged in active service in the field, but in the organization of those executive branches which were charged with the general direction and conduct of the war. Our noble Army in Mexico, Regulars and Volunteers, were victorious upon every battle field, however fearful the odds against them, etc. (Pp. 2481-2.)

On December 6, 1880, in his fourth annual message, R. B. Hayes said:

Attention is asked to the necessity of providing by legislation for organizing, arming, and disciplining the active militia of the country and liberal appropriations are recommended in this behalf. (P. 4570.)

On December 1, 1890, Benjamin Harrison said:

The encouragement that has been extended to the militia of the States, generally and most appropriately designated the National Guard, should be continued and enlarged. The military organizations constitute in a large sense the Army of the United States, while about five-sixths of the annual cost of their maintenance is defrayed by the States.

In his first annual message, December 4, 1893, Grover Cleveland said:

The total enrollment of the militia of the several States was, on the 31st of October of the current year, 112,597 officers and enlisted men. The officers of the Army detailed for the inspection and instruction of this reserve of our military force report that increased interest and marked progress are apparent in the discipline and efficiency of the organization. (P. 5877.)

In his second annual message, December 3, 1894, Grover Cleveland said:

The total enrollment of the militia of the several States is 117,333 officers and enlisted men, an increase of 5,343 over the number reported at the close of the previous year. The report of the militia inspectors by Regular Army officers show a marked increase in the interest and efficiency among the State organizations, and I strongly recommend a continuance of the policy of affording every practical encouragement possible to this important auxiliary of our military establishment. (P. 5968.)

In his fourth annual message, December 7, 1896, Cleveland said:

The Organized Militia numbers 112,897 men. The appropriations for its support by the several States approximate \$2,800,000 annually, and \$400,000 is contributed by the General Government. Investigation shows these troops to be unusually well drilled and inspired with much military interest, but in many instances they are so deficient in proper arms and equipment that a sudden call to active duty would find them inadequately prepared for field service. I therefore recommend that prompt measures be taken to remedy this condition and that encouragement be given to this deserving body of unpaid and volunteer citizen soldiers upon whose assistance we must largely rely in time of trouble.

During the past year rapid progress has been made toward the completion of the scheme adopted for the erection and armament of fortifications along our seacoast, while equal progress has been made in providing the material for submarine defense in connection with these works, etc. (Pp. 6159 and 6160.)

For the first time in the history of the country it is proposed in this bill to provide for the payment to the officers and men of the Organized Militia, or National Guard, a compensation sufficient to reimburse the officers for the money expended for uniforms and incidental expenses, and to the men sufficient to reimburse them for their car fare and other expenses incident to attendance upon the drill, discipline, and training prescribed. If it be contended that military service is a duty, devolving alike upon all citizens of a free country, it may well be replied that the history of the United States has shown that such a small proportion of our citizens volunteer for the performance of this public duty that it is no more than simple justice that the whole people should reimburse them for the expenses incurred in preparing themselves to adequately defend the country.

This bill was recommended to the House by the unanimous vote of the committee. It represents a consensus of the opinion of the entire membership of the committee, regardless of political affiliation, and we believe it fairly reflects the sober sentiment of the American people. We invoke the candid judg-

ment and intelligent criticism of the House upon this the most important question that demands our consideration.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, it is a source of very great gratification to the Committee on Military Affairs that it was able to report to this House a bill which has the unanimous support of the members of that committee. [Applause.] It illustrates the feeling of the country to-day—that on a question of this character all American citizens should stand together. [Applause.] And that in endeavoring to present to this House a military policy for the country, that all men should be actuated by a desire to do what is best for all of us, and that no party lines should enter into the discussion of a question which is so close to the interests of our people. [Applause.]

Mr. Chairman, the bill which this committee has presented to the House for its approval is one which is made up of several component parts. It is a general preparedness bill. It deals with the Regular Army; it deals with the militia; it deals with the mobilization and utilization of the industrial forces of the country in time of war. It deals with a plan of providing the necessary officers which this country may need in time of war, and it undertakes, in a comprehensive way, to meet all of the different views which have been promulgated by those who are in favor of national defense. It also undertakes to deal with it from a reasonable standpoint, and we believe that we are presenting a bill which does not go to either extreme.

It perhaps will meet with opposition from those who are opposed to any addition to the present defense of the country, and it will perhaps meet with the opposition of those who think that we have not gone far enough in providing for a larger standing army. If that is the case, it would indicate that those who presented the bill have done so in a sane and safe way, not going to the extreme on either side. The House must remember that we have in this country a volunteer system, and in preparing this bill we had to deal with the conditions of this country and not with the conditions in other countries where the compulsory military system prevails.

It has been stated by a great many people that we ought to have a standing army of 250,000 men in time of peace. Gentlemen who advocate that plan do not stop to consider how we are going to get that many men to enlist in the Army in time of peace. The Adjutant General of the Army, in his statement before our committee, stated that it would be impossible under the volunteer system to keep an army at more than 140,000, and 140,000 is the number which the committee has presented in this bill for the line of the Army. Therefore we have gone as far as we can go toward having a standing army which will be efficient in time of peace and around which we can build up a larger army, if necessary, in time of war.

To have an army of 250,000 men would mean compulsory military service, which I do not believe the people of this country desire. I do not believe they would uphold any Member in this House in voting for a compulsory military system as obtains in countries in continental Europe. [Applause.] Therefore the other alternative is, and it was very frankly stated by officers of the War College, that in order to obtain an army of 250,000 men it would be necessary to double the pay of the present Army and pay the private soldiers \$30 a month. They admitted that they would have to go into the market and compete with the employers of labor, and in order to get men in the Army they must pay more than they are paying now. In other words, an army of 250,000 men in this country under the volunteer system will cost the country not less than \$500,000,000 a year if the pay is doubled; not for one year but for every year, and I do not believe that the people of this country or the Members of this House are ready to settle in time of peace upon the people of this country an expenditure annually of \$500,000,000 to maintain a force of men, a very large number of whom could not be used in time of peace, and who would be idle and drawing money from the Treasury without returning any service for it.

Of course, if we had a war with any country, this Congress and the people would be ready to vote any amount of money in order that the American people should preserve their liberties. [Applause.] But, gentlemen, we are speaking now of a peace proposition and not of a war proposition. This is a military policy which we are laying down for a time of peace and not for war. It is a preparedness proposition, which is to be the military policy of the country, and which, if war comes, will meet the situation.

The first part of this bill deals with the Regular Army. It adds 10 regiments of Infantry to the present number of regi-

ments of Infantry that we now have. We now have 30, and 10 more will make 40 regiments of Infantry. It adds 6 regiments of Artillery. We now have 6, and this addition will make 12 regiments of Field Artillery. We add 52 companies of Coast Artillery, an addition of about 6,000 enlisted men to that arm of the service. We add 15 companies of Engineers and 4 aero squadrons. That is in effect what we do to the Regular Army, and we provide that the strength of the line of the Army shall be 140,000 men. That means fighting men. It does not include the Quartermaster's Corps nor the Hospital Corps nor the Philippine Scouts. So that we are really providing for 168,000 enlisted men. But the Philippine Scouts, of course, are not a part of the defense of this country. The Quartermaster's Corps are not men who go into war; nor are the Hospital Corps men. They are what is known as noncombatants.

That is, in brief, what we do for the Regular Army. We increase the number of officers by 786 for the purpose of having them detailed to military colleges and schools of the country and for duty with the National Guard. We increase the officers in the Quartermaster's Corps and in the Ordnance Corps, two corps which have much to do with making efficient the fighting force of the country. We increase the Medical Corps of the Army by 251 officers, and the committee on yesterday evening voted to increase it still further by providing 7 medical men for every 1,000 enlisted men.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. Certainly.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. I notice there is no increase in the officers of the Signal Corps. Was there any special reason for that?

Mr. HAY. There is no increase in the officers of the Signal Corps proper, but there is an increase of 76 officers in the aviation section of the Signal Corps.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. In the Signal Corps proper, was there some special reason for not increasing the officers?

Mr. HAY. The committee did not think it had sufficient reasons given to it for increasing the officers of the Signal Corps.

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. Certainly.

Mr. ANDERSON. As I understand the bill, it repeals the section which authorizes the present Medical Reserve Corps, and I would like to ask the gentleman what takes the place of that corps?

Mr. HAY. It repeals that particular section of the law providing for the Medical Reserve Corps, but it provides for an officers' reserve corps, into which medical men will volunteer, just as they do now in the Medical Reserve Corps, and it gives them a better opportunity because, under the present law they could only have the rank of first lieutenant, while under the provisions of this bill they can get as high as the rank of major, so that the Surgeon General of the Army preferred the provisions in this bill to the provisions in the law that now provides for a Medical Reserve Corps.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. KAHN. The gentleman spoke of a total enlisted strength of 140,000 men in time of peace.

Mr. HAY. In the line of the Army.

Mr. KAHN. In the line of the Army. Under this bill, in case of the imminence of war, that force can be materially strengthened by action of the President, without any action of Congress.

Mr. HAY. When war is imminent, or in time of war, it can be increased to 207,000 men.

Mr. HAMILTON of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman state how, in that connection?

Mr. HAY. By filling up the organizations. I may say that the organizations of the Army are skeletonized; that is, instead of having full strength they are reduced to about one-half. Take an Infantry regiment, for example. A skeleton Infantry regiment is about 900 men under this bill and a full Infantry regiment would be 1,930 men, so that by increasing the organizations in the Infantry and Field Artillery and in the Cavalry and so on throughout the service there would be 207,000 men that could be added to the 140,000 in the event of war.

Mr. DILL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. DILL. The gentleman stated there was an increase of 52 companies in the Coast Artillery?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. DILL. Will that be sufficient?

Mr. HAY. That is what was asked for by the War Department.

Mr. STAFFORD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. STAFFORD. The gentleman stated this bill would increase the number of officers by 786, in order to provide instruction to the National Guard and the schools throughout the country, and that they are to be detailed from those in the active list?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. STAFFORD. Why did not the committee compel the detail of those upon the retired list, many of whom are young and able and competent for that character of service?

Mr. HAY. Mr. Chairman, the committee had that question before it. Under the law as it is now officers on the retired list can not be ordered to duty except with their own consent, and the committee did not feel that it could frame a provision which would eliminate the possibility of having men on the retired list detailed for duty who possibly might not be fit for it; and we thought, moreover, that the active officer is much more efficient and much better fitted to perform these duties than the retired officer, and therefore we did not put in the bill any provision compelling retired officers to perform this duty.

Mr. FESS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. FESS. Does this contemplate an increase simply on the continent or will part of them be detailed to the insular possessions?

Mr. HAY. A part of this force will, of course, be in the insular possessions. There are now 29,300 men in the Philippines, in Panama, and in Hawaii, and if this bill passes it is proposed to put a still larger number of men in those insular possessions. If this bill passes and becomes a law at the strength of 140,000, there will be at all times in the United States about 60,000 men. The balance of them will be in the insular possessions. Of course, the gentleman will understand that at no time since the act of 1901 was passed, providing for an enlisted strength of 100,000 men, have we had 100,000 enlisted men in the Army. The President fixes by Executive order every year the number of enlisted men that he thinks the country requires, and up to the present time he never has gone to the extent which the law allows him to go, because he did not think more men than he fixed were necessary to perform the duties of the Army in time of peace. On February 25 there were 86,628 men in the fighting strength of the Army, plus 5,900 and odd Philippine Scouts, which are not counted really as a part of the strength of the Army, and if this is fixed at 140,000 it is not likely that at any time there will be that many men in the service, because there will be no use for them in time of peace.

Mr. SMITH of Texas. Mr. Chairman, I hear the statement frequently made that the reason that the strength of the Army has never been increased to 100,000 is because enough volunteers could not be secured. I would like to ask the gentleman if that is true? Whether because of that a greater number has not been fixed by the President?

Mr. HAY. Well, that may have had something to do with it; but the ability to get volunteers for the Army depends very much upon conditions in the country. When conditions are prosperous in the country it is very difficult to get men for the Army. When conditions are not prosperous they do not have the same trouble.

Now, I understand that last month recruiting slumped very much, and recruiting officers have found it difficult for the last month to obtain recruits for the Army, and The Adjutant General, as I stated a moment ago, stated that the best he could possibly obtain under the working of the volunteer system was 140,000 men, as large an army as could be kept full. Some gentlemen believe we ought to have a short enlistment—

Mr. HUDDLESTON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. I will.

Mr. HUDDLESTON. I want to ask the gentleman what is the average cost of recruiting a man in the Regular Army?

Mr. HAY. I think the average cost of recruiting a man is about \$180. That is the cost of recruiting, not pay.

Mr. SLOAN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska.

Mr. SLOAN. What, if any, inducement does the bill carry for the stimulation of enlistment—increased compensation or anything of that kind?

Mr. HAY. It does not carry any increased compensation. The pay of the Army now is larger than that of any other country in the world, twice as much; and, of course, the pay of the Army is the main item in the Army appropriation bill. The appropriation bill last year carried \$101,000,000 and \$49,800,000

of that was for pay alone, so you can see that the pay is really a very important part of the appropriation bill and that if we raise the pay of the Army we are running into a very great expense.

Mr. SLOAN. What does he get now per month?

Mr. HAY. A private is paid \$15 per month; a corporal and sergeant and first sergeant and quartermaster sergeant get more, of course.

Mr. HELM. Within comparatively recent years the compensation of the private soldier was increased from \$13 and something to \$15 with a view of stimulating enlistment.

Mr. HAY. Yes, sir.

Mr. HELM. What effect has that had?

Mr. HAY. Well, I presume it has had some effect, of course. That is in the act of 1908, which increased the pay of the Army.

Mr. BENNET. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. BENNET. In time of peace what is the pay of a private soldier in an army like the Italian, the Russian, the French, the German, or British Army?

Mr. HAY. I have not those figures exactly, but they can be obtained; but I understand that in the German Army they pay enlisted men 2 cents a day, and that is about the price that is paid throughout continental Europe, where they have in all those countries compulsory military service.

Mr. BENNET. That is the information I had six or seven years ago and I wanted to know if there had been any change.

Mr. HAY. There has been no change.

Mr. BENNET. So people who criticize the apparently great cost of our Army in time of peace apparently fail to take into account the fact that we pay \$15 a month, whereas the German Government, for instance, pays 60 cents a month?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman state how these 86,500 soldiers are distributed, approximately?

Mr. HAY. I will try to do it, sir.

Mr. HILL. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. I will answer the gentleman from Michigan first. There are now stationed at the Panama Canal Zone 7,300 men; in the Philippine Islands there are now 13,000; in Hawaii there are 9,000, about 800 in Porto Rico, about 800 in China, and 800 in Alaska, and the balance are in the United States. I now yield to the gentleman from Connecticut.

Mr. HILL. Some weeks ago I had occasion to look up the figures on precisely the basis given by Mr. BENNET, of New York, and if the gentleman from Virginia desires I will give him those figures relating to the pay in the various nations.

Mr. HAY. I will be glad for the gentleman to do so.

Mr. HILL. This is computed on the basis of 300 days in the year, not 365 days. The United States pays 60 cents a day, Germany 12½ cents, Great Britain 30 cents, France 6½ cents—remember, this is prior to existing war, in the year 1913—Italy pays 23½ cents, Russia 1½ cents, Austria 2½ cents and Japan 2½ cents. This was the condition prior to the existing war.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. I know the chairman quoted from memory the cost of the enlisted man. I have here the testimony of Gen. McCain before the committee and he testified that the entire cost per man was \$87 last year. This includes all overhead charges, and he goes on further to say that the charge for the actual enlistment of the man would cost about \$19.

Mr. DILLON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. I will yield.

Mr. DILLON. What are these soldiers in China doing? For what purpose are they there?

Mr. HAY. The soldiers in China are a part of the force kept there by England, Germany, France, and, perhaps, Italy for the purpose of protecting the embassies of those nations.

Mr. DILLON. How many of them are there?

Mr. HAY. About 800.

Mr. HUDDLESTON. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. I will.

Mr. HUDDLESTON. May I ask the gentleman to state a little more fully what this cost of recruiting includes? Does it include equipment or anything of that kind?

Mr. HAY. Oh, no; it does not include that. It only includes cost—

Mr. HUDDLESTON. Of maintaining the recruiting stations and getting the men to sign up?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. BYRNES of South Carolina. May I ask the gentleman: When the two companies in the Coast Artillery Service provided for in this bill are furnished, what percentage of the guns of our fortifications will then be manned?

Mr. HAY. I can only state to the gentleman this—that the Committee on Military Affairs does not deal with guns in the coast defense. That is a question which is in the jurisdiction of the Committee on Appropriations and all we have is the private personnel. Now, in 1907, when the Coast Artillery Corps was formed, there were provided for that corps 19,000 men, which it was then stated would be sufficient to man our coast defenses.

Since that time they have sent out from this country, and away from our coast defenses, to Panama and Hawaii and the Philippines, about 52 companies of Coast Artillery, and they are asking us now to add these 52 companies of Coast Artillery to take the place of those which were sent out of the country to man the fortifications in the insular possessions.

Mr. BYRNES of South Carolina. Does the gentleman recall whether or not, if the 52 companies were provided, we would still be 800 men short of the force originally intended to man the defenses of this country, as was testified before the committee?

Mr. HAY. I do not recall that distinctly, but if we are only 800 men short we are pretty well up to what we ought to have.

Mr. BYRNES of South Carolina. Will the gentleman tell me this? He stated that 52 companies were the number of men asked for by the War Department. Have you any information as to the recommendation of the War College?

Mr. HAY. I have information as to the recommendation of the War College.

Mr. BYRNES of South Carolina. What was the recommendation?

Mr. HAY. They recommended a standing army of 281,000 men, and for the Coast Artillery they recommended something like 60,000 men. I am not sure of the exact number, but it was something like that.

Mr. SANFORD. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. I will.

Mr. SANFORD. I want to understand the chairman's position. The gentleman who preceded you stated that we have had a law in this country ever since it was organized, which placed universal obligation of service on all men between 18 and 45 years of age in case of war. Is that correct?

Mr. HAY. I think that is correct.

Mr. SANFORD. Of course, there is a universal obligation of citizens to serve in time of war. So that the difference between this country and all other countries in the world to-day is with reference to the obligations to train and not serve, is it not?

Mr. HAY. That may be. But I can not yield to the gentleman for a speech.

Mr. SANFORD. I just wanted to ask you what the difference was. You have compared here the difference in the pay. Now, foreign countries do not pay their soldiers, do they?

Mr. HAY. They do not.

Mr. SANFORD. They compel them to learn to be soldiers?

Mr. HAY. But you can not train the entire population of this country of military age except by passing some law which will put them into training. You have to have some legislation for that purpose.

Mr. SANFORD. I am not antagonistic. But when you spoke everyone applauded when you said that we would never stand for universal compulsory service. We have always stood for it, and we have it.

Mr. HAY. We have it if we choose to put it into effect.

Mr. SANFORD. We always have had it in every war.

Mr. HAY. We did not have it in the Mexican War and we did not have it in the War of 1812 and we did not have it in the Spanish War, but we did have it in the Civil War.

Mr. FIELDS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. FIELDS. The country has never exercised universal compulsory service?

Mr. HAY. Of course not. Congress has the power to compel every man of military age in the country to render military service, but Congress has never seen fit to exercise that power; and I do not believe that Congress will see fit to exercise it now.

Mr. SANFORD. Did we not exercise it in the Civil War?

Mr. HAY. Yes; but I am talking about in time of peace and not in time of war. I will state to the gentleman that I have an amendment, which is not a committee amendment, to propose, that the President be given power in time of war to draft every man between the age of 18 and 45 in this country, and I hope that the House will vote for that amendment.

Mr. SANFORD. That is compulsory service; that is all.

Mr. HOWARD. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. I will.

Mr. HOWARD. I wanted to ask the chairman of the committee if he could give the House, after his long service on the Military Affairs Committee, in view of the fact that we have just increased the organization of the Regular Army, what, in his opinion, is the cause for the reluctance, in view of the pay that the privates get in this country as compared with other countries, on the part of the young men in the United States to enlist in the Regular Establishment?

Mr. HAY. I can only say to the gentleman that in prosperous times men can get great deal better jobs on the outside than they can by going into the Army, and for the last 10 or 15 years the War Department has been very rigid in its requirements from a recruit. It is the popular idea that the Army is a refuge for criminals and all kinds of bad characters. That is not true. The fact of the business is that a man who offers himself as a recruit for the Army has to show good moral character, physical fitness, and altogether prove himself to be worthy of being a soldier of the United States. And the Army to-day is composed of as fine material as to young men as you will find anywhere. [Applause.]

Mr. HOWARD. I would like to ask the gentleman one other question: Do you not think that a great deal of this reluctance on the part of young men to enlist in the Army is the indefiniteness of where they are to be located? That is to say, the monotony of being sent miles and miles away from home to do garrison duty at some post where they have no ties of any sort? And is not that responsible, in your judgment, for a good many of the desertions that occur in the Regular Army?

Mr. HAY. That may be. But a man, in joining an army, has to submit himself to orders. He can not join the Army and say, I want to go to this place or that place or the other place. It would be impossible to build up an army upon that idea, because you never know when you will need a man or where you will need him. When he joins the Army he joins it with the idea that he must be subject to the orders of his superiors and go wherever they choose to send him; and that may deter some young men from joining the Army.

Mr. HENSLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. HENSLEY. I notice that you are adding 786 officers for the purpose of providing training for militia and students in colleges. Has the gentleman any information as to how many institutions of learning are now supplied with military men for instruction purposes?

Mr. HAY. Yes. About 100 schools and colleges are now supplied.

Mr. HENSLEY. This is in addition to that?

Mr. HAY. Yes; but we have a large number of organizations in the National Guard. We have, for instance, in the National Guard 64 regiments of Infantry alone—I think it is—and we want to provide, out of these 786 officers, officers for the instruction of the National Guard as well as for the schools and colleges.

Mr. HENSLEY. Then, I understand that there are 100 institutions that are now provided with officers detailed for instruction?

Mr. HAY. Yes; either active or retired officers.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield there?

Mr. HAY. Certainly.

Mr. KAHN. I wish to call my colleague's attention to the fact that there are institutions having 2,500 members in the cadet corps that have only one officer, and this bill will allow one officer to every 400 men?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. BUTLER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman permit a question?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. BUTLER. Where do you contemplate finding these officers? What are the means you intend to employ to get all these extra officers? It has been a matter of great concern to us in the Committee on Naval Affairs to provide officers sufficient for the service.

Mr. HAY. Of course all the vacancies will be in the rank of second lieutenant, which is the lowest rank. They will be filled up from the bottom.

Mr. BUTLER. Will they be appointed from civil life?

Mr. HAY. From West Point and from officers of the National Guard, graduates from the military schools and colleges, from enlisted men of the Army, and from civil life. We think we can get the extra officers without much trouble.

Mr. FESS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. FESS. The chairman spoke about military schools. Would that include a State university that has a military department?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. FESS. Let me ask the gentleman this question: Is the idea of a soldier doing constructive work entirely irreconcilable with a standing army?

Mr. HAY. The gentleman means in time of peace, building roads?

Mr. FESS. Yes.

Mr. HAY. I do not think it would be possible to get men in the Army to build roads.

Mr. FESS. Even if you paid higher wages?

Mr. HAY. I do not think even then you could do so.

Mr. FESS. Those two ideas are irreconcilable?

Mr. HAY. Yes, sir.

Mr. GUERNSEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman permit a question?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. GUERNSEY. If I understand the provisions of this bill correctly, when war is imminent the President can increase the Army by 207,000 men. Is that in addition to the present strength?

Mr. HAY. No.

Mr. GUERNSEY. What provision is there in this bill that would encourage enlistment up to 207,000 men?

Mr. HAY. The gentleman means in time of war?

Mr. GUERNSEY. Yes.

Mr. HAY. In time of war it is always easier to get men to enlist in the Army than in time of peace. There is a very large number of young men in the country who in time of war volunteer, and are anxious to volunteer, but who do not want to go in the Army in time of peace. I do not think there would be any trouble in getting the men.

Mr. BRITTEN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. Certainly.

Mr. BRITTEN. Would there be any difference in the status of officers in the line between those taken from citizens and those who were graduated from West Point?

Mr. HAY. None at all. When a man is second lieutenant it does not make any difference where he comes from, whether from West Point or from civil life, after he gets in.

Mr. BRITTEN. He could go right up the line?

Mr. HAY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SMITH of Idaho. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. With pleasure.

Mr. SMITH of Idaho. Do you contemplate giving any preference, in providing for these additional officers, to officers who served in the Volunteer Army during the Philippine insurrection?

Mr. HAY. It is not so contemplated. The age limit for a second lieutenant is from 21 to 27 years, and those men who served in the Philippine insurrection are beyond that age, and we did not think it would be wise to raise the age limit in order to get a few people in who could not have time to render the service as long as it ought to be, and who besides would be second lieutenants at the age of 40 or 45 or 50, and be commanded by young men of 25 or 30 or 35 years of age.

Mr. OLIVER. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. OLIVER. The gentleman spoke of recruiting officers from graduates of West Point and from the State militia and from graduates from military schools. Is not the preference given to those sources in the bill?

Mr. HAY. Yes, sir.

Mr. OLIVER. Will the gentleman state briefly just what that is?

Mr. HAY. If the gentleman will look in the bill he will find it there. I have so little time that I can not go into it in detail now, but if the gentleman will look at page 29 of the bill, beginning with line 3, he will find it there.

Mr. DILL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to a question?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. DILL. This bill provides for 786 officers to be used in colleges and other places for training cadets. Is there provision whereby the War Department will keep in touch as to the names and addresses of young men who are trained in those institutions?

Mr. HAY. Yes. There is a provision for that.

Mr. DILL. That is being done at the present time?

Mr. HAY. Yes; it is. The War Department has now a list, and keeps a list of all graduates of military schools and colleges.

Mr. DILL. And ordinary State institutions and State colleges?

Mr. HAY. Yes; every military school.

Mr. LINTHICUM. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. LINTHICUM. I notice, on page 81, a captain is allowed \$500 a year, and when it comes to the medical officer he is limited to not to exceed one-half of that.

Mr. HAY. I will explain that later. Some medical officers get \$500 if in command of field hospitals.

Mr. LINTHICUM. But other medical officers have a great deal of office work—

Mr. HAY. They are officers of the National Guard. They do not do very much in that way.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. HAY] be permitted to complete his statement without interruption.

Mr. HAY. I am very glad to be interrupted, because I believe in that way I can serve the House better than by making a set speech.

Mr. BUTLER. That is what you are doing now. [Applause.]

Mr. BARKLEY. I thought I would be helping the gentleman by making the request.

Mr. HAY. I am very much obliged to the gentleman from Kentucky, but I am glad to be interrupted. I am anxious to give all the information I have.

Mr. KINKAID. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska.

Mr. KINKAID. Does this bill increase or decrease the proportion of officers to the number of privates?

Mr. HAY. It increases them very largely.

Mr. KINKAID. Is it contemplated that that is for the purpose of using more officers than the present law provides for, or is it in order to have a reserve, on account of the possible greater mortality of officers than of privates under the new mode of trench warfare?

Mr. HAY. I will say to the gentleman that that was done for both purposes. It was done for the purpose of having officers enough to train the young men in these military schools and colleges and to be detailed for duty with the National Guard and to have as many officers as we could possibly carry for the purpose of using them in time of war. And I will say to the gentleman on this subject of officers, about which we have heard so much, that this bill provides for 7,450 officers. There are in the National Guard to-day about 9,000 officers. There are in the country to-day not less than 10,000 graduates of military schools who are fit to become officers. So that if we should ever have any trouble we should certainly have quite a good nucleus to whom we could look for our officers, and I do not think there is as much danger of our not getting officers as some people seem to think. What we are providing for in this bill in connection with the National Guard and the schools will give us officers every year upon whom we can call if the necessity arises, which I hope never will.

Mr. KINKAID. I heartily agree with the idea of having a good reserve, but I want to ask a further question. Are not a good many military men of the opinion that fewer officers are required in proportion to the number of privates than the law now provides?

Mr. HAY. I do not exactly understand the gentleman's question.

Mr. KINKAID. Is it not the opinion of a good many experienced military men that fewer officers are really needed than the law now provides, in proportion to the number of privates to be controlled by them?

Mr. HAY. I will say to the gentleman from Nebraska that I have never yet seen a military man who thought there were fewer officers needed than had been provided in this or any other bill. The trouble the committee has had has been that the officers have all the time wanted more officers. They always want more. I do not say that by way of criticizing these gentlemen, because the more officers there are the more promotions there will be and the more money they get, and they are human like the rest of us.

Mr. KINCHELOE. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. KINCHELOE. How many members are there now in the regular enlisted State guards of this country?

Mr. HAY. There are now of enlisted men about 120,000.

Mr. KINCHELOE. In the State guards?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. BRITTEN. Does this bill provide an age limit at which lieutenants of the second grade are taken into the service?

Mr. HAY. This bill does not provide it, but the law provides that they shall be from 21 to 27 years of age.

Mr. BRITTEN. Not under 21?

Mr. HAY. Not under 21.

Mr. CANDLER of Mississippi. The gentleman a moment ago started to discuss the question of the term of enlistment, but was carried away from that subject by other questions.

Mr. HAY. I propose to discuss that as soon as I can get the opportunity.

Mr. CANDLER of Mississippi. What is the present term of enlistment?

Mr. HAY. The present term of enlistment is four years with the colors and three years in the reserves. This bill provides three years with the colors and four years in the reserves.

Mr. BRITTEN. The committee, then, were of opinion that the shorter term of enlistment would probably secure more soldiers?

Mr. HAY. That is the opinion of the committee, generally speaking. That is not my opinion, however.

Mr. PLATT. Will the gentleman explain section 79, which refers to West Point?

Mr. HAY. Section 79 provides that the number of cadets at West Point shall be doubled, and that each Member of the House and each Member of the Senate shall have one more appointment than at present. That is to be provided for in such a way as the President may determine. If they were all appointed at once, there is no room at West Point to receive them all, and we have to put up some buildings there before we can do it.

Mr. BRUMBAUGH. Can the gentleman tell us about what per cent of the graduates of West Point and other military schools stay with the Army after graduation during their lives and what per cent go into business?

Mr. HAY. So far as West Point is concerned, possibly 95 per cent remain in the Army. The graduates of other military schools and colleges do not go into the Army at all unless they are appointed from civil life, and therefore I have no means of knowing about that?

Mr. BRUMBAUGH. Another question. What claim has the Government upon the graduates of West Point and other military schools?

Mr. HAY. The Government has no claim on the graduates of any other school than West Point.

Mr. BRUMBAUGH. What power has the Government to call back into the service West Point graduates, in whose education the Government has spent considerable money? If they resign and go into business, can the Government call them back?

Mr. HAY. If they resign and leave the Army, the Government has no more control over them than it has over anybody else.

Mr. FOCHT. Mr. Chairman, in Pennsylvania State College, where the attendance is 2,800, they now have one full regiment, officered by an assigned officer of the United States Army. They desire to recruit two full regiments. How many officers will be assigned in that case?

Mr. HAY. How many will there be in the two full regiments?

Mr. FOCHT. I should judge a thousand in each regiment.

Mr. HAY. Then you would have four United States Army officers under this bill.

Mr. SLEMP. The gentleman says that the Regular Army has 83,000 men.

Mr. HAY. They had on February 26, 86,000.

Mr. SLEMP. That does not include the 20,000 that has been provided for.

Mr. HAY. No; not as yet.

Mr. SLEMP. So that, with the 20,000 and the number provided for here in this bill, makes 160,000.

Mr. HAY. No; the resolution that we passed only permits the organization to be recruited up to their full strength.

Mr. REAVIS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. Certainly.

Mr. REAVIS. The gentleman spoke of a provision of the bill making the terms of enlistment three years in the colors and four years in the reserve; are members of the Regular Army in the reserve under salary?

Mr. HAY. No; they are not paid.

Mr. REAVIS. They go back into civil life?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. REAVIS. Has the Government authority under law to call the men back to the colors while they remain in the reserve?

Mr. HAY. If they need them in time of war.

Mr. REAVIS. They occupy a different relation to the Government, then, than ordinary citizens during the four years?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. RAGSDALE. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. Certainly.

Mr. RAGSDALE. On page 68, section 61 provides that officers, now employees of the Government in the District of Columbia who are members of the National Guard, shall be entitled to leave of absence from their respective duties without loss of pay, time, or efficiency in rating on all days engaged in field training under the provisions of this act. As I understand

it, they not only get a salary in Washington, they not only get the time they are entitled to by sick leave and leave of absence, but they get this time and pay for any training while in camp.

Mr. HAY. That is true.

Mr. RAGSDALE. Without regard to the period of time they remain in camp. In other words, if under a certain condition of affairs the President of the United States saw fit to order them into camp for six months, during all that time they would draw their salary in the District and their pay in camp.

Mr. HAY. I hardly think that is a fair statement, because the bill provides for 15 days of training.

Mr. RAGSDALE. It requires that, but it permits as much time as the President might see fit to order.

Mr. HAY. He could do it, but I do not think the President would. However, this is a very small detail, and I have quite a number of other matters to consider.

Mr. RAGSDALE. But this might amount to a great deal.

Mr. HAY. Very few people in the Government departments are in the National Guard.

Mr. RAGSDALE. They could all enter the National Guard, could they not?

Mr. HAY. They could, but they are not apt to. But it was thought that if these men in the Government employ were patriotic enough to go into this organization, that they ought not to be penalized if they were called out for training. [Applause.]

Mr. Chairman, I started to speak of the term of enlistment. I said some gentlemen believe in a short enlistment, in a two-year enlistment. I do not believe that you can maintain the efficiency of the Army with a two-year enlistment, because the average service of men in the Army would only be about one year, and if the Army was called upon in an emergency you would have an Army composed of half-baked recruits, men who had only been in the Army one year, and we all know that during the present war in Europe it has taken England one year to train a soldier sufficiently to justify her in sending him to the field. That is one reason why I do not believe that the enlistment period should be reduced below that of three years.

Another reason is that if you have a man trained for a soldier in two years he is just beginning to render service for the money which you have paid him. Another reason is that if you have two years' enlistment it will be that much more difficult to keep the Army full, because instead of getting them one-third, you would have one-half every year. If you had an army of 140,000 men you would have to have 70,000 recruited every year. Another reason which perhaps does not weigh with us much now is that it costs a great deal more to have a short enlistment than to have a long one.

Mr. BRITTEN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. BRITTEN. How does the gentleman conclude that with a two years' enlistment you would only get one year's service?

Mr. HAY. Because in the course of two years one-half would go out, and that would leave in the Army men who had only been in one year, and you would be taking in men who had no service at all.

Mr. BRITTEN. But the man who enlists would stay in two years?

Mr. HAY. Yes; he gets two years' service; but in the Army generally you would have men who had had but one year's service. Now, more than that, if you have a short-term enlistment you are going to find it extremely difficult to get men to enlist. Those who advocate the short-term enlistment insist there shall be no reenlistments. If there is no reenlistment you can not get men in the Army, because there will be no future for them. The backbone of the Army to-day is the non-commissioned officer, who is an enlistment man, and if a man only goes in for two years and is not allowed to reenlist, there will be no inducement whatever for a man to go into the Army.

I think I have said enough and answered questions enough with regard to the Regular Army, and I want to say a word about the National Guard.

Mr. FESS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. FESS. Before the gentleman goes on, is the Aviation Service in this bill the only Aviation Service we have, or does the Navy Department have an Aviation Service?

Mr. HAY. The Navy Department has an Aviation Service.

Mr. FESS. How much do we have in the Army?

Mr. HAY. We provide in this bill for 133 officers and 720 enlisted men.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, before the gentleman leaves the Regular Army, I hope he will explain to the House that the increase is in four increments.

Mr. HAY. Yes; in four annual increments. By that we get one-fourth each year for four years, and that applies to the officers, except these 786 officers whom we want to get at once, because we want to use them in training at once. It has been stated by some people that it is impossible for Congress to federalize the National Guard or to federalize what is known as the Organized Militia. It is true that not for many years, since the beginning of the Government almost, has any attempt been made to really federalize the National Guard. Congress has never undertaken to exercise the powers which are conferred upon it in the Constitution, and therefore gentlemen have assumed that Congress could not do what it has not chosen to do. It is not denied that the Constitution provides for the organization for the militia and for the disciplining and training for the National Guard or the Organized Militia in accordance with the discipline prescribed by Congress. If Congress has those powers, Congress can exercise them.

The Constitution never contemplated conferring upon Congress a power which Congress could not exercise, and, therefore, in this bill this committee has undertaken to exercise the powers which the Constitution has conferred upon Congress, and we believe we have federalized the militia in such a way as to bring it under the control of the President and of the War Department so that it will be trained in time of peace in such a way as to be fit for service in time of war. We provide that it shall go into the service of the United States immediately upon a declaration of war or when war is imminent, and that it can be mobilized at once without the delays and without the confusion which took place at the time of the Spanish War. I have not time to go into the details, but I would be very glad to answer any question upon any section of this bill dealing with the National Guard, because I believe I can convince any fair-minded man that there is not a section in this bill which is not constitutional, and which will not stand the test of the court. For myself, I do not believe that there will ever be any question raised as to the constitutionality of it, but if it were raised, these provisions in this bill will stand the test in my judgment; will be declared constitutional by the Supreme Court of the country. We have a provision in the bill for a mobilization of industries in time of war.

Mr. STEENERSON. Mr. Chairman, before the gentleman leaves the militia, is it the opinion of the committee that when the militia is called forth under this proposed law into the service of the United States, the United States will then have the same authority over it as it has over the Regular Army, so far as any expedition beyond the boundaries of the country is concerned?

Mr. HAY. This bill provides that in time of war or when war is imminent the President shall draft into the service of the United States the National Guard and when they come into the service of the United States they cease to be militia and become United States troops. In other words, they become a part of the Army of the United States, and the President can send them from Dan to Bersheba, if he wants to.

Mr. STEENERSON. He can send them anywhere that he can send the Regular Army?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. FESS. The right to appoint the officers is still reserved in the State?

Mr. HAY. Yes; but we provide that they shall qualify themselves by an examination which shall be determined by the Secretary of War.

Mr. FESS. Then they are not volunteers—the governors of the States are not called upon?

Mr. HAY. No; Congress has the right to confer upon the President the power to draft anybody, and this bill confers upon him the right to draft the members of the National Guard, and provides that when they are so drafted they shall cease to be militia.

Mr. FESS. Then he does not call for them through the governor at all?

Mr. HAY. Not at all. He calls them through his own orders.

Mr. SIMS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. SIMS. That is the very subject that I desire to ask about. If the State of Tennessee or the State of Virginia sends a regiment of National Guard upon the call of the President, the officers have already been appointed, and they do not cease to be officers of the organization because of being drafted by the President?

Mr. HAY. This law provides that the President shall appoint all of these officers when they are drafted. It provides that for two reasons. First, that the President is the Commander

in Chief of the Armies of the United States, and when soldiers come into the service of the United States the officers who are to command those troops ought to be appointed by the President. As a matter of practice, however, if he drafted the National Guard, he would necessarily have to appoint the officers that were then in command of the different troops, companies, and batteries and regiments in the National Guard, because he has nowhere else to go to get officers, and because those officers under this bill would have taken the examinations and would have qualified themselves to be officers in accordance with an examination prescribed by the Secretary of War.

Mr. SIMS. Would the President have the right to take the officers of a Tennessee regiment and appoint them in a Maine regiment, and from a Maine regiment appoint them in a Tennessee regiment?

Mr. HAY. He would; and he ought to have the power, the complete power, over these men in time of war, when the responsibility rests upon him who shall command the soldiers of the country.

Mr. SIMS. But at no other time than in time of war or when war is actually imminent?

Mr. HAY. Oh, no. The draft is only a war provision.

Mr. SLOAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. SLOAN. With the power of the President to draft the militia, does he draft the organization or the individual members of the organization?

Mr. HAY. He drafts the individual members, and undoubtedly when he drafts them he would keep the same organization that they had when he drafted them, but in order to meet the constitutional condition it is necessary to put it in that way.

Mr. HILL. May I ask the gentleman a practical question?

Mr. HAY. Yes, sir.

Mr. HILL. Last week I received a volunteer offer from a complete organization of an artillery regiment of men to go to Texas from the State of Connecticut. Is there anything in the present law by which that organization could be accepted and put in this service?

Mr. HAY. Yes, sir. In the volunteer law passed in 1914 if the President chooses to do so he could call upon that regiment.

Mr. HILL. And take it as an organization?

Mr. HAY. And take it as an organization. That law provides that when three-fourths of a National Guard organization volunteers it shall be taken in as an organization.

Mr. HILL. That was not true during the Spanish-American War.

Mr. HAY. It was not.

Mr. HILL. But it is true now.

Mr. HAY. It is true now.

Mr. FESS. Could the President call upon an individual member of a regiment without calling upon the whole regiment?

Mr. HAY. He could.

Mr. FESS. Suppose he would not go?

Mr. MANN. Was the gentleman about to yield the floor?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. MANN. May I ask the gentleman a question?

Mr. HAY. Certainly.

Mr. MANN. I understood the gentleman a while ago to say that if the Army were increased to 250,000 and the pay of the enlisted men was increased from \$15 to \$30 a month the cost would be \$750,000,000 a year?

Mr. HAY. Yes; just about.

Mr. MANN. I confess I can not see how the gentleman can figure that out. The present cost of the Army is about \$1,000 a man, maybe a little more than that.

Mr. HAY. Of course, I was figuring in that not only the pay and the equipment, but I was figuring ammunition and everything that is necessary to go with the Army. Now, at present in the Army bill of last year the ordnance part of that bill carried about \$9,000,000. Now, this year we are asked to appropriate three times that much for the ordnance alone.

Mr. MANN. That is for reserve, I take it.

Mr. HAY. Of course, and some of that we are appropriating now is for reserve.

Mr. MANN. That is not chargeable to the maintenance of the Army?

Mr. HAY. Yes. I say we are charging everything. You do not figure that in, though, when you say that the soldier costs \$1,000 a year.

Mr. MANN. Of course, when we say a soldier costs \$1,000 a year we do not mean that. The soldier does not cost \$1,000 a year—the enlisted man does not cost \$1,000 a year; and how can you figure out, if you add \$180 a year to the pay, increasing from \$15 to \$30 a month to the pay of the enlisted man, that you

can add a half a million dollars more than the estimated cost to have an army of 250,000?

Mr. HAY. Well, while it is true you pay \$180 a year for the private, the corporal gets \$18 a month, and therefore he would get \$36.

Mr. MANN. Well, not necessarily.

Mr. HAY. Well, that was thought to be the fair thing—to give the man that has a little more rank more than a private soldier.

Mr. MANN. Oh, it is perfectly evident if you increase the pay of the private enlisted man from \$15 to \$30 you would have to make some increase—

Mr. HAY. Undoubtedly.

Mr. MANN. In some of the lower officers. Of course that would not apply, though, I take it, to the commissioned officers.

Mr. HAY. It would not increase the pay of the commissioned officers, but you would increase the number.

Mr. MANN. You increase the number by the increase of the Army, but that would have no relation whatever to the increase of the pay of the enlisted man. I understood the gentleman to say that the basis of the large increase in the cost was upon the increase in the pay of the enlisted man. I could not figure it out. We pay now for the enlisted men in the present Army less than \$25,000,000 a year, I think; certainly less than that for the line of the Army, including retired pay and increase or fogg pay.

Mr. HAY. I think last year the appropriation was something like \$21,000,000 for the enlisted men, but I want to say to the gentleman—

Mr. MANN. The increase for the enlisted men of the line of the Army for this year is \$18,200,000; \$2,300,000 for length of service and \$2,850,000 for the retired pay.

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. MANN. Now, that is the line of the Army, and that is a very small proportion of the total cost of the maintenance of the Army.

Mr. HAY. If the gentleman will let me say, in stating 250,000 I ought to have said 500,000. That is what I ought to have said.

Mr. MANN. That puts a different face upon the subject.

Mr. HAY. The 250,000 would cost somewhere in the neighborhood of a half a million dollars—mighty near it.

Mr. MANN. I can not see how the gentleman can figure it out.

Mr. HAY. I can show the gentleman. Take, for example, the Quartermaster's Corps. It is now 7,000 men. Now, if you had an army of 250,000 you would have to double that at least. Now, take the Hospital Corps, and you would have to double that. That is 7,000 under this bill. You would have to double that, and that would be 14,000. And you have got to double all along the pay not only of the private soldier but that of the corporal, the sergeant, the first sergeant, and the quartermaster sergeant; and you will find that, taken together with the men, the subsistence, the transportation, and the one hundred and one things that go toward the expense of the Army, it would be at least more than treble what we have now if we have an Army of 500,000 men and keep them on foot.

Mr. MANN. Including the pay of the officers, the pay of the Army is now less than one-half the total appropriation for the maintenance or support of the Army?

Mr. HAY. It is a little less than one-half, but of course the other part of the appropriation is a part of what we have to pay to sustain the Army.

Mr. MANN. True enough; but there would be no greater cost for the maintenance of the Army, no greater cost for the transportation of the Army, whatever pay you allowed the Army? That will be practically the same?

Mr. HAY. The cost would be much greater to have to furnish transportation facilities for an army of 250,000 men.

Mr. MANN. I say, whatever the pay, the cost of the equipment, the cost of the uniforms, the cost of all the quartermaster stores, the cost of all subsistence and transportation, would be the same, whatever the pay?

Mr. HAY. But, of course, that subsistence and that transportation would go up relatively with the size of the Army.

Mr. MANN. With the size of the Army?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. MANN. Of course. Now, the present cost is in the neighborhood of \$1,000 each for the number of soldiers in the Army, per year?

Mr. HAY. Yes.

Mr. MANN. Why would it go up in proportion if we increased the Army?

Mr. HAY. I do not mean to say it would cost any more to keep a soldier on foot, but I do mean to say that the larger you

make the Army the relatively larger is the expense of maintaining the Army.

Mr. MANN. Undoubtedly, and if the present Army is supposed to cost \$100,000,000 a year on the basis of about 100,000 men, why would not an army of 250,000 men cost about \$250,000,000 a year if you keep the present pay?

Mr. HAY. I will tell you what I will do. I will get the War Department to make a table to show the cost of keeping an army of 250,000 men a year, and have it before this bill passes, taking into consideration everything. Of course, I can not keep those figures in my head, and if we could have it tabulated it would show just what it would cost; and that is information which probably the House ought to have.

Mr. MANN. Well, I have so much confidence in the fact that the gentleman from Virginia does carry figures in his head so exceedingly well, that I called his attention to the fact. I thought he said an army of 250,000 men, and therefore I called his attention to it.

Mr. HAY. And I did. And what I wanted to say at the time was that if we wanted to keep the country on a war footing it would take 500,000 men to do it; but what this committee wanted to do was to supply what would be necessary in time of peace.

Mr. Chairman, I have consumed much more time than I had any intention of doing, and I will yield the floor with this statement, that I trust very much that the Members of this House will study this bill and look into the real merits of it. I think they will find it presents a reasonable plan of preparedness to be put into operation in time of peace and which everybody can support and which, when it gets into operation, will have accomplished the purpose of all those who are in favor of bringing about a proper national defense. [Applause.]

Mr. HARDY. Will the gentleman yield just for a question? I wish to ask the gentleman, Mr. Chairman, if he did not omit largely what he desired to say on industrial preparedness?

Mr. HAY. I did; but I did not get the time.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. McKENZIE]. [Applause.]

Mr. McKENZIE. Mr. Chairman, the Constitution of the United States prescribes that Congress shall provide for the common defense and is given power under the Constitution—

To raise and support armies.

To provide and maintain a Navy.

To provide for calling forth the militia and to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrection and repel invasions, and to provide for the organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.

Congress in the performance of this duty heretofore has provided for a small Regular Army and the Organized Militia of the several States as the Military Establishment in times of peace, relying principally upon volunteer forces in time of war.

The Regular Army has been increased from time to time, as provided by Congress, with the present maximum fixed at 100,000; but at no time has the full maximum strength been appropriated for by Congress.

The Organized Militia received practically no consideration from the Federal Government in a financial way until within recent years; in fact it has never been considered by some of our military men as a force to be dependent upon in time of war.

I am prompted to say at this point that whatever critics may be constrained to say reflecting upon the policy pursued by Congress in the past relating to national defense, it has evidently been approved by the people.

In addition to what Congress has done by way of appropriating money for the Regular Army and the Organized Militia, it has been making appropriations for the gradual building up of a reserve in all things necessary to equip an army. But notwithstanding these facts, many of our people, from one cause or another, have awakened to the fact that, in their judgment, our Nation is in a helpless position and wholly unprepared for defense in case of an attack by a first-class power.

The fact that our Nation has grown from a population of over 3,000,000 to 100,000,000; from a condition of poverty to that of wealth; from a condition of weakness in all the potential elements of national defense to that of matchless strength, enjoying the distinction of being the richest, the strongest, and in every sense the most independent and powerful nation on earth, except in the matter of military and naval preparedness, gives no comforting assurance to those of our citizens who see danger and ultimate disaster to all our hopes and aspirations as a nation unless we immediately provide for very large military and naval establishments.

The historic fact that for more than 100 years covering the period of our growth and development we escaped invasion by the warring nations of the earth, that oceans still separate us from them, and that we have never been engaged in war in all that time, except of our own making, furnishes no evidence of security to the advocates of a large Army and Navy.

Much has been written and published in the past few months demanding that Congress provide for adequate national defense.

Numerous orators have grown eloquent in portraying our helplessness as a nation and dramatically demanding action by Congress. Even Members of Congress and politicians have earnestly declaimed along the same line. Leagues and organizations, some old, some of mushroom growth, have put forth high-sounding resolutions demanding adequate national defense.

The effect of this propaganda has been to inflame the fears of the timid and arouse the indignation of those aware of the misleading statements contained in many of the articles, speeches, and resolutions. However, all this has been of little value to the members of the Committee on Military Affairs charged with the grave responsibility of preparing and presenting to this House a plan for the reorganization and strengthening of our Military Establishment along reasonable lines.

The members of the committee approached the consideration of this important subject with open minds, and I am satisfied that it was the patriotic desire of every member of the committee to recommend what he believed would be best for his country. The committee is composed of men from every section of our land. The chairman, Hon. JAMES HAY, hails from the Old Dominion; Hon. JULIUS KAHN, the ranking member of the minority, is a resident of California. The Atlantic States are represented by FARLEY and CALDWELL, of New York; OLNEY, of Massachusetts; NICHOLLS, of South Carolina; TILSON, of Connecticut, and GREENE, of Vermont. The Southern and Middle States by DENT, of Alabama; WISE, of Georgia; QUIN, of Mississippi; FIELDS, of Kentucky; McKELLAR, of Tennessee; LITTLEPAGE, of West Virginia; GORDON, of Ohio, and CRAGO and MORIN, of Pennsylvania. The Western Plains by ANTHONY, of Kansas, and SHALLENBARGER, of Nebraska. The upper Mississippi Valley by HULL, of Iowa, and McKENZIE, of Illinois.

Surely it can not be said the committee is provincial in its membership and therefore not representative of the whole country. The people of both coasts, the sections of our country which will be called upon to meet the first onset of the invader in case of war, are ably represented on the committee. And the great central portion of our country is represented by men whose patriotism I am satisfied extends beyond the confines of their respective States and, I trust, to whom Bunker Hill and the Golden Gate are as dear as they are to the citizens of Massachusetts and California. I feel, however, it is but fair to state to the House and to the country that the present Committee on Military Affairs is composed of men who give but little heed to impassioned harangues and glittering generalities, whether coming from the lips or pen of the extreme pacifist who opposes all military preparedness, or the wild-eyed jingo who would bankrupt our Nation in preparation for war with an enemy who may never appear.

After a careful investigation of a number of plans submitted to us, and after exhaustive hearings in which persons representing every phase of the subject appeared before the committee and presented their views, the committee agreed to report the pending bill.

At this point I might properly say that the committee in approving and reporting the bill did it with the full understanding that it was a measure intended to provide for national defense and not for any war of conquest. In other words, to provide a military establishment sufficient to defend our country in case of an attempted invasion by a first-class power. Such an establishment, we believed, could be provided under the operation of the bill now before the House.

In the preparation of this bill we were not unmindful of the oft-reiterated statement that in the matter of providing a sufficient military establishment for the proper defense of our country that Congress should be guided exclusively by the advice of military experts. We were fully persuaded that in all matters pertaining to the tactical organization of the Army and the different units of the same the advice of experts should be followed. But when it comes to the matter of determining whether or not we shall maintain a large Regular Army in time of peace, having in mind the enormous expense of the same, that the people, through their representatives and not military experts, should be consulted.

A number of concrete plans were submitted for our consideration. The plan submitted by Secretary of War Garrison provided for increasing the Regular Army approximately to 141,000 officers and men, and also provided for the organizing of a volunteer force of 400,000 men to be known as the continental

army, or by any other name which Congress deemed appropriate. His plan also provided for a reserve in both the regular and volunteer forces.

The War College plan, as it is known, provided for a Regular Army of approximately 281,000, and a volunteer force such as was recommended by the Secretary of War. The estimated cost of the War College plan would be, as stated by one officer, about \$1,000,000 a day.

Gen. Wood also submitted a plan recommending a regular force of 220,000 and a like volunteer organization. All of these plans provided for a volunteer force in time of peace had in view the enlistment of the men for a period of three years with the colors, after which they were to pass into the volunteer reserve for a term of three years. The officers in this proposed volunteer force were to be appointed by the President from the Regular Army, and the men were to be drilled from one to two months annually for three years, and paid for their services while on duty.

In none of the aforementioned plans for the reorganization of the Military Establishment was the Organized Militia, known as the National Guard, taken into consideration as an effective or dependable military force.

The committee, after a full investigation, was convinced that the plan for the proposed volunteer force commonly referred to as the continental army was impractical and could never be successfully carried out without compulsory service, a policy which, in the judgment of the committee, would be abhorrent to the people of our country in time of peace. For this and other reasons we decided not to incorporate any such scheme in the Military Establishment of our country at this time. I might add that it was the judgment of the committee that any attempt to organize and maintain such a force would be destructive to the National Guard, an organization which is now composed of approximately 130,000 officers and men, and which force we believe is a far more dependable and effective military organization than any such volunteer force could be made, notwithstanding the fact that the officers of the Organized Militia are not appointed by the President nor under the direct and exclusive control of the Secretary of War.

We propose to increase the Regular Army by the addition of 10 regiments of Infantry, 6 regiments of Field Artillery, 52 companies of Coast Artillery, 15 companies of Engineers, and 4 aero squadrons, and also by the addition of the necessary officers to the Quartermaster Corps, Medical Corps, Ordnance Department, and the Veterinary Corps, in order to enable the several corps and departments to perform the duties imposed upon them. We have also provided for the addition of 786 extra officers to aid in training the militia and for service in the schools and colleges where military training is taught, and have increased the aviation section of the Signal Corps by adding 73 officers and 720 enlisted men.

We have changed the enlistment period in the Regular Army from four to three years with the colors, after which service the enlisted men may be furloughed into the reserve. And we provide that the peace strength of this army shall be fixed at 140,000 men of the line and give the President the power to expand the same in time of war to full strength, amounting to at least 170,000 of the line.

In addition to the foregoing increase in the Regular Army, we have provided for what we believe to be the complete federalization of the Organized Militia under the name of the National Guard.

In doing this we were not unmindful of the factious criticism that will be directed against this section of the bill by those who pin their faith for security solely upon a large Regular Army. It has been said and will be repeatedly reiterated that a man can not serve two masters. That it is impossible to conceive how any man a resident of one of the States, a member of the Organized Militia, subject to the authority of his State, and who has sworn allegiance to the same, and also at the same time has sworn to support the Constitution of the United States, and that he will obey all lawful orders of the President of the United States, can be an effective soldier subject to such dual authority.

After hearing all of the gentlemen, after discussing the matter for a long time in the committee, we came to the conclusion that we would accept practically the proposition recommended by the Secretary of War to increase the Regular Army to 140,000 men of the line in time of peace. We believed that his judgment was sound on that matter, and the only feature where we differed with him was on the question of attempting at this time to organize a great volunteer force of 400,000 or 500,000 men to take the place of the Organized Militia of the several States. We believed that to attempt such an organization would be destructive to the National Guard.

Mr. QUIN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield there?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman yield?

Mr. McKENZIE. Yes.

Mr. QUIN. In addition to the Secretary of War, did not the Chief of Staff think that 125,000 or 140,000 men were all that we could use in time of peace?

Mr. McKENZIE. Yes. I was going to state that. We believed it would be destructive to the National Guard, and the committee did not feel that we were warranted in ignoring this organization that is as old as the country, that has got now about 130,000 officers and men, at the behest of technical critics and military experts. We were thoroughly convinced that whatever may be said of the Organized Militia of this country, it would be a far more dependable force in time of danger than a volunteer force that is drilled only one or two months in each year. Therefore we discarded the idea of the continental army, and have, as the chairman said, absolutely federalized the National Guard and made it a part of our military organization.

Now, gentlemen, I know that there has been much criticism of the National Guard.

Mr. FESS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McKENZIE. Certainly.

Mr. FESS. Does the gentleman think that there is any force in the argument that our State militia, even under the new bill, with the officers selected by the State, would be 48 separate units, out of which you could not get any unity? Would there be any force in that?

Mr. McKENZIE. Absolutely none; because the officers of the National Guard who appeared before our committee—and I believe it is also the universal sentiment of the country—stated that they are now soldiers of the United States and not of the respective States in which they live, and that they would be ready and willing to go in response to the call of the President of the United States.

Mr. CALLAWAY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McKENZIE. Yes.

Mr. CALLAWAY. Is it not a fact that all the men associated with the Regular Army discounted the value of the militia, and the backing of the militia rested on the testimony of the militia alone?

Mr. McKENZIE. Well, there is probably some truth in that, but I do not want to enter into that discussion because we are going to put them all together and make of the two elements an army for the United States.

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. McKENZIE. Yes.

Mr. DENT. I do not want to take up the gentleman's time, but along the line of the question that the gentleman from Texas [Mr. CALLAWAY] asked, did not those officers of the Army who had been detailed with the National Guard, and had been with them, testify in the hearings had before the committee in favor of the National Guard, and those who had not had that experience did not?

Mr. McKENZIE. That is true.

I wish to state in this connection that the members of the committee were not disposed to ignore a military organization as old as our country and capable of being molded into a powerful and effective organization at the behest of technical critics and hair-splitting military experts. Fortunately for us, and I think for our country, the Constitution is very plain on this matter, and it was thoroughly understood by those living at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, that Congress had supreme power over the Organized Militia as will appear by statements of such great Americans as Patrick Henry, George Washington, James Madison, and James Monroe, quotations from whom will be found in the report on this bill. The committee stood squarely on the Constitution and has provided for the organization of the National Guard in every detail.

We have provided for its armament and for the disciplining of the guard in accordance with the rules and regulations governing the Regular Army.

We have provided for the training of the National Guard by officers detailed from the Regular Army in accordance with the prescribed discipline, reserving to the States their right under the Constitution to appoint the officers, but we have prescribed the qualifications of such officers.

We have provided a small scale of pay for the officers and men of the National Guard, believing that it is unjust to ask men to give their time and energy to this service of the country without compensation.

We provide further in this bill that the term of enlistment shall be three years with the colors and three years in the reserve; that all applicants for enlistment are required to take a physical examination prescribed by the Secretary of War. We further provide, in order to forever put at rest the criticism that the Organized Militia, or National Guard, is not sub-

ject to the call of the President, except in the cases cited in the Constitution, that he, in time of war or imminent danger, may not only order out the Organized Militia but shall have power to immediately draft all or any portion of the same into the service of the United States.

Under the provisions of this bill the National Guard may be expanded in time of peace to approximately 425,000.

I am aware that there are many critics of the National Guard, men who place no dependence in the same as an element of national defense to be relied upon in time of danger. And such men take particular delight in reciting the story of the inglorious conduct of some of the poorly organized and badly drilled militia organizations of Revolutionary times, and also of the War of 1812. Such critics relate the story of the capture of the Capital of our country by a British force inferior in number to the militia assembled on that occasion, and it seems to give some of them great pleasure. Every student of American history has read that story, and also the story of the disgraceful conduct of a few other Americans in the War of 1812. However, in my judgment, to compare those motley organizations to the well-organized, well-drilled regiments in the National Guard of to-day is far-fetched, and is just as unreasonable as it would be for a friend of the National Guard to claim that a band of riflemen behind cotton bales, such as Gen. Jackson had at New Orleans when he defeated the British, could successfully compete with a highly trained modern army, armed with the most improved implements of warfare.

It has been said, as I remarked before, by those arguing for a large Regular Army that the National Guard can not be depended upon to volunteer, and that such statements are warranted in the light of history. To controvert this statement I shall include as a part of my remarks a report of The Adjutant General showing the quota assigned to each State in the call for volunteers in the Spanish-American War and the response by States.

Table showing quotas originally assigned to and troops furnished by the several States and Territories during the War with Spain.

States and Territories.	Quotas originally assigned.		Total.	Total number accounted for on muster-out rolls.
	Call of April 23, 1898.	Call of May 25, 1898.		
Alabama.....	2,500	1,500	4,000	4,022
Arkansas.....	2,025	1,215	3,240	2,836
California.....	3,237	1,942	5,179	5,819
Colorado.....	1,324	795	2,119	1,437
Connecticut.....	1,607	965	2,572	3,251
Delaware.....	341	204	545	1,028
District of Columbia.....	449	270	719	990
Florida.....	750	450	1,200	1,350
Georgia.....	3,174	1,905	5,079	4,383
Idaho.....	239	139	378	728
Illinois.....	8,048	4,829	12,877	13,617
Indiana.....	4,302	2,581	6,883	7,423
Iowa.....	3,772	2,264	6,036	5,694
Kansas.....	2,787	1,672	4,459	5,021
Kentucky.....	3,408	2,045	5,453	5,614
Louisiana.....	1,940	1,164	3,104	2,916
Maine.....	1,256	753	2,009	1,893
Maryland.....	1,942	1,165	3,107	2,711
Massachusetts.....	4,721	2,834	7,555	7,113
Michigan.....	4,369	2,622	6,991	6,841
Minnesota.....	2,873	1,723	4,596	5,380
Mississippi.....	2,157	1,295	3,452	3,161
Missouri.....	5,411	3,246	8,657	8,410
Montana.....	537	313	850	1,132
Nebraska.....	2,411	1,448	3,859	4,046
Nevada.....	141	82	223	522
New Hampshire.....	752	452	1,204	1,369
New Jersey.....	2,962	1,778	4,740	5,501
New York.....	12,514	7,508	20,022	20,864
North Carolina.....	2,584	1,551	4,135	3,961
North Dakota.....	473	276	749	719
Ohio.....	7,248	4,348	11,596	14,255
Oregon.....	829	498	1,327	1,570
Pennsylvania.....	10,769	6,462	17,231	17,448
Rhode Island.....	710	426	1,136	1,654
South Carolina.....	1,850	1,110	2,960	2,618
South Dakota.....	766	449	1,215	1,134
Tennessee.....	3,060	1,836	4,896	6,266
Texas.....	4,229	2,538	6,767	6,765
Utah.....	434	255	689	578
Vermont.....	634	379	1,013	1,044
Virginia.....	2,787	1,672	4,459	5,223
Washington.....	1,178	708	1,886	1,854
West Virginia.....	1,389	834	2,223	2,694
Wisconsin.....	3,274	1,965	5,239	5,453
Wyoming.....	235	138	373	476
Arizona.....				
New Mexico.....				
Oklahoma.....	858	396	1,254	1,515
Indian Territory.....				
Total.....	125,256	75,000	200,256	210,157

<sup>1</sup> This does not include general officers and staff and United States Volunteers.

And in connection with the above report I desire to call attention to the fact that the quota allotted to Illinois, 12,877, was filled by 13,647, and in addition to that Adj. Gen. Frank Dickson, of the State of Illinois, stated before the committee that Illinois not only furnished its quota but that the National Guard volunteered as organizations. And in addition to the number taken into service, in three months after war was declared there were organized and officered in full 27 regiments of Illinois volunteers, which were never called. I merely cite these instances to show that the National Guard is composed of men ready for service, and that the spirit of patriotism is still alive in our country. The officers of the National Guard who appeared before the committee asserted that they considered themselves soldiers of the United States and ready to go at a moment's notice when called in the defense of their country. So far as I am personally concerned, I deem it an insult to the patriotic men who meet week after week in their armories to drill and learn to be soldiers, for some critic, who, perhaps, spends his evenings at the card table, the bowling alley, or at some social function, who never spent a moment in his life, or spent a dollar of his money in preparing himself to defend the rights of others, to speak slightly of the National Guard by saying that they would not enlist in time of war, and, if so, would not be a dependable military asset.

I am fully convinced that the National Guard under this bill will become a powerful and potent factor in our Military Establishment. The companies being composed of men who are neighbors and friends and when brought together as an army will need but little training in order to become a force in whose hands the flag of our country will never be sullied by craven conduct, and the enemy who undertakes to invade our land will find in these sons of America a foe worthy of his steel.

It is also provided in this bill for an officers' reserve corps, for the training of cadet companies, volunteer summer training camps, and also that the Government shall furnish equipment and detail officers as instructors in schools and colleges having, at least, 100 physically fit boys over the age of 14 years.

I am fully convinced that the bill is a wise and conservative measure. I do not claim that it is perfect. There are a few things in the bill I do not approve of in full, but necessarily any such bill must, to a certain extent, be a matter of compromise. It will be subject to the criticism of extremists, but I am inclined to feel that it will have the approval of the great mass of the American people.

The Regular Army at peace strength of 140,000 men of the line will furnish a reasonable garrison for the Philippine Islands, Hawaii, the Panama Canal, Alaska, and China, man our harbor defenses, and give us a mobile force in the United States of approximately 50,000. For one I was influenced to some extent in fixing this number of regular troops in time of peace by the statement of Gen. Scott, Chief of Staff, that an Army of 135,000 was sufficient to perform all the functions of the Regular Army in time of peace; and also by statements of other military men, that a Regular Army of 250,000, or even 500,000, would be wholly insufficient in case of war; and also by the statement of Gen. McCain, that 50,000 men was the maximum number that could be enlisted annually. I also agree with the statement made a short time ago in the editorial columns of the Chicago Tribune, that "Any nation that takes refuge behind a large paid regular army is doomed to rot." I may not have this quotation verbatim, as I quote from memory, but at any rate, the foregoing is the substance of the statement.

It goes without saying that if an army of 135,000 is sufficient to perform all the functions required of the Regular Army in time of peace that all the force added above that number would be in the nature of a luxury and could correctly be termed the "standing" army.

Under this bill we could mobilize in a short time an army of not less than 500,000 as an effective fighting force to hold the line until reserves and volunteers could be supplied.

Is this force enough?

The advocates of a Regular Army of 250,000 or 500,000, of course, will ridicule such a force and undoubtedly will heap ridicule and abuse upon every man who differs from them and especially any man who stands for the enactment of the present bill into law.

But, Mr. Chairman, do the advocates of a Regular Army of 500,000 comprehend what it would mean to this country; and if so, do they take their countrymen into their confidence? Why should they not be frank and honest in their contentions and say to the people what they know, if they know anything about the subject, that such an army in time of peace could only be raised by conscription or compulsory military service? Why not tell the people frankly that such an army would cost annually \$500,000,000? Why do not these advocates of a large

Army come out boldly and go the full length of what their plan would mean, namely, conscription of Americans to serve in time of peace without pay? If they will do this I will have some respect for their courage and consistency. So far as I am personally concerned I am opposed to a reversal of all the traditions of our country by establishing military conscription in time of peace. I am also opposed to men serving in the Regular Army without reasonable compensation in time of peace. And I am opposed to any military program that will place a burden upon the people of this country in time of peace of \$500,000,000 annually or any like sum.

Mr. Chairman, I wonder if these advocates of an enormous military establishment ever stop to think of the effect of such a program on our people. We as a Nation are looking to an extension of our trade in foreign lands; in other words, an export trade. If we are to pile the burden of taxation higher and higher upon the people it will mean increased cost of living; increased cost of living necessarily means higher wages; higher wages means added cost to the products of our great industrial establishments, thereby making it more difficult for the American producer to compete with his foreign competitor in the markets of the world; loss of market means business stagnation; business stagnation means idleness; idleness means want. With such a condition in our country, do you imagine that the people would not murmur at a great standing Army, quartered in every section of our country, waiting for an invasion of some foe? This Army, well paid, well clothed, and well fed, while, perchance, many of our citizens and their families suffered from hunger! But their murmurs, according to the theory of the large-army advocate, ought to be easily stilled when told that they are safe from danger of invasion; that they would be protected by this large standing army, and even though it cost them annually a considerable portion of their hard earnings the insurance would be worth the money. Ah, Mr. Chairman, has this great Nation of freemen come to the point that it is willing to endure this burdensome expense in order to be protected from the assaults of some foreign enemy? Is the spirit of patriotism and self-reliance of the citizen dead? Surely not.

And if I am not mistaken, Mr. Chairman, if we ever fasten such a burden as this upon the American people, the time will come when the clouds of war will hang ominously around our flag, but it will not be the war clouds from afar, but it will be those more dangerous clouds of angry revolution. For, Mr. Chairman, if I have any conception of the spirit of the American citizen, he will never submit to a despotic system of taxation for the maintenance of an unnecessary and useless military establishment in time of peace.

Mr. Chairman, I ask again, Is the force provided for in this bill sufficient?

I can hear the man who wants an army of 250,000 to 500,000 in time of peace and the man who says that Germany could in a few days after we lose control of the sea land a force of 387,000 men on our shore say no. However, this estimate of an expeditionary force put out by the War College has no terrors for me. I respect the wonderful efficiency and power of the German military machine, but I know of no reason why one should designate Germany as a possible enemy. Surely the history of the past will not justify any such assumption. But be that as it may, let us assume for the sake of argument that such an attempt is to be made by some foreign country.

The first thing to be accomplished by an enemy before attempting to bring an expeditionary force to our shores would be to drive our Navy from the seas. Is there a man in this Chamber who believes that the navy of any nation on earth, except England—and I doubt her ability—could sweep our Navy from the seas and make it a thoroughfare over which transports carrying men could safely pass in less time than several months?

I do not. I am convinced that the \$500,000,000 we have expended in the construction of naval vessels in recent years, such vessels being manned with men whom I believe have the courage of a Lawrence or a Perry, would safely guard our shores for a number of months, if not for all time.

Again, Gen. Wood stated before the committee that a man could be trained to be a good fighter in six months. It would require less time to bring our Regular Army up to its maximum and put the National Guard into shape as a potent defensive force. With our Regular Army at its maximum, 170,000, as provided in this bill, supplemented by the National Guard at peace strength, 425,000, we would have a force larger than the estimated maximum number of supposed invaders. I am willing to concede that any nation attempting to invade our shores would employ in the service the very flower of its Army, and I am willing further to concede with such a highly skilled force of men we perhaps would not be prepared to combat such

a force man for man on equal terms. However, we would have the advantage of fighting on the defensive, which is no small advantage in case of an attempted invasion, and I am not ready to subscribe to the views of some people in discussing this matter that it would require a force of Americans perhaps two or three times as large as that of the invaders to successfully cope with them.

Taking into consideration the strength of our Nation, our harbor defenses, our Field Artillery, our reserve of ammunition, I have no hesitancy in saying that unless our Navy, fearful of defeat, sought refuge in the shelter of our harbor defenses, we would have ample time to mobilize a sufficient force with which to repel such an invasion.

I can understand the necessity of European nations maintaining large standing armies ever ready for a conflict, especially on the Continent, where mere boundary lines with such fortifications as may be erected thereon are all that separate them from each other, and with their railroad systems so constructed that it is possible to mobilize their armies on an enemy frontier within a few hours and to immediately begin the invasion.

Whatever may be said of our military preparedness, our country is so situated geographically that it can not be immediately attacked by the army of any foreign power save that of Mexico and Great Britain and these two countries are never taken into consideration by the average advocate of a large military establishment, dismissing Mexico on the ground of weakness and Great Britain on the theory that we will never have war with this Anglo-Saxon people. The point I am endeavoring to make, Mr. Chairman, is that in the event of war with any of the other foreign powers, we will have, at least, a reasonable time in which to prepare to meet the invaders. All this talk that our country is liable to be invaded in a few hours after declaration of war is to my mind the veriest nonsense.

I wish to submit at this point a few facts to controvert statements I have seen in print to the effect that Congress in the past has been guilty of gross negligence in failing to make appropriations for the building up of a reserve of the articles, necessary to equip an army in time of war. The truth is, Mr. Chairman, that Congress for a number of years has been making annual appropriations to carry out the recommendations of the Department of War in the matter of reserve in good faith.

The fact that certain Army officers have changed their minds and now recommend a different plan on a very much larger scale is no reflection on Congress, as will appear from the statement made by the Chief of Ordnance that we now have on hand nearly enough equipment for an army of between 400,000 and 500,000 men—I am now speaking of reserves. He also stated that we have over 1,000,000 rifles on hand and 200,000,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition. That there are also built and under construction 1,077 machine guns and 900 field artillery guns; also 750,000 rounds of field artillery ammunition. The Quartermaster General stated that there is on hand such equipment as his department must supply to an army sufficient for the Regular Army, the National Guard, and 250,000 additional men, and that in 90 days there could easily be provided equipment for 600,000 to 700,000 men.

The Chief of Engineers informed the committee that we have on hand heavy intrenching tools for nine Infantry divisions, and that these tools can be supplied in 15 days; and also we have pontoon equipment for 500,000 men. Gen. Gorgas, the Surgeon General of the Army, stated that there is in store supplies for about 250,000 to 300,000 men in addition to the supply of the Regular Army.

I do not contend that such a reserve is sufficient to carry on a great war. We all know better. I do contend, however, that it demonstrates that Congress has not been derelict in its duty in this matter, and that it is a sufficient reserve to equip a force necessary to meet the first expeditionary force that any nation can possibly bring to our shores at any one time, and that it is sufficient to enable our Government to defend itself for such a period of time as will make it possible to coordinate and mobilize the great resources of our country in such a manner as to supply the men for any sized army necessary to be called into service.

This, Mr. Chairman, practically covers the main provisions of the plan proposed by the committee for national defense and prescribes the size of the Army to be maintained in time of peace.

I am persuaded that the plan proposed in this bill will give the Nation adequate defense and that to add to the burdens of the people by recommending the maintenance of an unnecessary military force in time of peace would not only be unwise but un-American, for it is conceded by all that in any great war in

which our country may become engaged it must rely upon volunteer forces; and it is conceded by military men that with our scale of pay a large Regular Army is prohibitive. And further to attempt conscription of men to serve in the Army without pay in time of peace, such as is the custom in European countries, is not possible at this time, nor do I feel that it is desirable.

I ask again, Will such a military establishment as is proposed in this bill be large enough? My own answer is, that all depends on the future policy of our country. If our Nation is to pursue the same wise, conservative, and just policy in the future which has made the name of the great American Republic an honored and distinguished one among the nations of the earth, I say yes.

If we are to follow the wise counsel of the Father of Our Country and avoid entangling alliances with other nations and continue to pursue a course tempered with justice, fairness, and impartiality toward all the nations of the earth, being ever zealous of our honor, demanding that the rights of Americans shall be respected, but dealing justly with all nations and demanding only a square deal for ourselves, we need no great military establishment, and I would say that the force provided for in this bill will be sufficient.

However, Mr. Chairman, if we are to change our policy and, instead of continuing as a peace-loving people imbued with the ideal of dealing justly with all nations, and attending strictly to our own affairs, our Nation is to become an arrogant boaster, assuming a "holier than thou" attitude toward the other nations of the earth; if we are going to enter into alliances with other nations; if we are to assume the rôle of pretender, in saying what shall or shall not be done by the people of our sister Republics; if we are going to assume that the Monroe doctrine includes more than the maintenance inviolate of the sovereignty of the nations of the Western Continent from aggression by any European or oriental nation—that it shall include every possible contingency that may arise affecting the intercourse between the nations of this continent with other nations of the world, and that we shall insist that none of them can enter into a treaty or contract giving any advantage to any particular nation without having first obtained our consent—if we are going to assume that we have a right to dictate to Japan just what she shall or shall not do in China or elsewhere; if we are going to permit American bankers and speculators to go into other countries, as the French went into Morocco and the English into Egypt, and then we are to follow these gentlemen up with diplomacy and cannon to protect what they are pleased to assert are their rights as American citizens in foreign lands, it will be necessary for us to have an Army of at least 1,000,000 men ready with gun in hand.

But, Mr. Chairman, let us hope that we will continue to be true to our traditions and that we will not change a policy which has been the pride and glory of American citizenship.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I wish to say that I am not a peace-at-any-price advocate. I believe in maintaining our national honor inviolate, but I want that national honor to continue to be grounded in the principle of justice and equity. I am aware, as every thinking man is, that it is idle to argue that we have reached a period in our history where we are immune from war.

Just so long, Mr. Chairman, as nations are governed and controlled by crowned heads there is ever present the menace that some king, in order to maintain his place on the throne, or obsessed with the ambition of writing his name on the pages of history as a great warrior, utterly disregarding the rights of humanity, may seek to provoke war with our Nation. And, again, our own statesmen are not all perfect and by error, or, perchance, to gratify selfish ambitions, might involve us in war.

Knowing these things, I am in favor of reasonable preparedness. In case our country should unfortunately become involved in war, I desire a small regular force as a nucleus, supplemented by a large and well-drilled National Guard, and by the reserve of both the Regular Army and the National Guard, and also the trained citizenry from our summer camps and military schools. I am also in favor of a large reserve of all kinds of equipment necessary to fit an army for service, in order that we may have the same with which to equip the volunteer forces immediately upon being called to defend the country.

Mr. Chairman, in addition to this, and pertaining to national defense, I would have the children of our country taught in the homes and in the schools of the land something about the sacrifices made in order to establish this Government. I would teach them the significance of the American flag and the noble principles it represents. I would have them taught the meaning of American citizenship, and that it is a sacred privilege, much greater than the boast of the ancient Roman, to be able to

say, "I am an American citizen." And, Mr. Chairman, I would have our Government enact wise and just laws for the protection of our citizens at home, in order that they might feel that they owed a debt of gratitude to their Government and would be ever ready to respond to a call in its defense. And, Mr. Chairman, I would do another thing. I would protect our country by a careful regulation of immigration into our land. It may be astounding to know that there are several millions of aliens in our country over 21 years of age who have never signified their intentions of becoming American citizens.

I feel, Mr. Chairman, that we would be within our rights when an immigrant comes to our shores to require him to swear allegiance to the Constitution of our country. If he refused, I would deport him. For, Mr. Chairman, I think the time has arrived when we should see to it that, enjoying the privileges and opportunities here afforded him, he should not be subject to the call of any foreign sovereign, and at whose order be required to return to his native land to aid such sovereign in maintaining his crown.

Let it be understood we welcome all men capable of making good American citizens, but that we are going to insist that all living under our flag and enjoying the blessings of American liberty must under all circumstances stand for America first. [Applause.]

#### MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE.

The committee informally rose; and Mr. GARNER having taken the chair as Speaker pro tempore, a message from the Senate, by Mr. Waldorf, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed bills of the following titles, in which the concurrence of the House of Representatives was requested:

S. 4505. An act appropriating money to equip Puget Sound Navy Yard for battleship construction;

S. 5016. An act to authorize the reconstruction of an existing bridge across the Wabash River at Silverwood, in the State of Indiana; and

#### Senate concurrent resolution 16.

*Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That there be printed and bound, under the direction of the Joint Committee on Printing, the proceedings in Congress, together with the proceedings at the unveiling in Statuary Hall, upon the acceptance of the statue of Henry Mower Rice presented by the State of Minnesota, 16,500 copies, with suitable illustration, of which 5,000 shall be for the use of the Senate and 10,000 for the use of the House of Representatives, and the remaining 1,500 copies shall be for the use and distribution of the Senators and Representatives in Congress from the State of Minnesota.*

The message also announced that the President had, on March 16, 1916, approved and signed bill of the following title:

S. 3518. An act granting pensions and increase of pensions to certain soldiers and sailors of the Civil War and certain widows and dependent relatives of such soldiers and sailors.

#### THE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT.

The committee resumed its session.

Mr. KAHN. I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. ANDERSON].

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. MONTAGUE). The gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. ANDERSON] is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. ANDERSON. Mr. Chairman, we are the richest Nation on earth. If this statement gratifies the pride, if it satisfies the vanity, it makes no appeal to the enthusiasm. It paints no picture on the canvas of the mind. It conveys no impression of the greater United States.

I wonder if you have in your mind's eye a picture of our part of the Western Hemisphere. In the center of the picture, the heart of the empire of the United States, with its 4,000 miles of coast line; to the north, Canada; to the south, Mexico.

To the northwest is Alaska, with its nearest open port 1,300 miles from San Francisco, and with no direct railroad communication with continental United States. Across the Bering Sea it almost touches hands with Russian Siberia, while the farthermost Aleutian Island extends some 2,500 miles toward Japan. It is a vast storehouse of mineral wealth; its agricultural possibilities have scarcely been touched. In less than 50 years it has produced \$525,000,000 of wealth.

Some 2,500 miles south of Alaska, and 2,000 miles from San Francisco, are the Hawaiian Islands, with an area of 6,500 square miles and a population of 208,000, of which 100,000 are Japanese and Chinese.

West of Hawaii is our part of Samoa, the islands of Guam and Tutuila, and beyond them, and 7,000 miles from San Francisco, are the more than 3,000 islands that compose the Philippine Archipelago. These have an area of 40,000 square miles, and a population of 9,000,000, of which only 20,000 are Americans.

To the south, we own the Panama Canal, upon which we have expended some \$400,000,000, and which we are obligated to operate in time of war as in time of peace.

In the Atlantic, we have Porto Rico, with an area of 3,600 square miles, and a population of upward of a million.

Next to Porto Rico is the island of Cuba, whose independence and integrity we are bound by treaties to preserve.

Still farther to the south of us are the Republics of Central and South America. Our own safety and security forbids our permitting foreign aggression there.

Suppose we go a step further. Alaska has a foreign commerce of \$47,000,000 annually, the Hawaiian Islands of \$80,000,000, the Philippines of \$110,000,000, Porto Rico of \$86,000,000, and Cuba of \$308,000,000. All together the commerce of Alaska, Cuba, and our insular possessions amounts to more than \$600,000,000 annually. Our noncontiguous territory and insular possessions are second in importance and extent only to those of Great Britain and possibly of France.

Since 1870 our foreign commerce has increased from less than one billion to over four billions. Our goods are sold in every country, Christian and barbarian, the world over, and are carried upon every sea.

In that 50 years we have lived easily, luxuriously. We have developed commercially and industrially. We are self-centered and content. We want peace. We wish only to be let alone. The world will not let us alone, because we can not let the world alone—our foreign interests are too numerous, our commerce too vast, and our possessions too valuable.

Civilization has moved westward. With laggard but compelling hand it has awakened Japan and aroused the sleeping giant. The commercial progress of Japan has been, if anything, more marvelous than our own, and the drama of her regeneration is about to be reenacted in China. We prohibit Chinese immigration, while we insist that Chinese ports shall be open to Americans and American goods. The coast States restrict the rights of Japanese in land ownership and otherwise, while we insist upon the full measure of our own in Japan. We are able to do this because we control the Pacific. How long will we be able to do it when the control of the Pacific is wrested from us?

As the tide of civilization has moved westward the commercial importance of the islands of the Pacific and of the countries bordering upon it have correspondingly increased. Already Japan is seriously challenging our commercial trade in the Pacific. The end of the European war will see the greatest struggle for commercial supremacy in the world's history, for the great debt of that conflict must be paid in large part from the undeveloped resources of comparatively new countries. It is inevitable that much of that battle for commercial supremacy should take place in the countries bordering upon the Pacific Ocean.

We are all of us pretty much in the same boat. It makes but little difference whether Servia, Germany, England, or Japan rocks the boat, the effect is dangerous for all of us. We can not avoid the logic of events abroad nor separate ourselves from their consequences.

In 1492 a Spanish queen financed a sailor by the name of Columbus, and Europe laid its hands on America.

In 1802 Spain ceded Louisiana to France. Of this event, President Jefferson wrote to Mr. Livingston, the then American minister to France:

*The cession of Louisiana and the Floridas works most sorely on the United States \* \* \* it completely reverses all the political relations of the United States and will form a new epoch in our political course.*

Again—

In Europe nothing but Europe is seen or supposed to have any right in the affairs of nations; but this little event of France's possessing herself of Louisiana, which is thrown in as a nothing, as a mere make-weight in the general settlement of accounts—this speck which now appears as an almost invisible spot on the horizon—is the embryo of a tornado which will burst on the countries on both sides of the Atlantic and involve in its effects their highest destinies.

In 1898 a Spanish general by the name of Weyler attempted to impose upon the people of Cuba the savage and deathly policy of "reconcentration" of noncombatants. A flame of indignation spread across the country as a result of this barbarism, and when the war was over we came into possession of the Philippines and Hawaii, and the mastery of the Pacific.

In 1914 some Servians killed the heir of Austria. We had no part in the killing, but the whirlwind of calamity which followed it shook our "ship of state" from stem to stern.

On March 9 a man by the name of Villa, with a band of bandits, attacked the American town of Columbus, N. Mex., and to-day our troops are fighting in the neighboring Republic.

If anyone believes that peace or war is entirely of our own making, let him carefully consider these events.

Do you suppose that France would have consented to the purchase of Louisiana by the United States if we had not held the maritime supremacy of the Western Hemisphere, and with

Great Britain, of the World? Do you think we could enforce the open door in China and our own exclusion acts at the same time if we did not control the Pacific? Ought we to have arbitrated the oppression of Cuba? Would we permit Great Britain to cede British Columbia to Japan in consideration of her aid in the present war? Let the pacifist answer these questions.

When the Appomattox of the world war has been fought the minds of all men will turn again to arbitration and the peaceful settlement of international disputes. International disputes which do not involve the surrender of the principles of humanity or the integrity and honor of our country may properly be submitted to judicial settlement, but let us not forget that civilization has advanced, the weak have been lifted up, and the oppressed succored, because some men have thought enough of the humanities of peace to fight for them; that democracy has been sustained because some men have thought enough of liberty to die for it.

It is the destiny of America to be the custodian of the humanities of peace and the guardian of the freedom of democracy. We shall fall short of that destiny unless we are sufficiently prepared to make our voice heard and respected in the councils of the world. The voice of America is, and will be, for peace, but it is the peace of Switzerland, not the peace of China.

I am not learned in the art of war nor skilled in the technique of national defense. I do not know the number or kind of guns that should be used, the location and nature of the fortifications, the kind and size of the Navy. Expert knowledge and technical skill are not requisite to an adequate conception of our unpreparedness in consideration of our geographical location, our foreign commerce, our insular possessions, and our international importance.

The Statesman's Yearbook contains the following statement with reference to our Army:

The reserve, or unorganized, militia comprises, with certain exemptions, the whole of the manhood of the Nation between the age of 18 and 45 all being legally liable to serve in a national emergency for a period of two years. Their estimated number is 15,000,000, but they are untrained and of no present value, though encouragement is being given to rifle shooting.

In event of war the United States could put into the field about 60,000 Regular troops and about 80,000 or 90,000 partially trained National Guard. The American Nation relies on being able to raise, in case of emergency, a great volunteer army. If sufficient numbers were not forthcoming, the reserve militia could be obliged to serve for two years; but this army, whether its ranks were filled by voluntary or compulsory recruitment, would practically be a new creation.

It would be difficult to put into language a more severe indictment of our military unpreparedness than this unbiased and unpartisan statement.

National preparedness ought not to mean a mere race with the nations of the world in the effort to build the fastest ships, the largest guns, and create the biggest army; but a brief comparison of our military and naval equipment with those of other countries may be enlightening.

In battleships of the dreadnaught and superdreadnaught class we rank third; in battle cruisers, fifth; in cruisers, sixth; in light cruisers, fourth; in destroyers, fifth; in torpedo boats, eighth; and in submarines, third. When the ships now building are completed, in tonnage we will be fourth, Great Britain being first, Germany second, and France third. But the superiority of the British Navy does not rest on either number or tonnage of ships alone. Our largest dreadnaught has a tonnage of 27,500 tons and carries 14-inch guns. Its engines develop 35,000 horsepower, and it has a trial speed of 21 knots. Great Britain has at least six vessels of equal tonnage, carrying 15-inch guns, with 58,000 horsepower, and a speed of at least 25 knots per hour. Germany has at least three dreadnaughts with larger guns and greater speed. The 15-inch guns carried by the British dreadnaughts have a greater range than any of the guns in our coast defenses, with the exception of those at the Panama Canal. As far as I am able to determine, our Navy is excelled in every branch except marksmanship and courage.

France has 60 times as many aeroplanes as the United States, Germany 45 times as many, Russia 35, Great Britain and Austria each 18 times, and Belgium  $4\frac{1}{2}$  times as many. On the 1st of July last we had 23 aeroplanes, none of which were armored, and no dirigibles.

At that time France had 20 army corps of 33,000 men each, each corps had 30 batteries of 4 field guns each, or 2,400. In addition, each corps had 6 reinforcing batteries—a total of 2,880 guns. France had also 42 batteries of heavy artillery of 2 guns each.

We had 212 batteries of four guns each in the Regular Army and Organized Militia. We had no heavy artillery. There was a marked deficiency of enlisted men in every branch of the service.

No amount of elaboration of argument could make our deficiency in military preparedness more apparent than this statement.

It is said that we spend more on our Military and Naval Establishments than any other nation except Great Britain, and have less to show for it. I have no doubt the statement is true, but it is no more true than a like statement would be concerning any other of the departments of the Government. The remedy is better administration, not the abandonment of the policy of national preparedness.

If the cost of equipment alone is considered, if the cost of administration and of pay and allowances is eliminated, the comparison would be much less to our disadvantage.

But why should we not appropriate for national defense? We have no other more pressing national need. The children of America are educated as are the children of no other nation on earth. Our highways are fast being brought to a high state of efficiency and usefulness. Our commercial, industrial, agricultural, and political interests are amply provided for. We spend great sums in the improvement of our rivers and harbors. We are the most prosperous Nation in the world. Our people pay less taxes than any other. Why should we not appropriate for that upon which our commerce, our agriculture, our happiness, and our very national existence depends?

I should not be fair to my own convictions if I did not say at this point that my desire for preparedness for national defense would be much more keen if it were not for the feeling that there has been great extravagance and inefficiency in the expenditures heretofore made for that purpose. I shall vote for proper measures for the reorganization of the Army and Navy in the hope that the conditions which have made possible the extravagances and inefficiency in the expenditure of previous appropriations will be eliminated.

If there is one thing more than another which the discussion of this question has established it is that our people will not stand for a large standing army.

The expense of such an army is prohibitive, but it is not principally on this account that our people are opposed to it. They believe that a large standing army is opposed to the spirit of democracy and of our institutions. They regard it as an institution apart from their daily lives and their daily business.

In times of peace such an army would have nothing to do, and ought to have nothing to do. It is a mere burden upon peaceful industry. The ambitions of the professional soldier are not their ambitions; the thoughts of the soldier are not their thoughts; the spirit of the soldier is not their spirit.

They remember that standing armies have often been the instruments of tyranny and oppression, but every thinking man must realize that there must be, somewhere in the country, a force of men sufficiently trained and equipped and sufficiently large to meet any emergency which might arise and to support our position in the councils of the world. They want this force organized in such a way that it will be representative of the thought and the purpose of the whole people. The question is, How can such a force be created which will not be subject to the same objections as a large standing army?

My answer to that question is: Through the public schools of the country.

The history of war demonstrates that the battles have been fought by young men—boys. In a memorandum issued by the Pension Bureau in 1890 it was estimated that the average age of the survivors of the Civil War in 1865 was 28 years. It is probable that the average age at enlistment was around 22. More than one-half must have been under that age.

There are in the high schools of the country 500,000 young men averaging from 14 to 19 years of age. Two hundred thousand enter the high schools of the country every year. These young men could be taught the rudiments of military training, could be improved in physique, could be instructed in the care of themselves, could be taught how to use the instruments of warfare. Think what it would mean to the country to have in the ranks of its citizens millions of men trained to stand erect, trained in discipline, in system, in self-control, in self-reliance, obedience, and loyalty. Think what it would mean when applied to the business life of the Nation.

The training would not be confined to the mere learning of routine drills and the manual of arms. This means simply the going through of stated motions, and becomes irksome with repetition. The ordinary drills would be supplemented by practice marches, range and field work. Training camps could be held during the vacation seasons. The boys would gain knowledge of the roads in their own localities and whence they led, the topography of the country, and its advantages for defense and offense.

It is the purpose of education to develop the young in certain essentials, such as the preservation of health, the building of character, efficiency in fitting the individual for self-support and effective living, the acquiring of knowledge, and acquaintance with environment, and the liberalizing of the mind. I do not wish to be understood as criticizing our educational system, but it seems to me in some essentials insufficient and imperfect—one-sided. Take the average young men of to-day and strip them of the refinements of modern tailoring and it is surprising how many of them are round-shouldered, flat chested, and underdeveloped. It is not their fault, for it is very largely the result of the lack of suitable physical training in the schools. Such consideration as is given to physical training in the schools to-day results in making athletes of a few and hunchbacks of the rest. Military training in the high schools would supply the opportunities for physical development which are now lacking.

The physical, mental, and moral training received by the young men during the high-school period and the cost of this training would not be a dead loss to the country or to the student. It would contribute to his success in civil life.

There is nothing new in the idea of military training in the schools. Washington approved of it; Jefferson advocated it; educators everywhere testify to its effectiveness in character building and in promoting the efficiency and thoroughness of the individual, and their testimony is borne out by the experience of those who have had occasion to employ the graduates of colleges and universities.

Educators, clergymen, social workers, all testify to the need of something in our educational institutions which will lead to a fuller appreciation of civic duty and a greater regard for law and authority, and that the requisite is discipline such as military training affords.

The principal argument urged against military training in the schools is that it would create a spirit of militarism in the country. Military training teaches, among other things, a respect for your own weapons and those of the enemy. It is quite absurd to suppose that a young man who has constantly the opportunity to observe the effect of bullets and exploding shells is going to be consumed with a desire to feel their effect upon his own body.

Militarism is defined as "a system or policy which causes nations to keep up great armies." An army of 500,000 men is not excessive for a nation of a hundred million people, especially if it is only a reserve and built upon democratic lines. The principal menace of militarism lies in the education of men to make war their chief business; in the subordination of the civil life of the people to the military. The pacifist fears that the education of young men in the technique of the soldier will result in a desire to make war his chief business. If I believed that this would be its result, my fear would be as great as that of the most radical pacifist. Its purpose is utterly different, and its history utterly opposed to this fear. Its purpose is not to train men to be soldiers, but to train them so that if they must be soldiers they will be good soldiers, physically able and technically prepared. I shall not "raise my boy to be a soldier," but if my country needs my boy, he will want to go, and I will want him to go [applause], but I want him to be so prepared that his chance will be at least equal to that of his opponent.

Switzerland has had military training in her schools for more than 50 years. Switzerland to-day is the only oasis in the European war desert. The Swiss boy begins his military training when he is 8 years of age. Military knowledge and skill is a result, but physical development is the prime purpose of his instruction. The Swiss Army is approximately twice as large as our available force to-day. A Swiss army corps can be mobilized in three days, with all necessary equipment, transports, and munitions, ready to march against the enemy. I have never seen an estimate of the time required to mobilize our Army and militia, but it is more likely that it would take three weeks than three days. The Swiss soldier costs his Government \$35 a year, the American soldier costs his Government twenty-eight times as much as his Swiss comrade.

The cadet corps which I have in mind could be equipped and trained at an expense not very much larger than those in Switzerland.

As a man grows older, as he analyzes his own life and the lives of those about him, as he increasingly sees things in the retrospect from the vantage ground of experience, he realizes that student days are the most impressionable and the most plastic in life. Its friendships are the most lasting and its associations remain the greenest. "I knew him in school" is the strongest claim to intimacy that human language can ex-

press. "Just to be a boy again" are the magic words that conjure in the mind days of boundless enthusiasm, limitless imagination, and illimitable hope—days when place and creed, birth and nationality, were all reduced to a common level. There is but one level like unto it in all the world, and that is the level of the soldier. To wear the same uniform, to eat the same food, to endure the common hardships of the march, to lie down at night grateful for the contact with the earth after utter exhaustion, to stand at attention with your comrades as the Star-Spangled Banner is played, when the sunset gun is fired, and the flag comes down, is an experience worth the while of every American. [Applause.] "I didn't raise my boy to be a soldier," but I would not give the hole in a plugged nickel for a boy whose heart did not beat a little faster at the strains of the Star-Spangled Banner and who could not feel the impulse to stand at attention when Old Glory is raised to its "place in the sun." [Applause.] Treasured within its bosom are the memories that men hold dearest. Cherished within its folds are America's glories of the past and her hopes for the future. Beneath its Stars and Stripes democracy must work out her destiny. [Applause.]

We need a national revival—to be baptized with a new national spirit. We need something in our institutions that will annihilate caste and creed, birth and nationality, and amalgamate us into a people with one language and one loyalty. [Applause.] We need to waken to the consciousness that we belong to a Greater America. The world has accorded us a greater place in its councils than we have accorded ourselves. We can not evade the consequences of the world's opinion or escape from the duties which they impose upon us. The conscience of America must have a part in the molding of the designs of civilization, must have a voice in determining the rules of the game. The world looks to America for the perpetuation of the ideals and the institutions of democracy. To this end we must be prepared. [Applause.]

Mr. KAHN. I yield 12 minutes to the gentleman from Wisconsin [Mr. FREAR].

Mr. FREAR. Mr. Chairman, the bill before us presents a reorganization of the Army. A world-wide war with difficulties along the Mexican border brings the subject of adequate defense close home. The country will not hesitate to pay the bill providing value received is rendered, but on the other hand it is not ready to accept every visionary scheme that masquerades under the cloak of "preparedness."

Possibly it may be gratuitous to suggest a self-evident truth, but every sincere friend of real defense, of honest dealings in public affairs, and of proper governmental business methods, will look with suspicion on questionable provisions contained in any bill, whatever may be its announced purpose.

I do not intend to discuss the bill as a whole, nor in anything I may say is criticism of the committee intended, but it is proper to suggest that out of 85 sections in the bill, containing over 2,160 printed lines, an insignificant item of only five lines, known as "Section 82," deserves the closest scrutiny.

It reads as follows:

That to provide for the fixation of atmospheric nitrogen by the development of water power, or any other means, necessary to establish an adequate supply of nitrogen, the appropriation of such sum or sums of money to construct the necessary plant for such purpose is hereby authorized.

That is the entire section—all that is contained on the subject in the 91-page bill. No limitation in amount, location, or general character is provided in section 82, although the Secretary of War is to make a selection of location, determine the expense and general character of the "plant." No armor plate factories, no gun factories, no munition factories, no new arsenals, or other "plants" are mentioned in the bill, but Congress is asked to delegate to the Secretary of War, and through him, subordinate Army Engineers are to exercise a predetermined expenditures of \$24,000,000 on the Alabama Power Co.'s holdings at Muscle Shoals in the Tennessee River.

NAVIGATION, FIXATION, AND FERTILIZATION.

Why was section 82 slipped into the Army bill after it had been proposed in the naval bill? Why has the Alabama Power Co. urged that its project be inserted in the agricultural bill after it was refused consideration by the river and harbor bill?

The amount demanded by the Alabama Power Co. from the Government is substantially the same in every case, but in the river and harbor bill it is to aid invisible "navigation"; in the agricultural bill it is a "fertilizing" project that needs Government aid, and when it fails to command acceptance on either ground we find the "plant" anchored in the Army bill on the ground of "preparedness."

Incidentally the Alabama Power Co. is now "preparing" to sell \$100,000,000 in bonds, according to its own statement, and

apparently the Government is being used to finance the company's projects and to give a certificate of good character to its new bond issue. I do not desire to do anyone injustice, but will present some facts which, I believe, are worthy of consideration.

Attached as exhibits to my remarks will be found abundant evidence to support the assertions made as to the primary purpose, location chosen, amount to be expended, and methods employed to secure \$24,000,000 from the Federal Treasury under the innocent-appearing 5-line section that will cost the Government over \$4,000,000 per line. At this time I will briefly refer to some insignificant facts which invite the close attention of the House.

The Military Committee's report contains 14 pages, apart from statistical tables. One-third of the report in fine print is devoted to evidence given by Mr. Frank S. Washburn before the committee, and, strange to relate, out of a 14-page report devoted to a 2,160-line military bill, one-third of the report contains Mr. Washburn's rosy essay on fixation of atmospheric nitrogen and relates to the 5 lines contained in section 82.

Nothing appears to indicate what confidence may be placed in Washburn's statements. Nothing appears to show who Mr. Washburn claims to be, although 4 pages of a treatise by Mr. Washburn alone is offered in justification of this remarkable section 82.

In view of the fact that no information is vouchsafed by the committee on the subject and because Mr. Washburn and his associate, Mr. Worthington, have been in attendance before committees for many months in a patriotic effort to promote navigation, fertilization, and fixation of Government preparedness appropriations at Muscle Shoals, I will supply some significant facts as to their deep interest, taken from Moody's Manual for 1915; but first I desire to discuss briefly a subject on which Mr. Washburn claims to be an expert and of which I have no technical knowledge—one vitally connected with section 82 and the proposed \$24,000,000 Government expenditure.

#### WHY GIVE \$24,000,000 TO MR. WASHBURN'S FERTILIZING EXPERIMENT?

Mr. Washburn is the authority quoted by the committee in its justification for section 82. On his unsupported word Congress is asked to authorize an expenditure of \$24,000,000 with which to go in partnership with Mr. Washburn's company. In the committee report he learnedly discusses his fixation process, and, based upon his argument and his judgment as set forth in the committee report, the Government is now prepared to make great investments as proposed by section 82.

Mr. Washburn's hypnotic influence has apparently convinced the committee of the great value of his proposition, but before discussing its merits I refer briefly to his proposal, found on page 13 of the report. Therein he speaks as president of the American Cyanamid Co. and discusses the fixation process with apparent candor. He also has some equally positive ideas on the cooperative plan, and, quoting from his proposal:

The total initial investment under the cooperative plan is, therefore, \$48,000,000, of which the Government expends in power development \$21,000,000, receiving 3 per cent per annum thereon, the ownership of which development it retains and an "idle investment of \$3,000,000."

Apparently the Government is expected to invest \$24,000,000 in cash, possibly all of which is an "idle investment." Mr. Washburn's proposed investment will be discussed hereafter.

What do we know of Mr. Washburn's proposition, business experience, judgment, or purposes? He has injected himself into the proposition, so that its merits must necessarily stand or fall on the value of his own statements. I well remember when Army engineers were first criticized for waterway waste last session, I was warmly abused for my temerity in questioning their judgment, but cumulative testimony has been piled up, based on their admissions, proving beyond question the truth of those criticisms. It requires equal temerity to question the utterances of a great promoter who represents a new process for fertilizing, as well as a number of companies that are willing to undertake the business when financed by the Government, but I desire to offer some significant expert opinions on the same subject which Mr. Washburn failed to present to the Military Committee.

On March 12, 1915, or about a year ago, Mr. Washburn read a paper on the cyanamid process before the American Institute of Electrical Engineers and the New York Section of the American Electro Chemical Society. If time permitted I should be glad to quote some significant statements appearing in his paper, but I will only give a few words of criticism which come from men of the highest standing in the country—men whose opinions are well worth considering—before we blindly join partnership with Mr. Washburn and Mr. Worthington in a \$48,000,000 project, of which the Government will furnish \$24,000,000 in cash to offset an indefinite investment by the Government's partner, as will later appear.

#### EXPERT OPINIONS OPPOSING MR. WASHBURN'S CYANAMID SCHEME.

At the meeting of the Electro Chemical Society, Mr. Leland L. Sommers, an expert of high authority on fixation of atmospheric nitrogen, discussed the same subject at the same meeting, and said pointedly in criticizing Mr. Washburn's cyanamid paper:

Personally I do not accept the unqualified statement in regard to the success of the cyanamid process that Mr. Washburn puts forth, because, while it has been successful, I do not think that engineers by any means accept it as the final word in nitrogen fixation.

Criticisms of Mr. Washburn's paper were pointed, and Mr. Sommers's knowledge on the subject of atmospheric nitrogen may be inferred from a technical paper of 40 pages on that identical subject offered at the same time. His paper did not occasion any criticism, although the Washburn paper was not so fortunate.

Dr. C. W. Bennett, who is one of the membership committee of the organization, a man of standing in his profession, said of the Washburn paper:

No one denies that the preparation of cyanamid is the cheapest working process for the fixation of nitrogen. Nitrogen from cyanamid, however, is not as cheap as nitrogen from other sources. We must all admit that by-product ammonia can be placed on the market as ammonium sulphate at a profit for very much less, approximately one-fourth the selling price of cyanamid. This industry as is pointed out in another communication, is increasing steadily in this country and in others, and it will take the development of only a few other by-products to enormously increase the output of by-product ammonia. \* \* \* No process in operation to-day for the fixation of nitrogen, as has been pointed out a number of times, can hope to compete with by-product ammonia. In drawing conclusions we can not compare alone the processes for the fixation of nitrogen, but we must also compare the price of the product in question, prepared from other sources, because the final user does not care whether his ammonia comes from the distillation of coal or from atmospheric nitrogen.

Mr. Bennett asserts that by-product of ammonia can be sold at a profit for approximately one-quarter the selling price of cyanamid. If he is right, it will be a congressional scandal to give \$24,000,000 for that purpose.

Mr. Sommers says, in his comprehensive paper on Fixation of Atmospheric Nitrogen:

It would be hopeless to attempt to put this acid (derived from fixation of atmospheric nitrogen) into a product to compete with fertilizer prices, for they are some 50 per cent lower. \* \* \* It is useless to look only to cheap power as a solution of this problem, as the real solution is in the improvement of processes (p. 373).

Commenting upon Mr. Sommers's paper, which appeared simultaneously with Mr. Washburn's effort, Dr. L. H. Baekeland said:

#### USELESS EXPENSE IN MARKETING, NOT MANUFACTURING.

We have heard the statement that in many cases it is more expensive to buy fertilizer than to have a low yield per acre. This is very true; and if the price of fertilizer gets too high, a low yield per acre becomes practically unavoidable. Unfortunately, in this country we are almost everywhere confronted with the detrimental economic condition of too many middlemen. \* \* \* The time will come \* \* \* when you will no longer speak about an excess of ammonia production in gas or coke ovens. There will not be such a thing as excess of ammonia. All ammonia will be saved.

Mr. Baekeland does not suggest the cyanamid process as having any bearing on the fertilizer or nitric-acid supply in this country, but he does suggest a situation which Mr. Washburn does not offer to meet—a reduction in the cost of fertilizer to the consumer through the elimination of too many middlemen. The Washburn Co., if it can profitably produce commercial fertilizer, will get all that the public will pay without any limit to unconscionable exactions, although financed by the Government.

I quote his words, because in the World's Work for March we are informed Dr. Baekeland was given the highest honors that could be conferred by the societies of which he is a distinguished member, an award of the Perken medal for eminence of industrial chemical research.

It is a matter of surprise that the Military Committee did not call some of the experts of world-wide fame whom I am mentioning, but, on the contrary, has placed entire reliance on the testimony of Mr. Washburn, who has \$24,000,000 at stake, to be given his company by the Government.

#### THE BEST TESTIMONY OBTAINABLE ON MR. WASHBURN'S SCHEME.

During this same discussion of Mr. Washburn's paper by experts, the secretary of the society, Joseph W. Richards, significantly said:

Mr. Landis, chief technologist of the American Cyanamid Co. (Mr. Washburn's), has said that his company confidently expects radical changes in nitrogen fixation processes in the next 5 or 10 years, and that it is prepared, if necessary, to scrap its whole plant inside of 20 years, thinking there might very possibly be no cyanamid process in use at that time (p. 405).

Mr. Richards is a man of high standing, and his statement based upon the chief technologist of Mr. Washburn's own company appears to have gone unanswered.

These are not expert opinions from Army engineers regarding commercial possibilities at Muscle Shoals, but expert opinions

from the highest class of electrochemical engineers in the country who confidently predict that within 20 years Mr. Washburn's own company may scrap its cyanamid factory.

Other significant statements were made at the same meeting, but I will only read one further opinion which, however, is significant. Dr. Sumners, from whom I have quoted, and who appears to be a high authority on the subject, says of Dr. S. Peacock, on page 412 of the discussion:

Dr. Peacock's paper is very much to the point. Undoubtedly you all know that Dr. Peacock is one of the best authorities in America on fertilizer. He is thoroughly familiar with everything that has been connected with the use of nitrogen in fertilizers.

This high praise from a high authority is prefixed to Dr. Peacock's statement, which appears in his own paper on page 410, as follows:

As a commercial undertaking, nitrogen fixation must remain substantially dormant so long as the ammonia produced as a by-product of coal distillation remains of such relative amount that it is capable of controlling the rewards of capital invested in nitrogen fixation. It may be accepted as a fact that no nitrogen fixation method has as yet been publicly proposed which can produce nitrogen as cheaply as coal by-product of ammonia.

Reduced to a bald business statement, Dr. Peacock says that no man with good business judgment would invest in any nitrogen fixation proposition unless he expects to lose his investment. That appears to be the reason why Mr. Washburn is unable to finance his project with private capital. Dr. Peacock's paper was read immediately following Mr. Washburn's paper. Peacock is a recognized expert whose statement was not challenged, whereas Mr. Washburn's rainbow-colored statements were repeatedly criticized and appear to conflict with inexorable facts. The Government is interested in providing its own explosives, but it should bear in mind that in a matter in which Mr. Washburn is vitally concerned, and which is of doubtful value, it may be well first to ascertain the business interests and experience which entitle him to our confidence.

#### MR. WASHBURN TOO BUSY TO BECOME AN EXPERT.

I have discussed briefly Mr. Washburn's project. Let us now inquire as to his business connections. Mr. Frank S. Washburn is chairman of the board of directors of the Alabama Power Co., of which company Mr. J. W. Worthington is a director. From Moody's Manual it appears the Alabama Power Co., by a process of benevolent assimilation, has taken over the Alabama Electric Co., the Wetumpka Power Co., the Alabama Power & Electric Co., the Alabama Power Development Co., the Huntsville Railway, Light & Power Co., the Decatur Light, Power & Fuel Co., the Etowah Light & Power Co., the Bell City Light & Power Co., and possibly some other smaller companies.

Mr. Frank S. Washburn is also president, vice president, or director in the Birmingham, Montgomery & Gulf Power Co.; the Anniston Electric & Gas Co.; the Little River Power Co.; the Muscle Shoals Hydro Electric Power Co.; the Alabama Traction, Light & Power Co.; the Alabama Interstate Power Co., and possibly other companies, most of which are located in Alabama or Canada.

Mr. J. W. Worthington also appears as an officer or director in many of the companies named, which have a combined authorized capitalization aggregating about \$70,000,000. Mr. Washburn is also president of the American Cyanamid Co., organized nine years ago, that has an authorized capital of \$8,000,000 and is operating a fertilizer factory at Niagara Falls, Ontario, Canada. This factory produced 37,586 tons of fertilizer in 1914. It is further stated dividends on preferred stock of \$3,258,600 are regularly paid semiannually, but whether from profits or stock sales does not appear.

An interesting balance sheet appears on page 2044 of Moody's Manual for 1914. Assets are scheduled as follows:

Land, buildings, and equipment.....	\$2, 218, 347
Bills and accounts receivable.....	19, 263
Cash.....	75, 218
Inventories.....	450, 515
License patents and patent rights.....	3, 569, 578
Founding and propaganda.....	230, 580
Total.....	6, 563, 510

FIFTY-EIGHT PER CENT OF ASSETS IN PROPAGANDA AND PATENT RIGHTS.

By a strange oversight no balance sheet appears for the many other companies with which Mr. Washburn is connected. Because of this silence, unusual among corporations quoted in Moody's Manual, we must analyze the one balance sheet submitted in seeking information as to financial methods and management of a concern with which the United States is asked to form a partnership. The American Cyanamid Co. places its total assets for 1914 at \$6,563,510, of which amount \$3,569,578, or more than half of the total, is listed for license patents and patent rights. Another item is \$230,580 of assets noted as "founding and propaganda."

Possibly we may look with doubt upon any company that seeks to join partnership with the United States, whose assets rated as propaganda and patent rights reach over 58 per cent of its entire assets. We may also properly inquire what method of valuation is employed in making up the rest of this remarkable balance sheet.

Just what reliance should be placed upon such a showing is a matter of individual opinion, but what of the Muscle Shoals Co. and the Alabama Power Co. and all the other affiliated Washburn concerns which fail to file any public statement with the great financial authority from which I have quoted. Reputable concerns inspire respect by taking the public into their confidence, but this record is offered by a concern or concerns with which Army engineers have recommended we join partnership and which we are expected to finance with \$24,000,000 of Government funds.

#### A WATER-POWER MONOPOLY WANTS \$24,000,000 OF GOVERNMENT HELP.

Apart from the fact that the Alabama Power Co., of which Mr. Washburn is chairman, is credited with owning or controlling 96 per cent of all water powers in Alabama, we find the following statement of water-power sites owned by this one company, according to one of its prospectuses, a copy of which has been given me:

	Horsepower.
Coosa River, Lock 7.....	45, 000
Coosa River, Lock 12.....	105, 000
Coosa River, Lock 14.....	100, 000
Coosa River, Lock 15.....	80, 000
Coosa River, Lock 18.....	100, 000
Tallapoosa River.....	115, 000
Muscle Shoals on Tennessee.....	400, 000
Sauty Creek.....	6, 000
Town Creek.....	7, 000
Little Creek.....	52, 000
Choccolocco Creek.....	2, 000
Total.....	1, 012, 000

From the highest authority, we have the connections of both Mr. Washburn and Mr. Worthington, and from the prospectus of one company we learn that they control over 1,000,000 horsepower in Alabama and Georgia. From official records we learn that, ably supported by Army engineers, the Muscle Shoals proposition has been forced upon the attention of three or four different committees of the House, and for those who care to follow its methods, attention is invited to page 3685 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD of March 7, from which it appears that the same project is well entrenched in the hearts of the people composing part of another legislative body. In other words, Congress is informed that we must take over Muscle Shoals; that it has us going and coming. Presumably, \$230,589, spent by one company for propaganda in urging its claims on public notice, has not been spent in vain. How much more has been spent for propaganda it would be interesting to know.

It may also be surmised that \$230,589 spent for propaganda has to its credit Alabama laws containing certain exemptions from taxation for the company which are not enjoyed by war-tax ridden citizens, taxpayers who are asked to contribute \$24,000,000 to the Alabama Power Co. on the advice of Army engineers. That company has the right of eminent domain under the law, a right to condemn and destroy the properties of smaller competitors whenever it sees fit to do so. It is supreme in Alabama and has strong connections on surrounding States. It has champions in Congress, who have advocated an \$18,700,000 appropriation for this company in the past and now present an old friend in a brand new \$24,000,000 suit of fixation pattern to replace the discarded \$18,700,000 navigation garb of last year.

I have briefly presented some facts regarding a company whose president lists 58 per cent of the company assets under the items "propaganda" and "patents." These matters presumably are to be passed upon by Army engineers representing the Secretary of War. In order to determine the value of their judgment I will revert briefly to recent history connected with this same Muscle Shoals project when garbed in a peek-a-boo "navigation" waste.

Before doing so an interesting coincidence may be mentioned. I have not questioned the motives or good intentions of the committee in authorizing the Government to finance the concerns represented by Mr. Washburn and Mr. Worthington, which will give some standing to the \$100,000,000 stock-selling operations they are promoting. I believe the committee has been misled by the "preparedness" argument that already covers a multitude of questionable proposals.

#### A PROMISING FERTILIZER MONOPOLY.

To those of an investigating turn of mind, however, I call attention to the fact that the great Duke interests are reported to control the best phosphate fields in this country. The Ammo-Phos. Corporation is a great fertilizer company capitalized at

\$6,000,000 organized less than six months ago, with J. B. Duke chairman of the board of directors. Mr. Duke was formerly president and one of the organizers of the American Tobacco Trust. Mr. Washburn has stated that the most important single contribution toward a high-grade fertilizer "would be a high-grade chemical salt containing nitrogen and phosphorus." "The process for the fixation of atmospheric nitrogen will contribute the nitrogen content to such a fertilizer compound."

With this state of facts, what a complete fertilizer monopoly might be brought about, providing the Duke phosphate and Washburn water-power interests joined forces and were financed by the Government.

If the technologist for Mr. Washburn's company is right in saying the cyanamid business may be scrapped and out of business soon, the project will not be a serious menace to agricultural interests of the country; but to show that every contingency may have been provided for I call attention to the fact that Mr. K. F. Cooper, who is vice president of the \$6,000,000 Duke fertilizer company, recently organized, is by a singular circumstance general manager of the American Cyanamid Co., of which Mr. Washburn is president, according to the Engineering News, volume 73, No. 1, page 21. More interesting information might be afforded on the same subject if time permitted.

#### MUSCLE SHOALS IN A NEW GARB.

Section 82 does not state the amount or location of the proposed "fixation" factory, but every member of the Military Committee familiar with the statements of Mr. Washburn and Maj. Burgess before that committee understands that Muscle Shoals on the Tennessee River is the location desired. Burgess said substantially he did not know anything about water powers on the Columbia River or elsewhere that would be as suitable as Muscle Shoals. He further stated that it would cost the Government \$14,500,000 for a plant and dam 100 feet high. This is not the whole project planned by Washburn, but is part of it, and Maj. Burgess admits, page 44 of his testimony, his proposition would prevent navigation between the upper and lower river, but as he naively says of this waterway, it is only navigable at this point "for about six months in the year."

A fairly clear statement of Muscle Shoals appears on pages 1137 and 1142, inclusive, of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for January 13 of this year. The facts there presented will be reverted to because they disclose the methods of the Alabama Power Co. and the harmony of action among our Army engineers.

Muscle Shoals is a short stretch of the Tennessee River that was originally unnavigable. The United States Government gave a land grant of 400,000 acres of land to Alabama for a fund with which to build a canal and improve two rapids on the Tennessee River of which Muscle Shoals was one.

Alabama soon gave up the proposition but not the land grant, and then the Government undertook the contract of improving navigation at that point by building a canal upon which we have thus far spent \$4,550,000 for "navigation." In 1913 the total commerce reached less than 6,000 tons, or about two train loads. Every ton of freight floated through the canal cost the Government \$40, according to calculations based on interest and maintenance.

A number of years ago the Alabama Power Co. bought up parcels of land along the river and secured all the available water-power sites. After the laws of Alabama were adjusted to relieve the company of taxes the company with its peculiar methods of propaganda started to have the Government build a 150-foot dam or two dams totaling 150 feet for "navigation" in order to develop the water power for the use of the company. A brief history of the effort is contained in Committee Document 20, Sixty-third Congress, last session.

As Army engineers are to determine the location of the fixation factory after the manner proposed by Maj. Burgess, I desire to further give a brief insight into the methods of the engineers as disclosed by Document No. 20, which was prepared by the Chief of Engineers for the guidance of Congress.

#### THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT OF ARMY ENGINEERS.

Briefly, the proposition was for the Government to appropriate \$8,575,000 for two dams 150 feet high for navigation. Then it was to pay \$1,750,000 additional for flowage rights, and then \$8,325,000 more was to be loaned to the Alabama Power Co. at 3 per cent for 100 years to be repaid in installments. Eighteen million seven hundred thousand dollars in all was to be paid by the Government.

That is what Army engineers recommended. Scandalous? Yes; and unbusinesslike; but that is the proposal at Muscle Shoals for "navigation" in 1915.

Col. Riché would not stand for the flowage gift and he says in Document No. 20—

I recommend all lands and easements be donated to the United States and do not fear delay will result in loss to the United States or prevent the improvement of Muscle Shoals.

In this he was overruled by the board of which Col. Black, the present Chief of Engineers, was chairman. Col. Black signed a report for the board in which he said that to await donations of flowage rights—

would doubtless lead to considerable delay and would be apt to defeat the present opportunity to make this improvement in favorable terms.

Col. Black wrote the report proposing a donation of \$1,750,000 to the power company for flowage rights after Riché had protested against its payment. Col. Black is the engineer who reversed Deakayne and Townsend on the Missouri River \$20,000,000 wasteful project.

#### CONGRESS TO DELEGATE POWER TO COL. BLACK.

Col. (now Gen.) Black is the present Chief of Engineers called upon to determine the merits of this fixation proposition. Last year he recommended \$18,700,000 for Muscle Shoals, \$10,325,000 of which was for 150-foot dams for navigation to accommodate 6,000 tons of commerce. This year he is to decide the fixation preparedness Alabama Power Co.'s proposal. Is Congress ready to delegate this power to Col. Black. Last year I proposed an investigation of the Muscle Shoals project, which is indefensible; but it is no worse than this new nitrogen-fixation craze, which appears to be the result of a carefully prepared propaganda sprung at the psychological moment, having for its ultimate aim the development of Muscle Shoals by the Government for the benefit of the Alabama Power Co.

Last session a preliminary Muscle Shoals item was placed in the rivers and harbors 1915 bill just before its introduction on the floor of the House. The item was stricken from the bill after a hard fight on the floor. It was then reinserted when the bill was reported to the Senate, but the bill was defeated in the Senate. Then the Army engineers, under a supposed reexamination of the river for which no specific appropriation was made, spent, according to press reports, \$90,000 more at this same point.

At the beginning of this session the Muscle Shoals item bobbed up before the Rivers and Harbors Committee, but was refused a place for "navigation." Word was then circulated that it would be placed in one of the preparedness bills—and it is here.

Discredited as a navigation proposal it yet had the indorsement of Army engineers. Recommended for a nitrogen-fixation project it surely has their approval, because they recommended a partnership with the Alabama company in Document No. 20. If it should fail to meet with the approval of Congress, notwithstanding the engineers' O. K., it may yet be inserted in the Agricultural bill as a fertilization proposition that will give untold (?) benefit to the agricultural interests of the country.

I have many communications relative to the lobby methods pursued, and connecting this lobby with the recent water-power bill passed in another body. I have also communications relating to the stock-selling end of this \$100,000,000 company, but will not discuss that phase of the question.

#### SECTION 82 SHOULD BE STRICKEN FROM THE BILL.

These may be attached as exhibits but have no part in this statement of facts. I have briefly shown that Mr. Washburn, who represents many companies, has endeavored to float his project at Government expense. That it is not a safe proposal to undertake, according to the ablest electrochemical men in the country. These men, who have no interest in the action of Congress, state unanimously that the Washburn cyanamid process can not compete with the by-product of coal process. They quote the expert of Mr. Washburn's company as admitting that the cyanamid process may be "scrapped" and out of business in a few years. Not one of the engineers indorsed Mr. Washburn's glowing statements, according to the Electro Chemical Society's official record, and, strange to say, Mr. Washburn has never replied to them, so far as that record discloses. His own interest in the result has been manifest for years. He controls over 1,000,000 horsepower. It is a proper case for private enterprise, but to ask the Government to go into a foolhardy proposition condemned by experts familiar with the subject is to perpetrate waste and inefficient business methods as discreditable as those which have been followed in our river and harbor legislation. And by a singular coincidence Army engineers are depended upon in both instances to put over the proposal.

#### GOVERNMENT MANUFACTURE OF NITRATE.

Let the Government manufacture its own explosives if desired. Whether by the coal-extraction process or by air-fixation process should be determined only after careful investigation. To give

the Secretary of War power to decide, and to place that discretionary power in the hands of the Army engineers, is foolhardy and unbusinesslike in the extreme.

If need be, let us condemn and take over private water powers wherever located as a military necessity, leaving the owners to their recovery in the Court of Claims. That would avoid the hold-up proceeding which will certainly result under the provisions of section 82.

I do not believe the country is in a mood to accept any pork-barrel proposal in the preparedness bill. Scandal is sure to attach to any political party espousing such an indefensible proposal.

Those who advocate Government manufacture of war supplies have ground on which to stand, and those who advocate permitting private parties of known business experience and standing to furnish part of our war supplies may also find justification for such course, but no excuse can be offered for a proposal which requires the Government to finance a proposition for a private company with practically certain disaster to the venture—a vicious proposition which the Government can finance only through war taxes levied upon the people.

No more astounding delegation of authority was ever proposed in Congress under any administration than this unlimited authorization for a proposed expenditure of \$24,000,000 by the Government at Muscle Shoals, in partnership with companies that list over one-half of their assets as patent rights and propaganda in the proposed partnership, and many list water-power privileges and patent rights in this new arrangement at any amount acceptable to the Army engineers, who at the last session agreed that over \$10,000,000 should be credited under the head of "Navigation"; with companies that are trying at the present time at both ends of the Capitol to get \$20,000,000 or more from the Government through the Agricultural, river and harbor, and preparedness bills; with companies that, when squarely defeated on this floor, are endeavoring to insert their proposals in the Agricultural bill now before another body, with the hope that through conference their vicious proposal may become law at this session; with companies that are primarily speculative promotion enterprises, according to the judgment of experts whose opinions I have quoted. Section 82 is an effort to put through Congress a proposal that will not stand the light of publicity and should be stricken from the bill.

#### EXHIBIT 1.

[From Manufacturers' Record, Mar. 9, 1916.]

ONE HUNDRED MILLION DOLLAR BOND ISSUE ARRANGED BY ALABAMA POWER CO.—HYDROELECTRIC PLANT ON COOSA RIVER TO BE DOUBLED IN CAPACITY AT ONCE AND LARGE STEAM PLANT BUILT—FUTURE PLANS OUTLINED.

The Alabama Power Co. has arranged to spend \$100,000,000 in carrying out its plans for great hydroelectric developments in the middle South. A loan has been secured through the placing of bonds for the large amount named.

Expenditures will be made throughout a term of years.

About \$4,000,000 will be used at once in more than doubling the company's present units of hydroelectric development on the Coosa River, near Birmingham; also in the construction of an auxiliary steam plant in the Birmingham district, possibly on the Warrior River.

Writing to the Manufacturers' Record of the company's plans, Mr. James Mitchell, president of the Alabama company, New York, under date of March 4, makes announcements as follows:

"This company is now providing for a bond issue to be limited to \$100,000,000, of which \$4,000,000 has been placed for immediate needs, and further amounts can be issued when and as required.

"Contracts have been placed for a new hydroelectric unit at the Lock 12 plant on the Coosa River. This unit will be about 20,000 horsepower, or slightly larger than the original units.

"Plans are now being worked out for the installation of a 20,000-kilowatt steam plant, which is necessary to safeguard the company's power supply in times of extreme drought. Contracts have not yet been placed for this plant, but will be placed during the coming week. The site has not been definitely selected, but there are many opportunities to place such a plant along the Black Warrior River basin, where coal can be cheaply obtained from numerous mines, so the choice of location is not a matter of immediate moment.

"The company plans extension of its transmission lines in a number of directions and intends to be ready at all times to meet the demands of the community it serves."

In connection with the occasion for employing the \$96,000,000, not covered by immediate plans, it is stated that "the Alabama Co.'s ultimate development in Alabama is predicated upon legislation regarding power sites now sought in Washington and bears special reference to the use of Muscle Shoals. The large water-power site owners of the country are pressing certain legislation which is being as stoutly resisted by others who claim that too much encroachment upon the rights of the public is contemplated in the form in which the power-site owners desire this legislation. The use of the remainder of the \$100,000,000 available bears relation to the ultimate future and the possibilities of favorable legislation."

#### EXHIBIT 2.

[From the New York Times, Dec. 29, 1915, front page article, fourth column.]

NITROGEN FROM AIR READY FOR MARKET—JAMES B. DUKE ANNOUNCES COMPANY WILL TURN OUT 4 TONS OF NITRIC ACID DAILY—PRICES TO BE MUCH LOWER—SOUTHERN ELECTRO-CHEMICAL AND OTHER CONCERNS HAVE BEEN EXPERIMENTING FOR MONTHS.

Nitric acid obtained by extracting nitrogen from the air will be put on the market next Saturday by the Southern Electro-Chemical Co., according to James B. Duke, one of its officers.

This announcement follows close upon the recommendation of Brig. Gen. William M. Crozier, Chief of Ordnance of the United States Army, who in his annual report published yesterday urged that the Nation take steps to be independent of the Chilean beds for the nitrates used in making gunpowder.

The Southern Electro-Chemical Co. and several other corporations have been experimenting for months upon foreign processes for the derivation of nitrogen in an inexpensive way from the realm of cloud-land.

Mr. Duke's company expects to turn out 4 tons of nitric acid a day from its works at Great Falls, S. C., about 50 miles from Charlotte, and to deliver it at a lower price than that charged for acid made by the present commercial processes.

The chemical will be produced on a much larger scale if the great problem of getting water power cheap enough can be solved. As set forth by Gen. Crozier, the production of nitrates by these new methods depends upon abundant streams and numerous falls.

The work will very likely be carried on in Canada by the Quebec Development Co. (Ltd.), of which Mr. Duke is the president. This company has been acquiring extensive water-power rights in the neighborhood of Lake St. John, and will have works on the Saguenay River. Mr. Duke has operated in this region before, and in June of 1914 a dispute rose between him and officials of the Interstate Chemical Corporation over a process for the making of phosphates and certain power rights. At that time a suit for \$8,000,000 was brought against him by persons who feared that they might be ousted. Several chemists in this city consider the recommendation of Gen. Crozier a practical one, and they see no reason why the Government, by arranging for cheap power, could not foster the "industry of turning the very air to gold in times of peace and ammunition in days of war."

If some kind friend will only state Mr. Duke's predicament as to the "great problem of getting water power cheap enough" to Mr. K. F. Cooper, the vice president of Mr. Duke's \$6,000,000 company, so that he can take the matter up in a friendly spirit with Mr. K. F. Cooper, general manager of Mr. Washburn's \$8,000,000 cyanamid company, possibly a solution of the difficulty may be reached.

#### EXHIBIT 3.

[From Manufacturers' Record, Mar. 9, 1916.]

GOVERNMENT ALIVE TO NECESSITY FOR NITRATE PLANT SOUTH—PLANS POINT TO DEVELOPMENT OF GREAT HYDROELECTRIC DEVELOPMENT AT MUSCLE SHOALS IN THE TENNESSEE RIVER.

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 7, 1916.

In the Army appropriation bill recently reported to the House recommendation was made that there be established a large nitrate factory, to be operated jointly by the United States Government and private interests, for the manufacture of fertilizer in time of peace and nitrates for explosives in case of war. While no site is specified in the bill, the statement has been made by members of the Military Affairs Committee that the board would naturally consider the vast water-power projects on the Tennessee River. The greatest of these is at Muscle Shoals.

The power for the nitrate factory would, of course, be furnished by water power, and a considerable expenditure will be necessary for the improvement of Muscle Shoals.

At the last session of Congress the United States Army engineers recommended to the Rivers and Harbors Committee the adoption of a project which provides for three dams at Muscle Shoals, two to be power dams: Dam No. 1, with a height of 102 feet and a length of 4,450 feet, requiring 1,304,700 cubic yards of cement, and Dam No. 3, with a height of 48 feet and a length of 6,285 feet, requiring 488,500 cubic yards of concrete. When these dams are constructed, they will furnish open-river slack-water navigation for nearly 100 miles on the Tennessee River itself, and improve navigation of two tributaries of the Tennessee River, namely, Elk River for 30 miles and Shoal Creek for 20 miles, making a total improvement on the Tennessee River and its tributaries of nearly 150 miles.

And now, fortunately for the taxpayers of the country, and luckily for the development of the natural resources and commerce in the vast drainage area of the Tennessee River, the costly navigation improvement of the Muscle Shoals stretch of the Tennessee River can be accomplished under a plan by which, "through the development of water power, the United States Government is repaid all of its expenditures for navigation and water-power development, and becomes the sole possessor of all the things for which that expenditure was made."

The accomplishment of the Muscle Shoals project will mean the manufacture of ammonium phosphate, using the phosphate rock from the phosphate fields of Tennessee near by Muscle Shoals, in combination with cyanamid. Ammonium phosphate contains about five times as much plant food as the ordinary fertilizer, making it correspondingly cheaper to handle, bag, ship, and transfer from the point of manufacture to the farmer.

#### EXHIBIT 4.

[From the Decatur Daily, Decatur, Ala., Mar. 9, 1916.]

FLORENCE RAISES \$10,000 FOR SHOALS—CITIZENS CONTRIBUTE LIBERALLY FOR BIG DEVELOPMENT PROJECT.

FLORENCE, ALA., March 9.

That Florentines have unlimited faith in Muscle Shoals development was conclusively proven at a mass meeting held in the courthouse at Florence last night when the circuit court room was taxed to its capacity.

The Muscle Shoals finance committee asked for \$2,500, which was subscribed as fast as the secretaries, H. A. Bradshaw and W. H. Mitchell, could take the names of the contributors. This brought the Florence donation for the furtherance of the Muscle Shoals development up to \$10,000 during the last few months. This money is being used to defray the expenses of those actively engaged in the oversight of the public's interest in this all-important project.

R. T. Simpson, president of the commercial club, introduced Col. C. W. Ashcraft, who said people from one end of this country to the other are talking Muscle Shoals. Instead of impoverishing other sections, as is often the case in big enterprises, our progress in the Muscle Shoals development is the progress of every section of the United States. It stands head and shoulders above everything else in Washington. Many of the important congressional committees are considering it simultaneously.

The speaker complimented the Shields bill and said it removes obstacles that have heretofore existed. He declared our "preparedness" is our salvation. The surveys and plans for Muscle Shoals develop-

ment are made, and it stands 999 chances out of 1,000 to be selected as the site of a Government nitrate plant.

Mr. N. C. Elting, chairman of the finance committee, said: "I presume every man, woman, and child in Lauderdale county is for preparedness. If all had been prepared, the fearful war now raging would never have been." He said the conditions relative to Muscle Shoals are indeed optimistic. He read the following telegrams from Washington:

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 7.

N. C. ELTING, Florence, Ala.:

Will you please extend my thanks and hearty feeling of congratulations and encouragement to the courageous, upstanding, constructive people of Florence, and tell them that the bill introduced in the House by the Military Committee authorizing the development of water power and construction of atmospheric nitrogen nitric-acid plants, and Chairman HAY, in his report on the bill, in part says:

"The committee consider this question of the first importance in the consideration of preparedness for national security." Our efforts supported by the lead of Florence secured the authorization for the proposed development, and if Florence will stand pat, put up and see us through, we will get these plants. The total development with fertilizer plants established to cost \$50,000,000.

J. W. WORTHINGTON.

WASHINGTON, March 7, 1916.

N. C. ELTING, Florence, Ala.

Vote on Shields bill will not be taken until to-morrow and probably not until Thursday. Its passage is conceded.

J. W. WORTHINGTON.

And thereby hangs a tale. Is it not an astounding situation that committees at both ends of the Capitol are called upon to appropriate from \$20,000,000 to \$24,000,000 of Government funds to help out the Alabama Water Power Co., in the rivers and harbors bill, for "navigation"; or to provide in the Agricultural bill for a "fertilizing factory"; or in the military bill for "explosives"? Will the item get through Congress by some parliamentary juggle? I have given facts that deserve the examination of everyone interested in keeping the military bill and all other bills free from suspicion and scandal.

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, in the temporary absence of the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. HAY], who has left the control of the time in my hands, I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. OLNEY].

Mr. OLNEY. Mr. Chairman, the Committee on Military Affairs presents to the first session of the Sixty-fourth Congress a unanimous report on House bill 12766, known as the Hay bill, increasing the military efficiency of the United States.

Since the time allotted to the committee has been necessarily limited, I intend to devote my limited portion to certain features of the bill which appeal particularly to me in their adoption.

The American National Red Cross, through its president, Miss Mabel T. Boardman, appeared before the Military Affairs Committee and made a profound impression. It is granted permission by this bill to erect buildings on any military reservations of the United States suitable for the storage of supplies which shall be available for the aid of the civilian population in cases of serious national disaster. Within the last decade, the American Red Cross, in directing 80 large relief works, has distributed supplies and relief funds aggregating over \$15,000,000, and any further relief and assistance which this Government may tender to this worthy cause must be commended.

It also appeared in evidence that Japan to-day has 1,800,000 members of its Red Cross, Germany has 1,000,000, Russia has 1,000,000, England has 500,000, and the United States a paltry membership of 27,000 members. This statement shamed me so much that I immediately enlisted as a soldier of the American Red Cross, as this button in the lapel of my coat will show you. [Applause.] And if I only had the green ribbon indicative of this memorable day I might be the man of the hour or the man of the day. [Applause.]

I am thankful to say that since Miss Boardman gave her testimony, energetic efforts and solicitations have brought the membership of the American Red Cross to well over 30,000 members. [Applause.]

I consider the American Red Cross one of the most important arms of the Government in time of war, and its usefulness can not be exaggerated.

The Military Affairs Committee builded better than we knew when section 83 makes provision for summer military training camps after the idea of the Plattsburg camp. The committee was unanimous in its opinion that the continental-army plan to enroll 133,000 men each year for three years until a force of volunteers of 400,000 was enrolled was doomed to disappointment and failure. The idea of one or two months' intensive training a year was a capital one, but when we consider that the continental army would have cost the Government \$15,000,000 the first year, \$30,000,000 the second year, and \$45,000,000 the third year, and that volunteers would be recruited largely from the ranks of salaried men, it was deemed an expensive and impracticable experiment. Furthermore, the military camps are

not vacation schools, and the young men who join such camps are entitled to their vacations; and how many public-spirited citizens exist to-day who will pay their clerks, the main artery of supply for summer camps, full pay for two months' absence from business.

The continental-army plan having fallen to pieces, why not encourage the increase and development of summer military training camps all over the country, where periodical military drill of four weeks' duration is taught? A healthy renewal of interest in the Plattsburg and similar camps founded last summer has been evident, since nearly 20,000 men have been drilling inside during the winter months, and 1,500 patriotic citizens alone of Boston and vicinity are included. The original incorporators of the Plattsburg Camp Association inform me that present indications are that at least 30,000 men will attend military training camps in the season of 1916 at many points between the two oceans, and that Plattsburg alone is making provision for five periodical encampments from June 5 to October 1. The men of Plattsburg who appeared before our committee sought Federal recognition and control.

In the United States about a million men are coming of age each year, and at least three-quarters are fit for military training, and there are nearly 5,000,000 men between the ages of 19 and 25 fit for service.

In addition, there are at least 700,000 young business and professional men who would be eligible to join military training camps. The work of such camps is considered supplemental to the work of the State militia and in nowise conflicts with the interests of the National Guard. On the contrary, evidence has shown that service at Plattsburg and other camps has stimulated military drill to such an extent that the ranks of the National Guard have been swelled materially by summer-camp volunteers. While the Plattsburg Camp Association did not seek an appropriation, I feel confident that a substantial appropriation from Congress, say \$3,000,000, would be acceptable. This sum would train and provide for 75,000 volunteers and would remove from these military camps the idea or stigma generally prevailing that the summer camps are established by and for a privileged class. The Plattsburg Camp Association and similar organizations desire to make the camps as democratic as possible, and to make it possible for the young men of moderate means to take advantage of one month's intensive drill during the summer, and they would welcome an appropriation for this reason. The cost per man is about \$40 for his four weeks' instruction, and food subsistence is reckoned on the same basis as a regular soldier. When the proper time comes I shall urge this House to grant such an appropriation, and we can thus secure a strong volunteer reserve force, a real substantial continental army, if you will, on an economical basis, which will have the benefit of one month's intensive training eight hours per day and which would not be subject to duty in time of strikes or riots.

Personally I am keenly interested and enthusiastic in the future development of the summer camps, not only as a school of instruction in military tactics but also as a move for the betterment of the health and morale of the American youth. But I want to bring the camps within the reach of all citizens.

I want the people of my district furnished the means and opportunity to enlist their services at Plattsburg. Besides stockbrokers, lawyers, business men, and clerks who have patriotically drilled at the camps, I want the shoe operatives and the granite cutters in the fourteenth district of Massachusetts, as well as the 6,000 skilled mechanics of the Fore River Shipbuilding Corporation, furnished the same chance of enlistment. A substantial appropriation will provide the means of bringing together a splendid body of citizens at the summer military training camps, where a broad democratic spirit will be disseminated and inoculated, and this air and spirit of good-fellowship and comradeship once fostered and created will bear fruitful results and will prevail ad infinitum.

At my request, Mr. Samuel Gompers, president of the American Federation of Labor, wrote me the following letter, in answer to a question concerning the feasibility and future development of the Plattsburg Camp Association:

WASHINGTON, D. C., March 13, 1916.

Hon. RICHARD OLNEY, 2nd,  
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

Sir: There are many features of the Plattsburg camp idea which I heartily approve, but there are some features that I can not wholly endorse. In reply to an invitation to visit the Plattsburg camp last summer, I wrote Gen. Leonard Wood, calling his attention to some of these. The features and the tendencies that I could not approve were the limitations put upon the democracy of the movement.

Under the provisions for the Plattsburg and similar training camps, it was impossible for men working for wages to avail themselves of the opportunity for military training, physical development, and outdoor life.

To be sure, I fully appreciate the fact that the Plattsburg camp was democratic in spirit, and with this spirit must have had a lasting effect upon those of different walks of life who for a few weeks at least lived together without artificial distinctions, under conditions which brought out the inherent value and good qualities of the men.

But, as I have said before, because of inability to pay their expenses in such a training camp, the wage earners were practically debarred from this opportunity.

In order to provide for all citizens equal opportunity for participation in training camps, there must be some compensation for loss of wages, otherwise those with small incomes will be unable to benefit by them.

There are many indications that there has been a decrease in the virility of our Nation during the past decade. Whatever the cause of this decrease in physical power and resistance, it is a matter of grave concern to all.

Agencies that will build up our citizens physically must be a part of our social organization. Nor is this of concern from the military standpoint only, or purely as a problem of national defense. The effects of increased vigor and of better health among our citizens will be plainly shown in increased efficiency in all activities of life. If these agencies are in accord with democratic ideals, they will leave an indelible impression upon the mental outlook and the habits of all those who come under their influence.

In addition to what I have written, you may perhaps be interested in my address at the annual meeting of the National Civic Federation, on the subject of "National Preparedness." That address, together with a letter I wrote to the National Security League, was made a public document. I am sending you a copy, and call your attention specially to the first four paragraphs on page 10.

Very truly, yours,

SAML. GOMPERS,

President American Federation of Labor.

The most expert testimony to the Military Affairs Committee showed that the United States Army, such as it is, about 100,000 strong, is the most competent and efficient in the world man for man. The rules and regulations for enlistment in the Regular Army are so strict that only the best fitted recruits, mentally, morally, and physically, are accepted. The Adjutant General's report for the last fiscal year informs us that there were 168,842 applicants, of which 123,731 were rejected.

Gen. McCain testified that 50,000 was the maximum number that could be expected to be recruited in a year in time of peace—using extraordinary measures. It was also indicated that a minimum peace strength of 140,000 men would satisfy and comply with present conditions, providing that the reserves and reservoirs for the second line of defense were sufficiently adequate and powerful.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Massachusetts has expired.

Mr. OLNEY. May I have a little more time, I will ask the gentleman from Virginia?

SEVERAL MEMBERS. Give him more time.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman one minute more.

Mr. OLNEY. Mr. Chairman, I am proud to be reckoned a Member of the Sixty-fourth Congress of the United States, the most important since the Civil War. I am proud to have been one Member of that great majority which lately upheld in no uncertain voice the foreign policy of the President, which action obliterates the impression in European countries that this House was a house divided against American law, liberties, and institutions.

As Abraham Lincoln was the man of destiny and hope in the nineteenth century, so in these crucial and critical times of war and rumors of war do we as a Nation place our trust and confidence in Woodrow Wilson as the man of destiny and hope in the twentieth century, believing that his wisdom will prevent entangling alliances, and that he, the pilot and captain, in avoiding dangerous rocks and treacherous reefs, with steady hand and cool judgment will steer our ship of state at the proper time into a harbor of refuge and safety.

Although the Hay bill was reported unanimously, through the courtesy of the chairman each member was allowed to reserve his right to support any changes or amendments which would more particularly conform to his opinion of how the efficiency of the United States Army would be more thoroughly established.

Conditions of affairs change almost in a night, as evidenced in the recent complications in Mexican affairs. How splendid was the wisdom and patriotism of this Congress as displayed in the late afternoon of March 14, when, almost to a man, in this Chamber it arose and authorized the War Department, through the Hay resolution, to recruit the Regular Army immediately to its statutory strength, supplying at once a reservoir for 19,000 additional troops. Memorable was the day and commendable the action thereof.

Should the United States intervene in Mexico within the next six months, intervention will only come because our patience will be exhausted and our national honor will be at stake, and

the course of the President will have the moral and physical support of every red-blooded American. [Applause.]

Mr. KAHN. I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Delaware [Mr. MILLER].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Delaware is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. MILLER of Delaware. Mr. Chairman, I am very glad to be given time following the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. OLNEY], because in part of his remarks he dealt with the military training camps to which section 83 of this bill relates, otherwise known as the "Plattsburg idea." Section 83 of this bill is the particular section to which I will address myself at this time in the few minutes at my disposal. This section gives the Secretary of War authority to maintain, upon military reservations or elsewhere, camps for the military instruction and training of such citizens as may be selected for instruction and training, upon their own application and under such terms of enlistments and regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War. In addition, the Secretary of War is authorized by this section to use, for the purpose of maintaining these camps and imparting military instruction and training, such arms, ammunition, accouterments, equipments, tentage, and field equipage as is necessary.

The section also authorizes the Secretary of War to furnish the citizens undergoing instruction, at the expense of the United States, subsistence and medical supplies during the period of attendance. The Secretary of War is also authorized to prescribe courses of theoretical and practical instruction to be pursued by the persons attending the camps after they have dispersed to their homes. If this bill becomes a law and the section to which I have referred is included therein, there will be established throughout this country a system of military training camps such as were held last year at Plattsburg Barracks in New York State and at Fort Sheridan in the State of Illinois, which camps were under the direction and supervision of the Regular Army officers. It is my understanding that this particular section was prepared by certain gentlemen of the Military Affairs Committee after consulting with the War Department, with a view to establishing the so-called military training camps throughout the country by national legislation. Last year it was my privilege to undergo the regular course of instruction at the first Plattsburg camp held for business and professional men. At this camp there were over twelve hundred men, from practically every State east of the Mississippi River, and at the second camp about 600 additional. I therefore feel that I can bring to the attention of the House some useful information concerning this particular question.

The President of the United States in a recent message to Congress said:

It will be right enough, right American policy, based upon our accustomed principles and practices, to provide a system by which every citizen who will volunteer for the training may be made familiar with the use of modern arms, the rudiments of drill and maneuver, and the maintenance and sanitation of camps. We should encourage such training and make it a means of discipline which our young men will learn to value.

It was demonstrated last year that through the disinterested effort of the young men of the country and without any governmental action except the interest of a few Regular Army officers under Maj. Gen. Wood, the "Plattsburg idea" has come to stay, regardless of whether the Government will officially recognize it by legislation and appropriation of money. If, however, this plan is established by law the system referred to by the President in the remarks I have just quoted will, in fact, become a reality.

#### THE NATIONAL GUARD'S ATTITUDE.

It has been said by some people that the so-called training-camp idea would hurt the National Guard. We have evidence to the contrary, however, in a letter which I shall not read at this time in full, but which I will ask unanimous consent to insert in my remarks, from Maj. Gen. John F. O'Ryan, of the New York National Guard, in which he states that, on the contrary, the so-called "Plattsburg idea" of military camps has aided the National Guard in the State of New York, because a great number of men who served at Plattsburg have entered the various organizations in the State of New York. It might be well at this point to call attention to an allusion in his letter in which he says in some localities there are men who desire military training, but who are so circumscribed that they can not make available for the purpose the amount of time demanded by service in the National Guard. He means by that, I dare say, those of our citizens whose business or occupation prevents them from attending regularly the weekly drills. In addition, there are a great many people who live in the country, not near enough to the cities where the armories or National

Guard units are located to take advantage of membership in those organizations, and therefore they can not see service, much as they would like to, in the National Guard.

Under the training-camp plan a man can serve his apprenticeship rather than throughout the year in a system of weekly drills in a 30 days' continuous course of military training in one of the training camps. I have only brought forward the question of the National Guard as it relates to training camps because I desire to be fair to both systems and to show that both can operate alongside of each other and in many instances in conjunction with each other. Under the bill the various National Guard units are supposed to have 48 weekly drills throughout the year of one and a half hours' duration, together with two weeks in the field. Allowing 10 hours per day for field service, it will be seen that the total hours per annum under this system amount to 212 hours. Allowing the same number of hours for field service, a 30 days' course of instruction and training at a military training camp will show 300 hours per annum. I merely mention this point to show that those of our citizens who can not take advantage of the National Guard will not fare badly under the military training-camp system when it comes to a sum total of military training and drill. At this point I desire to insert Maj. Gen. O'Ryan's letter, to which I have referred:

HEADQUARTERS NATIONAL GUARD OF NEW YORK,  
New York, January 17, 1916.

The question is sometimes asked whether there is any conflict of interest or effort between the organizations of the National Guard and the training camps for college and business men. This question may not only be answered emphatically in the negative, but it may be affirmatively stated with equal emphasis that the training regiments have been of benefit to the National Guard of this State at least. A very considerable number of men of the Plattsburg training regiment have joined organizations of the New York Division, some as commissioned officers and some as enlisted men.

Wholly aside from the foregoing there is another aspect of the training camps which should not be lost sight of. There are in some localities men who desire military training, but who are so circumstanced that they can not make available for the purpose the amount of time demanded by service in the National Guard. Some of the men in this class find it possible to devote 30 days for training during the summer months. The training camps furnish the needed opportunity for men in this class. These camps are, therefore, performing a service to the Nation in respect to such men which it is not possible for the National Guard to perform.

I have no hesitation in urging upon officers of the National Guard throughout the States their fullest cooperation in support of the excellent movement represented by the training camps. In New York State facilities have been provided in some of the armories for detachments of men of the training camps who desire to continue the work begun at Plattsburg.

JOHN F. O'RYAN,  
Major General, N. G. N. Y.

#### THE PRESENT TRAINING-CAMP SYSTEM UNDEMOCRATIC.

The present training-camp system as now constituted, but not recognized by law in the appropriation of money, is undemocratic, because a man who can not afford to pay his transportation or the cost of his subsistence or his clothing is unable to go to these training camps. I believe that the idea put forward in the President's message of a citizens' reserve army can be started and have a strong nucleus in these military training camps if they are established throughout the country and we recognize them in legislation such as is contained in section 83 of this bill and then provide for an appropriation in the Army appropriation bill when it comes out. I think it is the intention of the War Department—and I do not speak without having looked into the matter—that the Government should pay for the subsistence as well as the uniforms of these men while they are in the training camps. It was my experience that, at the outside, it did not cost me more than \$60 to serve at Plattsburg during the 30-day period, and this included subsistence, transportation, and clothing. Of course, that is a good deal of money to some people, and I believe we are doing a wise thing when we make provision to place within the reach of all citizens who are fitted to attend these training camps. The present state of affairs as regards the financial side of these training camps is not the fault of those who originated the idea of these camps, but of the Government, which to date has not provided the necessary legislation or money to place the advantages within the reach of all. In spite of this, however, at last year's camp we saw national statesmen and legislators, famous lawyers, great bankers and merchants, and many high State and city officials standing elbow to elbow in the ranks with men who labor for a daily wage, and both were proud of it.

INDORSED BY THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

Only yesterday the present Secretary of War, Mr. Baker, gave out a letter addressed to the governing committee of the Military Training Camps Association of the United States, in which he unqualifiedly indorsed this plan. I am not going to

read it to the committee now, but I will ask to insert it in my remarks:

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, March 16, 1916.

TO THE GOVERNING COMMITTEE OF THE MILITARY TRAINING  
CAMPS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES.

GENTLEMEN: I heartily approve and indorse the valuable and patriotic service that is being rendered to the country by the army training camps for civilians.

I believe in the work of these camps, not only from the military point of view but as of value to the Nation educationally in promoting discipline, order, and good citizenship. The camps are exactly in line with the sound policy of reliance upon a citizenry trained to arms as our main safeguard for defense.

I appreciate highly the service rendered by the university presidents and civilian committees who are forwarding this movement.

These camps were originated by the War Department in 1913 for the training of students, and have been since extended for the benefit of other citizens, with gratifying results.

You may rest assured that in continuing your work of developing and promoting these camps on a national scale you will have the continued cooperation and support of the War Department.

Yours, most sincerely,

NEWTON D. BAKER,  
Secretary of War.

#### CAMPS DURING 1916.

Beginning in April and extending through September there are to be 11 camps throughout the country, that is, 11 localities where camps are to be held. Four of these are to be held at Plattsburg Barracks; 4 at Fort Oglethorpe, Ga.; 1 at Fort Sheridan, Ill.; 1 at Fort Benjamin Harrison, in Indiana; 1 at Ludington, Mich.; 1 at Fort Douglas, Salt Lake City, Utah; 2 in California; 1 in the Puget Sound district, and 1 at Fort Wright, near Spokane, Wash. In addition there are to be 2 in the southern department—1 at Fort Sam Houston and 1 at Fort Bliss, in Texas. You will see therefore, gentlemen, that it is the idea of the War Department, having these camps in charge, to see that every section of the country is covered so that not only the youth of the land but those of our citizens who are in the prime of life can attend these camps and undergo a course of military training.

Mr. POWERS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MILLER of Delaware. How much time have I remaining, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has two minutes.

Mr. MILLER of Delaware. I will yield to the gentleman from Kentucky for a short question.

Mr. POWERS. I just want to ask the gentleman about the number of people who usually attend these camps.

Mr. MILLER of Delaware. I am very glad the gentleman asked the question. Last year, which was the first year in which camps were held for adults, there were in attendance at the two Plattsburg camps 1,800 men and at Fort Sheridan, in Illinois, approximately 600 men. I am reliably informed that at the present time there are no less than 24,000 applications on file for service at these camps throughout the United States. Bear in mind, gentlemen, that this is under the present conditions, where a man has to go and pay his own subsistence and buy his own clothing, and so forth.

Mr. PLATT. If the gentleman will allow, I think there were three camps at Plattsburg.

Mr. MILLER of Delaware. I am very glad the gentleman called attention to that. The first camp was a students' camp, composed of those young men who were in the high schools and colleges of the country.

Mr. PLATT. Colleges of the country.

Mr. MILLER of Delaware. I want to say here that the inception of the military training-camp idea was started in 1913 more as an educational project rather than one of a militaristic nature, and there was developed from the student camps of 1913 the so-called business and professional mens' camp of 1915.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion I want to state to the committee—and I think that you will agree with me—that the so-called "Plattsburg idea" will be the means of supplying a nucleus of officers for and perhaps a real foundation of a citizens' reserve. I for one do not want to see a big standing army in this country, because I do not think we can have one sufficiently large enough to place our entire reliance thereon; but I do want to see a sufficiently well-drilled, disciplined, and equipped citizens' reserve that will serve this country when it is needed. [Applause.] I overheard the gentleman from New York [Mr. PLATT] ask whether the men who underwent the course of training at Plattsburg did not leave with the exaggerated idea of their own capabilities as officers. I have no hesitancy in saying that the result was just the contrary. The men who went through Plattsburg were taught one of the most beneficial lessons in that they were shown how very little one could learn of the elements that go to make up an officer. The greatest lesson that was impressed upon all those who went to

Plattsburg was the utter impossibility of raising, drilling, and disciplining, to say nothing of equipping, an army in 30 days or many times 30 days.

Another fact brought out was the utter fallacy of the theory that these military training camps will breed and spread a spirit of militarism throughout the land. The men who have been no nearer to war than 30 days in a training camp can well testify that even this short experience tends rather to discourage than encourage a spirit of militarism. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to take any more time of the committee right now, because this question can only be touched upon lightly in the few minutes I have, but I merely wanted to bring the subject before the House, and I firmly believe that if this section is enacted into law with the rest of the bill it will provide a means of supplying this country with trained and disciplined men when they are needed, as well as providing a means in times of peace for those of our citizens who are so inclined to make of themselves more useful citizens. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the RECORD on this particular question. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Delaware? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. MILLER of Delaware. Section 83 of the bill is herewith appended in the extension of remarks:

SEC. 83. That the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to maintain, upon military reservations or elsewhere, camps for the military instruction and training of such citizens as may be selected for such instruction and training, upon their application and under such terms of enlistment and regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War: to use, for the purpose of maintaining said camps and imparting military instruction and training thereat, such arms, ammunition, accouterments, equipments, tentage, field equipage, and transportation belonging to the United States as he may deem necessary; to furnish, at the expense of the United States, subsistence and medical supplies to persons receiving instruction at said camps during the period of their attendance thereat; to authorize such expenditures, from proper Army appropriations, as he may deem necessary for water, fuel, light, temporary structures, not including quarters for officers nor barracks for men, screening, and damages resulting from field exercises, and other expenses incidental to the maintenance of said camps, and the theoretical winter instruction in connection therewith; and to sell to persons receiving instruction at said camps, for cash and at cost price plus 10 per cent, quartermaster and ordnance property, the amount of such property sold to any one person to be limited to that which is required for his proper equipment. All moneys arising from such sales shall remain available throughout the fiscal year following that in which the sales are made, for the purpose of that appropriation from which the property sold was authorized to be supplied at the time of the sale. The Secretary of War is authorized further to prescribe the courses of theoretical and practical instruction to be pursued by persons attending the camps authorized by this section; to fix the periods during which such camps shall be maintained; to prescribe rules and regulations for the government thereof; and to employ thereat officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army in such numbers and upon such duties as he may designate.

REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF UNIVERSITY PRESIDENTS ON THE SUMMER MILITARY INSTRUCTION CAMPS FOR STUDENTS.

NOVEMBER 17, 1915.

These camps have now been in operation for three successive summers. In their growth and admirable management during the past two summers of 1914 and 1915 they have more than fulfilled the expectations of those endorsing them, based on the first year's experience in the summer of 1913. The camps of 1913 and 1914 were held before the breaking out of the great war abroad, which has brought into greater prominence than before their value to the Nation.

We repeat the hearty endorsement given in our reports on the camps held in 1913 and 1914. This year they were visited by a number of the members of our committee, and the committee as a whole has given attention and thought to their educational usefulness in the summer season.

The students attending are under careful oversight. The excellence of food, sanitation, and medical care has been well maintained. The students have an ideal five weeks' outing, pleasurable and beneficial to them; and the instruction, drill, cavalry exercises, field maneuvers, field surveying, and field work generally give them in the continuous five weeks' training an insight into military matters. They are, in addition to this regular work, given ample time for recreation and rest.

We commend the camps to the authorities and students of universities and colleges of the country. We believe that the training and instruction which the students attending receive not only emphasize the dangers and losses of wars lightly and unpreparedly entered into, but we also believe that the training given is excellent, and a great benefit, mental and physical, to the students attending.

President John G. Hibben, chairman, Princeton University; President A. Lawrence Lowell, Harvard University; President Arthur Twining Hadley, Yale University; President John H. Finley, University of the State of New York and Commissioner of Education; President H. B. Hutchins, University of Michigan; Superintendent E. W. Nichols, Virginia Military Institute; President Benjamin Ide Wheeler, University of California; President J. G. Schurman, Cornell University; President Edmund J. James, University of Illinois; Chancellor J. H. Kirkland, Vanderbilt University; President A. C. Humphreys, Stevens Institute of Technology; President H. A. Garfield, Williams College; President George H. Denny, University of Alabama; President Henry Sturgis Drinker, Lehigh University, secretary.

Data contained in circular sent out by the Military Training Camps Association of the United States appended in the extension of remarks.

MILITARY TRAINING CAMPS OF THE REGULAR ARMY—THEIR HISTORY AND VALUE UNDER ANY PLAN OF NATIONAL DEFENSE—THE NECESSITY FOR A CAMPAIGN OF EDUCATION, ITS COST, AND APPEAL FOR ITS SUPPORT.

1. THE STUDENT CAMPS.

In July, 1913, the first training camp of the Regular Army for college and high-school students was held on the field of Gettysburg. The plan originated with Maj. Gen. Wood, United States Army, and was part of the effort to arouse the young men of the Nation to a sense of their military responsibilities or, in Gen. Wood's words, to justify manhood suffrage by the ability and readiness to render manhood service in the cause of national defense. In 1913 a students' camp was also held at Monterey, Cal., and in 1914 and 1915 similar camps were held in various parts of the country.

While these camps have been very successful, they have been attended by only 1,720 students in all. This has been due almost entirely to lack of funds and organization to put the camp idea before the general body of students throughout the country.

2. THE PLATTSBURG CAMPS OF 1915.

In June, 1915, a corresponding movement was started among the younger professional and business men. This movement spread through many of the large cities of the country and resulted in the Plattsburg training camps for business and professional men of 1915.

On account of lack of time, preventing any well-organized effort, the camps were necessarily recruited in a haphazard manner, but nevertheless resulted in an attendance of 1,800 men at Plattsburg.

Like the student camps, these camps were held with the approval of the War Department and under officers of the Regular Army. A high standard of morale and substantial military results were attained.

Indirectly the Plattsburg idea brought about a similar camp at Fort Sheridan, Ill., attended by over 500 men, and similar movements in various parts of the country. A camp has been recently announced to be held at Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., for southern men, and plans are being made for sectional camps on a large scale in the summer of 1916. Unquestionably the Plattsburg idea has had great influence throughout the Nation in developing a sense of military obligation among the young men of the country. It is capable, however, of accomplishing infinitely greater results if organized and developed.

3. THE MILITARY TRAINING CAMPS ASSOCIATION.

The students attending these Regular Army student camps formed in 1913 at Gettysburg "The Society of the National Reserve Corps," for the purpose of promoting the training-camp idea and supporting a sound military policy. The men of the business and professional men's camps formed an organization for similar purposes at Plattsburg in 1915.

With the object of coordinating and developing the common aims of these organizations there has recently been organized the "Military Training Camps Association of the United States," for the purpose of "encouraging reasonable military training for citizens of the United States by promoting a national system of training camps and by such other means as may be advisable."

The membership of this new national association will be restricted to men who have actually attended Regular Army military camps. It starts with a membership of 3,500 men, and it is expected that members of future camps will join the association, so that the movement for citizen military training will be promoted by a single strong national organization. It will steer clear of political activities and, as distinguished from other societies for national defense, will avoid legislative propaganda and devote itself exclusively to the single purpose of encouraging and providing military training for young men.

4. FUNCTION OF THE ASSOCIATION.

The immediate object of the Military Training Camps Association will be to recruit a large number of men for the 1916 military camps. While it is as yet uncertain exactly what form legislation will take in Congress, it is certain that instruction camps for civilians will be held on a large scale in 1916 and form a part of our permanent military policy.

Whether or not the Congress of 1916 makes provision for the military training of citizens on a large scale, the Military Training Camps Association has an important and useful function to perform. It is certain that the larger the number of men at summer camps in 1916 the better off will be any plan that Congress may finally adopt. If Congress enacts the legislation now pending for the training of citizen soldiers, it will be the task of our association to obtain recruits for the instruction camps. If Congress fails to provide adequately for the military training of citizens, the vital need of training camps, as the best available means of obtaining a citizen soldiery, compels the support of every citizen to whom the Nation's security and unity have any meaning.

Experience has shown that the recruiting for citizens' camps must be conducted through a strong civilian organization, and that to accomplish results a thorough and well-organized campaign must be conducted.

5. SCOPE OF THE WORK.

There are in the United States nearly 1,000,000 young men coming of age each year, and of this number about 750,000 are conservatively estimated to be fit for military training. Between the ages of 19 and 25 there are over 4,500,000 men fit for service. Of these men it is estimated that there are in the colleges alone not less than 200,000 of proper age and physique. (Actual male attendance in colleges in 1914 was 237,562, in high schools 541,486.) In addition there are at least 700,000 young business and professional men who are fit for and would be benefited by a reasonable amount of military work. While it is not practicable at present to reach directly through a private agency all the young men of the country, it is entirely feasible to bring the "Plattsburg idea" directly to the attention of over 1,000,000 college, high-school, and young business and professional men. A considerable proportion of these men are ready and eager to equip themselves to serve their country if only a practicable plan is presented to them. Such a plan is the summer training camp of the Regular Army.

The aim of the military training camp is to give men of average physique four or five weeks a year of intensive military instruction under officers of the Regular Army, so that at the end of that time men of no previous military experience will at least have learned the rudiments of military organization and discipline, close and open order drill, use of the military rifle, become familiar with the clothing, equipment, feeding, sanitation, and transportation of an army in the field, and the handling and control of men in maneuvers under conditions

approximating those which they should be prepared to meet in active service in time of war.

The work of the training camps is supplementary to the work of the militia of the States. The military camps afford opportunities to those men whose business or professions or home ties do not permit them to attend at regular intervals over an extended period of service in the National Guard, but who are able to devote a few weeks a year under field conditions to preparing themselves for the privilege of sharing in their country's defense in time of need.

The Military Training Camps Association proposes to put the training-camp idea, its opportunities, and advantages, before the great constituency of young men above described.

This will be done by distributing circulars through the medium of the college and graduate lists. Young Men's Christian Associations, commercial and professional organizations, etc., by sending speakers to the colleges and larger cities, by organizing local recruiting committees, and by other similar means.

Bulletin issued by the officer in charge of training camps, Governors Island, N. Y., appended in the extension of remarks in order to illustrate just how the matter is being handled at present.

1916 MILITARY TRAINING CAMP—EASTERN DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES ARMY, FORT OGLETHORPE, GA.

[Bulletin.]

#### 1. QUALIFICATIONS.

An applicant for enrollment for the "business and professional" men's camp must be, first, a citizen of the United States, or have taken out his first papers; second, between 21 and 45 years of age; third, of sound physical condition, capable of hard drill and maneuver marching with a full Infantry equipment, eyesight normal or corrected by glasses to admit of target practice; fourth, have a college education or the equivalent. By "equivalent" is meant a good elementary education which has been supplemented by business or professional training. This to be stated on application blank.

#### 2. PERIOD OF CAMP.

The first camp will open Monday, April 3, and continue to April 30, 1916. Men are required to report in camp on April 3.

If conditions warrant, other camps will follow this one. A student camp will open July 5 for students at least 5 feet 4 inches in height and between the ages of 18 and 30 in universities, colleges, and the graduating class of high schools—and other schools rated as such—or graduates of the same.

#### 3. LOCATION.

The camp will be located at Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., a military post now garrisoned by the Eleventh United States Cavalry.

It is near Chattanooga, Tenn., with both electric and steam railway service between the city and the camp.

#### 4. CAMP EQUIPMENT AND EXPENSES.

Arms, ordnance, and equipment, including mess outfit, will be furnished by the United States Army.

Expenses, for four weeks (exclusive of transportation to and from camp, and the uniform, which costs from \$8 to 10), about \$30. This to be deposited in advance and includes \$5 to cover loss or damage to United States property, which is refunded in case no loss or damage is incurred. This sum covers board, camp expenses, and ammunition expended.

Government loans tentage, ordnance (full field equipment), blankets, ponchos, cots, pillows, sweaters, and mattresses.

City furnishes camp site, drill grounds, running water, and electric lights (latter in mess shacks, Y. M. C. A. tents, officers' and orderly tents, rear, and showers). It also pays for damage to crops or maneuvers.

Y. M. C. A. furnishes a large tent for each battalion, tables, chairs, and writing materials.

All instructors are officers of the Regular Army.

NOTE.—Each company has attached to it one sergeant and one private of the Regular Army as sergeant instructor and signaler, respectively.

Extra pay for cooks and waiters—who are detailed enlisted men—is paid out of the \$30 deposit.

#### 5. UNIFORMS.

Each man must take one pair tan marching shoes; medium weight socks; one pair light shoes, or sneakers; underwear; two pairs of olive-drab breeches, cotton; one pair leggings, regular pattern; two olive-drab shirts, wool; one Army blouse, cotton; one campaign hat and cord (special for military training camp); toilet articles and other necessities.

Articles of uniform may be purchased from Post Exchange, Fort Oglethorpe, Ga.; Army and Navy Cooperative Stores, 16 East Forty-second Street, New York; Sigmund Eisner, 103 Fifth Avenue, New York; or from camp store. These outfitters will furnish measurement blanks on request.

The Munson last shoe is recommended, but any good tramping or hunting shoe of fair leather will be satisfactory. Must be broken in.

All necessary articles of uniform or clothing may be purchased at the camp store conducted by the camp authorities.

Civilian clothing, etc., in trunks and suit cases will be properly stored.

#### 6. TRANSPORTATION.

Chattanooga, Tenn., is reached by the following railway systems: Southern; N. C. & St. L.; C. & N. O. & T. P.; Central of Georgia; A. G. S.; W. & A. Camp is reached by steam or electric railway.

Arrangements have been made for special rate for attendants of 1½ cents per mile each way for the round trip.

Facilities for moving passengers and baggage direct to the camp have been made.

Agents of any of the above railway systems will furnish information as to rates, routes, schedules, and arrangements for special cars and trains where the numbers warrant.

#### 7. BOOKS ON MILITARY MATTERS.

It is recommended that the following books be read before attending camp: Infantry Drill Regulations, or Cavalry Service Regulations, or Field Artillery Drill Regulations, United States Army Field Service Regulations, Manual of Military Training by Capt. James A. Moss. For those wishing more information, additional books are suggested: Tactical Principles and Problems (Hanna), Basic Course for Cavalry (L. C. Andrews), Elements of Military Hygiene (Ashburn), Military

Sketching and Map Reading for Noncommissioned Officers by Lieut. Grieves.

The above may be obtained from the Army and Navy Cooperative Stores, No. 16 East Forty-second Street, New York; the United States Infantry Association, Washington, D. C.; the George Banta Publishing Co., Menasha, Wis., or from any book publishing company.

#### 8. INOCULATION.

It is strongly recommended the typhoid prophylaxis inoculation be taken at the camp, or before if preferred. (No charge for this treatment at the camp or for approved applicants at any Army post.) Not obligatory.

#### 9. INSTRUCTION.

The purpose of the camp will be to give each attendant as much of the fundamental education of an officer as can be imparted in the duration of the camp. A certain definite routine will be prescribed for all, including rifle practice.

Special opportunities under selected officers will be offered for training in various branches of the service, Cavalry, Artillery, Engineers, Signal Corps, and First Aid.

There will be present at the camp, Cavalry, Artillery, Signal Corps, and Infantry officers of the Regular Army.

Those who have had a fundamental Infantry training or have attended a military training camp, may enter directly a troop of Cavalry or a battery of Artillery and devote their time to this special training, provided there are enough applicants.

#### 10. ORGANIZATION.

Attendants at the camp will be divided into war-strength companies of Infantry, troops of Cavalry, or batteries of Artillery, commanded by officers of the Regular Army, whose duties cover not only those of instruction but also the health and general welfare of their commands. Attendants are on a cadet basis.

#### 11. SPECIAL PERIODS OF ATTENDANCE—NATIONAL GUARDSMEN.

Those who are members of the National Guard or have had other recent military training, since August, 1911, may apply, and on approval may attend for less than the prescribed period. As the military training is progressive, the latter part of the camp is recommended for such men. Men of sufficient experience will be used as officers and noncommissioned officers for the various organizations. The original enrollments stating experience are on file with the commanding officer of the camp.

#### 12. EXAMINATIONS.

No examination is required, but a board of regular officers on duty at the camp will make such recommendations as to individual qualifications as they may deem proper, to be filed with the War Department.

For further information apply to

OFFICER IN CHARGE,  
Southern Military Training Camp,  
Governors Island, N. Y.

DECEMBER 20, 1915.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 20 minutes to the gentleman from Vermont [Mr. GREENE].

Mr. GREENE of Vermont. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the Record.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Vermont? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

Mr. GREENE of Vermont. Mr. Chairman, it is manifest to all of us that in this short allotment of time one who has undertaken to give any attention to the details of this proposed legislation can not do justice to any opinion he may have formed about it, much less can anyone who has tried to study the general subject of preparedness or national defense undertake, in justice to his own opinion or to the good nature of anybody else, to make his position as to details plain and unmistakable. I must content myself, therefore, under the circumstances by only briefly suggesting a few things which I am hoping hereafter to dwell upon in extenso in the Record.

In the first place, this matter of national preparedness has been not only the most eagerly discussed of all popular topics in the later years of our generation but it has been one of the most likely to be misunderstood, misinterpreted, and misapplied. It is probably true that there has been a more general dissemination of misinformation about our military situation, about the strength and character of our organized Army, and the probable and possible strategical situations which might involve our Army, and about various other factors connected with this subject than would fill libraries.

The word "preparedness" has come to be a synonym for "national defense," and it is a convenient synonym, because it enables any man, no matter what his opinion in the concrete may be, to say offhand that he is, of course, in favor of adequate preparedness. The trouble comes, however, in trying to analyze what we may mean by military preparedness. I think we have perhaps derived something of a wrong impression, some of us, from the reports that have been in print in the magazines, in the newspapers, and current on the platforms, and on the sidewalks, and in places here and there where men get together and exchange views, because the tendency has been to carry the popular idea that somehow or other Congress was finally going to come out with a proposition to organize and maintain in the Regular Army of the United States half a million men in time of peace.

Now, I think when the public sees the bill that is presented here to-day, and when the facts are carefully examined, some-

thing of that erroneous impression will be dispelled. And then I am inclined to think that many of our friends who have been somewhat cautious about undertaking to support any definite scheme of preparedness at all, will feel that they are perfectly safe in supporting a bill that only provides for a Regular Army of something less than one-third of what the public has been taught to expect.

I think that the tendency of the average American in contemplating the idea and possibility of this country ever going to war is to rely upon our potential military strength. The average person has been inclined to say, "Oh, well; it is not necessary for us to maintain a large Military Establishment, because when the time comes we are the richest country on earth; we have hundreds and hundreds of thousands of fine young men who will volunteer to the defense of the flag, and we have every kind of resource imaginable for the maintenance and support of this Army in the field, and brains to spare by which its activities may be directed and administered." The trouble is, somehow, that we are relying upon some Aladdin's lamp by which all these resources will be conjured into existence in the twinkling of an eye by genie or by the mere fiat of Congress.

We forget that in order to prepare for national defense, even under the moderate terms of the measure that is proposed to you to-day, it will require years of labor. There is no such thing as this instant conjuring of efficient national preparations for national defense into existence. It takes time, even under the most favorable and favoring conditions of peace.

Let me give you an illustration, for instance, that may appeal directly to your own business, practical, everyday experience about this notion that the potential resources of our country will be sufficient to take care of us in any time of urgency and stress. I will confess it is something of a whimsical illustration, but it has a directly sensible and serious application, as you may see. Suppose any business man in this country now, with all the wheels turning in industrial life, with every favoring circumstance in the way of transportation, and with everything else that helps to facilitate the avenues and possibilities of trade in time of peace, wanted to place an order in this country for 5,000,000 buttons of a particular type and design and wanted those buttons delivered to him at an agreed spot in 30 days. That looks like a trifling thing. It looks like a small thing, and the average man would say, "Why, of course, in this enormous country of ours, with all its markets and resources of one kind and another, there ought not to be any difficulty at all about a man being able to assemble in 30 days, or even less, in a given spot 5,000,000 buttons after a pattern and design that he might require." And yet practical business men know, day in and day out, week in and week out, through all the years, more or less such propositions about small matters are put up to them, and they begin to rake and scrape this country with a fine-tooth comb to get together just such a quantity of articles of small account like that, and often fail to do it.

Take that question of 5,000,000 buttons. Suppose that war was suddenly to confront this country, most unexpectedly. Those 5,000,000 buttons would hardly be enough to gird up the trousers of the first 500,000 men that we want to put on the firing line. And you can go from buttons to batteries; you can go from the smallest, the simplest detail of the everyday necessity of the soldier's outfit right straight up to the enormous, the gigantic, the almost, to the layman, incomprehensible complication and bulk and magnitude of detail that must be organized to maintain and support an army in the field after it has got there; and you will find just exactly that same problem staring us in the face. It looks easy. It looks easy to conjure out of all the infinite resources of this land the articles and the necessities for the maintenance of troops in the field, but when the time comes, when the stress is upon us, when, instead of favoring business conditions, we are met with all the complexities and operations of war, when every resource is being strained both in industrial arts and transportation to do everything else except what we may want done at that particular place and time, then we find what a tremendous problem it is to get ready to put an army into the field; much more to maintain it after it is there.

The popular mind somehow is possessed of the fancy that armies simply consist of a wonderfully gallant line of brave boys in blue, with rifles in their hands. People do not stop to realize that this glorious little firing line is, after all, but a small part of the proportions and organization that must be reckoned with in any scheme of war. There are plenty of men; there is no trouble about the enlistment of plenty of men to go to the firing line. The problem consists in so organizing and so coordinating our resources behind those men that they can be kept there, and

that they will not be more of a danger to themselves than the enemy is to them.

Mr. GOOD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield there?

Mr. GREENE of Vermont. Certainly.

Mr. GOOD. As I read the bill, there is only one section that contains an authorization for the acquiring of ammunition or any of the parts of ammunition. That is section 82, covering the nitrate plant.

Mr. GREENE of Vermont. I think the gentleman will bear in mind that already, under our present system, we are manufacturing a large part of what we need.

Mr. GOOD. I understand that; but I understand from men who have traveled abroad in the last 10 months that when the war broke out in Europe Germany had a less supply of ammunition than France, but Germany knew every private plant and knew the power of their engines and their capacity, and immediately turned those plants into munition factories. That is what she did; and so her ammunition was fresh ammunition and had not deteriorated. Why is it that this bill does not contain some provision whereby the manufacturing institutions of America can be commandeered, just as American boys can be brought in to fight a battle?

Mr. LONGWORTH. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman from Connecticut yield?

Mr. TILSON. Certainly.

Mr. LONGWORTH. I may say to the gentleman from Iowa that that exact condition is provided for by a bill brought in by the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. HILL] to create a dye industry. We produce now only about 8 per cent of our dyes. The experience of Germany was that they were able not only to supply their own wants but the wants of the rest of the world, and they were able immediately to turn those factories into high-explosive factories. So far as nitrogen is concerned, I called attention, in an interruption of a speech by the gentleman from Wisconsin, to the fact that Germany was to-day able to manufacture all her nitrogen, not out of water power by the fixation of atmospheric nitrogen but as a by-product out of the coking of coal. We need only follow Germany's example in that respect and we would have an ample supply.

Mr. GOOD. We are likely to provide for the dye industry; but why not look after it when we are looking after the killing industry? [Laughter.]

Mr. GREENE of Vermont. I may say that if the gentleman will examine the bill in detail he will find a provision in there covering that point.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from Connecticut yield to the gentleman from Nebraska?

Mr. TILSON. Yes.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. I happen to have a copy of the bill right here, and you will notice that section 84 of the bill provides for covering the exact proposition referred to. We there empower the President to commandeer all such factories.

Mr. GOOD. Yes. It provides for that; but it does not give authorization for the acquisition of the equipment—the dies and lathes.

Mr. TILSON. That would be in the appropriation.

Mr. GOOD. We have not the authorization to-day to acquire all these things.

Mr. TILSON. May I interrupt the gentleman?

Mr. GREENE of Vermont. Yes, if I have any time left.

Mr. TILSON. If the gentleman will wait until we reach section 21 of the bill, he will have an opportunity to vote upon an amendment which I propose to offer in the shape of a bill which provides for the furnishing of these preliminary dies, gauges, jigs, and so forth.

Mr. LONGWORTH. That is not the sort of dyes we were speaking of. [Laughter.]

Mr. GREENE of Vermont. Now, Mr. Chairman, I will go on with what is left of my own speech. I followed the subject referred to by the gentleman from Iowa with diligence during the committee hearings on this bill, and if the gentleman will read the hearings carefully he will find a discussion along the line of the inquiry he has brought up. We have endeavored to cover some of those propositions in this bill.

I do not hesitate to declare myself as convinced beyond all manner of doubt that our present preparations for national defense are sorely inadequate. I believe they are sorely inadequate not only in contemplation of the possibilities of the present day but even for the ordinary routine peace establishment.

I believe this bill is a practical working measure, founded in the main on a correct principle that permits of development and expansion to suit changed and changing conditions,

and that it is probably the best proposition for the substantial increase of the Military Establishment that can be expected of the House under all the circumstances that attend its organization and policy at the present time. Realizing that under any and all conditions the best that can be hoped for from this body in the way of advanced legislation must be begun and more or less slowly accomplished through considerate and intelligent compromise by many men of many minds, I am convinced that this bill makes a very decided step in the right direction. I am hopeful that if its essential features can be enacted into law time and experience will develop the best that is in it, eliminate such weaknesses as may be discovered, and, on the whole, result in the placing of our Military Establishment within a comparatively short time on a basis of reasonable preparation for national defense consistent with our recognized national policy in this regard.

The bill does not go as far as I would like in the matter of numerical strength of the Army as a whole, and in the matter of providing for the best efficiency of some branches of the military service. But, recognizing the difficulties in the way of securing the instant realization of one's own ideals and standards in such matters in this practical legislative world of give and take, I have joined in the unanimous report of the committee recommending the passage of the bill, with the understanding that some amendments might be offered or supported, because I believe half a loaf is better than no bread. And I truly think there is far and away more than half a loaf in this well-considered measure.

#### PROBLEM OF REORGANIZING THE ARMY.

Every practical man knows that it is easier in most instances to construct any large public enterprise or institution from the very beginning, building it out of hand in the light of knowledge gained from experience, observation, and investigation, and working out a symmetrical idea all the way through, because there is nothing already in existence to uproot or to get around or to go over or that must be for some reason brought into the scheme and roughly coordinated with it, than it is to make over and modernize an enterprise or institution that has been in existence for more than a century and a quarter without disturbing its general character and effectiveness while the work is in progress and without destroying any of its essential parts.

The work of remodeling the United States Army and our military system generally presents all the difficulties that must naturally be expected when one undertakes the disturbance of organizations that have been in existence in some form or another for generations and are interwoven with usages, customs, habits of thought, history, and tradition that the popular mind, and the men in the service also, to a great extent, have accepted as matters of fact, and perhaps even matters of necessity. It is not to be expected that such a task can be performed in one legislative measure, not only because the wisdom of lawmakers can not be expected to determine the right thing to do when military experts themselves are not agreed upon it, but because the great body of the people that are to be called upon to support the institution out of their pockets must themselves be convinced that these changes are not only expedient but necessary.

Not only that, but not all change is necessarily betterment just because it is change, as we all know, and there are many, if not most, features and principles and policies intermixed in our present Military Establishment that have found their place there because experience justified them, and the wise layman will let them alone until he finds something better to put in their place. This is particularly worthy of thought at this time, when the air is full of plans and schemes, propositions, and propaganda of all manner of Army reform, for the most part coming from men that are actuated by the highest considerations of lofty patriotism, to be sure, but that all too often are not born of any very practical military experience, and in most instances do not reckon upon the state of public opinion and the nature of public policy in this country at all; and Congress never yet made a success of legislating very far ahead of public sentiment and the habits and practices of the people that it is designed to represent.

#### SHOULD HAVE FIXED WORKING PLAN.

I believe that in some way found most expedient and practicable the Congress should have laid before it a well-considered general comprehensive plan for the evolution of a military establishment and the maintenance of a military policy adapted to the present needs and anticipated growth of the United States. That plan and policy, in so far as is practicable, considering all things, should be accepted and adopted as a permanent standard, should "stay put," so to say, until perhaps coming generations may have good occasion to change it. But in the meantime it should be let alone and should be the constant guide of the lawmakers in their annual or occasional provisions for the

Army—and the Navy—by way of legislation and appropriations. With such an outline before it and with the firm resolve never to let politics or demagoguery or any caprice of the moment tamper with it, the various committees of the House charged with legislation in that field could regularly go about their work with some reasonable expectation of making each step count toward the expected total, making each contribution symmetrical and consistent with the standard established, just as a city or a State, or a private citizen or business concern for that matter, often begins and carries on to completion some scheme for public works or private industrial enterprise too elaborate to be made all at one undertaking.

#### TRAIN THE YOUTH TO ARMS.

I sincerely believe that we shall never wholly solve this great problem of adequate preparation for national defense in this country until, in some practical and sensible way, it shall become a recognized policy on the part of the people themselves to arm and train in military science the youth of the land as a matter-of-fact detail in their education for the duties and responsibilities of citizenship. I put it this way because I think we are all presently agreed that the time is not ripe for such a thing as compulsory military service by command of law and under penalty of law. The people are not in sympathy with it because somehow it suggests the ancient tyranny of militarism and hated domination of military overlords. They have not yet taken time to analyze the proposition, tip it over, and look on the other side.

But the hour has struck for the beginning of popular education on the subject, and the popular mind has already begun to take up the lesson and study it. One of these days it would not be surprising if public opinion in America came to favor the idea of military training for youth as an incidental part of their education, because it will be plain that this training is not something forced down upon them from a despotic Government above and simply for the Government's own maintenance, but that, rather, it is something that the people should do for themselves, in and among themselves, for their own preservation and the maintenance of their own homes and their own standard of civilization, and because it forms habits of mind and strength of character that are as useful in peace as in war. When public sentiment does reach that stage, then the law that carries out the idea will not only come about in a natural way but will be observed without fear or friction, because it will be doing literally what all laws in this land should do—carrying out the will of the people themselves.

Just as we argue to-day that every citizen should go to the polls and exercise his right to vote, that the elective franchise is a responsibility and not a privilege, so we shall some day argue that every man protected by the Nation owes to the Nation his contribution toward the national defense, whether it be time, service, property, or life, or all of them.

#### REPUBLICS UNPREPARED FOR WAR.

It is a significant fact in history that a strong centralized government is usually prepared for the emergency of war, while a republic or democracy generally never is. Of course, philosophers have reasoned throughout all this experience that what the looser form of government lost by reason of terrible sacrifices in the beginning of war because of unpreparedness for it was more than made up in the long run by the higher character of citizenship that it developed under its system of permitting and guaranteeing greater liberty to the individual. And it has been said that, after all, the ultimate benefit to humanity and civilization wrought by the freer government was worth all that its fearful sacrifices to defend and maintain itself usually cost. This is a comforting reflection when calmly read in an easy chair by a fireside, but it is quite another thing when the real test comes and when living human beings must give up their philosopher's books and easy chairs and make the awful sacrifice they have been reading about.

It seems to me that the world has grown old enough by this time, and our democratic-republican experiment in government has become strong enough by this time, so that we might prudently venture a little readjustment of the practical application of this lesson of history. Why should we pay the terrible price of unpreparedness for war when a little foresight, a little common sense, may help us to minimize the cost and the sacrifice, if not often avoid it altogether because our preparation actually prevented war? Why should we be content to dwell in a fool's paradise of fancied security from all attack just to make the philosophy of history good by blundering through to ultimate victory with a frightful sacrifice of lives and treasure when we are attacked? Why not do with the Nation as we do with ourselves individually—take out a little life insurance?

#### DREAD OF LARGE STANDING ARMIES.

The English-speaking people are born to an inherited dread of great standing armies, it is true, and there was a time when

English-speaking men, and men of all tongues for that matter, had a good right to dread them. But those were the days of strong centralized monarchies, practically absolute monarchies, when the soldiers belonged to the King, were paid by the King, and served the King alone. Nothing like that exists to-day nor has it ever existed in the United States. Why should men continue to terrify the multitude with the idea that any attempt to raise the United States Army must mean a militaristic domination and tyranny such as old King George once undertook here rather unsuccessfully, if memory serves aright? No such thing is possible to-day because the soldiers not only come from the people themselves, but they are paid by the people and serve the people directly and nobody else. And always and forever the people can have just as many of them or just as few of them as they please by simply keeping their hands on the purse strings.

#### PLANS OF MILITARY STUDENTS.

It is only natural to expect that professional military men, when called upon to suggest plans for national defense, will submit the most comprehensive and complete scheme of preparedness that their experience, study, and talents can devise. They would not be true to their professional ideals, they would not be faithful to the service in which they are employed if they did not. They are men set apart for the special study of these special problems by reason of their own special fitness and training. They are employed to make their life business cover a field of possible horror that all the millions of men and women that pay them for it hope with all their hearts will never be covered by anything but theoretical tactics, imaginary strategy, and peaceful drill. They are commissioned and compensated for the express purpose of learning so much about the art of war and of organizing our military resources to such a practical state of immediate effectiveness that no other people will ever try to make war upon us, or will be unsuccessful if they do. When they are called upon, therefore, to propose plans for the safeguarding of this land against an armed foe they can in all conscience do nothing less than propose the very safest and surest plans that the latest developments of military science suggest. They are specialists for that very purpose.

#### DUTY OF THE LEGISLATORS.

Now comes the work of the legislator, the task of reconciling these practical theories of practical theorists with the probable demands of the times and the nature of the times, the ability of the National Treasury to support, and the willingness of the people to be taxed to maintain. And it is his function and his responsibility to sift out of these professional plans of the experts that which is apparently necessary and indispensable for the purpose both have in mind and that will at the same time respond to the test of these enumerated conditions of demand and support. The task is a delicate one and the layman should approach it with caution and a deep sense of responsibility. But it is an imperative one and must be undertaken without fear or favor. The schemes of military scientists, however patriotically inspired, if left unchecked by the cool, calculating, practical economist, would inevitably drift the land toward a riot of reckless militaristic extravagance out of which in the end no good could come that even military men themselves could see. On the other hand, if the subject were left to the cool, calculating, practical economist alone the tendency would be right the other way, and we should soon find the land content with the flimsiest of pretenses for national defense—in some respects, indeed, just where it is now.

#### SIZE OF THE REGULAR ARMY.

I am not satisfied with the total strength of the line of the Army as fixed by this bill. Conceding, as one must, of course, that it exceeds the figures asked for by the War Department, it is still plain that it is not by any means nearly equal to the figures proposed to the War Department by the specialists of the Army employed for that very purpose, and I submit that a lay opinion may also be ventured in such case without undue assumption or immodesty inasmuch as we laymen must take the responsibility for the figures that are adopted in the end. Without intending to criticize motives in an offensive way, I do suggest that perhaps considerations of economy had no small part in determining the size of the Regular Military Establishment as it was officially proposed to Congress and to the Committee on Military Affairs.

At the outset it should be remembered that any attempt on the part of Congress to fix the strength of the Regular Establishment to be maintained in time of peace at a figure sufficient for the actual emergency of war would mean the appropriation for the maintenance of a simply enormous standing Army and saddle the country with an annual expenditure that the people would never consent to, and never should. When we estimate the size of a Regular Army sufficient to defend this country

against attack, an Army so large and so complete within and of itself that attack would probably be useless, we must carry our minds into a realm of figures for soldiers and figures for money that makes the proposition utterly out of the question. And out of the question, too, not simply because of unwarranted money extravagance, but for the more vital factor of menace to national character. For when a people in any land under any civilization reach the point where they simply hire mercenaries to do their fighting for them and defend their hearthstones for them, they have no sense of liberty, no ideals of civilization worth preserving. The policy of the United States always has been, and I hope always will be, unreservedly against such suicidal folly as that.

#### REGULAR ARMY IN TIME OF PEACE.

This leads us to the conclusion that the Regular Army in time of peace should be so constituted in the matter of size and distribution of special arms and resources as to be sufficient for the preservation of law and order within our own boundaries, the maintenance of the constitutional guaranty of a republican form of government to each State, for its own efficient training and the education of its officers in the military science and art of war, and for the instruction and training of the youth of the land generally in the profession of arms and the duties of the soldier so that there may be constantly available in some form or another sufficient material from which to draw the great volunteer forces that inevitably must combine with and be a part of the Army in the dread emergency of war. Add to this the somewhat generalizing assertion that the Army should be large enough at all times to keep before the world a sufficient indication that this country is armed and prepared to defend itself, that its military resources are not simply altogether potential but that they are organized and coordinated and capable of instant and enormous expansion and employment in the field, and we have something of the moral effect of military preparedness that every self-respecting people must expect to maintain if they hope to have any share whatever in the making and the preservation of that comity of nations that is hoped for through the operation of international law.

Keeping in mind these two elements, therefore, the one an Army sufficient for national defense at any and all times; and the other an Army sufficient for peace purposes with expansive capacity in the emergency of war, it is plain that any amount of armed forces we add to the peace establishment that do not bring it up to the force necessary for war is almost literally wasted and means money thrown away for needless expense. Nothing can be accomplished by an addition to the Regular Army of men and officers that are a little more than are needed in time of peace and miserably short of what are needed in time of war; that is, nothing but absurdly extravagant waste of the people's money.

This was the idea kept in mind by the committee when the size of the Regular Army was fixed in this bill. To my mind, however, the limit decided upon was not sufficient, even for peace purposes, and for reasons that I shall attempt briefly to sketch, although it must be said that these reasons in part were more or less considered by the committee when it arrived at its conclusion.

#### NEEDS OF THE REGULAR ARMY.

I believe that it is a wise policy to maintain the Army in time of peace with certain arms of the service requiring special and intensive training for efficiency at figures of strength disproportionately higher than the normal ratio those arms of the service would hold to the total strength of the Army in time of peace, if the peace strength were all that we intended to calculate upon. I believe this because, when the emergency of war confronts us and we are put to increasing the Army on a huge scale at short notice, it is impossible to get these specially trained men at short notice, and the Army would have to go into action with a weakness in those branches of the service that would work more disaster and expense in lives and treasure than it would cost to maintain them at disproportionately larger strength in time of peace.

There should be a disproportionately larger number of officers in the peace establishment also, and for the same reason. This fact has been kept in mind pretty generously in the formation of this bill, I admit, but I am inclined to believe that the emphasis for their use was laid almost altogether on the necessity for their service as instructors of the National Guard and citizen soldiery, and that the capacity of the Army for sudden expansion in time of war did not enter into the calculations as much as might be. If we are to encourage and develop the idea of bringing about a citizenry trained in arms in this country, we must expect to have to employ a great and greater number of officers as time goes on in order to furnish the requisite competent instructors for our boys. Then, when the emer-

gency of war comes, those same officers that have been school-masters will all find places in the organization in the battle field, and there will be none too many of them at that.

But there is still another phase of this subject that may be worth considerable thought. The United States has enormous potential military resources, it is true, but they are almost wholly potential, inchoate, unorganized, unrealized. I hinted at this and the possibilities that grow out of it at the beginning of my remarks. Whenever we have been confronted with the possibility of war or the actuality of war, we have invariably found that it took time, time, time to begin to put those great resources of ours into use. And even then, with the best of brains and energy, with toil unabating and zeal unflagging, with a whole country stirred to its center by a noble patriotic impulse, and all men everywhere in the land willing to lend a hand, the inevitable confusion of everybody trying to do everything needful all at the same time tended in instances innumerable to delay the very cause that all were striving to advance.

The enlisting and organizing of volunteer troops, the mobilization of Regular and National Guard troops already organized, and the organization and coordination of sources of supply for these troops, the gathering and transportation of troops, supplies, matériel, and munitions—all thrust upon the country at once—with every forge, factory, workshop, and market straining to its utmost to manufacture or to distribute, and with every available means of transportation congested with raw materials going one way and troops and supplies going the other—all this tremendous business suddenly thrust upon a country as unmillitary in its everyday habit as ours, means that the demand for trained Army officers to take charge of this emergency and bring order and effectiveness out of it will far exceed the capacity of any corps of officers we not only provide in this bill but are likely to provide in its successors, even with the utmost liberality of intention. Because we know we shall be short, even under the most favoring circumstances, it seems to me good reason why we should at least go a little farther than we do in anticipating such a shortage now.

In something of the same proportions the same argument will apply to the necessity for still larger provision for enlisted men. If the Regular Army is to serve as the nucleus for a war Army and is not simply to do the fighting alone, as we so often say, then, it seems to me, one of the greatest of the functions a large part of the Regular Army will be called upon to perform at the outbreak of war is this very work of organizing the military resources of the land. And we know from experience that, even with the freest of calculation beforehand, we shall never have enough help when the time comes.

#### ENORMOUS TERRITORY TO BE COVERED.

But entering into this whole proposition as to the size of the Regular Army, whether we are calculating solely upon its uses in time of peace or whether we are thinking also of its capacity for expansion in time of war, is the serious factor presented by the enormous expanse of territory that our Regular Army must cover under any and all circumstances. If we were called upon to estimate the size of a requisite Regular Army for the defense of the same number of people as we have now dwelling in the United States, and those people were living in some compact territory sufficient to the needs of their numbers without overcrowding, we could base our estimate on a somewhat different scale of proportion than we must employ now. But with conditions as they are, with continental United States alone encompassing a great domain that includes in many of its single States areas greater than most of the European nations, with a coast line of over 5,000 miles to defend right here at home, say nothing of our possessions overseas, it must be manifest to any thoughtful man that a Regular Army large enough to be of any use at all to such a country, even in time of peace, must be sufficiently large to enable it to garrison and police this enormous piece of geography. We are having an excellent object lesson of about how effective our regular establishment is for such peace purposes right at this very hour when we are compelled to raise an extra 20,000 men just because we are going across the Rio Grande to hunt a few hundred bandits.

#### "SECOND LINE OF DEFENSE."

Of course, we all agree that the Navy is our first line of defense. There is no question about that. But some of us appear to think that pretty much the whole stress of preparations for national defense should be laid upon the Naval Establishment just because it is the first line of defense. To men of that opinion I would take the time only to suggest the query, What would we be able to do, if in the fortunes of war, we should chance to lose control of the seas? Every prudent man that has a complicated machine in constant or expectant use, a machine that is intended to withstand a strain that is particularly

and peculiarly wearing or destructive of it, does not hesitate to provide himself with spare parts. And he does not calculate that the spare part that he gets may well be inferior to the part it is to replace simply because the part already in the machine is going to bear the first test of wear and destruction. He knows, like a sensible man, that if the first part gives out under the wear the part he puts in must be just as good, or even better, for that matter, or it will give way just as the first one did. If we should ever lose control of the seas in time of war, our problem of national defense, instead of being simply reliance upon a land force of calculated strength sufficient to repel possible invasion while the Navy was still afloat but busy elsewhere, would be infinitely more complicated than ever, because the enemy would have greater and freer access to our shores and to more parts of them at once.

#### DEFENSE OF THE COAST.

In this connection it might be well to remind some lay strategists of a point in the subject of preparation against invasion of this country in time of war that many of them appear to overlook or misunderstand. There is a tendency to confuse harbor defenses with actual coast-defense preparations. We use the term "coast defense" loosely when we apply it to the defenses we have prepared on our shores. What we have in existence to-day are simply forts and guns and mortars and mines designed for the protection of the harbors at our most important seacoast cities. These defenses are in their very nature immovable; they are fixed; and must permanently guard the spots they are intended to protect. In between these harbor defenses stretch several thousand miles of unprotected coast line where an enemy unmolested might easily effect landings with great numbers of men and quantities of armament and stores. And the melancholy fact is that we have not to-day either sufficient mobile troops or mobile artillery of sufficient size to protect ourselves against a landing at any one of scores of strategic positions along this tremendous coast line.

We loosely talk about our standing army being our "first line of defense." Under conditions as they exist to-day this mistaken idea means only the pushing out to the front in time of war of a little handful of well-trained men who can not hope to combat such a force as would be brought against them by any enemy that would dare plan to attack us at all, and who would be slaughtered hopelessly and helplessly while this great land of such incalculable potential resources in men and stores and money was desperately groping about to bring into existence the invincible military power that Fourth of July orators have been boasting about for so many generations.

#### MUST RELY UPON CITIZEN SOLDIERY.

It follows, therefore, that apart from wise provision for a sufficient Regular Army our main reliance under our national policy must be upon having at instant command a great body of citizens trained to the use of arms, experienced in the duties of a soldier, acquainted to some practical extent with the life of a soldier in the field and the conditions and limitations under which life must be maintained there in such splendid fettle that it can survive the camp to meet the enemy and conquer him with as little loss as possible. Hitherto in our experience the loss of life in the camp when the enemy was not being engaged at all has been more to be dreaded than the actual shock of combat. Fortunately advanced medical science has begun to change this state of affairs to a remarkable extent. But the fact still remains that the average volunteer army in the field is at first more of a menace to itself than it is to the foe, for the very natural reason that men accustomed to the easy and comfortable indoor conditions of life at home must go through a severe and hazardous readjustment to new and strained and sorely trying physical conditions in the great outdoors in time of war.

However, the problem must be met and solved, and the first proposition in it is to determine what form of organization of our citizens for military training purposes and what authority for this training and service in time of peace or time of war shall be adopted and enforced.

#### THE "CONTINENTAL ARMY" PLAN.

It was proposed by the War Department that there should be organized for this purpose what might tentatively be called a "continental army," a force of citizen volunteers to be enlisted directly into the United States service and to be maintained solely at the expense of the National Government and under the authority, control, and discipline of the Congress and the President. Tentative details as to this organization and its administration were also proposed, which it is not necessary to discuss here, inasmuch as the plan is not before us for consideration now. It is sufficient to say that these volunteer citizens were to be permitted to go about their usual

private avocations, but were to be enlisted and sworn into the United States military service, were to be armed and equipped, and were to be summoned to compulsory drill and training for a certain period each year for a term of three years, after which each soldier was to be placed in a reserve force for another period of years, during which time he was subject to a call to the colors. In this way it was proposed to build up a great military reserve among the citizenry of the land in the course of a few years, so that in time of war we should no longer be put to dependence upon levies of raw and untrained men from the walks of business and industry and the professions, but would have a population largely imbued with the military spirit and a great force of men more or less accustomed to the use of arms and the duties of the soldier, with some form of always existing organization to which they might be summoned for war.

It should be said in all fairness that it was given out with much and repeated emphasis that this plan did not contemplate the undoing of the existing Organized Militia of the several States, or the National Guard, as it is now more commonly called, but that the National Guard or any part of it could come over to the continental army or act in conjunction with it on occasion.

Now, I want to say right here that, in my opinion, this idea that the Organized Militia of the country should be, as contemplated in this continental army plan, an out and out Federal force, that it should be under the pay and control and maintenance of the National Government and serve the purposes of the National Government under the authority and direction of Congress and the President within its sphere of usefulness, as the Regular Army does, is the only safe and sound one upon which our citizen volunteer army can be properly organized or successfully maintained. And I may add, by way of evidencing good faith in this assertion, that I took occasion myself to dwell with considerable emphasis upon that very idea as the only possible solution of this militia and volunteer citizen soldiery proposition in a speech I made to this House in the Sixty-third Congress on January 21, 1915, when I advocated the federalization of the so-called National Guard some time before this continental army scheme was set afoot.

So that I have no hesitation whatever at this time in indorsing with all my best judgment the idea that is the basic principle upon which this continental army was to be organized and maintained.

#### WEAKNESSES OF "CONTINENTAL ARMY" PLAN.

But I could not bring myself to accept the continental army plan as presently workable, or, for that matter, advisable, because, not matter what was said about it by its friends—that it was not designed to undo the National Guard but was to be a comrade in arms with the National Guard—the stubborn fact remained, as I view it, that it was simply an attempt to make two similar bodies occupy the same space at the same time. And every law of physics tells us that that can not be done. If this plan were put into operation there could be but one result: One of the institutions would have to give way to the other. But, to be sure, if this were to mean merely the same old operation of the law of the survival of the fittest, there could be no objection to the plan being tried out, because the country simply wants, and certainly ought to have, the best that it can get in the way of an organized citizenry trained to arms, and sentiment and home and personal interests ought not to be permitted to stand in the way of it.

At the same time, however, we were told repeatedly that the two organizations would in all probability continue to exist side by side; that the continental army plan was designed to reach a class of men not now and not likely ever to be attracted to the ranks of the National Guard, and that as a consequence the field would be better covered by the two bodies than it had been by the existing one organization. My objection to that was, first, that it was a needless expense and a mischievous dissipation of military energies and military resources and a frivolous complication of military organization to have two bodies of soldiery in existence in the same field when one body of sufficient size would do; second, that if the nature of the continental army plan was, as indicated, to be such as would attract to it men that would not go into the National Guard and that they were men who could afford each year to take a month or two months out of their business or other occupation, then we would be simply creating an aristocratic corps of the leisure class and deliberately setting it in opposition to the National Guard, no matter how sincere our good intentions in disavowing such purpose.

We might disavow and disavow the idea that we were constituting any class distinctions in this form of military organization, but on the very face of it the fact stuck out so plain

that any man might read that the continental army could only be made up of men that had time and money enough to take out of their lives and away from their families two months or so of each year and practically give it to the Government. And that did not strike me as being quite in tune with the democratic idea of American social order, to say nothing of American patriotic volunteer war service.

Now, it was admitted that the continental army plan was an experiment, that it had not a soldier in existence and ready for it, that it must at the very outset be tested out by attempts at recruitment following popular education as to what it was and what it was designed to do, and that, when the beginning was made, it must be organized, equipped, drilled, trained, and generally whipped into shape at places and times, under conditions and circumstances in conformity to hopes and expectations all uncertain, and against difficulties and obstacles well known or apprehended, and that it would take three years at least to determine just what it would amount to at that.

#### WHY NOT DEVELOP THE NATIONAL GUARD?

It seemed to me, therefore, as it did to the entire committee, apparently, without even a first consulting of our minds upon it, that, as a matter of practical, everyday expediency in adapting our plans for a greater organized military establishment to existing conditions, it was wiser not to risk this wholly untried and altogether experimental scheme of a continental army that was not represented by so much as a solitary "high private in the rear rank" with local habitation and a name, but to take the already existent National Guard, invoke all the powers of the Constitution of the United States in the organization of it as a Federal force, and make a "continental army" out of that.

The National Guard is already in existence, with over a hundred years of history and traditions. It is armed, equipped, housed, organized, in part disciplined and trained, musters already 129,000 men, in round numbers, with degrees of military training and effectiveness running from poor to superb, but with the major part certainly in the scale of good to excellent. It already answers to what pretty much all military men hold to be one of the greatest considerations for such a force, in that it is territorialized, has State headquarters, recruits from a given locality, sends its reserves back to that locality where they may be quickly found again, assembles in its ranks men more or less of a common acquaintance and community of localized interests and even kinships, has a continuous existence and passes the grandsons of grandsires through the same ranks as generations come and go, and beyond all that has an imperishable and altogether glorious State pride behind it that quickens the sense of responsibility of the men that serve and deters the possible coward from deserting when it is certain that he will be disgraced at home where his shame will be known, where it hurts the most.

Still more, it has been shown that most of the men in the National Guard to-day are earnestly anxious that the National Guard shall be truly federalized, that it shall actually become a recognized part of the United States military forces, that it shall be given a place among Uncle Sam's authorized and dependable soldiers, and that it may be given an opportunity to live down at last the old-time sneer that forever greeted the term "militia" when real soldiers were being talked about.

It is true that the National Guard as it exists to-day, or as it has existed for generations and as the popular mind has fallen into the way of regarding it, is something that has been bequeathed to the country through the sequence of history, and is not something made to order by the logic of latter-day events to meet modern necessities. It is true that, had there been no militia organizations of any kind when the Federal Constitution was formed, there never would have been the occasion for their existence along the lines they have followed since, because the States never would have deliberately invented little State armies for themselves in all probability.

But the fact remains that the Organized Militia is with us and is a far more excellent and efficient body of trained soldiery to-day than it ever was before, and far more competent in all respects than most people probably imagine as they think of some of the amusing features of the old-fashioned militia times that the elders saw and their children have read about; and it is something tangible, something right to hand with which to begin and to continue the creation of the Federal militia force that the continental army was meant to supply.

#### "FEDERALIZING" THE NATIONAL GUARD.

It is argued with great earnestness by many men whose opinion is well worth serious consideration that the National Guard can not be made an out-and-out Federal force under the provisions of the Constitution of the United States as they read to-day. On

the other hand, this committee in its report cites the opinions of men who either assisted at the making of the Constitution or were living at the time and following the process of the argument that accompanied it, and they are all emphatically protesting that the Constitution has done to the militia the very identical thing that these men of to-day say can not be done with it—that is, divorced it from the States and nationalized or federalized it. This may, perhaps, very properly be regarded as something of an open question to-day, nevertheless.

For my part, I am inclined to believe still, as I did when I discussed the question more than a year ago, that there will still be necessary some reconstruction of the militia clauses in the Constitution of the United States before the federalization of the National Guard will be found to be wholly satisfactory or beyond dispute in emergency. It is not denied by anyone, however, that Congress never has yet exercised all the powers over the militia that are conferred upon it by the Constitution or to the extent that those powers are conferred. I believe it is worth while to consider whether it is not a fact that the rights of the several States not surrendered by them to the Federal Government in the Constitution, but reserved to them or to the people, were wholly civil rights and not military rights. The very purpose of the formation of the Constitution as stated in its preamble was, among other things, "to provide for the common defense."

At all events, whatever time may bring forth as this experiment at federalizing the National Guard is tried out, I firmly believe it is a start in the right direction and that it will work out more effectively to our purpose in the end than the continental army plan could possibly have done. There will doubtless be occasion to make some changes in this law as experience develops the need for them. I would not be surprised if it were found that, little by little, the States would themselves come to the conclusion that it was a mere waste of money for them to keep up their troops themselves and that if the Federal Government were determined to federalize the militia in law for the purposes of control and administration it would also be welcome to go still further and wholly federalize them in appropriations for their support. True to the drift of affairs in English-speaking lands, most of these things are brought about by evolution rather than by direct fiat of law.

Now that the tendency toward federalization of the National Guard is being helped by both law and public opinion, I am inclined to think that a few years will produce a change in the situation that will make the practical effects of the plan about as appreciable in the matter of federalization as if there had been an out-and-out amendment to the Constitution prescribing and enforcing it. I think it can be shown that the idea that the States and not the Federal Government had the first and sole control, generally speaking, of their 48 little armies has grown up not so much from strict test of law as by that very same process of evolution of thought and habit of thought on the part of both people and Government. I believe the fact that Congress has not exercised its full authority over the militia is the greatest reason why people have argued that it did not have much to begin with.

At all events, why not take the National Guard as it is today, federalize it as far as possible, as this bill proposes to do under the most liberal interpretation of the Constitution, and then let the same three years of experience with it that the continental army plan would have required when it started from nothing at all, determine what more must be done, if anything, to complete the work of making the militia a Federal force beyond all question and dispute? We shall be educating soldiers all this time and preparing for the national defense. We shall be utilizing what we have already in existence and making it more and better. We shall be recognizing loyal Americans who for years have made great sacrifices of time and leisure and money and put in incalculable periods of hard work for the development of a military spirit among the citizenry of the country, all out of national pride and true patriotic purpose. And we shall be preparing the way for public opinion then to determine whether it is well to have a federalized volunteer force of this kind or not, and, if the decision is, as it undoubtedly will be, that it is the thing to be done, then that same public opinion will regard the amendment of the Constitution to complete it, if such a thing be necessary, as a mere matter-of-fact thing that ought to have been done long ago. It is only in such orderly, evolutionary ways of popular education and practical demonstration of merit and need that anything substantial of any kind is ever successfully done with national institutions or constitutions—in this country anyway.

#### AMERICANS NOT YET A "RACE."

We Americans are prone to characterize certain races of mankind as volatile, effervescent in temperament; to say that they

go off half-cocked in times of national stress or excitement; that they act by uncontrollable impulse in times of national crises, and are not guided by deep reasoning and cool, deliberate, logical thinking. And yet we ourselves forget that, with all the various agencies of immediate publicity that in one form and another disseminate ideas and conflict of ideas throughout this broad land of ours, we can and do ourselves at times arouse more tempests in teapots at the breakfast tables in our country morning after morning as the years go by than perhaps any other highly enlightened people on earth.

One reason for it is the very fact that our marvelous facilities for instant communication with one another or comparatively immediate transportation of persons and literature may be used as thoughtlessly at times as they may be employed to good purpose at others. We have here in America wonderful resources for invoking the often to be dreaded awful power of making 100,000,000 people all think of the same thing at the same time. Another reason for it is that, proud as we are of our national unity, of our fast growing and developing national self-consciousness, we are in fact anything but one people racially.

We are, considered in the matter of racial origin and characteristics, the most diverse people of a higher order of civilization assembled under one flag anywhere on the globe. We represent among ourselves the greatest variety of inherited racial characteristics, tendencies, traditions, sentiments, and ambitions that can be found anywhere on earth in any one compact territory that is governed by the most enlightened standards of the most enlightened people now making history. It is our magnificent hope that time will mold us all into a homogeneous mass, with such a blend of all that is best in every family among us that there shall some day inhabit this part of the earth the noblest and best of all races that ever came out of the womb of time, and that that race will be called American.

But there is no such thing as an American race to-day, unless we find it in the Indian. We are not a race; we are simply a political entity.

#### WHAT AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP MEANS.

If this were the time and occasion to go further into the philosophy of our present situation and discuss some very pressing social and political problems that are vitally involved in it, we might ask ourselves some very serious questions and lay down some mighty important postulates.

Say what we will about troops and armament, tactics and strategy, military strength potential and military strength immediately available, the first step in national preparedness for the liberties of peace or for a war of defense is to find out who among our own citizens are at heart truly American nationals, and who, on the other hand, sharing our plenty and abusing our hospitality, are masking under the guise of nationals while their hearts beat to the rhythm of war drums that may some day sound the call to arms against our very selves.

We have been all too indulgent and easy-going in this land for many generations past, have paid little heed to some of these problems that must one day come to vex us if we do not arouse to them before it is too late. It is high time we began to find out for ourselves at least two things about our boasted American citizenship: First, what duties and obligations, what aspirations and consecration to national ideals, it entails upon those who bear its privileges here at home among us; and what guaranty of protection to life and property it carries with it when those who bear it venture on peaceful errands abroad.

However, we are not to deal with that aspect of the situation now in the consideration of this pending legislation.

But we ought not to lose sight of the lesson of all this as we give our best thought to the consideration of this very question of preparedness for national defense. After we have made due reckoning of all the factors of proper national self-respect, all the truly patriotic impulses that should animate us in our relations to each other and to the world; after we have consulted the best practical idealism that estimates our due share in the attainment of a higher civilization and the means of wisely safe-guarding every element in it after it has been made our own, we should still think of the stubborn fact that just at this time, with all the Eastern Hemisphere ablaze with war, we are likely to entertain ideas and advance propositions for future national security and the sacrifices that ought and must be made for it that by and by, in cooler, calmer times, we shall not be quite so willing to undertake.

We are daily persuading ourselves that we are very serene and coolly calculating about this, but we know in our heart of hearts that we would not be human beings like our unfortunate brethren in the battle fields across the seas if we were not subconsciously, at least, influenced in some degree by the smoke

of gunpowder that is wafted into our own peaceful atmosphere from the horrible scenes abroad. It would not be extravagant to say that no country is in its normal thinking mind to-day, nor could it be expected to be with pretty much all the world turned upside down.

#### THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN.

Now, I believe that just because pretty much all the world appears to be turned upside down is the first and greatest reason why we should make most unusual preparations for national defense. I believe with all my soul that our present-day Military Establishment is most inadequate even for its purposes in normal times, and glaringly so as related to the conditions of to-day. I abate not one jot or tittle of my implicit faith in the proposition that this country now needs and will continue to need a scheme of national defense and the military force to realize its effectiveness that is far and away greater than anything we have ever maintained before. I even go so far as to argue that our danger from possible war is not so likely to be realized in the midst of the present European conflict as it will be when that war is over—perhaps years after it is over.

So that I am not yielding any of my convictions upon the immediate necessity for preparedness for war when I still further urge that we must, at the very time we are planning the reorganization and reconstitution of our military forces on a greater scale, keep also in mind that fact, that we are making these estimates and doing this work in the heat of an atmosphere surcharged with abnormal forces and relations of forces. For that reason we must by the best that is in us so lay our plans at this time that we shall not find that we have been carried beyond the reasonable bounds of far-sighted prudence and committed ourselves to some details and features of our enterprise that never will stand the test of calmer thought when the air is clear once more. In other words, we are hoping to build for the Army this time something that will remain with us as a permanent establishment, something that will be so carefully deliberated, so wisely constructed, that the greater part, at least, of its essential features will stand the test of time in our generation, war or no war.

The air is just now full of all manner of suggestions for the practical realization of the great patriotic impulse that is behind this whole idea. Men are promising the greatest of personal sacrifices of time and leisure, the most laudable devotion of self-denial for years to come, that they may, as they say, learn how to be soldiers and be enrolled as part of the citizen soldiery sworn to the national defense in time of need. Propositions for this and for that organization or undertaking on the part of all classes of people among us are seriously put forward on all sides, some of them with palpable germs of practicality in them, some of them as empty as dreams. The whole country is stirred to a pitch that one might almost call military ecstasy about these matters, and good resolutions are fast making easy a good many national regrets hereafter.

What I want to suggest is that in the midst of all this we keep our heads, that we never forget how prone we are to these great and noble impulses, how easily we make these splendid resolutions of self-denial and tax-bearing in time of stress, and how easily, like the poor, weak mortals that we are, we forget all about them when the excitement is past and gone.

#### BUILDING FOR THE FUTURE.

I want to see our military establishment reconstructed on greater and stronger lines than ever before. But I want the plans so well laid, so carefully deliberated, so sensibly estimated, that they will stand the test of both peace and war. We are planning a great military institution while the tide of popular excitement is running high. I want its foundations so well laid and its superstructure so secure that we shall have all of it left to us in that inevitable day when the tide goes out again.

So much for the general character of the propositions put forth in this bill. I will not attempt to discuss the measure in detail because all that will be done by the committee when the bill is considered in debate under the five-minute rule. I want to say something now about the urgent necessity for making plans for national defense at this time, regardless of the particular merits of this or any other similar measure that may come before us in this Congress.

#### THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL DEFENSE.

The truth is that the minds of the American people that once not a great while ago would have been shocked beyond expression at the mere suggestion of the *Lusitania* affair have been for so long fed daily upon the bloody details of the horrors of the world's greatest war of all time that they are becoming well-nigh benumbed, losing their sense of proportion and the true perspective of human sympathies and emotions. Indeed,

we stand so far self-accused in this regard that we must plead guilty of what would in normal times amount to a constantly diminishing self-respect, else we would never have peaceably submitted to the repeated outrages upon our citizens and the national honor that we have borne during the past 20 months. As we grow more and more calloused to these terrible tales of slaughter of human beings by wholesale, so we are, perhaps, more and more indifferent to the suggestion that war can ever come to us. We are well-nigh hypnotized by horror, and are no longer the coldly, sensibly calculating Americans that the world reckoned us in former days.

#### OUR DUTY TO THE WORLD.

Some of our friends have argued that any unusual increase in our military forces at this time may be construed as in spirit, at least, a threatened breach of neutrality, or, if not that, at best a policy that will prejudice our attitude before the world as a Nation religiously devoted to peace and anxious to play the rôle of peacemaker among the nations of the world. I am not so sure that this country has any mission in this direction. I am more inclined to the opinion that we will do better to demonstrate to the world that our own idea of a self-governing nation is a practical one and that it is working out its own ideals of peace in a peaceable manner right here at home than to set out upon any Quixotic notion that we are so spiritual ourselves, so highly illumined in an exalted sense of world responsibility, that it is our sacred duty to mind other people's business because they are incapable of doing it on such a high plane as we follow ourselves.

#### OUR DUTY TO OURSELVES.

But let me suggest this to those who fear the consequences of preparations of the character contemplated in this proposed legislation: If the present war in Europe presents a world situation so critical that the United States should make every honest effort to keep out of it, and if we are almost constantly trembling now with fear lest we be unable to do that, then it must surely be critical enough to warn us to stop and think and plan what we would have to do if we could not keep out, or if we should be involved in a war that might some time follow it.

If there is any one thing that the present situation of this country in this regard teaches us at all, it is that we have too long unheeded the repeated warnings of those among us who in years past have urged us to be ready for just such an emergency as confronts us to-day. Advocates of national preparedness of yesterday were laughed to scorn as they foretold that some day this country might find itself threatened by war with a superior armed power. Not a day goes by now that does not see us trembling lest we wake up on the morrow to find it so.

#### SOME MISTAKES OF PACIFISTS.

Still we are asked, "What is behind all this agitation for national preparedness for war?" The answer is simply, "History." Nations are no better in morals, no loftier in purpose, than the individuals that compose them. That sounds rather platitudinous, to be sure, but like many other platitudes it has fallen on dull ears too many times already. We keep going on about our business here in this country, generation after generation, serenely trusting to the fond hope that inasmuch as we have no national purpose to despoil other peoples, no other peoples will ever be tempted to despoil us. It is true we read in school days of wars that were largely inspired by the same old human greed of gain and lust of power and dominion, but we closed the book and our education at the same time, lulled our fancy with the comforting thought that all history was made and imprisoned between book covers before we came on the earth.

We soothed ourselves with the comforting reflection that nations have become "civilized" in our own time and never will make war any more. It is true that now and then this solacing philosophy has been jarred a bit by some warlike demonstrations in other parts of the earth. It is true that we have seen war follow war in some regions remote, maybe, but the warning did not come home to us, and we were well-nigh on the way toward scrapping every battleship that was not already decaying of its own accord, dismounting every fieldpiece and burning up the very formula for making gunpowder, when the greatest war of all history broke out, to include within its belligerents well-nigh all the civilized world but us and a few small neighbors.

I repeat, nations are no better in morals, no loftier in purpose, than the individuals that compose them. Indeed, one might very well undertake to contend in an academic discussion of the proposition that, if anything, they are worse. It is a fact well known of our own experience that many a man will blink at his Government's doing a thing that for moral reasons he would not think of doing himself. Government is an impersonal, intangible thing, you know, while human beings must face direct, immediate, and personal responsibility for their own acts.

"THIS IS THE LAST OF WAR."

After every war of modern times there have not been lacking men to prophesy that that was the last of war. After every war of unusual duration, that left nations apparently exhausted by the terrible struggle, left them to mourn enormous losses among the finest and the best of the manhood in their lands, left them to care for multitudes of widows and orphans, left them to help support a mournful roll of hideously crippled veterans, left them to rebuild waste places, regain commerce, struggle beneath a burden of debt, and wrestle with desolation, hunger, disease, and poverty—after every such great historic catastrophe many men have said that such a nation can not for many a generation, at least, become a belligerent power again and participate in another such struggle as that which recently well-nigh wrecked it forever.

And yet every lesson of history from the earliest times proves exactly the contrary. One has only to study for a little while the history of Europe from the days of the Napoleonic wars, a little over a century ago, down to the present time to find that nation after nation went through just such an experience only to emerge in the end with a reinvigorated vitality, a new national consciousness and pride, a reawakened national purpose, and the inspiration to a redoubled and better organized energy that raised it to a plane of economic wealth and social greatness it had never reached before. One may debate the contrariness of logic, the seemingly inexplicable ordering of things that brings this all about, but it is the truth, and every page of history that deals with war testifies to it.

I will admit that simply because these benefits do come out of war despite its frightful horrors and unspeakable miseries is no reason why nations should invite war or even run the risk needlessly to become involved in war. War is a calamity to any people that must bear it, no matter how beneficial to posterity its results may ultimately prove to be. But I do suggest that when we know that any civilization that is destined to live at all and is founded upon race ideals that are determined to persist is not ruined by war, when we know that war does not have the effect of putting these great nations out of the forces on this globe to be reckoned with even to the death, it is folly for us in America to sit idly by with contentment in our fool's paradise and say, "When this war in Europe is over all the powers will be so exhausted that they can make no more war, and we shall be safe."

THE MENACE TO THE UNITED STATES.

What is likely to happen after the great European war is over? Of course, the wise man will not prophesy much in detail about such a thing as that, but the man of ordinary vision, if he interprets a few simple lessons of history the way they have interpreted themselves from generation to generation for many centuries, may easily lay down a rough outline that it will be safe enough to keep in mind and prepare for, on general principles, at all events.

Remember, first, that for several decades past the United States has been steadily climbing toward the first place in the world's industrial wealth and commerce. It has been notoriously the most prosperous country on earth, and, as such, the most envied. While in the natural course of events it would have taken, perhaps, many decades more before its growth in business and money profits would have placed it in the lead, the war has had the effect of arresting the competition of its most dangerous rivals, of diverting their opportunities for gain to itself, or even causing them to pour hitherto unheard-of sums of money from their own lands into our coffers.

So, not because we have all at once developed a superiority in industrial pursuits and commerce of our own accord, but simply because we have through the caprice of fate become the residuary legatee of a great part of the world at war, it is not improbable that we are destined to take this long-sought first rank among the powers of the earth soon after the war is over, if we do not even hold it now.

In the stress of rivalry among nations for wealth and power, competition is for the most part invariably directed toward the leader for the time. Community of interest, not by any means inherent friendship, makes all secondary powers in the race more or less regardless of one another while the struggle continues among them to gain the trade and its opportunities for wealth and aggrandizement that the leading power is withholding from them all in common. Hitherto, while viewed with ill-concealed jealousy as some day to be the leading power in this race for world wealth and commercial supremacy, the United States has been comparatively free from most of the frictions and international disputes that inevitably accompany this race for dominion in the trade of the globe's markets. We have been permitted to grow practically unmolested because the powers of continental Europe had other aims for their enterprise and energy, and our hour had not yet struck.

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COMMERCE BREEDS WARS.

When this war is over, when the nations of the Old World set about recouping their fallen fortunes, rebuilding their forges and factories, making their devastated lands once more inhabitable and productive, once more seeking for the old and for new avenues of trade by which to repay the staggering financial losses that have befallen them, when the taxpayers of these countries begin to groan under the awful burden of debt that is piled up on their shoulders and that promises to be bequeathed as a melancholy legacy to generations yet unborn—then will be the time when all the eyes in the Eastern Hemisphere will turn with envious glances to the young giant of the western world who has fattened during the period of their misfortunes. Then will be the time when the United States will begin to feel the pressure of trade rivalry as it has never felt it before.

And if we learn anything from the history of commerce, we know that, directly or indirectly, it is the cause of more wars in these modern times than probably any other interest of mankind.

Of course nations in these days of so-called enlightened civilization are altogether too cunning to make the greed of trade and commerce an ostensible and avowed cause for war. But commerce, the pursuit of world trade, more than any other one thing is the occasion for constant and complicated personal relations of the peoples of the various nations of the earth with each other. It brings into the closest of association or the keenest of rivalry the wits and interests of men from the uttermost parts of the earth. It is the occasion of a never-ceasing coming and going up and down upon the waters of the earth. It assembles in all harbors ships of peace and ships of war of all manner of men. It employs every means of transportation from burden-bearing coolies to the fastest of modern express trains in every corner of the earth, and jostles together in the most freakish way and often under the most delicate and strained circumstances strange men from strange lands that know little in common except the desire for money.

And the trade of the world is capricious. Every textbook on political economy may work out what theory it will about the balance of trade and the ideal system of world marketing and exchange of products and commodities with equal benefit to both sides to the transaction, so that all the ledgers of all the world may show trial balances that figure out all sides making a profit, a just and altogether righteous distribution of gain, and all the world prosperous and happy. And then comes along some circumstance altogether unforeseen and unforeseeable, and a large part of the earth may be lacking food at home and have no sufficiently available credit in any bank or foreign exchange with which to relieve the distress of its own people.

Through all such diverse ways as these commerce constantly sows the seed of friction among the people of the world. An agency of untold, incalculable benefit to humanity and civilization in its primal intent, it is at the same time the potential parent of hatreds and wars innumerable, and always has been.

DANGER TO US WHEN THE WAR IS OVER.

So I say if we are not to have reason to dread war in the midst of the terrible conflict now raging in Europe—and I doubt very much if we are—we must not lose sight of the pregnant fact that after this war is over, after the nations now in arms have begun to recuperate and seek again their lost places in the world of trade and industrial progress, the United States of America, the only great power on earth unscathed by this terrible affliction, the only great power sustaining no losses of account by it and actually waxing rich and richer indirectly because of it, must take heed lest it find itself for the first time in its history the solitary object of the jealous rivalry of any or all the powers of the Old World.

INTRIGUES OF FOREIGN DIPLOMACY.

If we are attacked at all, if we are drawn into a war at all, it doubtless will not be by a manifest declaration of hostilities based upon an openly avowed jealousy and covetousness. It will be the result of probably several years of off-repeated disputes and friction, all growing out of the complexities of intercourse in the struggle for world trade, and each put away in memory to tally one on the score of bitterness and hatred until the opportune day dawns when shifty diplomacy and unscrupulous intrigue can so cunningly play the cards that the United States will be at war with a jealous rival who maintains, maybe with some superficial show of reason, that the responsibility for any war at all is all on us.

In days that do not go back of our own generation just exactly this same shrewd play has been invoked by nations in Europe, and with success.

"BALANCE OF POWER" DOCTRINE.

Undoubtedly one of the results of the European war will be something of a readjustment of social and political conditions

and policies in the nations now at arms against each other. There is much reason to anticipate that such will be the case, and there might be some satisfaction at other times and in other places in dwelling upon some of the aspects that these changes are likely to take. But there is one possibility among them that I think we can not afford to neglect just at this time. In the first proposal of it perhaps it may be thought by some to be rather fanciful or a strain of the imagination, but stranger things have happened, for all that, and this may be one yet to happen, for all that we know now.

For many generations before the present conflict the statecraft of Europe has occupied itself, among other large continental problems of concern, with attempts to maintain what was known as the balance of power among the nations with their ever-increasing multitudes of people that were forced to dwell together in its cramped and confining area. The constant fear that some great militaristic nation would sooner or later gain dominion over the territory by subduing to its rule the various nations and races beside it and compelling them to support it by their own industry, taxation, and military service as the only means of preserving their physical existence at all, has been responsible for this European doctrine, and the reports it has followed to keep patched up and presentable from generation to generation what has amounted to nothing less than an armed truce that finally burst out into the present horrible conflagration.

During the progress of this policy of maintaining the so-called balance of power, we have seen congresses of rulers and statesmen unblushingly rend smaller nations apart, upset their governments, distribute their peoples among their own dominions regardless of their natural inclinations or love of home and country, and even divide the men of one race, who by every instinct of nature would fare best in a governmental community of their own kind and making, and partition them off to each other with a nonchalance that was brutal even if enforced by a specious pretense of world safety and benefit to civilization. This game has been played before our very eyes for decades and even centuries, and yet we have tried to deceive ourselves into the notion that the world was growing better, that civilization was becoming more and more ideal, and that the lion and the lamb were fast getting ready to lie down together.

Once the races of men fought each other for temporal dominion largely, not merely because of the glory and pride of conquest, but because organized industry and trade were comparatively unknown and nations could prosper for a time by despoiling one another with the sword. Now comes the era of industrial competition and the struggle for dominion of the money markets of the world.

#### STRUGGLE TO REGAIN WORLD'S TRADE.

Let me suggest for your consideration the possibility that, after this war is over and the crippled combatants set about reestablishing themselves in industrial pursuits and wealth against the next great day of world conflict that is bound to come, maybe the doctrine in Europe will be, not the resumption of the old policy of balance of power, so far as military strength and territorial aggrandizement go, but the balance of power in the world's trade. What if there should prove to be some day a combination in Europe to control the trade of the world? What if these powers now at war with each other, realizing for a time to come the futility of hostilities for any purpose of territorial expansion, should all see a common rival and a common interest in a common rival, especially if the bread and butter and clothing and comfort of their people, now made unspeakably miserable by the calamities of war, should be seriously restricted by the quasimonopoly of commerce and trade held by any more favorably situated peoples—and those peoples should happen to be over here in America?

#### "WHO IS TO ATTACK US?"

But we are asked, "Who is to attack us?" The answer is and must be, "We do not know." And not to know who our possible antagonist may be is even more threatening to our security than if we did. A foreseen foe may be anticipated, his warlike preparations discounted, his probable strategy forecast and studied, and his armed strength and matériel estimated and may be overmatched. At all events, in long eras preceding the actual clash of arms, it is possible to safeguard in many ways against the menace and encroachments of a nation that maybe has some historic reason for revenge upon us or easily understandable and plain temptation to aggrandizement at our expense. It is the element of surprise, the menace of the unexpected, that is most to be dreaded in war.

When we enter at all upon speculations about war, we must prepare our minds to set aside pretty much all the rules and maxims by which men and nations may calculate their expect-

tations in intercourse with each other in times of peace. According to the spirit of Christian civilization, war is an anachronism, and like all such is not reducible to the common laws of common times and experiences. We may study history and philosophize over its lessons as we will, in the end we may be reasonably sure of only one fundamental conclusion: That war always has been, is now, and shows no sign of cessation, and that the wisest man on earth can not tell when, where, and why the next war may break out.

#### FUTILITY OF FORECASTING NATIONAL POLICIES.

If it is more or less idle to attempt to forecast reasons why one nation may or may not go to war with another, it is no less so to speculate why such and such nations are likely to form offensive and defensive alliances. There often appears to be a suggestion of logic in the lay of events and conditions that prompts such a forecast, but history repeatedly shows how vain it is. I am moved to dwell upon this for a moment because some of our brethren have been more or less busy in later months figuring out various combinations of world powers that would do thus and so to our possible enemy, if by any unlucky chance we should become involved in war ourselves. And the general trend of their prophecies has been that other interests than ours would help to protect us against any likely foe when we did not even half try to protect ourselves.

In this connection we might do well to remember that the Triple Alliance appeared to be a fixture in European policies. Germany, Austria, and Italy might be depended upon to stand by each other in war, and every calculation of theorists appears to have been based upon that as a foregone conclusion. But when the strain came, Italy left her partners and joined the allies. Japan and Russia, that only a few years ago were locked in combat, are now sworn allies, and there is talk of the warmest reciprocal understanding between them when the war is over. The Crimea in 1854 saw Russia fighting Great Britain, France, and Sardinia, or the beginning of the present Kingdom of Italy. Sixty years later all four of these powers are aligned to fight two empires that in the form we know were not in existence at that time. And similar instances may be multiplied as long as one is content to keep at the books and pick them off.

#### GREATEST CRISIS IN HISTORY CONFRONTS WORLD.

This is a sobering and a solemn problem that confronts us. It is not one to be discussed with easy elegance of rhetoric by literary assemblies in most approved academic atmosphere, coming to no resolution thereon; not one to be declaimed with mock-heroic outbursts of pseudopatriotic spirit on popular platforms, pledging all America to one sublime self-sacrifice, coming to no resolution thereon; not one to be flippantly ridiculed out of all consideration as the mere phantom of disordered imaginations or the subtle device of greedy capitalists to fool the multitude for more inordinate gains, showing no possible resolution whatever.

Whether we like to acknowledge the bitter truth or not, we are face to face with a world crisis such as was never before written in all the story of mankind.

No matter how deeply entrenched were many of our hitherto cherished ideals of man's duty to himself and his neighbors, no matter how eagerly some of us had begun to welcome what were believed to be the first most promising signs of the dawn of universal peace and the realization at last of the brotherhood of man, we find ourselves—all of us, of whatever opinion—face to face with a staggering reality.

One might almost say without conscious exaggeration that the greater part of the world has gone mad.

There is no more safe reckoning upon what sensate beings and responsible governments of their own making or choice may be inclined to do or may do in the midst of the terrible strain that is now put upon the minds and impulses of millions of our fellow creatures with deadly weapons in their hands and all the malice of war, death, and destruction in their hearts. Mere philosophizing, academic speculation upon probabilities, or any other similar resorts of reason and judgment approved in normal times are not safe guides alone in this extremity.

#### WE HAVE NO "FRIENDS" EXCEPT OURSELVES.

Saddening as the thought must be to all of us, the people of the United States must make up their minds that, tried in the last test, measured by the last rule, weighed by the last scruple, they have no certain friends upon this broad earth except themselves.

And they must quietly, reasonably, and with cool, calm deliberation prepare themselves to face any eventuality that may be the immediate or the distant product of this awful world cataclysm.

We have great reason to hope and to believe, it is true, that in some way or another the old order of things will some day right itself and be even a better order of things than we have ever known before. It has always proven so before in other times of national peril, and it will doubtless prove so yet again, or else all our conceptions of Providence have gone a-glimmering and the world is given over to chaos and self-destruction. We must not believe that that can be true; but we can not doubt—we must not, in peril of our very national existence, dare to forget—that while civilization is shaken to the very center as it is, we owe it to ourselves and our posterity as sensible men to take every reasonable precaution against a world that is running amuck.

#### AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT OF SELF-GOVERNMENT.

Three hundred years ago the fathers founded on this virgin continent the beginnings of a social order and political idealism that we have fondly called our American concept of civilization. It was an experiment in a new kind of government for mankind, an experiment that was designed to evolve new ideas and realizations of civic liberty, freedom of mind, and social righteousness. It is still an experiment. The fathers fled from the oppression and tyranny of centuries-old institutions of government and social order in Europe to plant this new idea of man's destiny in a new land. Succeeding generations of men have watched and tended it as it grew and flourished, and each in its turn has poured out its lifeblood in war that it might survive.

All through the ages at various times and in various lands other men have sought to work out other experiments in government and social order that might bear some fruit of hopefulness for the ultimate freedom of mankind. All of them in their turn have failed and been forgotten, save here and there one or another that has been set up to be tried since the American idea has given such promise of some day being realized in very truth.

#### NO PLACE LEFT TO BEGIN AGAIN.

The world has been becoming crowded since the days when the fathers of American liberty found this new land open to their mission, so that to-day there is not a spot on the face of the earth where any people of race stock sufficient to achieve great things of world moment may go and undertake their mission for humanity in a region unoccupied and suited to their life and its necessities.

The world's greatest experiment in the struggle for the emancipation of mankind from the thralldom of the errors of the past is taking place right here in America to-day, the last bit of earth provisionally left open and unpeopled for countless ages after the world was old, indeed. If our experiment fails, either through our own folly or that of our children, or if it fails because we do not prize our institutions and our civilization enough to defend and to die for them there is no other land on the face of the globe where the same or a better experiment under similar conditions may be begun again.

Let us have something beside dollars and cents in our calculations upon the great problem that is before us now. Let us partake of something of the noble sentiment that through all these generations since Plymouth Rock and Jamestown has made such ungrudging sacrifices for us. We are not a warlike people by instinct or cultivated nature. We do not design to make war upon other peoples. In the midst of all the frightful carnage, the cataclysm of horrors that shocks the civilized world to-day, we may well fear the worst even as at the same time we fervently hope for the best. This matter has passed beyond the stage of mere political economy or cash balances and businesslike reckoning on probabilities.

We are driven to the necessity for arming ourselves, not to enlarge or stimulate our civilization by conquest, but actually to preserve it from possible destruction.

The world calls us commercial and greedy. Shall we not show it, if need be, that we are ready to fight to the death to protect something we regard as infinitely higher than factory chimneys?

This extract from President Monroe's message of December 3, 1822, referring to conditions in Europe, reads as if it might have been written to-day, and is as true to-day as it was when Congress heard it 94 years ago:

\* \* \* distant as we are from the troubled scene and faithful to first principles in regard to other powers, we might reasonably presume that we should not be molested by them. This, however, ought not to be calculated on as certain. Unprovoked injuries are often inflicted, and even the peculiar felicity of our situation might with some be a cause for excitement and aggression. The history of the late wars in Europe furnishes a complete demonstration that no system of conduct, however correct in principle, can protect neutral powers from injury from any party; that a defenseless position and distinguished love of peace are the surest invitations to war, and that there is no way to avoid it other than by being always prepared and willing for just cause to meet it. If there be a people on earth whose more especial duty it is to be at all times prepared to defend the rights with which

they are blessed and to surpass all others in sustaining the necessary burthens and in submitting to sacrifice to make such preparation, it is undoubtedly the people of these States.

Mr. KAHN. I yield to the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. POWERS].

[Mr. POWERS addressed the committee. See Appendix.]

Mr. KAHN. Will the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DENT] kindly use some of his time?

Mr. DENT. I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. QUIN].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Mississippi is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. QUIN. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, I desire to say that this bill, as you see from the report, comes from the committee with a unanimous backing. Democrats and Republicans alike all agree to this bill. While there are some features in it that every man could not subscribe to, yet as a whole the committee have reported to this House what they considered the best bill that could be brought forth under all of the circumstances. According to the judgment of a large majority of that committee, a standing army of 140,000 men is all that this country needs now, and the committee had to back them in their judgment the Secretary of War, Hon. Lindley M. Garrison, and the Chief of Staff, Gen. Scott, both of whom your committee recognized as able to give advice on that vital question.

The National Guard provision is a substitute for the continental army scheme that was proposed by Secretary of War Garrison and connived at by some few others. The committee believe that the National Guard is the proper source from which a citizen soldiery can be drawn in this Republic. The National Guard in each State will naturally get the best, the most active, and among the most patriotic young men of each community, and the evidence before our committee demonstrated that the present National Guard of 129,000 men is composed of strong, virile, and patriotic young men.

Then the question of the federalization of the National Guard came up. There are many good lawyers on the committee, and we are advised that the President of this Nation had some of the best lawyers at his command to pass upon the question of the constitutionality of this provision; and it is the unanimous belief of your committee, and the opinion of the legal advisers of the President, that the scheme of federalization comes within the Constitution, and that in the imminence of war or in actual war every member of the National Guard at once, which means each company, battalion, and regiment, with their officers, as units, drafted by the President, becomes a member of the Standing Army of this Republic, and the companies, battalions, and so forth, as units, will become units in the Regular Army, to be sent without the borders of this Nation or anywhere else where duty may call.

So that question is, in the minds of the committee, absolutely settled. Your citizen soldiery then will be built up to a number equal to or greater than the continental army scheme proposed.

Then the cost amounts to little. This bill provides that the private soldier in the National Guard gets only \$48 a year provided he attends all the drills required. The captains and all officers above him get \$500 a year, first lieutenants \$240, and second lieutenants \$200 a year, and nobody else to be paid any officers' salaries. From an economic standpoint the National Guard was the only proposition that your committee could say would build up a strong citizen soldiery in this country at a very small cost. We owe it to the taxpayers of this country to consider them first in the formation of the citizen soldiery. No one, unless he goes back on the Chief of Staff, who is an expert, and on the Secretary of War, the highest authority of this Nation in the War Department, can believe that we are justified in calling up and making a greater standing army than 140,000. As the chairman [Mr. HAY] explained to you in his remarks, this bill has an elasticity about it that allows more than that number of men when the President calls. We know from the evidence before the committee that under present conditions you can not get a standing army in this country of more than 140,000 men. We know that men are not going to volunteer any faster in the future than they have in the past. With all of this talk about war, and the European war having been in progress for more than 19 months, the number of enlistments in the Regular Army has not increased, and it will not do so in the future. We are now almost at war with Mexico.

I have been one of those who believed that we ought to stay out of Mexico; but since Villa has come up into the United States, attacked a town, set fire to houses, and murdered women and children in the nighttime at Columbus, N. Mex., I am proud

that the United States has seen fit to go after him. [Applause.] And I hope that they will send enough soldiers with big enough and long-range enough guns to shell the mountains and canyons of Mexico so that neither a jay bird nor a rabbit can live there for 16 months. [Applause.] I hope it will jar the whole population of Mexico to such an extent that they will remember it for 400 years and have respect for the American flag for all time. [Applause.] It is time that the United States Government is showing an iron hand in some matters, and in my judgment the President of this Nation has done the wisest thing possible when he has ordered the soldiery to go into Mexico and get Mr. Villa and that other gang of cutthroats, thieves, assassins, and midnight marauders. [Applause.]

But, gentlemen, it takes money and it takes soldiers to do that. Of course we know that Mexico is not much to contend with. We realize the fact that we must prepare in this country to protect the Monroe doctrine in Mexico, South America, and elsewhere, and in my judgment that is one of the main reasons why this Congress should pass this military program just exactly as this committee has brought it out, a wise, economic, and judicious measure, that patriotism and duty to our constituents, to every man and interest in this Nation, demand of this Congress.

This bill mobilizes the commercial interests and industrial enterprises of this country in time of war. It takes all of the present munition factories and puts them at the command of the President of the United States in war or imminence of war. This bill carries with it the idea that the railroads of this country shall be commandeered by the United States in time of war. In other words, it is a practical, sensible measure. It has in it the authority to establish a plant to fix nitrogen from the atmosphere. And let me tell you right now, gentlemen, if this Congress fails to put in the proposition to manufacture nitrates from the air it will be a most vital mistake, and you will be condemned from one end of this Nation to the other. The saltpeter mines down in the deserts of Chile, in South America, is the only source from which we can get nitrates to manufacture powder. The evidence shows that in times of peace you can get enough, perhaps, from coke and coal products; but for actual war necessities, estimated at 180,000 tons of nitric acid, we must have the power to manufacture nitrates, and the nitrogen must come from the atmosphere that surrounds mother earth. Nitric acid is an absolute requisite in the manufacture of powder and all military explosives. Then if we need national defense at all, this is the most necessary thing in this bill, and we must make it a part of the law in order to be safe from any and all enemies who might cut us off from the supply in Chile. The greatest benefit to the Nation will be in the establishment of the nitrogen industry as a sure source of powder supply in the event of war and as a great economical advantage in giving cheap fertilizers for the farmers in time of peace.

There are two reasons why this is the most necessary and vital thing for preparedness—both preparedness for war and preparedness for peace. You need this as an absolutely necessary potential of the essential element to manufacture explosives in time of war.

You need it in time of peace for fertilizer in this country. Do you know my friends that the great farming class of this country, according to the evidence before the committee, is paying about \$75,000,000 a year for nitrogen that goes into fertilizers, and the bulk of it comes from Chile? Your Government, as an incident to this preparedness program should establish a plant, should cooperate with private capital; if the Government will not do it, to manufacture the phosphate or nitrate that goes to make up the fertilizing qualities of plants in this country. You can not possibly pass a real national-defense bill unless you have a nitrate plant established, and the evidence before our committee shows that it could be done by water power, and that is the only reasonable and feasible way by which it could be done.

It is proposed that this Government should construct a dam or dams and power house and install electrical machinery, in fact, develop the power and lease it, at interest cost to the Government, to a company for the sole purpose of fixing nitrogen in times of war, and in times of peace to make fertilizer for the farmers and all the powder the Government needs in peace time. Let every friend of the farmer in this Congress vote to force the Government to reach up into the atmosphere and pull down fertilizer at a cheap price for our farmers.

The American Government ought to go into the business itself; but I am convinced that a majority of the Members of Congress would never agree to that. However, a Member who can fail to agree that the Government should go so far as to cooperate with private capital with Government supervision to control the plant and manufacture all the powder we need, and as an incident the fertilizers that the farmers of this country must have and save the American farmers thereby \$40,000,000 a year, in

my judgment has a false conception of the obligation of this Government to the citizens. How can any of you vote against this provision?

My friends, if we have all the preparation on earth and fail to put in the construction of a plant for making nitrogen from the atmosphere, your bill is a failure if you have war with a nation which could control the nitrate from Chile. Your bill would be an absolutely nonsensical one, for what use is it to have a hundred thousand machine guns and cannons and hundreds of thousands of men in the field with rifles in their hands unable to do anything for the want of powder? If you cut off the supply that we now get nitrate from, where are you going to get it? It is as plain as it can be that in a very short time our country would be destitute of all powder and explosives. We can not get a plant ready for operation under 12 months. Our country would be panic stricken; and the American people will not be fooled on that.

Some gentleman said before our committee that we could not do it because of a lobby. Some few of our committee said this feature would cause us to be criticized by the press. I saw one young man representing the Farmers' Union of the country, and he said they were very anxious to get this nitrogen plant established so the farmers could get cheap fertilizer. I know he is right. I am for him and the farmers. I believe that the lobbyist here is the great Powder Trust that controls the saltpeter in Chile. I believe that is the lobby which is going to interfere and endeavor to keep this nitrate proposition from being made a law in this bill. That is the lobby I am afraid of. Now, I have not seen a lobbyist of the great Powder Trust, but I am like a farmer who passes by a little patch of vines and bushes in his field near the creek. He scents a very peculiar, strong, rank-smelling odor, and while he has not seen the polecat, yet he knows he is there, or has been there, because he can smell him. [Laughter and applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Mississippi has expired.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 30 minutes to the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER].

Mr. GARDNER. Mr. Chairman, this bill makes a noise like preparedness; but it is not a noisy noise.

#### SUITS ALL THE NEAR PACIFISTS.

It is almost as still and almost as small as the still, small voice of the human conscience. This bill has not even awakened Henry Ford, and it has not brought a dissenting voice from a single one of the near-pacifist members of the Committee on Military Affairs. It seems to suit the pacifists all right. There are 91 pages and 20,000 words to this bill, and it gives us just two new regular soldiers for each word. Forty thousand additional Regular soldiers is what it gives us.

Plenty of words, but a scarcity of Regular Army men; and yet Regular Army men are exactly what we want and need.

#### THE REGULAR ARMY MAN.

There is nothing on earth that comes within gunshot of being "practically as good" as the Regular Army man. No amateur soldier can any more compare with a professional soldier than an amateur plumber can compare with a professional plumber. The lawyer who spends six days a week lawyering and one day a week soldiering is pretty certain to be six times as good a lawyer as he is a soldier. That is the fundamental trouble with our militia. Furthermore, I have not yet been carried away with this idea of an army of has-beens, or reserves, as they are called; that is to say, an army largely made up of men who once upon a time have done a turn at soldiering. It may be all right to have a supplementary army of ex-soldiers, but I have a notion that the cheapest thing in the long run will be to maintain a good-sized regular force of about 300,000 men, and then train our boys so that they will all know something about how to fight if need be.

I believe in compulsory military training for every young man, be he the son of a beggar or the son of a multimillionaire. I mean real, hard military training under real, hard military discipline, day in and day out, for a substantial period of time. I do not mean high-school drill and I do not refer to armory evolutions once a week in the long winter evenings. That kind of thing is military drill, not military training, where every youth is compelled to learn to subordinate his will to that of his officers.

Do not misunderstand me. I am not advocating compulsory military service in time of war. I hope that we can maintain the Army by volunteers in time of war, but I want those volunteers to be trained men when they enlist.

#### NEAR FEDERALIZATION.

I think nothing at all of the alleged federalization of the militia provided in the Hay and the Chamberlain bills. You

can not really federalize your militia so long as the States appoint the officers, and I confess that I do not see the logic of Uncle Sam paying soldiers that some one else commands. Think of it; this Hay bill, and the Chamberlain bill also, for that matter, actually proposes that the State governors shall continue to command these 48 little armies while the Nation pays a big share of the bill. Suppose that some governor, of Massachusetts, for instance, were to order out his army to suppress a strike, do you not think that Uncle Sam ought to have the right to say "Halt," if he did not approve of the governor's order of "Forward, march"? Well, if you pass either one of these bills, Uncle Sam will not have a word to say about it. He can pay the piper, but he can not name the tune.

#### WHY NOT LISTEN TO THE WAR COLLEGE?

What in the world is the use of having an elaborate War College here in Washington if we refuse to pay the slightest attention to anything which it says? Last summer the President asked for a report as to our needs in the way of an army. The War College replied that we needed an army of 280,000 regulars and 380,000 reserve regulars, not reserve militiamen, to make us safe against invasion, in case our Navy were unable to retain control of the seas. Instead of this force, the Hay bill gives us in all 140,000 regulars and 60,000 reserve regulars. Instead of 660,000, the Hay bill gives us 200,000 regulars and regular has been.

#### WHAT THE NEW SECRETARY OF WAR SAYS.

For the balance we are told that we must depend on 48 little armies of State militiamen hastily consolidated under national control. Oh, it is true that Chairman HAY, in his report on this bill, gives us a table showing 1,324,790 men, which he says are "men who will be at once available upon the passage of this bill." Let us see how that is. On March 9, 1916, I wrote a letter to the new Secretary of War, Mr. Baker. Here is what I wrote:

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
Washington, D. C., March 9, 1916.  
To the honorable the SECRETARY OF WAR,  
Washington, D. C.

SIR: On page 14 of Mr. HAY's report on the new army bill, I find a statement that 1,324,790 men will be at once available as a national force upon the passage of the Hay army bill.

Calculating in the same way as Mr. HAY's table is calculated, how many men are now available as a national force without the passage of any bill at all?

Very respectfully,

A. P. GARDNER.

Here is Secretary Baker's answer:

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, March 16, 1916.

HON. A. P. GARDNER,  
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

SIR: 1. In reply to your letter of March 9, 1916, I would answer the question therein contained as follows:

Using the same method of calculating as Mr. Hay adopted on page 14 of his report on the new Army bill, we should now have available, without any legislation whatever, approximately the following number of men who have had some military training:

Regular Army, including Philippine Scouts	100,000
Reserve of Regular Army	60,000
National Guard	129,000
Men trained and in the country	995,790
Total	1,284,790

In other words, the only immediate effect of the passage of the House Army bill would be the increase of the Regular Army by 40,000 men, and even that increase, being added in four annual increments, would require about four years' time to be recruited and a still longer time to become effective.

2. The fallacy of this method of calculation is shown by the following statement of actual conditions:

As a matter of fact, the reserve of the Regular Army at present amounts to only about 2,875 men. This number will increase gradually until, under existing period of enlistment, it reaches a maximum equal to about 40 per cent of the total strength of the Regular Army, or about 40,000 men for the present Army of 100,000 or 56,000 men for the Army of 140,000 provided by the House bill. The net increase in the reserve would ultimately reach about 16,000, but it would not begin to become effective until about three years after the passage of the bill.

Mr. Hay estimates that there are 995,790 men who have had military training and are now in the country. This estimated number includes 270,200 men who have passed through the Regular Army in the past 10 years, 395,590 men who have passed through the National Guard, and 330,000 men who have passed through military schools and colleges in the same period. No deduction is made for those who have died or become unfit for service.

From the annual reports of The Adjutant General we find that during the past 10 years there have been discharged from the Army 89,644 men who did not reenlist. If we estimate the number of these who have probably died or become physically unfit for service at 2 per cent per year, or 6,848, we would have remaining 82,796 instead of 270,200 as estimated by Mr. Hay. These 82,796 men may be considered as having been adequately trained at date of discharge, but subsequent changes in methods, armament, etc., and the long separation of many of them from all connection with matters military make it unsafe to consider them as adequately trained except with respect to discipline. Three months' intensive training probably would render them effective.

It is believed that Mr. HAY's estimate of the number of men who have passed through the National Guard is substantially correct, but none of

these men were really trained when discharged and about two-thirds of them were discharged before expiration of term of enlistment when they had received training ranging from that imparted in one day to that possible in a nearly completed enlistment period.

Although last year some 33,000 students at our military schools and colleges were receiving military instruction, only 5,200 of this number were graduated. Using the latter figure for computing the number who have passed through military schools and colleges during the past 10 years, we obtain a total of 52,000 instead of 330,000 estimated by Mr. HAY. The records of the War College Division show that, as a matter of fact, only about 40,000 have graduated during the past 10 years from civil educational institutions of all classes at which officers of the Army were detailed. Until three years ago military training in these institutions consisted almost entirely of close-order drill and ceremonies. Consequently none of these 40,000 graduates are adequately trained. The class which will graduate in 1917 will have received a much more adequate course of training.

The only adequately trained men in the country are in the Regular Army and Army Reserve. The National Guard, those who have served therein, and the graduates of educational institutions having military training should be considered as only partially trained.

The numbers of each are as follows:

Adequately trained:	
Regular Army, including Philippine Scouts	100,000
Regular Army Reserve	2,900
Partially trained:	
National Guard	129,000
Others who have had some training	241,800
Total	473,700

Included under the heading "Others who have had some training," are 82,796 who have passed through the Regular Army, about 132,000 less 2 per cent per annum allowance for deaths or physical disability, or about 121,200, who have completed an enlistment in the National Guard, and 40,000 less 2 per cent per annum allowance for deaths or physical disability, or about 37,800, who have graduated in the past 10 years from military schools and colleges. Except for about 1,100 graduates of military schools who have been listed by The Adjutant General, the Government has no knowledge of the present addresses of any of these 241,800 men nor of the number of them that would be willing to volunteer for service in time of war.

The passage of the House Army bill would increase the Regular Army by 40,000 men in a period of three to four years, would make a net increase of the Regular Army Reserve by about 16,000 men in a period of about seven years, and would also increase the National Guard and therefore the number of partially trained men available in the country, but to just what extent I am unable to predict.

You will, of course, understand that accurate information on this subject is not available, and that therefore the figures I am giving you are at best only approximate.

Very sincerely,

NEWTON D. BAKER,  
Secretary of War.

Here is an analysis of Secretary Baker's comment on the figures in Chairman Hay's report:

#### CHAIRMAN HAY'S REPORT SAYS.

1. On page 14 of his report Mr. HAY says that 1,324,790 men will be at once available on the passage of the Hay bill.

2. Mr. HAY says that the reserve Regular Army will be 60,000 men.

3. Mr. HAY says that it is estimated that 270,200 former Regulars can be counted upon as part of our available material.

4. Mr. HAY says that in the last 10 years 395,590 men have passed through the National Guard.

5. Mr. HAY says that 33,000 young men passed through our military schools last year. He therefore reckons that 330,000 of these young men have received military training in the last 10 years and accordingly should be reckoned.

#### SECRETARY BAKER SAYS.

Secretary Baker says that calculating in the same way as Mr. HAY calculates there are now available 1,284,790 men without passing the Hay bill or any other Army bill at all. The Secretary makes this comment: "In other words, the only immediate effect of the passage of the House Army bill would be the increase of the Regular Army by 40,000 men, and even that increase, being added in four annual increments, would require about four years' time to be recruited and a still longer time to become effective."

Secretary Baker says that our present reserve of the Regular Army is now only 2,875 men, but that it will ultimately be 40,000 men, whether the Hay bill passes or not. The Secretary further says that the Hay bill will ultimately increase the reserve by 16,000 men, but this increase will not begin to become effective until about three years after the passage of the bill.

The Secretary says that only "82,796 instead of 270,200, as estimated by Mr. HAY," would be available. About these 82,796, the Secretary makes the comment that it is "unsafe to consider them as adequately trained except with respect to discipline. Three months' intensive training probably would render them effective."

The Secretary says that Mr. HAY is correct and adds: "But none of these men were really trained when discharged and about two-thirds of them were discharged before expiration of term of enlistment, when they had received training ranging from that imparted in one day to that possible in a nearly completed enlistment period."

The Secretary says that out of the 33,000 military students last year only 5,200 were graduated. On this basis, he says, "we obtain a total of 52,000 instead of 330,000 estimated by Mr. Hay."

A significant paragraph in the Secretary's letter is as follows:

The only adequately trained men in the country are in the Regular Army and Army reserve. The National Guard, those who have served therein and the graduates of educational institutions, having military training, should be considered as only partially trained.

The numbers of each are as follows:

Adequately trained—	
Regular Army, including Philippine Scouts.....	100,000
Regular Army, reserve.....	2,900
Partially trained—	
National Guard.....	129,000
Others who have had some training.....	241,800
Total.....	473,700

The Secretary concludes his letter with the following observation:

The passage of the House Army bill would increase the Regular Army by 40,000 men in a period of three to four years, would make a net increase of the Regular Army reserve by about 16,000 men in a period of about seven years, and would also increase the National Guard and therefore the number of partially trained men available in the country, but to just what extent I am unable to predict.

So you see that there is a good deal of difference between the estimate in the report and the estimate of the Secretary of War. The report estimates nearly three times as many trained and partially trained men in the country as the Secretary estimates.

#### EX-REGULARS DID NOT FLOCK TO THE COLORS.

Let us not fool ourselves into thinking that former Regulars will flock back to the colors in time of war. Has-been Regulars will not tumble over themselves in their anxiety to get killed any quicker than the rest of us. I hold in my hand a letter from Secretary of War Garrison, dated February 17, 1915. In it he informs me that in the Spanish War only 974 former Regulars returned to the Regular Army from civil life. It is true that many Regulars in all probability returned to the colors in the ranks of the Volunteers. Statistics are incomplete. Unfortunately, they were compiled only for the First Army Corps and for the second division of the Third Army Corps. A liberal estimate based on these incomplete figures would show that about 2,300 former Regulars, coming from civil life, enlisted in the volunteer service at the time of the Spanish War. This makes in all about 3,300 former Regulars who enlisted either in the Regulars or in the Volunteers.

And yet somewhere about 25,000 ex-Regulars who had been in the Army within the preceding 10 years were available for military service.

Here is an extract from Secretary Garrison's letter:

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, February 17, 1915.

Hon. A. P. GARDNER,  
House of Representatives.

My Dear Mr. GARDNER: I have the honor to furnish you with the following information bearing upon the queries set forth in your letter of the 10th instant:

2. How many former Regular Army soldiers reenlisted for the Spanish War either in the Regulars or Volunteers?

The records of this department show that during the 10 years ending June 30, 1898, 53,399 men had been honorably discharged from the Army for causes that would not render them ineligible for further military service. Of this number 26,271 reenlisted so as to make their service in the Regular Army continuous, thus leaving at large in civil life 27,128 men for the entire 10-year period. Of course, this number must have been reduced somewhat by casualties prior to the beginning of the War with Spain.

The records show that from April 1 to August 31, 1898, both dates inclusive, 3,162 men, who had had previous service in the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps, enlisted in the Regular Army, but 2,188 of these enlistments were continuous-service reenlistments of recently discharged men, leaving 974 as the number of former enlisted men of the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps who entered the Army from civil life during the period from April 1 to August 31, 1898.

The foregoing data, it will be observed, relate solely to reenlistments in the Regular Army and were ascertained only after a protracted examination of the official records. No compilation of data showing the exact number of former Regular Army soldiers who enlisted for the War with Spain in volunteer organizations has ever been made, but assuming that the data set forth in the inclosed table are representative of conditions among all the volunteer forces of the War with Spain, it will be seen that the percentage of men in volunteer organizations who previously served in the Regular Army was approximately a little over 1 per cent.

Very truly, yours,

LINDLEY M. GARRISON,  
Secretary of War.

#### THE MILITIA.

As to the 129,000 men in the militia or National Guard it is hard to guess how many effectives we could depend on in the event of war. The outlook is disheartening for anyone who has watched the militia records for target practice and camp attendance. Even in this last year, with the European war in progress, over 43,000 militiamen failed to go to camp, according to the figures of the Chief of Staff, United States Army. Furthermore, in his annual report, the Chief of Staff tells us that out of 91,000 militiamen armed with a rifle, no less than 41,000 were so indifferent to their duty that they failed to show up

for a single day's target practice throughout the entire year. According to this same official, our target practice "is in a fairly satisfactory condition in eight of the States and is unsatisfactory in all the others, with varying degrees of deficiency."

#### WHAT THE BILL PROVIDES.

Now, let us see what this bill actually does.

The Hay bill is a conscientious effort to build up an army without men. Counting the 20,000 men we voted the other day, the Hay bill adds 40,000 soldiers to the Regular Establishment, provides for picayune payments to militiamen in 48 different little armies, devotes a few paragraphs to regularizing instruction camps of the Plattsburg kind and to the formation of cadet companies, and doubles the number of cadets at West Point. The West Point provision is worth all the rest of the bill put together and a lot more besides. So far as the increase in the Regular Army is concerned, and so far as the summer camps are concerned, the bill is a Lilliputian step in the right direction. To regard this step in the right direction as an adequate satisfaction of the Nation's demand for preparedness is about as sensible as to regard the peanut tendered by some child's hand at the circus as an adequate satisfaction of an elephant's demand for food. What do 40,000 additional men amount to? If they were all well and strong, they might man a trench half the length of Manhattan Island, on which a part of New York City is built. If you were to put these 40,000 men in a trench here in Washington, with the left of the line resting on the Congressional Cemetery at Nineteenth Street SE., the extreme right would not reach beyond the American University on Nebraska Avenue.

Out of approximately 100,000 men in the Regular Army today we have some 35,000 available for a field or mobile army, as it is called. The rest of the men are in overseas garrisons or in the coast defenses or in the noncombatant corps. If we add 40,000 new men to our field force we shall ultimately have 75,000 Regulars for the field army of the United States, and that is all. Remember, however, that the Hay bill allows us four years' time for the recruitment of these 40,000 new soldiers. If we pass the Hay bill we shall ultimately have a force of Regulars in our field army sufficient to man the trenches along a 15 to 20 mile front, or about one-fortieth of the Texas frontier along the Rio Grande.

#### THE RECRUITING PROBLEM.

I believe that we are going to have the very greatest difficulty in the future in recruiting a Regular Army, and no wonder. We do not pay our soldiers enough. Fifteen dollars a month and all found, including quinine and coffins, does not offer men much inducement to hunt Mexican murderers where the ambushing is good. If we want good men for a good Regular Army we must go right into the labor market and compete for them. By the way, we voted the other day to increase the Regular Army 20,000 men, so that we could meet the Mexican crisis. If we need 20,000 more Regulars to fight Villa, how many more Regulars would we need to fight a real enemy?

#### DOES THIS BILL FEDERALIZE THE MILITIA.

Not being a lawyer, I do not propose to discuss the constitutional questions in this bill. As far as I can judge from the report made by the chairman, the committee feels that in its near-federalization plan a successful scheme has been hit on for circumventing that clause in the Federal Constitution which reserves to the States the appointment of officers and the training of the militia under Federal regulations.

The Missouri Military Council, whatever that may be, agrees with the committee, and so the committee quotes the council in Chairman HAY's report. On the other hand, Secretary Stimson and Secretary Garrison insist that the Constitution can not be uncoined; and, by the way, Secretary Garrison underlined his opinion by resigning his seat in the Cabinet of the President of the United States.

Each side marshals the decisions and the views of the big-wigs. No one knows what the Supreme Court of the United States will think when it is called upon to decide the question. One man's guess is as good as another's, and my guess is that any plan for federalizing the militia under which every private carries a lawsuit in his knapsack is a pretty good plan to avoid, the executive council of the National Guard Association to the contrary notwithstanding.

Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the Record.

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. DOOLITTLE). The gentleman from Massachusetts asks unanimous consent to extend his remarks in the Record. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. LONGWORTH. I was very much interested in what the gentleman said as to the overlapping authority of the President

and the governors of the States. Suppose, to follow out the illustration the gentleman gave, that the National Guard had been ordered out by the governor to suppress a riot, and at the same time an invading force was landed in this country, who would have the authority, the President or the governor?

Mr. GARDNER. I can not answer the gentleman.

Mr. LONGWORTH. If the gentleman can not answer, I do not know who can.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Chairman, I understand that the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER] has yielded the floor.

Mr. GARDNER. Certainly.

Mr. HAY. I yield to the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. GARD].

Mr. GARD. Mr. Chairman, I rise at this time merely to ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks in the RECORD for the purpose of inserting in the RECORD at this point the text of a substitute which I will offer for section 18 of the pending bill.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Ohio [Mr. GARD] asks unanimous consent to extend his remarks in the RECORD as indicated. Is there objection? [After a pause.] The Chair hears none.

The following is the substitute for section 18 of the bill referred to:

Sec. 18. That for the purpose of securing a sufficient reserve of officers for the military forces of the United States the President is hereby authorized to establish and maintain in civil educational institutions a reserve officers' training corps, which shall consist of a senior division organized at universities and colleges requiring four years of collegiate study for a degree, including those State institutions that are required to provide instruction in military tactics under the provisions of the act of Congress of July 2, 1862, donating lands for the establishment of colleges where the leading object shall be the practical instruction of the industrial classes in agriculture and the mechanic arts, including military tactics, and a junior division organized at all other public or private educational institutions, and each division shall consist of units of the several arms or corps in such number and of such strength as the President may prescribe.

That the President may, upon the application of any State institution described in the first paragraph of this section, establish and maintain at such institution one or more units of the reserve officers' training corps: *Provided*, That no such unit shall be established or maintained at any such institution at which an officer of the Army is not detailed as professor of military science and tactics or at any such institution which does not maintain under military instruction at least 100 physically fit male students.

That the President may, upon the application of any established educational institution in the United States, other than a State institution described in the first paragraph of this section the authorities of which agree to establish and maintain a two-years' elective or compulsory course of military training as a minimum for its physically fit male students, which course when entered upon by any student shall, as regards such student, be a prerequisite for graduation, establish and maintain at such institution one or more units of the reserve officers' training corps: *Provided*, That no such units shall be established or maintained at any such institution at which an officer of the Army is not detailed as professor of military science and tactics, or at any such institution which does not maintain under military instruction at least 100 physically fit male students.

That the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to prescribe standard courses of theoretical and practical military training for units of the reserve officers' training corps, and no unit of the senior division shall be organized or maintained at any educational institution the authorities of which fail or neglect to adopt into their curriculum the prescribed courses of military training for the senior division or to devote at least an average of three hours per week per academic year to such military training, and no unit of the junior division shall be organized or maintained at any educational institution the authorities of which fail or neglect to adopt into their curriculum the prescribed courses of military training for the junior division or to devote at least an average of three hours per week per academic year to such military training.

That eligibility to membership in the reserve officers' training corps shall be limited to students of institutions in which units of such corps may be established who are citizens of the United States or have legally declared their intention to become such, who are not less than 14 years of age, and whose bodily condition indicates that they are physically fit to perform military duty or will be so upon arrival at military age.

That the President is hereby authorized to detail such numbers of officers of the Army, either active or retired, not above the grade of colonel, as may be necessary, for duty as professors and assistant professors of military science and tactics at institutions where one or more units of the reserve officers' training corps are maintained, but the total number of active officers so detailed at educational institutions shall not exceed 300, and no active officer shall be so detailed who has not had five years' commissioned service in the Army. Retired officers shall not be detailed under the provisions of this section without their consent. Retired officers below the grade of lieutenant colonel so detailed shall receive the full pay and allowances of their grade, and retired officers above the grade of major so detailed shall receive the same pay and allowances as a retired major would receive under a like detail. No detail under the provisions of this section shall extend for more than four years.

That the President is hereby authorized to detail for duty at institutions where one or more units of the reserve officers' training corps are maintained such number of enlisted men, either active or retired, as he may deem necessary, but the number of active noncommissioned officers so detailed shall not exceed 500, and all active noncommissioned officers so detailed shall be additional in their respective grades to those otherwise authorized for the Army. Retired enlisted men shall not be detailed under the provisions of this paragraph without their consent. While so detailed they shall receive active pay and allowances.

That the Secretary of War, under such regulations as he may prescribe, is hereby authorized to issue to institutions at which one or more units of the reserve officers' training corps are maintained such

public animals, arms, uniforms, equipment, and means of transportation as he may deem necessary and to forage at the expense of the United States public animals so issued. He shall require from each institution to which property of the United States is issued a bond in the value of the property issued for the care and safe-keeping thereof and for its return when required.

That the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to maintain camps for the further practical instruction of the members of the reserve officers' training corps, no such camps to be maintained for a period longer than six weeks in any one year except in time of war or when war is imminent; to transport members of such corps to and from such camps at the expense of the United States so far as appropriations will permit; to use the Regular Army, such other military forces as Congress from time to time authorizes, and such Government property as he may deem necessary for the military training of the members of such corps while in attendance at such camps; to prescribe regulations for the government of such corps, and to authorize, in his discretion, the formation of company units thereof into battalion and regimental units.

That when any member of the senior division of the reserve officers' training corps has completed two academic years of service in that division and has been selected for further training by the president of the institution and by its professor of military science and tactics and has agreed in writing to continue in the reserve officers' training corps for the remaining two years of his course in the institution, devoting five hours per week to the military training prescribed by the Secretary of War, and has agreed in writing to pursue the courses in camp training prescribed by the Secretary of War, he may be furnished at the expense of the United States with commutation of subsistence at such rate, not exceeding the cost of the garrison ration prescribed for the Army, as may be fixed by the Secretary of War during the remainder of his service in the reserve officers' training corps.

That the President alone, under such regulations as he may prescribe, is hereby authorized to appoint as a reserve officer any graduate of the senior division of the reserve officers' training corps who shall have satisfactorily completed the further training provided for in the preceding paragraph hereof, or any graduate of the junior division who shall have satisfactorily completed the courses of military training prescribed for the senior division and the further training provided for in the preceding paragraph hereof, and shall have participated in such practical instruction subsequent to graduation as the Secretary of War shall prescribe, who shall have arrived at the age of 21 years, and who shall agree, under oath in writing, to serve the United States in the capacity of a reserve officer of the Army during a period of at least 10 years from the date of his appointment as such reserve officer, unless sooner discharged by proper authority, but the total number of reserve officers so appointed shall not exceed 50,000: *And provided*, That any graduate qualified under the provisions of this section undergoing a postgraduate course at any institution shall not be eligible for appointment as reserve officer while undergoing such postgraduate course, but his ultimate eligibility upon completion of such postgraduate course for such appointment shall not be affected because of his having undergone such postgraduate course.

That any physically fit male citizen of the United States between the ages of 21 and 27 years, who shall have graduated prior to the date of this act from any educational institution at which an officer of the Army was detailed as professor of military science and tactics, and who while a student at such institution completed courses of military training under the direction of such professor of military science and tactics substantially equivalent to those prescribed pursuant to this section for the senior division, shall, after satisfactorily completing such additional practical military training as the Secretary of War shall prescribe, be eligible for appointment as a reserve officer and as a temporary additional second lieutenant in accordance with the terms of this section.

That the President alone is hereby authorized to appoint and commission as a temporary second lieutenant of the Regular Army for a period of at least six months, with the allowances now provided by law for that grade, but with pay at the rate of \$100 per month, any reserve officer appointed pursuant to this section and to attach him to a unit of the Regular Army for duty and training during the period covered by his appointment as such temporary second lieutenant, and upon the expiration of such service with the Regular Army such officer shall revert to his status as a reserve officer.

That no reserve officer or temporary second lieutenant appointed pursuant to this section shall be entitled to retirement or to retired pay, and shall be eligible for pension only for disability incurred in line of duty in active service or while serving with the Regular Army pursuant to the provisions of this section.

That in time of war the President may order reserve officers appointed under the provisions of this section to active duty with any of the military forces of the United States in any grades not below that of second lieutenant, and while on active duty they shall be subject to the Rules and Articles of War.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. CRAGO]. [Applause.]

Mr. CRAGO. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, in approaching the subject of a military policy for our country we must accept certain fundamental principles of government before we can intelligently discuss a definite policy. First, I take it we must admit that it is the first duty of government to protect life and property, and in the final analysis a government must depend on its physical force to perform this function. Second, the physical force of a government to be effective must be organized, and whether this organization or mobilization shall be purposed to maintain peace or to successfully wage war if war comes makes but little difference. If we admit these propositions to be true, we must consider, first, the legal machinery by which it is possible to gather together or create this force, capable of meeting the demands made upon it, and, second, the adoption of a system in harmony with our principles of government by which we can have the services of our citizens in sufficient numbers to meet any emergency.

I believe that all sane people who have given this subject any real thought will agree that we as a Nation should take every

necessary precaution to prevent war, and that most of them will agree that in preparing to defend ourselves we will to a great extent make ourselves less liable to attack. How far we shall go, what shall be the degree of our preparation, what, in fact, shall be the purpose of our preparation, is a question for the people to determine and is not a question for military experts to define or demand. The fact that military experts, so called, have attempted to dictate the military policy for us has made it difficult to get our people to agree to legislation which is really necessary. We value to the full extent the advice and the counsel of these officers as to the organization, the discipline, and the equipment of the different units of our Army, but the extent of it, the purpose of it, the means of calling it into being, is for the legislative branch of this Government, representing, as they should endeavor to represent, the people, who must provide the means for maintaining it, rather than for the men who live by reason of our Army and whose life work is given to the Army.

Do not misunderstand me. I yield to no one in my admiration and respect for the men of our Army—those officers who in time of war as well as in peace we must look to for the suggestions as to the best means of bringing efficiency out of the forces at their command. But for these men to dictate our military policy is much like our handing over to any other branch of our Government the making of the laws which will dictate the course of this great Nation of ours.

Any measures of preparedness should be based on our present needs, and should reflect an intelligent and permanent policy, dictated by experience and the recommendations of our best military authorities. But legislation by which we bring this about should reflect the sober, deliberate judgment of the representatives of the people.

It has been well said that inefficiency is a part of the price that democracy pays for the blessings of individual freedom and personal liberty, and we are not yet willing to admit that they are not worth the price. It is our duty, however, to make the price as small as possible, and to that end we must work for the greatest efficiency possible under a system harmonizing with our principles of government.

Much has been said concerning the bill now pending. I simply want to add here some words, referring particularly to the adoption of the National Guard as a part of the first line of defense. In order to continue a rational program of preparedness the National Government, in addition to perfecting our small Regular Army, should give immediate and continuous attention to the following: First, follow to the fullest extent the opportunity offered by the federalization of the National Guard; second, systematically mobilize our physical resources, to the end that we may know at all times that we have control of all materials necessary to maintain ourselves if entirely shut off from the rest of the world; third, encourage the States in their work of imparting military instruction and discipline.

Cooperating with the National Government, the States first should vie with each other in furnishing the General Government with the most efficient organizations of troops for Federal service; and second, the States should establish courses of military instruction in all schools, and in all medical schools receiving State aid, insist on a thorough course in military hygiene and sanitation; and third, the States should relieve the National Guard of any possibility of police duty [applause] by establishing a State police force, trained for this particular kind of service.

Now something has been said as to the constitutionality of this federalization, and I want to say here that, after studying this question to the best of my ability, I agree heartily with our honored chairman in the conclusion which he has come to, and I have no sympathy with those people who are depending on something that has never been decided by a court of law, but who are merely using in their arguments an obiter dictum uttered by some official whose opinion is not the decision of a court of last resort.

Mr. FESS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. CRAGO. Yes.

Mr. FESS. I would like to ask the gentleman whether he knows of any experiment where a State has adopted a State constabulary to do away with police duty on the part of the National Guard?

Mr. CRAGO. I know of one splendid example, that of the State of Pennsylvania, where, about 12 or 14 years ago, against the protest of a great many people, such a course was adopted, and it has grown so in popular favor that to-day the 300 men of the constabulary in a State of 9,000,000 population have made it absolutely unnecessary to use the National Guard in such labor troubles as have occurred; and to-day you will not hear among people who condemned it in the beginning a word

of condemnation against the splendid body of men that has been organized for that particular purpose.

Sections 23 to 78 of the present bill apply to the National Guard and are intended to provide such an organization and discipline for this part of the militia as will make of it a real Federal force. I recognize the fact that our people are not ready for universal military service and that we can not hope to maintain a Regular Army at such strength as to give us an effective first line of defense; and believing that from our organized citizen soldiery must come the officers and men who will be first called to the colors in time of danger, we have turned to the National Guard in the belief that this body of men who, with but little encouragement, have kept alive the military spirit in our country during the years that our people have been engrossed in industrial progress, will be able to provide our nation with a real Federal force, one in harmony with our high ideals and capable of being made a dependable force.

In proposing this legislation we are fully aware of the arguments which have been urged against such a course. Some of these arguments are advanced through ignorance of the real value and the present worth of the National Guard, while others come from men who have a personal motive in their attempt to belittle the possibilities of this body of citizen soldiery. No one who has served long in the National Guard will claim for it perfection, nor should we expect more than we have achieved under the conditions as they have existed. The men who are responsible for the proposed legislation realize that it means either the achievement of proper results from this plan or it means the complete disbandment of the National Guard as a Federal force.

We believe that to continue the present halfway system of support is money wasted, and that it is unfair and unwise to maintain an organization for military purposes which deceives its members into thinking themselves soldiers when they really are not, and giving our people a false sense of security by relying on a force which in the test might not make good. It is better that we have no National Guard, so far as Federal purposes are concerned, than to have one not up to such a standard of efficiency as will accomplish its real purpose.

I want to take up briefly the arguments against using the National Guard as a Federal force, and dispose of them in the light of the facts and the conditions which we hope will prevail when the federalized National Guard shall have a chance to demonstrate what can be accomplished. In dealing with the subject we must formulate a system not only to meet the present strong demand for preparedness, when men are giving their best thought to the subject, but a plan which will in the years to come give us the men so necessary to any effective fighting force. In doing so I shall compare our proposed system with that of the German Empire, which most people admit is able to furnish quite an effective military force. The difference in effectiveness as a result of their universal military service must be made up with us through the patriotic zeal of our citizens and a recognition, if possible, of the fact that the failure on the part of a citizen to do his share is just as culpable as his failure to perform those duties devolving upon him in behalf of those who are dependent upon him by reason of family ties—which common humanity dictates.

The first criticism is usually the fact that the National Guard is composed of 48 little armies, and I think I heard those words ringing in this Chamber just a few moments ago—48 little armies, each under a different commander and lacking uniformity, efficiency, coordination, and unity. I will answer this criticism by saying that under the proposed plan a unity of organization would obtain, and our National Guard would be as much under the control of one commander in chief, namely, the President, as the German Army is under the Emperor of Germany.

Let me quote from pages 321, 322, 323, 324, and 360 of "The German Empire," by Howard. We find here:

Strictly speaking, the German Army is not a unit. Indeed, it may be quite properly said that there is as yet no imperial army, but simply contingents of the several States.

The principle of unity in the military organization of the Empire is carried out in three ways: (1) By placing the supreme command, both in war and peace, in the hands of the Kaiser; (2) by introducing a uniform organization, equipment, and set of tactics in all the contingents; and (3) by meeting the expenses of the army out of the common treasury. From a military standpoint, as Laband concedes, the different contingents may be regarded as parts of a wholly unified army, but from the standpoint of constitutional law, which is the only point from which the jurist can view the matter, it is a fundamental fact that there is no imperial army; these words are simply a collective symbol under which the contingents of the several States may be comprehended.

I will take this occasion to answer briefly the question that was asked in regard to the use of State troops in case this country was invaded, and at the same time the State should

have internal troubles. In the first place, such a contingency is unlikely to happen. These things do not occur in time of war, but only in time of peace. But the Federal control would, of course, be absolute on an occasion of that kind. I read further:

If it be true that the imperial army is but a name for the combination of the various contingents, what is the relation of the Empire to these contingents and what rights have the several States over their own armies? The answer grows out of the nature of the Empire as a Federal State. German jurists are generally agreed upon two points with respect to the nature of the Empire: First, the Empire is not a mere international arrangement based on contract, but a true State based on a constitution; second, the individual States, on entering into the Federal relation, ceased to be sovereign, but did not cease to be States. Each State has its own army, to be sure, but that army is recruited, organized, equipped, and drilled, not in conformity to rules and regulations laid down by the military authorities of the State, but the laws and ordinances of the Empire.

The matter of liability to military service, the recruiting of the various contingents, the qualifications and duties of officers, the establishment of a criminal code for the Army and the code of procedure in military trials, the maintenance of discipline, the whole arrangement of the military organization, the fitting out of the troops, etc., all fall within the competence of the imperial legislation. The States, indeed, possess military supremacy formally, but the material content and extent of this supremacy are determined by the Empire. The rulers of the several States are the heads of the various contingents; that is, the officers and men of the various contingents stand in a relation of immediate service to the ruler of the State to which their contingent belongs. They take the oath of allegiance to him and owe him their personal loyalty. Nevertheless they are all under the supreme command of the Emperor as head of the united armed forces of the Empire, and in taking the oath of allegiance to their own ruler they swear obedience to the Emperor at the same time. The Emperor has the right of inspection at any and all times, and he may order the remedying of any defects which such inspection may discover. Further, in the administration of their own contingents, the States, while actually conducting the work of administration, must keep within the bounds set by imperial law, the command of the Emperor, and the amount assigned to them out of the general budget. Any balance which may remain after the expenses of the military administration of any State are paid does not fall to the State, but flows into the imperial treasury.

Another provision here is:

It will be seen that two principles are at work in the military organization and administration of the Empire, the two principles which are always asserting themselves and seeking adjustment under the federal form of government, viz, the principle of unitarianism or centralization, which is constantly aiming to gather the whole power of the State into the hands of the Empire, and the federalistic principle, or principle of State supremacy, which seeks to preserve to the individual members of the Empire the largest measure of independence and control compatible with the efficiency of the whole. The very necessities of effective military organization demand that the supreme power and control be located at a single center, and that all the members shall be subordinate to this central authority. To reconcile this demand, which is vital to any successful military organization, with the justifiable desire on the part of the States and their rulers to retain and assert their own supremacy, is a delicate task and presents the problem which the imperial constitution attempts to solve.

The theory, therefore, on which the military powers are distributed is this: Every State has its own troops and is in possession of military supremacy. This supremacy is to be limited only so far as may be required in order to secure the unity of the federal Army, which is composed of these State troops.

In other words, in all these States making up the German Empire they appoint their own officers, and it is only the higher officers commanding the divisions who are subject to appointment by the Emperor of Germany. To sum up the organization of the German army, Laband puts it as follows: "To the Empire belongs the military organization and arrangement of the army, the supreme command in war and peace, the fixing of the requirements as to recruits and as to the budget of expenditures; to the States is left the formal supremacy over the contingents and self-administration."

Second, the appointment of the officers is in the hands of the different governors. This is a source of strength rather than weakness under the restrictions as contained in this bill. The States are never of one political complexion, and while partisan politics has never obtained in the National Guard of the larger States, even granting that it may in some of the States, is not the governor of a State as competent to select proper officers as the President, and is the power any more likely to be abused by a governor than it is by one man as President. Under the German system the officers are selected by the States.

Third, the right men will not join the National Guard by reason of fear of strike duty, and the unfriendly attitude of organized labor. This opens up an economic side of the question, one which goes to the very heart of our industrial system if it were entirely true, and would always so continue; but I believe this phase of the subject will eventually solve itself. To begin with, the National Guard was never originally intended for strike duty. Strikes are the product of our too rapid industrial development, and unfortunately we have been called on to pass through this period of our development. The necessity for such service is being lessened, first by organizing State police, trained for this particular service; second, by the better understandings existing between capital and labor. At times the use of the Guard in strike duty has been abused, and they

were thought by the great corporations to be their servants and subject to their instructions when on duty. Their real duty was to see that the laws were not violated, and when in some cases they were used as an adjunct to the corporations, naturally this created a feeling on the part of organized labor which it has been difficult to correct. This phase of the subject affects but few States and will in time disappear once it is known that the Guard is a Federal force.

But, says some one, will not the legislatures of the States refuse to support the guard if they are not to be used in this strike duty? This has not been the result in Pennsylvania, where we have that splendid organization known as the State police, which is maintained by the State. The true theory is that the guard from each State will be that State's contribution to the Federal service, just as the theory of our representation in Congress should be that each State sends its representatives to Congress, not to get what they can for that State, but as the State's contribution to the councils of the Nation. I regret to say that many of the criticisms of our volunteer system in former wars are only too true, but these criticisms do not apply to the present Organized Militia any more than the deserved denunciation of the inefficiency of our little Regular Army of former years applies to our present splendid reorganized Army of to-day, the equal, man for man, if not superior, to any fighting force in the world. [Applause.] The critics give little attention to the fact that in the War with Spain and the Philippine insurrection the organizations of the National Guard were quickly utilized in forming an Army of the size desired, and that these men, after doing duty in the Philippines, when their time of service had expired by reason of the ratification of the treaty with Spain, when they knew that they were needed to hold our island possessions while months were being consumed in building up an Army to relieve them, did what no other American soldiers ever did, either regular or volunteer, agreed to stay on the firing line until such time as they could be relieved. [Applause.] And Congress has never yet given proper recognition of this sacrifice to duty.

And now, since I have touched on this service, you will pardon my personal testimony concerning the deplorable conditions which existed in the National Guard of the different States in 1898, not in any manner the fault of the States or the National Guard, but the direct result of the neglect of the National Government to properly arm and equip these soldiers.

When the call to arms was sounded we answered, and on the 28th day of April, 1898, these young men of Pennsylvania, taken hurriedly from their homes the day before, found themselves at daylight at Mount Gretna, Pa., where they were unloaded on one side of that bleak mountain without shelter of any kind. It was bitter cold, and in a blinding mixture of snow and rain we were compelled to pass the day waiting for canvas and rations. We were camped there several weeks being mustered into the service of the United States. We had in each company 55 uniforms and 55 guns for 75 men. We were sent across the continent in that condition, the men being compelled to occupy during the long journey the poorest type of day coaches. When we reached San Francisco we were issued 20 more guns of the same type as our others. In order to provide shoes for the men there was dumped in front of my tent a miscellaneous assortment of shoes—pointed toes, enamel leather, congress gaiters—of a type which had not been seen in a first-class shoe store for a generation. In fact, I am satisfied the entire lot was the output of some store which had failed years before. The men were given brown canvas overalls, and thus equipped we were loaded on to an antiquated vessel built for the coasting trade in 1874. The men were quartered below the water line, under conditions which would have brought condemnation from an immigrant inspector if imposed on the poorest type of immigrant.

We made the journey across the Pacific and finally landed on the island of Luzon and in a few days were in action with the Spaniards, where we found our guns were not equal to theirs. We were using old-fashioned black powder, with Springfield rifles of a type condemned years ago. We lived in the trenches until August 13, when we moved our men into the surrendered city of Manila, with more than 300 men in our brigade without even a semblance of a shoe on their feet, in a country where the soil is filled with malarial germs, where the natives never think of going barefooted. Before long we were battling with the Filipinos, who were armed with guns far superior to ours, furnished, as we were told, by German merchants. We were compelled always to advance under more than 200 yards of their fire before we could fire a shot in return, and practically every man we lost in action was lost in reaching the point where he could return the fire. When I recall these evidences of the criminal negligence of those whose duty it was to see that the young men

who answered the call were properly armed and equipped, and when I think of what this cost, do you wonder that I am intensely interested in righting, so far as I can, this national disgrace?

We may here adopt the legal machinery for the formation of an army. If we have kept it in harmony with the human side of our problem it will accomplish its purpose. If not it will fail, but I have faith that its purpose and plan will find a response in the heart of every loyal American who loves his country and recognizes the fact that love and loyalty demand service. [Applause.] Very few of us will ever be called upon to bear the physical burden of whatever system we may here adopt. To younger men must fall the real service our country may demand, and so it does seem to me that as the representatives of the people, working for the perpetuation of a nation we love, we should all shoulder to shoulder present a solid line of determined action in the great task before us and so legislate that those who come after us may realize that we have contributed something of value to our country. [Applause.]

Mr. HAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 20 minutes to the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. SHALLENBERGER].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Nebraska is recognized for 20 minutes. [Applause.]

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Mr. Chairman, in the short period of time allotted to me I wish to confine my remarks chiefly to the question which I believe is the one really in dispute as to this bill, and that is, What shall be the size of our standing Army? We have the past experiences of other nations as a light to direct our own actions at this hour.

I am not to be stamped into enormous and useless expenditures for national defense because of the panic that has swept over this Nation by reason of the great war in Europe; but a study of the condition of the military arm of this Nation will, I think, convince any patriotic citizen that he is warranted in supporting the reasonable increases and program provided for in this bill.

Much as we may abhor war and cry out against it, there is nothing in the experience of mankind nor the history of nations to warrant the hope or belief that the world is yet growing weary of war. On the contrary, to-day, in the very center of civilization, mankind is blood-mad, and at any moment we may be drawn into the maelstrom of war that now roars around the earth. Neither religion nor civilization restrains the rage of nations. The most cultured and scientific peoples are the fiercest fighters. The experiences that now confront us on the Mexican border is evidence that at any day or hour the question of peace or war may be no longer a matter of our own choice. The gauge of battle may be thrown at us and we must be prepared to defend ourselves or be stricken down. We do not want war, but if it comes in spite of our wishes we want to win.

Let us hope that when peace comes to war-stricken Europe it will mean the beginning of the end of war; but if either side shall win a signal triumph I am fearful that the world will declare that the victory teaches a different lesson. If Germany and the Central Powers win, it will be heralded around the earth as proof stronger than Holy Writ that the greatest thing in the world is a 42-centimeter gun. If England and her allies triumph, it will be accepted as proof positive that the biggest thing in determining the destiny of nations is a battleship. If this should be the verdict of the world as the lesson of the present war, how shall we hope to escape the same curse while all the rest of mankind is taken. We are exactly the same flesh and blood, the same kind of people as those who are fighting like demons in countless millions over on the other side of the Atlantic. They are the same kind of men and women, the same civilization. America is what she is because she is the son and the daughter of Europe. We are no better or wiser than they. All of you are proud to trace your lineage there.

Left to ourselves, the power of public opinion and our splendid isolation may ward off the possibility of war. In Europe kings and emperors yet rule. They get together in secret conclave with their counselors and can bring war upon the nations, and the people are powerless to prevent it.

The only part the common people are allowed to play is to fight the battles in times of war and pay the debts in time of peace, and that is about all the common people are permitted to do in any land when war comes to it.

Two years ago all Europe was at peace, not one person in a million in all that Continent believed that the future held the possibility of war for them, but at about the same time we sent thousands of trained soldiers to Vera Cruz, Regular soldiers, trained to kill, armed to the teeth, and backed up by a great war fleet upon the sea; but we did not go to war with our southern neighbor, because the President knew that the great

mass and body of the American people are in favor of peace and against war with Mexico or any other nation if it can possibly be avoided with honor. The glory of the American Government and its people is that public opinion is supreme, and the strength of the President with the Nation is that it believes his great heart always beats for peace. [Applause.]

The bill before the House provides, in my opinion, for a reasonable and efficient increase in the Regular Military Establishment. The additions provided for are demanded by the increasing population of the country and are necessary that the Army may perform its proper functions for the Republic in time of peace. It also takes the first step toward providing a force of citizen soldiery to fight the battles of the Nation in time of war. Civilization need not fear the fighting man when he is fighting on the side of humanity and justice. It has taken a thousand years of fighting upon the part of the masses of mankind to win the rights the individual now enjoys in time of peace. There will never be an enduring peace throughout the world until the red-blooded fighting men of earth begin to fight against war and the abuses of power that makes it possible for war to curse mankind.

The bill is properly designated "An act to increase the efficiency of the Military Establishment of the Nation." It provides for a maximum strength of 140,000 fighting men as the line of the Army. Those who ask for a larger enlisted strength for the Regular Army are confronted with the admitted fact that it will require the utmost effort of the recruiting arm of the service to enlist 140,000 men in time of peace. Personally, I believe the number of enlisted men asked for by the Secretary of War in his report to this Congress, which was 134,000 men, would give us an Army of sufficient size to perform all the duties required of the Regular Army in time of peace; but I realize that all legislation is the result of compromise, and I am willing to accept the added organizations and enlisted personnel as provided in this bill. The minimum strength of the enlisted force as provided in this act, when the four yearly increments have been enlisted, is 127,000 men. When we take into consideration that we have to furnish garrisons for our military establishments in the Philippine Islands, in Hawaii, and the Canal Zone, in addition to those for our fixed fortifications at home, it will be seen that the mobile force of the Regular Army, as provided for in this act, will not be excessive in time of peace.

The record shows that Congress has been generous in the matter of appropriations for the Army in past years, and if we are lacking in those things that are essential to the effectiveness of the Military Establishment it can not be justly laid at the door of the legislative branch of the Government. In round numbers, since 1901 this Nation has appropriated for the support of the Military Establishment \$1,700,000,000. During the same period the expenditures of the German Empire for the same purposes have amounted to \$1,650,000,000, or practically the same expenditure as ourselves. With this money they armed the nation and builded a military establishment that is the wonder of the world.

This bill recognizes as one of its fundamental features the futility of relying upon a standing army to defend the Nation in time of war. A standing army is now recognized as essential as a training school for the Nation in time of peace, to develop trained officers of high efficiency and furnish the first line of defense if war shall come. The item of expense alone precludes the possibility of maintaining a standing army in sufficient numbers to defend a nation the size of ours in warfare with a first-class military power.

That distinguished advocate of a large army, the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER], proposes that we should increase our standing army to something like 250,000 or 350,000 men. This would increase our military expenditures by hundreds of millions, but a difference of a few hundred millions of dollars does not seem to startle us any more, when military affairs are concerned.

Mr. QUIN. Will the gentleman yield there?

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. Yes.

Mr. QUIN. The gentleman from Massachusetts did not explain how they were ever going to get these men, did he?

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. No; and no one has explained that yet. That is one thing that has never been explained. Such an army would require an annual appropriation of something like \$300,000,000 or \$400,000,000 annually, and even if we were able to enlist an army of that size in time of peace, which is believed impossible by those the best informed upon the subject, an army of that number is only cannon fodder for a week or two of conflict in modern warfare. The greatest mistake that we could make, in my opinion, would be to adopt the idea that with an army of 250,000 Regulars we would be

safe from invasion. It has been the practice of many countries in the past, when the people have grown rich and prosperous, to become indifferent and not willing to play the part of men in defending the life of the nation and to rely upon a professional army as a bulwark behind which the balance of the nation could rest at ease. Such a policy has always resulted in disaster when the system has been put to the real test of war. England was the last nation of Europe to rely upon a standing army of professional soldiers in numbers something like that advocated by many preachers of preparedness in the United States. Behind the bulwark of her battle fleet she felt herself secure with this obsolete military system. When the crisis came and that professional army was thrown against a nation of citizen soldiers in arms—and no men ever fought more bravely than this British army—they only served as a block for a week or so to stay the war chariot of Germany, until the citizen soldiery of France stopped the Teutons at the Marne. [Applause.]

Mr. KAHN. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. If it does not take too much time.

Mr. KAHN. Does the gentleman contend that these citizen soldiers whom he speaks of were untrained men? They had had three years' and two years' training, respectively.

Mr. SHALLENBERGER. I understand that; but after all they were just the same kind of soldiers that this Nation is going to obtain under this bill. They were not professional soldiers. They were not men reenlisted over and over again and maintained in a standing army, but they were men who took the duty of citizenship upon their shoulders, received their military training, and then went back to the avenues of peace, ready to come to the defense of the nation when it called them. That is the kind of an army program I am in favor of, and that is the only kind of an army program that will properly defend this country in time of war. [Applause.]

A century ago the kings and emperors of Europe relied upon a standing army of picked professional soldiers as a means of defense both for themselves and for the nation. The art of war became largely a thing of discipline and display. Suddenly the new Republic of France sprang into being and armed a nation of citizen soldiers, who, under the leadership of Napoleon Bonaparte, the greatest military genius the world ever knew, ran roughshod over the professional armies of Europe. But Bonaparte taught the Germans the secret of his power, and Prussia began to arm the nation. The story is told over and over again how Scharnhorst and Gneissau trained the 42,000 men each year that Napoleon allowed them in their standing army until they had a nation of citizen soldiers, each trained for a year. With this army they overthrew Bonaparte at Lepsic, and later on with Wellington wrought his everlasting defeat at Waterloo.

In the Middle Ages the professional soldiers of Europe were men mounted upon horseback, clad in armor. The man upon horseback is yet a synonym for the soldier. They were robbers in time of peace and pirates in time of war. The standing armies of Europe in that age consisted largely of paid mercenaries, who fought solely for loot and pay. Charles the Bold, of Burgundy, was the most powerful military prince in all Europe. He was the richest potentate of his time. He owned Burgundy and Lorraine, the fairest part of France, and the Provinces on the Rhine. He possessed Flanders and much of what is now known as the Netherlands. He claimed a part of Switzerland, and finally, in order to win for himself a crown in place of a ducal coronet, he claimed sovereignty over the men of the mountains. When he went forth to battle 20,000 knights, mounted on great horses and clad in shining steel, rode in his train. The men of Switzerland had neither horses nor armor. They were trained to fight on foot. They were armed only with an axe, a sword, and a spear. They were a nation of fighting freemen, just as they are to-day. They came down out of the mountains, and three times they met the knights of Charles the Bold in open field in pitched battles, and three times they overthrew him; and the last great fight cost him his kingdom and his life. And when the battle was ended his 20,000 knights laid dead upon the plain beside him or were scattered to the four winds of heaven; and for the first time in a thousand years these mountaineers of Switzerland showed the world that brave men fighting on foot are invincible against the man on horseback.

We have heard a great deal about the necessity for officers to make an effective army. Much is made of the wonderful military inventions that are revolutionizing the art of war; but we hear very little of the common soldier, and yet he is the very heart, the lifeblood, of every army. The ability to secure him is the one problem of preparedness.

We read much of the great guns the Krupps have builded—the "Brummers," the 42-centimeters—those great cannon that

can hurl a projectile weighing 2,500 pounds loaded with high explosives 20 miles across the face of the world. The highest point in the trajectory of the shell as it flies is 7 miles above the earth. That is 2 miles above the highest mountain upon God's footstool. When it falls upon a fort or an intrenchment and explodes it digs a hole like the crater of a volcano, and the earth shakes with the detonation of the shell. But the gun does not win the victory; it never takes the fortress; it does not deliver the last shock of war.

We are told of the famous horsemen of the armies of Europe—the Cossacks, the Uhlans, the Cuirassiers—mounted upon great horses, with rattling sabers and flashing spears, a hundred thousand of them dash by, and the earth trembles from their charge. An inspiring spectacle, the most thrilling in war. But they do not achieve the victory. They do not win the fortress. They do not take the city. No! The horsemen and the cannon only prepare the way. After the horsemen have gone by and the guns are silenced, then come the men; the men on foot, the common men of Europe; millions upon millions of them. The real fighting force of every army is the men who fight on foot. Every great battle of history in the last 300 years has been won by the common soldier, with his gun in his hands. The one lesson that war always teaches is that man himself, in the strength that God gives to us all, is yet triumphant over everything else upon this earth.

To-day the German people are fighting a wonderful battle to maintain their place in the center of Europe. The Slav pushes down from the north and the Latin hammers at them from the south, and the Anglo-Saxon thunders upon the deep from the west, and yet the Teuton holds his own. The whole nation is in arms and fighting for its life. The armies of Germany are not made up of professional soldiers. They are citizen soldiers, fighting for little or no pay. They are fighting now as that people has always fought when they have been united. When divided into separate governments and dependent upon professional armies they have always been easily overthrown. Their struggle for "a place in the sun" in central Europe has been going on for 2,000 years. They have never carried their battle flags to other continents for conquest. They are the only great European nation of which this can be said. But the German fights fiercely when fighting for his home and the fatherland.

The first glimpse we get of the German in history illustrates how invincible an entire nation is when aroused to arms. The armies of Rome in the days of her military glory were composed of legions of men who fought for the preservation of the Republic. When her emperors gained the throne they came to rely upon a standing army, and the first time that the Roman legions of the emperors met a people in arms, the armies of the Empire went down to defeat. Two thousand years ago, at the dawn of the Christian era, Octavius Caesar sat upon the throne of Rome and ruled the known world. He heard that away off in the North and in the West there had arisen certain tribes of barbarians who dared to deny his edicts and dispute the authority of imperial Rome. So he called to him one Quintillus Varus, his general. He said to him, "Go out against these men; bring them once more under our yoke; put the foot of the conqueror upon their necks; bind their chief men to your chariot wheels; and bring them here to make a Roman holiday." So they gathered together a mighty army of black-browed Roman veterans, and your history will tell you that for 500 years in conflict with the barbarians a Roman army had never known defeat—

Oh, gay, yet fearful to behold,  
Flashing with steel and rough with gold  
Was that bright battle front.

And in the vanguard, the imperial eagle of almighty Rome flapped his wings—and so they marched away.

Now, these German tribes had heretofore been easy prey to the Roman arms, for they were divided among themselves and fighting with one another, and in the open the Roman short sword and Roman discipline were invincible. But there had arisen a man in their midst. We know not what his name was. The Romans called him "Arminius," but we know that was only a corruption of the German "Herr-man"—the lord, or chief man. But no matter what his name was, he was a hero, and he bound those different warring factions together into one harmonious whole.

He said, "My people, united we stand but divided we fall, and we will no longer fight these Romans as the Romans fight, but we will fight them as Germans fight, with our homes and our families and our country at our backs." And so they took station in a great wood, the Teuterberger wood, and they placed the women and the children and their property in the center and the warriors formed a mighty ring about them, for that

was the way that people fought in ancient times, so that every man would have behind him all that life and home held dear. After days of waiting the Roman army drew out in the open and for days they tried to entice the barbarians out, but at the command of Herman they stood fast in the forest. At last the word for the Roman onslaught was given, and though their soldiery performed prodigies of valor, though their cavalry charged like a whirlwind, unbroken was the German ring. Every time that a man went down there was a hero ready to step into his place, and if any coward dared to give back the women and the children drove him once more to the fight, and the end was that after three days of most fearful fighting that grand army that had followed the mighty Julius Caesar from Spain upon the west to India upon the east, through one long series of unbroken victory, was absolutely annihilated and left its bones to rot in the Teuterberger wood. And when the news of that dreadful disaster, the most fearful that ever came to the Roman arms in conflict with the barbarians, was brought to Octavius Caesar, where he sat upon his throne of gold in the imperial palace of the Caesars at Rome, and he thought of his once proud army that had followed him to victory upon a hundred hard-fought fields now lying dead in that far-off German forest, he cried out in the agony of his soul, "Quintillus Varus, restore me my legions! Restore to me my legions!" And throughout the ages that has been the cry of every ruler and of every people that has relied upon a standing army as its bulwark of defense in the hour of the nation's peril.

It is because I do not want that cry ever to be heard in America that I am for this bill. The standing army of this Nation is officered by as brave and competent men as can be found in any army in all the world. The fighting quality of the enlisted men is not surpassed by the soldiers of any other nation. The effort of the Republic must be to train and arm the citizen who in time of peace produces the wealth and prosperity of the Nation and will be the bulwark of its honor and its glory in time of war. To add another regular soldier to our standing army above that provided for in this bill would, in my opinion, be a waste of public money. It is a demonstrated problem that we can maintain an army of a million trained citizen soldiers, the equal of the best armies in Europe, for about the same expense as the cost of a regular army of 100,000 men.

We should provide in plenty the best rifles and field artillery and ammunition and all other military equipment necessary to arm the manhood of the Nation. The first step should be to put a rifle, such as our regular soldiers are armed with, behind the door of every household in this Nation and provide the means whereby the citizens of the Nation can learn to shoot that gun. If we will arm and train the manhood of the Nation, we can produce an army at little cost that, bulwarked behind the two great seas that beat upon our eastern and western shores, will stand like a stone wall against every foe that can be brought against it. [Applause.]

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 20 minutes to the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. TILSON].

Mr. TILSON. Mr. Chairman, it is a long span of time from the days of the Roman legions, so eloquently described by the distinguished gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. SHALLENBERGER] who has just taken his seat, to the present year of grace; but during all the centuries that have intervened wars have occurred and recurred at shockingly frequent intervals. Nor is there any hopeful sign now visible that the day is near at hand when war will be no more. In spite of this fact, the subject of national defense, which always should be one of overwhelming importance, only recently has come into its own in the public attention of this country. It is well that it should enter into the thoughts of the people. It is a hopeful indication that "preparedness" has become a sort of national slogan, and I sincerely hope that out of it all there will come a reasonable, sensible, sane preparation for the primary duty of national self-defense.

It is not usual for me to take my political philosophy from Kansas, but a signed communication which I saw printed in the Topeka Capital a short time ago contains a bit of philosophy which to a certain extent represents the attitude of the extreme pacifist. It is entitled—

"THE FABLE OF THE OSTRICH."

"An ostrich with plumes of great value roamed peacefully about his accustomed haunts when he heard the sound of guns in the distance. He realized that this meant danger and that some avaricious hunter might take a notion to shoot him. But he philosophized with the following arguments:

"I do not know who this possible enemy is, therefore I am safe.

"I do not know, but think that some one will defend me in case danger should come.

"I am not sure, but I think those defenders are well enough armed. Jingoos say they are not, but jingoos take the word of those who make a business of fighting, who, of course, know nothing about it.

"The enemy is so exhausted from shooting that he will be unable to shoot me.

"If some one should attack me, I could instantly turn myself into a lion and repel the attack with ease. Anyhow, it is wrong to fight under any circumstances.

"I will not take refuge behind a fence or building, because the chances are that somebody got a 'graft' out of building them.

"There are two or three places on the boundaries of my domain where it is impossible to break through. Therefore I am safe.

"Although I have my faults, I feel that I should pose as a model of virtue, an example to the whole world. Therefore I will not resort to resistance.

"I believe in taking things as they ought to be instead of as they are.

"I do not believe in being prepared. I will stick my head in the sand and forget that there is such a thing as trouble.

"Moral: Ostrich plumes for sale." [Laughter and applause.]

It would be a sorry spectacle to see the tail feathers of the American Eagle on the bargain counters of any of the countries across the seas.

Before beginning my remarks on the bill I would like to say a word in regard to our chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. HAY]. His able leadership and the broad-minded patriotic spirit exemplified by him during the consideration of this bill in committee are worthy of commendation. The members of the committee differed sharply as to many things, and yet, out of all of these disagreements, he has brought in a bill upon which the entire committee has agreed. No member of the committee would have written this bill just as it stands. A part of the committee, just as patriotic as the rest, believed that there should be no increase in the Regular Military Establishment. They yielded much to their colleagues and deserve great credit for it. Others thought the Regular Army should be somewhat increased, some more than others, but no member of the committee and no one who appeared before the committee, including many distinguished military officers, favored a large standing army.

Mr. MONDELL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. TILSON. Yes.

Mr. MONDELL. Do I understand that the committee will stand by the bill as reported?

Mr. TILSON. What does the gentleman mean by "standing by"?

Mr. MONDELL. Resist amendments to increase.

Mr. TILSON. No such condition was sought to be imposed. Not only that, but it was thoroughly understood that at every opportunity during the passage through the House or in the later stages those who believe there should be an increase are expected to utilize every opportunity to endeavor to get it.

Mr. MONDELL. Then I understand that, while the committee reported the bill unanimously, the members do not consider themselves bound to resist important changes in the way of increase?

Mr. TILSON. That is correct. I do not believe that anyone on the committee considers himself bound to refrain from increasing the bill if he so desires and is able.

Mr. BENNET. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TILSON. Yes.

Mr. BENNET. I suppose that the committee would resist any attempt to change the title or to strike out the enacting clause?

Mr. TILSON. All of us think that this bill is very much better than the existing law, and therefore we are in favor of the bill and will support it.

Mr. BENNET. That is, if you can not get anything that is thought to be better.

Mr. TILSON. Those who wish to increase the Army or change other features of the bill have the liberty to try to do so.

It seems to be conceded, Mr. Chairman, that in a war of any magnitude citizen soldiery must be used. The Regular Army is considered as a model, a sort of school of instruction, as well as a national police force and a nucleus around which the real Army of defense must be built. There was no contest in the committee between a big Army and a little Army. The only question was just how large our little Army should be. The maximum fixed by the committee was somewhat less than a respectable minority of us thought it should be. It is fair to state that this minority was not made up on party lines. After

all, so far as this point is concerned, it is only a question of numbers, and those who thought there should be more had no difficulty in agreeing to the bill as reported.

As to the distribution of the small increase among the several arms of the service, there was complete unanimity that the Field Artillery should be increased. The lessons of the European war undoubtedly demonstrated that need. There was quite general agreement that the Infantry and Coast Artillery should be increased. Other increases of importance were made in other branches of the service, especially in the Medical Corps, the final addition being made by a committee amendment which the chairman will offer.

Mr. BORLAND. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TILSON. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. BORLAND. I notice that there are no increases provided for in the regular cavalry service of the Army. Is it contemplated that there will be increases encouraged in the militia, or the reserve force, of the Cavalry?

Mr. TILSON. It is hoped that there will be a considerable increase in the Cavalry and in the Field Artillery in the Organized Militia of the several States.

Mr. BORLAND. The gentleman is aware now that there has been a great deal of difficulty in doing anything of that kind formerly?

Mr. TILSON. Yes; and of the many difficulties in the way. One of them is the greater expense of Cavalry and Artillery.

Mr. BORLAND. But plenty of material for Cavalry is available if proper arrangements could be made for it by law?

Mr. TILSON. Plenty of it; and if the Government will encourage it I think there will be an increase in the Cavalry and in the Field Artillery.

It was brought home to the committee quite forcibly that more officers are needed. Good officers can not be produced easily. Their training is a matter of considerable time. Therefore it clearly appeared to be one of the duties of the committee to materially increase the number of officers. Besides the addition of officers provided for in the new organizations, almost a thousand extra officers are provided for, to be used largely for the training and instruction of the National Guard and in schools and colleges where military instruction is given.

Then there is a provision for an officers' reserve corps, which it is contemplated will produce eventually a large number of officers ready for service in time of war.

Another important step in the right direction is the provision for a reserve. The object of this step is the building up of a trained reserve to fill up the ranks of organizations to war strength in case of war. In my opinion it might have been more effectively done by a somewhat shorter service with the colors, but the step is in the right direction. Four years ago I introduced into the Sixty-second Congress a bill providing for the beginnings of such a reserve. I submitted to the House at that time facts and figures to show how such a reserve could be established and maintained. I pointed out the importance of having trained men rather than raw recruits to fill up our skeleton organizations. I called attention to the fact that we were missing an opportunity to conserve for possible use one of our most valuable national resources—the men whom we had trained at considerable expense for military service. Unfortunately, I was somewhat ahead of the time, and my voice was like one crying in the wilderness. It attracted little attention then, but it is gratifying now to see the same idea embodied in this bill.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TILSON. Yes.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. I would like to inquire of the gentleman, if he is not about to state it as he proceeds, how much of a reserve that would now have created if his plan at that time had been carried out? I would like to know, if we progress further with the bill, how many we could obtain in the future in this way?

Mr. TILSON. If my bill had been adopted four years ago, it would have been in full operation now only one year, so that we should not have had a very large reserve, but we should have had something.

Mr. GREEN of Massachusetts. What would it be now, if it had been put into effect then, is what the gentleman from Iowa inquired.

Mr. TILSON. If it had been put into effect at that time, it would have taken three years before anybody could have gone into the reserve at all, and therefore it would have been in full operation only one year at this time.

Mr. GREEN of Iowa. And after that how many?

Mr. TILSON. After that it was contemplated that it would furnish something like forty or fifty thousand a year—I do not

now remember accurately, but something like that; perhaps not quite so many.

Mr. GARDNER. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TILSON. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. GARDNER. How many years' service in the reserve, according to the gentleman's plan?

Mr. TILSON. My plan at that time was three years' service in the reserve, three years with the colors, and three years in the reserve. I would now make it two years with the colors and four with the reserve. By a committee amendment we have gone one step further and provided that in time of war a reserve battalion shall be raised and maintained for each regiment at the front. One of those who seemed to appreciate the reserve idea in the Sixty-second Congress was my friend, the distinguished gentleman from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN]. When it was decided for me that I should take a two years' vacation from Congress he came to me and asked the privilege of taking over my mantle in this particular matter, and he has done some very excellent work along this line. The committee amendment, which will be presented to the House, for a reserve battalion for each regiment in the field is almost entirely his work. One of the most deplorable defects of our lack of system in recruiting that bore the most bitter fruit in the Civil War was the lack of such a reserve to supply wastage and keep the ranks of well-trained regiments full. In that war scores of new regiments were raised and rushed to the front to be slaughtered because untrained, while regiments of seasoned troops at the very zenith of their efficiency were permitted to waste away to the size of small battalions.

After all, important as the Regular Establishment is, it would be comparatively insignificant if we ever became involved in a great war. It should be so, for no country should attempt to maintain a professional army large enough for such a task. It is a question whether any nation with such an army could long remain free. Great wars have been and must be fought, not by a professional army, but by the citizen soldier. Napoleon is credited with saying that there are three essentials for war; first, money; second, money; third, money. Surely there is one other requisite, and that is men. In the United States we have the men and we have the money. The problem is to properly utilize both for our national defense. Untrained men and gold coin are alike unavailing for the purpose. Both must be brought into condition for use in order to be effective. Unless this is done the former become only cannon fodder and the latter good only for tribute.

In some observations submitted to this House a few days ago, February 29, I called attention to some very necessary special tools and appliances that can be procured at comparatively small cost and will do more than any other one thing to make us ready to realize our material resources quickly in the way of providing arms and ammunition. It is my intention to offer at the proper place an amendment to this bill that will authorize the preparation in advance of these special appliances. I now bespeak your interest and votes in the adoption of such an amendment. I believe there will be no difficulty in convincing this House and the people of this country generally that the principle of the amendment which I shall offer and have been advocating for some time must be adopted and thoroughly worked out, and, when that is done, the problem of producing matériel for war is far on the way toward being wisely solved. I think it is going to put the "prepare" in "preparedness." [Applause.]

The problem of utilizing to the best advantages our resources in men is, however, a still more difficult one. There are just 21 different solutions of the problem in our committee. There are probably 435 different solutions in the House and nearly 100,000,000 in the country, because each individual has the only perfect plan in his own mind. They range all the way from dependence on a million men springing to arms between sunrise and sunset to universal compulsory military service. The committee has tried to avoid both Scylla and Charybdis, or, to bring it up to date, it might be said that we tried to steer a course somewhere between "the peerless statesman of Nebraska" and "the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER]." [Applause.]

The problem of the committee was not to chase fanciful theories, but the practical one of arriving on common ground where at least 11 of the 21 members of the committee could stand. It was only necessary that the majority of the committee should arrive at a conclusion which, in their judgment, was better than the law now in existence. It should be kept in mind that the issue is not between the ideal bill in the mind of each individual and the present bill, but the issue is between the law as it exists to-day and the present bill or such as the present bill may become after it has been amended.

Mr. POWERS. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TILSON. I yield to the gentleman from Kentucky.

Mr. POWERS. Does the gentleman propose to state that the only purpose of the committee was to make an improvement on the present law?

Mr. TILSON. It was our earnest purpose to make the greatest improvement we could. The gentleman is well aware that in any committee of this House, in the House itself, or in any other deliberative body, legislation or action of any kind as a rule is a result of intelligent compromise. The chairman of the committee was unusually successful in guiding to such a conclusion as to cause the entire membership of the committee to agree that it was better than the present law, hence a unanimous report. A few plans and numerous suggestions were submitted to the committee. The plan that received the greatest amount of notoriety was the one commonly known as the continental army plan. This plan was well and forcibly presented by the very able Secretary of War, Mr. Garrison. The trouble with it was that practically no one seemed to believe that it would work in normal times. It was said of it that its strongest advocates and most bitter opponents vied with each other in the strength of a common belief that it would prove a failure. The basic idea of this plan—

The CHAIRMAN (Mr. GARRETT). The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. KAHN. I will yield to the gentleman 5 minutes more, if he desires.

Mr. TILSON. The basic idea of this plan, the necessity of having a volunteer force under the control of the Federal Government was recognized; but that the continental army plan would produce any such force, or any force at all, was extremely doubtful in the minds of most of those who attempted to support it. It was believed besides that it would practically destroy the National Guard, which, after all, with all its faults and shortcomings, represents not only such military training as exists outside of our small Regular Army, but also the military spirit that has been kept alive during all the years.

The continental army plan having failed to attract support the attention of the committee was directed to the possibility of securing such a force by utilizing instead of ignoring or destroying the Organized Militia. Here was a force already in existence, had been in existence for more than 100 years, and was well understood, with all its history and traditions, as well as its shortcomings. It was conceded that in spite of all the difficulties under which the Organized Militia has labored a wonderful advance has been made in its discipline and efficiency, especially within the last 10 years. The object of the committee was to conserve this force. It was believed by the committee that it would be unwise to throw away, to sacrifice this force which had already proved itself able to exist, even under adverse circumstances, and to substitute for it something entirely untried, and which no one, either its friends or its enemies, believed would work.

Although I have been in the National Guard for a number of years, I speak now not as a National Guardsman but as an American citizen and as a Representative in the American Congress. My service in the National Guard has been a labor of love, because I have believed that such service was not only beneficial to the State in which I live but also to the Nation of which my State is an important part. I would not willingly or wittingly impose a single burden or hardship upon the National Guard, except such as I believe to be necessary for the higher duty of national defense. I believe that the National Guard should become a national volunteer force. [Applause.] I believe that it should come under the control of the National Government. I believe that under the Constitution the National Guard can be made such a national force, and if some of the Regular Army officers had spent more time in trying to show us how to accomplish it and less in trying to discover reasons why it can not be done they would have been more helpful. My own idea has been that it can be brought about by a dual enlistment—one with the State and another with the United States. There is nothing incompatible or unusual in such a status. It is not a case of serving two masters. We are all citizens of our respective States and at the same time citizens of the United States. Yet no one thinks of such a dual allegiance being incompatible. There was a question on this point in the minds of some prior to 1865. All doubt on this point was set at rest by the result of the war between the States. We are a Nation, and in questions involving national defense the power of the Federal Government is indisputably paramount. Therefore, when a man signs an enlistment paper obligating himself to serve the United States when called, or is commissioned as an officer by the Federal Government, I believe he is under the control of the

Federal Government, and no authority which any State could or would exercise over him would in any wise interfere with his availability or usefulness for national service.

It is my intention to offer at the proper place in the bill an amendment which representatives of the National Guard believe, and which I believe, will completely and sufficiently federalize the Organized Militia. In a word, this amendment will embody my idea of the dual enlistment and dual oath of office. I am not going to dispute with the chairman of our committee as to whether the bill as it stands sufficiently federalizes the militia. My amendment will surely do so if adopted.

Fortunately the National Guard through numerous representative officers made it clear to the committee that they desired to become a national force and entirely under national control. Since the passage of the Dick bill they had regarded themselves as already a national force. Willingness to render service when needed by the Federal Government was the prevailing reason given for joining the National Guard in the first place, and thousands of officers and men have continued in the service year after year solely for this reason. Their representatives told us that both rank and file were ready and eager to go the limit of federalization. They appealed to us to place them under national control and permit them to become the national volunteer force which all agreed to be an essential in any adequate scheme of national defense, and for which no one else seemed able to provide. The fine spirit of loyalty and patriotism manifested by the National Guard made a deep impression upon the members of the committee. There was no division of opinion as to the utilization of this material thus presented to us.

If the War Department and the officers of the Regular Army, in whose hands such matters must be placed, will enter upon the task with a desire to make the plan a success and will deal with the National Guard understandingly and sympathetically there is every reason to believe that within five years the National Guard will more than double in numbers and efficiency, and become a great and dependable military force, national in control and character. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 15 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DENT].

First, however, Mr. Chairman, after the gentleman from Alabama gets through, I will move that the committee rise, and then I will ask unanimous consent to continue the general debate until 6 o'clock and do away with the evening session. I just want to give that notice. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Alabama [Mr. DENT] is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. DENT. Mr. Chairman, there is no doubt that the public mind has been engaged in the discussion of preparedness for many months. This question has occupied the principal place in the newspapers of the country since the outbreak, I may say, of the European war. I have always believed that there could be no doubt that at least 95 per cent of the people of this country are in favor of military preparedness. But at the same time I am equally as convinced that at least 90 per cent of the 95 have no fixed opinion as to what preparedness exactly means. It was with this difficulty, then, that the Committee on Military Affairs of the House began its hearings upon this subject about the 1st day of last January. That committee spent seven solid weeks, holding morning and afternoon sessions, for the purpose of trying to determine exactly how far the country should prepare itself for war.

I said on the floor of this House a little more than a year ago, when the Army appropriation bill was up, that while we were all in favor of preparedness, nobody was able to tell us against whom we should prepare. I asked the question in my remarks then, Shall we prepare against Germany or shall we prepare against Japan? Shall we prepare against England or shall we prepare against the combination of the allies that are engaged in the European war? I asked the question if it was necessary to prepare only for war against Mexico. That question, Mr. Chairman, is still the predominant question when it comes to the proposition as to what preparation we shall make.

The committee heard those who were in favor of a large standing army, the committee heard the advocates of peace, the committee heard all sides of this proposition, and came out with a report that increases the Army by 40,000 men. It provides for a National Guard that in the end can be trained according to the discipline prescribed by Congress, and that will amount in its final consummation to something like 400,000 men as a second line of defense.

The committee became convinced that this country was not ready and willing to vote for a large standing army such as exists in the warlike nations of Europe. For that reason we

increased the Regular Establishment so that we would have a nucleus from which we could build in the event of war, and we provided for a National Guard organization that will give them training under a discipline prescribed by Congress and regulations fixed by the War Department.

It is a remarkable fact—it is, indeed, a most remarkable fact—that 21 members of this committee of the House, representing every section of this American Union, after seven weeks of discussion and hearings on this subject upon all sides of the proposition, have been able to present to this House a bill which meets their unanimous approval. [Applause.] And I want to say here, Mr. Chairman, that I think, as a member of this committee, I would be derelict in my duty upon this occasion if I did not state to the House the fact that this committee has brought forward a bill with a unanimous report is due to the diplomacy, the fairness, the intelligence, and the ability of the chairman of that committee, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. HAY]. [Applause.] And I will go further and say that this result has been accomplished because the minority membership of that committee was led by the genial, fair-minded, honorable, and distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. KAHN]. [Applause.]

Mr. Chairman, I do not agree, and I do not believe that the country agrees, that we should have a large standing army in this country. I believe that the sentiment of this country is in favor of building up a second line of defense from the citizen soldiery of the country who mix and mingle daily in the business and social life of the people among whom they live. And it is for this reason that the committee has brought in a National Guard pay bill.

I have not the time, even if I had the inclination and the House were willing to listen, to discuss the constitutional aspects of that question. The report discusses it very fully. The committee has reached this conclusion, in which I absolutely and thoroughly concur, that under the Constitution of the United States Congress has the power—the absolute power—to federalize, or to nationalize, if you please, the militia—the State troops known as the National Guard—in every respect except as to the appointment of its officers. The only power, therefore, that the Constitution reserves to the States is the power to appoint the officers and to train the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress, and the best authorities agree that even that power is subject to the qualifications fixed by Congress. We propose in this bill to prescribe the qualifications of the officers of the National Guard.

That is what we have undertaken in this bill. That, Mr. Chairman, is what the National Guard has asked for. That, Mr. Chairman, is the popular idea in this country by which to build up a second line of defense.

I do not think that it is necessary for me to undertake to defend the increase that the bill proposes in the regular military establishment of this country. The war in Europe has made it necessary that we should do something. The Mexican situation, which has recently arisen, has made it more imperative.

And in this connection I wish I had the time to call the attention of the House to a report made to the Forty-fourth Congress on the Texas frontier troubles. Every Member of this House would be interested in this report which was made to the Forty-fourth Congress in 1876.

I have said from the beginning, and I repeat, that the bill that we bring in here is not a partisan measure; it is not a Democratic measure and it is not a Republican measure; and I want to go further and state—and the facts will bear me out—that the policy pursued by President Wilson in regard to Mexico is not a Wilson policy or a Democratic policy, but it has been the policy of the Government of the United States ever since these troubles began on the Mexican border. If you will read this report, you will realize how similar is its language to the criticisms now heard of President Wilson for not pursuing a more vigorous policy toward Mexico. This report is No. 343, Forty-fourth Congress, first session, made by a committee of Congress composed, of course, of Democrats and Republicans. How much time have I, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has three minutes.

Mr. DENT. I will not undertake to read much of the report, but I want to call attention to some interesting features of it. I read from the report:

The history of the present raids can be said to have commenced with the Cortina war in 1859 and 1860.

But after the close of the war . . . commenced the pillaging on the Texas border. . . . It will be seen that the constant and immense robbery of cattle, which is the basis of this entire system of outrages, has, in the later statements, hardly been mentioned, as the

murders and other crimes which have grown out of it overshadow it. The question with the people has become one of existence, not of pecuniary loss.

From their entire immunity and the great attraction of the spoils, their numbers are continually increasing. From the oldest times, and among all people, punishment of crime has always been considered necessary to prevent its increase; but here we have the strange spectacle of a community openly subsisting on crime, while there is no punishment for them. Their own nominal Government is not strong enough to inflict it, while the Government of their victims—our own Government—from a highly refined sense of international politeness, has refrained from inflicting it.

This state of things is wholly due to the inactivity of our Government.

How strangely similar is that language to the language we hear to-day in criticism of President Wilson. This was written in January, 1876. I read further:

A few years ago some energetic chastisement, convincing the plunderers that there was some danger connected with their trade, would certainly have checked it, but the impression that our troops dare not cross the river has made them feel at ease.

Does not that sound like present day history? I read further:

When, after a hot pursuit, the robbers and their spoil reach and cross the river, and our brave troops stand helpless and overwhelmed with shame on the American side of a small river, and bear the taunts and insulting gestures of the escaped robbers and their friends, our Nation and its Government becomes in their eyes, as they do not study the subtle arts of diplomacy, an object of scorn and contempt.

All statements agree that the authority of the National Government of Mexico on the border is only nominal.

Such is the insecurity of life that Capt. McNally, who appeared before your committee, a man of known daring and a bold leader in those border fights, declares upon oath that no compensation, however great, could induce him to incur the danger which every inhabitant of the country between the Rio Grande and Nueces incurs every day, and that he considers his life, as a man whose business is war, safer than that of any inhabitant of that district. Deliberately and with full conviction, as this opinion is stated by one who is familiar with that country and all the facts, as a perusal of his evidence will show, it is fearful in its weight, and should come home to the heart and mind of every American.

In coming to the manner in which protection can be given, we must state it as the unanimous opinion of all military men familiar with that border that protection can only be complete if the commanding officer of our troops can, whenever he finds robbers in the act of carrying off their booty, follow them up, even across the river, punish or kill them, and retake the property of our citizens. They are unanimous in stating that a merely defensive policy would give imperfect protection, even if a large force were maintained there at great expense.

I might read more of this report, Mr. Chairman, because it bears upon this situation directly, but I mention it and call attention to it in connection with the fact that Mr. Wilson's policy in being internationally polite to Mexico, if I may so express it, was the policy of President Johnson, it was the policy of President Grant, and it was the policy of President Taft, whom President Wilson succeeded. So that it may be said to be a truly American policy.

But to-day we stand in a different situation. To-day we are confronted with the fact that a band of robbers and plunderers has not only entered the borders of our country from Mexican soil, but has actually attacked a town under the guard of United States soldiers, and has actually had a battle with them. I hope, and I believe that every American is with me in this proposition, that this incident will mean that these border troubles will and must be settled for all time to come. [Applause.]

Mr. BELL. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the address delivered by Speaker CLARK at the Washington Press Club last night be inserted in the RECORD. The subject is, "The making of a Representative."

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Georgia [Mr. BELL] asks unanimous consent that the remarks of the Speaker of the House at the Press Club last evening on the subject "The making of a Representative," be inserted in the RECORD. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Chairman, I move that the committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly the committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. GARRETT, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that that committee had had under consideration the bill H. R. 12766, the Army reorganization bill, and had come to no resolution thereon.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the general debate on this bill shall continue until 6 o'clock this afternoon, and that the provision in the rule providing for the session this evening be dispensed with.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. HAY] asks unanimous consent that the general debate shall extend to 6 o'clock this evening on this bill, and that the night session provided by the rule for to-night be dispensed with. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

On motion of Mr. HAY, the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union for the further consideration of the bill (H. R. 12766) to increase the efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States, with Mr. GARRETT in the chair.

Mr. KAHN. I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. WATSON].

Mr. WATSON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, I do not propose to speak upon any of the particular sections of the bill, but more especially on preparedness. I hope, however, that this measure will promptly pass.

One hundred and forty years ago a new Republic was formed on the North American Continent, a feeble union of States, with a system of government which all nations claimed could not continue.

But the world did not truly appraise the worth of those loyal patriots who pledged their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor for the freedom and independence of that Union.

This little Republic grew in strength, power, and wealth. In her development she has been zealously guarded by able and faithful men, who, constant to their trust as the northern star, have made that Republic, our country, to be the greatest Nation of all history. [Applause.]

It behooves us, whether in public or private life, to uphold the honor of our country as those in the past have done and bequeath its glory to the generation to follow. When the present conflict of nations has ended, which has paralyzed the doctrines of the Christian world, new social and commercial conditions will follow, which will extend to all civilized peoples of the universe. I do not know why the United States should be exempted from the sword. Wars may be the plan of creation, for history teaches us that nations have been blessed with but few years of continual peace from the memory of man down to the present hour.

The responsibilities of the United States Government increase as her wealth and power spread over her dominion, and Congress can not avoid them nor fail to prepare to defend the growing importance of our Nation.

No Member can prophesy, in these times, when Congress will be asked to declare war. Therefore I advocate increasing the Navy and organizing an Army not for aggression but to publish to the world that we will protect our rights and guard our citizens wherever they may be in the performance of their lawful and rightful duties. [Applause.]

I do not know the best course to pursue in order to increase the permanent efficiency of our Military Establishment, but I am confident that after this bill has been debated that we will have as perfect a system as it is possible to inaugurate at this time.

Our Nation is not prepared for the trials of war, and if an enemy invaded our country, compelling the President to issue a call for volunteers, an untrained Army would march to the front, only to meet death.

In all periods of our history, when grave international questions were to be solved, men who seemingly have been invested with divine power have safely defended our Nation's honor.

Again the country calls for men who are clear thinkers upon public questions, keen observers of human nature, to deal with the issues which now confront us, and the inevitable ones which will be daily manifested as the foreign war continues.

Every American citizen should stand by the President and assist him to preserve peace, and if peace can not be honorably maintained, then fight with him to perpetuate the dignity of our country. [Applause.]

In the early days men formed themselves into tribes for protection, and later nations were organized to protect tribes; thus the various Governments were established. A government, therefore, is a corporation for mutual protection, and it becomes the bounden duty of every able-bodied citizen to render military service to his country. In order to increase and permanently maintain a national defense it will become necessary to train our young men in military affairs, not only to prepare them for war, but to prevent the danger of the future generation becoming effeminate by the growing luxuries of the age. [Applause.]

I yield back the remainder of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields back two minutes.

Mr. HAY. I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. DICKINSON].

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, I purpose to vote for the pending measure that comes from the Committee on Military Affairs with a unanimous report, much as I regret the necessity for increasing the Army and the resultant increased expenditures for military purposes. I have taken especial interest in some of the provisions of this bill, particularly that part of it relating to the federalizing of the militia forces or National Guards of the several States of the Union and making them available when necessary for war purposes instead of the continental-army plan, as first proposed. I was especially pleased with the action of the committee, through its distinguished chairman, in printing in and as a part of its report a most admirable and convincing brief on the "Power of the Federal Government over the militia under the Constitution," which brief is credited by the report of the committee and its real author to the military council of the State of Missouri, but which brief, in fact, was prepared by Gen. Harvey C. Clark, commanding general of the Missouri State Militia, and at the head of the military council of the State of Missouri and for many years a close personal friend of mine, and now a resident of Nevada, Mo., and a constituent of my distinguished and gifted colleague, the Hon. PERL D. DECKER, who represents here with marked ability the fifteenth district of Missouri.

The modesty of the author of the brief caused him to credit it to the general council of which he is a member. His modesty is only surpassed by his ability as a lawyer and his qualification and fitness as commanding general of the National Guard of Missouri. I thought it not inappropriate to disclose to this House the real author of this brief, which makes plain "the absolute power of Congress to provide for the organization, discipline, and control of the National Guard, and for its Federal service within or without the United States under the Constitution and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States." I note in the public press that the National Guard of Missouri is ready for service. I read:

NATIONAL GUARD READY.

NEVADA, Mo., March 11.

Brig. Gen. Clark to-day wired the War Department at Washington tendering the services of the National Guard of Missouri to President 34308—15333

Wilson in case it was deemed necessary to use them. Gen. Clark informed the War Department the National Guard of Missouri were in a high state of efficiency and ready to move within 24 hours' notice.

This is done without waiting for the passage of this bill, the occasion being the trouble on the Mexican border, and the sending of United States troops across the border into Mexico in pursuit of and for the capture of Francisco Villa and his bandits who had invaded the United States and attacked and killed citizens and soldiers of this country at Columbus, N. Mex. It was fitting that Brig. Gen. Clark, an officer in the Spanish-American War and the commander of the National Guard of Missouri, should tender to the War Department the services of this National Guard, now in a high state of efficiency and ready to move within 24 hours' notice. The report of the committee and the brief contained therein will satisfy, in my judgment, everyone with an open mind that Congress has the power by appropriate legislation to prescribe the organization, armament, and discipline of the militia and to govern and use the National Guard as an efficient force for all war purposes. The fact that Congress has not in the past deemed it necessary to exercise this power is not sufficient reason for failing to legislate now, when the militia, under the Constitution, by proper legislation can be made an efficient force for all needed war purposes. Why substitute a new and novel continental-army plan, a mere experiment and of doubtful success? When the Constitution contemplates the use of the militia of the several States, why seek to break down and destroy these great military State organizations by attempting to substitute new methods for Army purposes?

I quote from the brief and the Constitution. Section 8 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States reads as follows:

Congress shall have power to raise and support armies; to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces; to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions; to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress; to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.

Section 2 of Article II:

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States and of the militia of the several States when called into the actual service of the United States.

I have always been opposed to a large standing Regular Army in time of peace, and such has been the historic position of the country and of the party of which I am a member. If an in-

crease is necessary at this time, because of changed and dangerous conditions, when possibly the Nation might be called to arms to protect its integrity and its sovereignty, it does appear that the increase provided for in this bill is not unreasonable. Many are urging a much larger increase. To my mind it is more important to have an efficient and well-equipped force than a very large Army in time of peace, to be largely increased, if necessary, for war. The present authorized Regular Army of 100,000, though in fact short by about 15,000, is scattered, doing service in the Philippine Islands, in Hawaii, in Porto Rico, in the Panama Canal Zone, and on the Mexican border and quartered in various parts of the United States, and only to a limited extent available now for pursuit of Villa and his bandit gang. If the full authorized quota of 100,000 were in fact in the Army and available for service, it would mean only one soldier for each 1,000 people of our 100,000,000 population. With an increase under this House bill of 40,000, making, in the aggregate, an authorized Army of 140,000 soldiers on a peace basis, it would mean about one soldier for every 700 population. That does not look very much like militarism—scattered, as it will be, to meet the necessities on the borders of our country, in our colonies and elsewhere, and as an efficient nucleus for a large Army when war comes. The bill, however, for war purposes, provides for a much larger force of Regulars, also to be added to by the various National Guards of the several States.

The increases in the Army and Navy will require legislation for increased revenues; and if these increases are made necessary by reason of extraordinary conditions growing out of the European war, that affects so seriously all the world, then additional taxation must be levied to meet these increases. The same influences that have made it necessary that these additional burdens be provided for have furnished extraordinary opportunities for large war profits. Those interests that reap these benefits out of the misfortune of this world war should bear their full share of these increased burdens and these war profits should, by appropriate legislation, be made to respond, so that these additional burdens should not rest heavily upon the masses, who reap no benefit from war conditions. The loudest cry for preparedness and for large increases in armament come from those most benefited by war, and it is entirely logical that those most benefited should freely contribute from their profits for this preparation for defense or war, if necessary.

But for permanent law, and particularly to meet the ever-increasing burdens of the Government, I would substantially enlarge the income-tax law. I would reduce the present minimum of exemptions and substantially increase the surtax, and thus have an income-tax law broad and comprehensive enough to meet the mandate of the American people that saw fit to compel an amendment of the Constitution of the United States so that great wealth and those enjoying large incomes and best able to pay should contribute a fairer share to the expenses and burdens of government. It is the fairest of all taxation, most easily paid, and the least burdensome, and paid by those who reap the greatest benefits of Government.

I stand with the administration and the country for all reasonable preparedness and for all reasonable increases of the Army and Navy and for such increases in taxation properly levied to meet these necessities growing out of changed conditions, having at all times a proper regard for the efficient use of all money appropriated, so that the money appropriated may be economically and efficiently used and so that efficiency may result and appropriations for worthy purposes be not squandered.

Every good citizen hopes that the time may come, and as speedily as possible, when war conditions will end, when disarmaments may come, when the necessity for large armies and large navies may no longer exist, when the internal affairs of our country may be our first care, and when the health and betterment of mankind everywhere may be the first care and desire of government, rather than war and the destruction of life and property; so that civilization may live and a Christian world be preserved rather than woe and sorrow and destruction be the heritage of every people on earth; when the cry for preparedness for war may no longer be heard in the land, but a preparedness for life's best interests and results.

I do not want to see this country grow war mad, nor do I want this country to be negligent in its duty to thoroughly prepare for its future safety and to be ready to meet every emergency that may come.

The patriotic citizens of the country will stand for all reasonable preparedness, but are not interested in war profits nor in the selfish interests that wax fat over the disturbed conditions of the earth which are encouraged in a degree by those who would reap large profits while the masses suffer. Efficiency in every business and walk of life is to-day the watch-

word and desire of all who love success and desire safety and prosperity and an advancement of our citizenship everywhere.

The country does not desire war, but, in my judgment, wants an efficient Army, large enough for all reasonable purposes, and a well-equipped Navy, large and strong enough to protect our country from attack from abroad and to protect our citizens and commerce whenever and wherever necessary. We want our coast fortifications, already strong, to be strengthened wherever needed.

We do not want war, but if any hostile nation should seek to invade our country, then a Nation of courageous and patriotic citizens will rise as one man, not only to repel invasion but to give the world such an object lesson of American valor that all nations will take heed and never again with hostile purpose attempt to set foot upon the sacred soil of this Republic.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. KINKAID].

[Mr. KINKAID addressed the committee. See Appendix.]

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. LONDON].

Mr. LONDON. Mr. Chairman, it is utterly impossible to treat the subject under discussion with any degree of adequacy in 10 minutes. In a previous address I dwelt at length on the fallacy and iniquity of the preparedness propaganda. The bill now before us provides for an unusually large increase of the Military Establishment. It carries with it an additional burden of taxes. And no matter upon whom the taxes are to be imposed in the first instance they will ultimately fall upon the shoulders of the workers, using the word "workers" in the broadest sense and including in the term all who earn their livelihood by useful service.

I suppose we all agree that the most charitable thing that can be said about the Army and Navy is that they are necessary evils. We do not want to increase the evil unless we must. In proposing an extraordinary addition to the Army we must first determine whether the increase is essential for the defense of a national policy. It is not claimed that it is necessary to suppress internal disorder. The advocates of the need of a large Army must convince us that the necessities and exigencies arising or about to arise from our international relations compel this disagreeable step.

The primary question, then, which we have to decide is, What is our national policy? Have we a national policy?

The fact that the Committee on Military Affairs brought in a unanimous report providing for an addition to the Army merely shows that both the Republicans and Democrats have surrendered to the clamor of the press. It means that the elected representatives of the people have suspended their judgment. Have abandoned the right to think for themselves, and have permitted two or three dozen individuals in the editorial rooms of the newspapers to fix the policy of the country. Who are these editors who cover white paper with all sorts of marks? What is behind them? Who dictates their pens? What determines their thoughts? To whom are they responsible? Who are their owners, and what are their interests?

Instead of a national policy, we have a national panic, and the national panic is particularly strong among Members of Congress. They seem to be scared out of their wits. With bulging eyes they scan the columns of the newspapers to find what the newspapers have to say about them. The papers take full advantage of this scare. Some of these newspapers were impudent enough to denounce as traitors the 147 men who refused to stultify themselves by again tabling the previously tabled McLemore resolution.

The apparent unanimity of the committee has also another meaning. The Democrats are happy in their belief that they have stolen the thunder of the Republicans. The latter rejoice that they have started the Democrats on the road to military expansion. Each side believes that it has fooled the other, and both are trying to fool the people.

With a definite national policy we can prepare adequate means to sustain it. No one will contend that the increased Army is intended for purposes of attack upon other nations. It is, then, to be used for defense. If for defense, then against whom? Is it not in order to ascertain from where and from whom danger threatens the United States?

There is one Member of Congress, besides myself, who is consistent. He is the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER]. He wants a big Army, a very big Army, one big enough to satisfy him. He fears "a rush of invasion," and he wants to be prepared to meet the invasion. For all that he knows some German scientist may invent a chemical substance by which the Atlantic will be dried up and the Teutonic Army will march upon Massachusetts. Its Representative prays for

an Army big enough to defend his beloved State. He is logical. He would have every man prepare to meet the attack at once. He would have us train all the time for that trying moment. He favors universal compulsory training. He would change the song of the cradle into a martial song.

Some say that the lesson of the need for preparedness is being taught by the European war. I draw an entirely different lesson from this war. The war was prepared just as surely as an explosion is prepared when enormous quantities of dynamite are accumulated. It is the very maintenance of big armies that has made the war possible—nay, inevitable. Will anyone dare gainsay that we would all have been better off to-day if there were no armies in Europe in August, 1914? A distinguished Member of the House referred to the German Army as the citizen army of Germany. The Social Democracy of Germany, which represents the most advanced democratic ideals of that unfortunate people, did not think so. As a means of fighting militarism they vainly demanded the establishment of a citizen army. They never ceased to warn against the menace of large standing armies, notwithstanding thousands of years of imprisonment which were meted out to them by the militaristic elements which controlled German life.

Armies in Germany, armies in France, armies in Russia, armies in Italy, everywhere men trained to fight, seeking to realize their life's dreams on the battle field, and then we wonder there is war.

As long as the conflagration continues in Europe we will be talking preparedness here. It will require all the strength of strong men to resist the invasion, not of a foreign enemy, not of a great military force, but of militaristic ideas. As long as the war continues there will be men among us for whom no army will be big enough, who will always want more preparedness, more of an army, more of a navy—and the more they will get the more will they demand.

This bill provides for 40,000 additional men. You know you can not get men to enlist. We are now practically at war with Mexico. Men are not going to enlist for \$15 a month, to act the part of professional butchers. You can get volunteers by the tens of thousands if you will arouse a patriotic fervor, if you will appeal to the deep sense of national honor, if you will call for self-sacrifice and martyrdom. In order to get these 40,000 men you will have to create a state of frenzy. You will have to prepare a state of mind which will impel men to join the colors. You will have to stimulate enlistments by holding over the heads of the people the threat of an impending war. You will have to lash yourselves into a state of madness which is the sure forerunner of war.

One of the gentlemen on the Republican side of the House, and who preceded me, went for his wisdom to a silly poem which appeared in a provincial newspaper, and one of the things he quoted from the supposedly satirical poem was the sentiment, "I don't want to prepare, because I do not know whom I am going to fight." The gentleman thought it was a silly statement. There is nothing silly about it. The question whom are we likely to fight will have to be answered before the people will shoulder additional burdens. The question will have to be answered before the people will submit to the enlargement of the military forces of the country.

We are told that war is inevitable; that it can not be foreseen; that it comes with suddenness, and that it is a part of human nature. There was surely nothing sudden about the present war. Was not Europe preparing for a quarter of a century for this very war?

War is no more inevitable than the plague is inevitable. War is no more a part of human nature than the burning of witches is a typically human act. Men succumbed to the plague because they were ignorant. Men burned witches because they were ignorant. When men came to understand the cause of the plague, the plague became impossible. When men will understand the cause of war, war will be made impossible.

We need not go into ancient history. It will be more profitable to examine modern history. While the forces that shape the destinies of nations do not lend themselves to exact classification, we may still group the principal wars of modern times into four classes—religious wars, wars which were the result of dynastic ambitions, wars for the unification of national groups into large nations, and, finally, the modern war, which is purely and simply a war for commercial supremacy, for markets, for spheres of influence and spheres of interest. Wars are nowadays shopkeepers' quarrels.

We need not anticipate that nations will rush at each others' throats because of religious differences. The possibility that kings and monarchs will, in pursuance of dynastic schemes, plunge their nations into war becomes more and more remote because of the growth of democratic ideas.

For the first time in the history of the world rulers of nations were compelled to appeal to their peoples, not in the name of national honor, but in the name of self-defense. Kaisers, kings, and czars were compelled to recognize the existence of a public opinion which rebelled against the asininity and criminality of war.

The third group of wars within recent times were the wars between small States occupying contiguous territory and consisting of populations of the same racial stock and language. The friction between the various Italian sovereignties thus resulted in one united Italy. The contest between the numerous German groups ended in a united Germany. The conflict between the North and South ended in one big United States.

The Saxon, the Bavarian, and the Prussian fought one another with the same zeal with which they now fight the allies. The Saxon sacrificed his life for Saxony; the Bavarian for the success of Bavaria; the Prussian for the triumph of Prussia. The patriotism of each was limited to the small group of which he was a member and to the small territory which that group occupied.

The same is true about the Italian nationalities. It was but natural that national groups occupying adjoining territory and being close neighbors, possessing a language of the same origin, differing only in dialect, should find it necessary to coordinate their efforts in the direction of forming one strong and united political organization and that both their selfish and higher interests should demand the creation of strong States along national lines. To this group should be added the struggles of small nations for emancipation from the yoke imposed upon them by larger States and nations.

We come now to the modern shopkeepers' wars.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from New York has expired.

Mr. LONDON. Will the gentleman allow me another five minutes?

Mr. EMERSON. Oh, give him five minutes more.

Mr. LONDON. Yes; you better do it.

Mr. KAHN. I do not know. I understood the gentleman was going to get some time from the other side. I will yield him five minutes more.

Mr. LONDON. Then I will take five minutes from the other side, as there is no one there. [Laughter.]

Mr. KAHN. I think it only fair to say to the gentleman that the chairman of the committee, Mr. HAY, has gone to the telephone temporarily on important business.

Mr. LONDON. Oh, I understand that; and then he may be exhausted by the great effort put forth in preparing the bill. There have been no great wars between 1871 and 1914. We have had a number of small ones. The big nations amused themselves by—

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. LONDON. Yes.

Mr. KAHN. Does the gentleman consider the Japanese-Russian War a small one?

Mr. LONDON. I was just going to refer to that. I was about to say that the larger wars were conflicts of economic interests, the direct clashing of material interests. Outside of the Russo-Japanese War, in 1905, since 1871 you have had the big nations attacking the little ones. Take England, for example. The English people are a brave and noble people. But the English people have never within recent times taken any chances with any big nation. England looked for easy jobs. It is true the war with the Boers was not an easy one. England did not calculate that it would have to send four times as many soldiers as there were Boers in order to defeat them, but that is what it had to do, and then it had to give a greater measure of autonomy to the Boer Republic than to any other British colony. Egypt, Morocco, the Congo, and the other numerous colonies seized by the big nations of Europe in Asia, Africa, and Australasia tell the same story of the aggrandizement of the big nations at the expense of the little ones.

Mr. KAHN. Does not the gentleman think the war between Russia and Turkey in 1878 was a pretty large war?

Mr. LONDON. Yes; but I explained in the last address I made here that it was primarily the desire of Russia to get access to the sea and to obtain a warm-water port, which was and is essential to her economic development.

What I want to disabuse your minds of is that idea advocated by Bryan, and which appeals to old women only [laughter and applause], that the present war is a causeless one. His appeal in the name of Christian ideals and his argument that this war is causeless, necessarily fall upon their ears. Commercialism has never permitted religion to stand in its way. The war is not a causeless one but a senseless one. I proceed upon the theory that there can be in modern times

no great war unless there is a deep, fundamental, and vital cause for it, a cause which involves the very existence of a nation, and I say that there is no real, deep, fundamental interest of the people of the United States which can clash with any other people of the world.

Perhaps I should revert for a moment to the Russo-Japanese War and point out to the gentleman from California that it was primarily due to the attempt of Russia to extend her influence in Manchuria and to her acquisition of valuable lumber interests in Korea, which directly collided with the interests of Japan. There was nothing spiritual about the causes of the contest. It had its origin in sordid commercial rivalry.

In a previous address I made clear the economic basis of the present war in Europe. The outstanding fact in the titanic struggle of the European nations is that at the bottom of it lies the contest for commercial supremacy, and then do not forget that the war is in the main conducted by nations occupying contiguous territory. There is not a single instance in the history of modern wars of a great industrial nation having been attacked by another nation separated by a great distance. The very idea that any outside power could attack the territory of the United States is too preposterous to be entertained by a sane mind.

The United States has no one to fear. It is invulnerable against attack. It is not in the increase of the Military Establishment that we shall place our hope for a greater and nobler America. Unless we are determined to become a world power in the sense of competing with other nations, by force of arms, for the possession of markets and for the extension of our colonial empire we need no increase of the Army and Navy. We are now a world power, a world power for good. The average American fails to understand to what extent this Republic has been a source of inspiration to all lovers of liberty all over the world. Let this Republic remain free from the contamination of militarist ideals.

Although I believe that the Committee on Military Affairs could have done a great deal worse, I feel constrained to announce that I will vote against any increase of the Military Establishment, as such an increase would mean that Congress has yielded to the false "preparedness" campaign.

Gentlemen, I thank you. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman yields back one minute.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, I yield 20 minutes to the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. HULL].

Mr. HAY. Mr. Chairman, I will say that I will charge myself with half the time yielded to the gentleman from New York [Mr. LONDON].

Mr. HULL of Iowa. Mr. Chairman, this bill to my mind is an answer to the question that is asked very often, What is reasonable preparation?

I desire to speak of two distinctive features of this bill, the utilization of the National Guard as the Federal fighting force of this Nation and the inclusion of a clause which will be the initial step toward the Government manufacture of arms and ammunition.

The principal opposition that was voiced during the last year against the so-called militarism program was not so much against preparedness as it was against the methods it was proposed that we use, to prepare.

The idea of a continental army was distasteful to the public mind, because it savored of the military tactics of Europe, and because it was, in the opinion of a large majority of the people, the first step in a system that would eventually lead to a predominance of the military over the civilian. The people were opposed to a policy that would centralize the military power of this Government in the hands of one or even a few men. They were opposed to a system that would create an immense standing army, the financial burden of which would increase year by year and necessarily impose upon them a perpetual tax.

Europe, now the greatest slaughterhouse the world has ever known, has unconsciously sent her message of warning across the sea. Europe has taught us that any program whereby civil life is subverted by the military must eventually lead to war. Europe's policy was originally a policy of defense; but gradually, as her army was increased—gradually, as the military gained the ascendancy—so was her defensive policy merged into one of offensive. The greatest burden of recent years that Europe has had to bear is her army and her navy. Her greatest burden in the years to come will be the direct result of that army and navy. The continental-army scheme would have led us in the footpaths of Europe. With eyes across the sea, the people of this United States rose up, almost as a body, and protested against any form of preparedness that would result in such a catastrophe to the civil life of the Nation.

This was the inception of the peace propaganda; this was the cause of that wave of protest that swept across the country against the military program as it was originally outlined.

It is a significant fact that since the death of the continental army scheme, and since the public has come to know that the National Guard is to be utilized in our preparedness for defense, all these protests have died out.

The National Guard has long been the popular military body of the Nation. The reason for this is that it is a military system that can be coordinated with civil life; that, by its very nature, it is, and must always remain, subservient to civil life, and therefore is, and always will be, a military organization for defensive and not offensive purposes.

Until the present time the growth of the National Guard has been retarded because it has had no substantial support. No other motive but that of pure patriotism has been extended as an inducement to enlist; its soldiery has been asked to give its time and energy without thought of compensation, and its officers have been asked for their knowledge and ability without adequate return for the same. The different bodies of the National Guard have also lacked that cooperation which is necessary to build up a strong and effective military organization that could be utilized as a unit in case of national defense. All honor should be given to that small body of officers, and to that relatively small body of men who, under adverse circumstances, have made the National Guard what it is to-day, and should we in the near future be compelled to defend our honor or our country, I believe the National Guard would give excellent account of itself, and would be the nucleus around which we could build a forcible fighting army. In my opinion the National Guard must always be looked to as the military body to protect the Nation. It is the organization which this Nation must depend upon to preserve our national honor or to protect our borders if at any time we should be in danger of attack.

This bill, if it becomes a law, will do away with the principal defects that now exist in the National Guard. In the first place, it provides compensation for the soldier who enlists, small it is true, and inadequate compared to the time he will have to spend and the danger involved in placing himself at the disposal of his country. Yet the average citizen is willing to devote his time to his country if he is given a return, be it ever so small. It is not the money, the small sum that he will be given if he enlists as a soldier, but it is the fact that his country recognizes the spirit in which he enlists that will attract the young man to the National Guard. It must also be remembered that the National Guard is now, and always will be, recruited from that great body of men we call the laboring element. It is they who must furnish the brawn and the sinew to make up the fighting force. These men are, and will be, in a position where they can ill afford to give their time to the defense of the Nation without some little compensation for the same. This is true of the officers. We pay others who are employed by the Government, why should we not compensate these men who are giving their time and efforts to the Nation's work, that they might become efficient to defend their country? It is this clause, therefore, providing for pay, which, in my opinion, will prove the big incentive to enlistment in the National Guard and to building up this organization to the size and strength that is contemplated in the bill.

The provisions of the bill will, in my opinion, create a much greater degree of efficiency both among the enlisted men and the officers. With the provisions for pay comes added requirements. The great defect in the present organization is that there has been no incentive to drill, no incentive to become proficient. In many instances it has been a social rather than a military organization. Now all this has been done away with. The soldier boy must be a real soldier if he enlists. Attendance at drills is required, better discipline is provided, better officers are assured, and better military training will naturally follow. I see no reason why the National Guard, under the provisions of the present bill, should not become as effective a fighting force as the Regular Army of the United States. In fact, I think it would become more so, for the spirit that surrounds and goes with a Volunteer Army, sufficiently trained, is lacking in the Regular Army.

And I want to say right here that I am very much in favor of the idea of relieving the National Guard of police duty, but I think you all understand that will have to come from the State and not from this body.

This bill carried to its logical conclusion will, in five years' time, provide a minimum of 425,000 soldiers, members of the National Guard, all trained, efficient, ready, and willing to fight for the Government. It can provide more, and its maximum

strength would be over 1,000,000 men. I think this body of trained volunteer soldiers will be adequate defense against any initial attack that might be made upon our honor or our border.

Another excellent feature of the bill is that which allows the State to retain control of its organization while the Government aids in preparing it in efficiency. This, of course, subject to the general provision that the Government can call the officers and the soldiers to Federal duties if war is imminent or is declared. In other words, all the efficiency of a Federal Army is secured without the flavor of militarism that surrounds a large national troop, supported, maintained, and regulated by the Government. The National Guard will remain, as a body, in each State, practically as it is, the one material change being that the Federal Government will provide remuneration, and for this consideration will require of the States a much greater efficiency and the right to use these State organizations in time of war.

One cause for lack of efficiency in the present National Guard is the insufficient equipment that it has heretofore been provided with. Soldiers can not learn to shoot without having something to shoot with. Artillerymen can not become efficient unless they have had time and equipment with which to practice. All this has been provided for in the bill.

Since the general provisions of this bill have become known to the public I have been flooded with letters from my State and my district. All these have been commendatory on the steps that have been taken to utilize the National Guard with which to build up a Federal fighting unit for the protection of this United States. If I have judged the opinion of my district and of Iowa rightly, they will commend this feature of the bill, and I predict that in a year's time the National Guard of Iowa will be enlisted to its maximum strength.

In my mind there is no more important clause in this bill than section 21, which provides that the Secretary of War shall appoint a board of five officers of the Army to investigate and report the feasibility and practicability of the Government manufacture of arms and ammunition and equipment. I am for the Government manufacture of arms. I believe we should begin at once and manufacture a larger portion of the military necessities. I believe we should gradually and as rapidly as possible build plants and secure equipment, so that in the course of a few years we should be able to manufacture 90 per cent, if not all, of the things that are necessary in provisioning, equipping, and maintaining an army, both in time of peace and in time of war. I believe this Government could annually save millions of dollars by so doing. There is no doubt about the fact that private manufacturers annually reap a harvest of fortunes off the profits made to supply our Army and our Navy. They are growing rich—in fact, they have been made rich—from the money paid to them by the taxes levied upon the people. I believe that the profits made by these manufacturers in two years' time is sufficient to build all the plants and secure all the equipment necessary to manufacture sufficient supplies for an army of 1,000,000 men in peace or war. I believe these immense profits that would be made in years to come from the additional arms, ammunition, and equipment that must necessarily follow as a result of this tremendous increase in our Army and Navy should revert back to the people, and I am in favor of any law or any act that will bring this about. I have been giving the matter considerable study during the year in which I have been a Member of this body, and my observation has been that the Government can manufacture what is necessary for the Army and Navy just as cheaply as can the private manufacturer. Why, then, should we not save the profits that he takes as his legitimate share for furnishing the Government with these supplies?

There are many who differ with my views on the subject. I am willing to be convinced, and I give them credit for looking at the question with the same open mind as myself. It seems to me, then, that the only fair way of arriving at a conclusion as to the relative cost of manufacture is to appoint a board of investigation that this section provides for. This clause provides for five Army officers, men who are supposed to have knowledge of the things needed, and cost thereof, in the respective departments which they would represent. They should be able to arrive at a much more fair conclusion than men who are ignorant of these subjects. It seems to me that this investigation should be thorough in every particular and every detail, so that when the report is made we can tell exactly the cost to the Government, both in purchase and in its own manufacture. I believe that the Government should manufacture all its own Army and Navy supplies if it could do it at the same cost as the private manufacturers. Government manufacture

of Army supplies would forever still that clamor of an ulterior motive that always arises when a report of war is heard. During the last years when the Mexican embroglio has been in progress, the constant cry has been that private parties have been urging the United States to intervene in Mexico that they might reap the profits from the added war supplies. Ever since the specter of our being involved in the European war has arisen, over the country has gone the rumor that private parties are urging on national discord in order that they might profit from the arms and ammunitions needed if we should be involved in war. Whether these rumors, these clamors are founded on fact, I will not undertake to state. This much is certain: That if the Government of the United States manufactured these things which are necessary for its Army and its Navy, either on a peace or a war footing, then this ulterior motive could be ascribed to no one. Then the peace, dignity, or safety of this Nation could not be jeopardized on account of a misunderstanding of the masses as to the motives behind such a movement.

There is another far-reaching argument in favor of Government manufacture. It is obvious right now. Suppose we should go to war with Mexico. We are short of machine guns. The Government has no plant equipped to manufacture them. Every private plant has contracted for months ahead to furnish machine guns to Europe. We could not buy them under private manufacture; we have no facilities to manufacture them ourselves. If the Government of the United States right now, or in the next few months was compelled to have a large quantity of machine guns in order to protect its borders or for use in its Army, its borders would have to go unprotected and its Army unsupplied, for we could not get them. This, to my mind, is an argument for Government manufacture much stronger than that of mere private gain.

I believe that we should be at all times equipped so that in case of necessity this Government should be able to manufacture such things as are absolutely needed by our Army in time of war.

Mr. KAHN. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. HULL of Iowa. I will.

Mr. KAHN. The gentleman, I know, has taken a deep interest in the manufacture of munitions in the Government arsenals. Is the gentleman sufficiently familiar with the difference in cost of production as between private manufacturers and Government arsenals, so that he could give those figures?

Mr. HULL of Iowa. That is one of the reasons why I want this clause inserted. I have my opinion. I believe that the cost is very much less when the Government manufactures Army supplies than when private parties sell them to the Government. In fact, we know that they are.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HULL of Iowa. I will.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. That has been proven in the case of the Frankfort Arsenal at Philadelphia in particular, and it is proven always, with the exception that no account is taken of the overhead charges, in which the Government seems to have an advantage, but there is not any question of doubt so far as the Frankfort Arsenal is concerned that there has been a great saving in the manufacture of munitions, particularly in small-arms ammunition, over the cost of such munitions manufactured by private plants.

Mr. HULL of Iowa. I think the gentleman is correct, and I believe it is true that in the statement as to the cost they always say that they do figure the overhead expenses. Now, the overhead expenses is an unknown proposition, and everybody has a right to their own opinion as to what constitutes it. The gentleman understands that.

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. The facts, however, have been stated here of the importance of this matter.

Mr. TILSON. Does the gentleman have in mind the manufacture of arms and ammunition for peace only, or for war times?

Mr. HULL of Iowa. I have in mind the times of peace, and, as far as possible, in the time of war.

Mr. TILSON. Has the gentleman attempted to figure out how much it would cost to erect a plant sufficient to produce the necessary arms and ammunition for a large war?

Mr. HULL of Iowa. I have tried to figure it out, and I have tried to have others figure it out, and generally, I think, the figures are very, very misleading. That is just one of the reasons I want this clause in this bill. I want somebody who has authority to find out and report to the Secretary of War, and he to this Congress, the truth about this.

Mr. HICKS. Will the gentleman permit an interruption?

Mr. HULL of Iowa. Certainly.

Mr. HICKS. Is it not a fact that when the Government figures the overhead charges in arsenals they omit the tax on those plants? I think that is a distinction; that they do not take into consideration all the taxes paid that a private plant will have to pay and the Government does not have to pay.

Mr. HULL of Iowa. I presume that is true. They do not pay the tax, and I presume they do not figure on it.

Mr. SLOAN. Will the gentleman yield there?

Mr. HULL of Iowa. Yes, sir.

Mr. SLOAN. You said something about the amount manufactured in case of war, and its expense, in response to the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. TILSON]. That amount would depend a good deal upon what particular adversary the Government would pick out to fight with, would it not?

Mr. HULL of Iowa. It certainly would. I might call your attention to one thing right here, and it will answer all these questions to some extent, even to the overhead expense. The question of aeroplanes is a pressing one with this Government to-day, and you have at Rock Island, although I was not going to mention it, because I wanted to be modest, a factory, and you have the power that is going to waste, and you might just as well be manufacturing aeroplanes at one-tenth the cost that you are paying for them to-day.

Mr. GORDON. Will the gentleman yield upon that point?

Mr. HULL of Iowa. Certainly.

Mr. GORDON. The gentleman knows, perhaps, or recalls, that it appeared in evidence before our committee that these aeroplanes were largely covered by patents, and that it was a serious obstruction to the Government undertaking to engage in their manufacture?

Mr. HULL of Iowa. Well, I have always heard that all these gentlemen were very willing to place at the disposal of this Government anything to protect its honor. I would like to see that put to the test.

Mr. KAHN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HULL of Iowa. I will.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, the gentleman has given this matter a great deal of attention, and can he inform the committee how large a percentage of Army supplies the Government is buying at the present time? I would say, with reference to munitions?

Mr. HULL of Iowa. I can not. I have found no Member of this House who can accurately inform me, and I doubt very much whether there is any Army officer who can inform me. We have so many different committees appropriating for this and that, and different people buying, that there is a general impression—and it is very often stated—that only 10 per cent is ever bought. But that, I am sure, is not the truth. They are buying a good deal more than 10 per cent, but it is done outside of our committee.

Mr. BENNET. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HULL of Iowa. I will.

Mr. BENNET. Does the gentleman propose to offer any amendment to the bill?

Mr. HULL of Iowa. Well, I have not decided; but I do not think I will. I am fairly well satisfied with the bill. It may be improved in some respects. It is a mighty good bill, I will say, in my opinion.

Mr. SLOAN. Will the gentleman yield there?

Mr. HULL of Iowa. Yes.

Mr. SLOAN. He says no Member of the House has been able to give this information. Would not the War and Navy Departments know precisely the relative amount produced by the Government factories and the amount produced in private concerns?

Mr. HULL of Iowa. I do not think you can find out without starting an investigation. If you can, I would be very glad if you would do so, and would come around to-morrow morning and tell me.

Mr. SLOAN. Have you inquired?

Mr. HULL of Iowa. I have, and I have found a great many people who say that it is only 10 per cent, but that does not take into consideration that there are other committees that make appropriations besides our committee.

Mr. GREENE of Vermont. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HULL of Iowa. Certainly.

Mr. GREENE of Vermont. Somewhere there would be an accounting of every dollar of Uncle Sam's money that is expended from the Treasury and what it goes for. Have you inquired from such a source what money has been paid out for munitions of war?

Mr. HULL of Iowa. No; I have not of them.

Mr. GREENE of Vermont. Would not that be the place to look for it before we began an investigation?

Mr. HULL of Iowa. That would be the place to go. And that is not all the investigation wants to do. These men want to do something else. They have got a lot of things to do.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, I yield five minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. BENNET].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from New York [Mr. BENNET] is recognized for five minutes.

Mr. BENNET. Mr. Chairman, I had no intention of speaking on this bill, but it did seem to me that it might be proper to indicate to the House that my colleague from the twelfth district [Mr. LONDON] did not in his remarks represent the entire 43 Members from the State of New York.

I agree with him in one respect. I think that he and the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. GARDNER], taking the gentleman from Massachusetts as a type, together sum up the question. Either you ought not to have any Army at all—just what my colleague [Mr. LONDON] desires—or you ought to have an efficient Army, which is what the gentleman from Massachusetts desires, and I am quite sure what the majority of the Members of the House desire.

Being largely Irish in my composition, I am pleased with the fact that the consideration of this bill was taken up on the 17th of March. As I listened to the Members of the committee, all of them saying how they "love their teacher," including the minority leader from California [Mr. KAHN], and what a grand bill it is, and how each of them would not have written this bill exactly this way if he had a chance, I was reminded a good deal of some of my Irish ancestors, who were quite wont to speak pleasantly to one they met, and keep the shillalah in their hands behind their backs. [Laughter.]

There are several parts of this bill. I have read the enacting clause, and I find it in excellent order. Therefore I am going to vote for what comes after, in order to get that clause through the House. I have read the title. It is not a title; it is not a description of the bill. It is a prayer, a hope, "to increase the efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States." That is what we all want, and so far we all agree with the committee.

But after I have listened to different members of the committee I realize, when they really get down to serious business and get to talking about what they want, the gentleman from Connecticut [Mr. TILSON] and the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. HULL] and the gentleman from California [Mr. KAHN] and other gentlemen who really do not agree with this bill, either in whole or largely in part, that this bill is simply intended to rope off the arena in which the "scrap" is going to occur.

The debate this afternoon has convinced me of one thing, particularly the remarks of the recent governor of Nebraska [Mr. SHALLENBERGER]. I never heard a better speech in my life for universal military training. You can not follow his argument and escape that conclusion.

Mr. GORDON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Does the gentleman from New York yield to the gentleman from Ohio?

Mr. BENNET. Certainly.

Mr. GORDON. Can you point out the difference between universal military training and universal military service?

Mr. BENNET. I do not know whether I could in five minutes.

Mr. GORDON. Gen. Scott, the Chief of Staff, who testified before our committee, said there was no difference between compulsory military service and compulsory military training.

Mr. BENNET. Then, if they are the same thing, that is what the argument of the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. SHALLENBERGER] applied to. When you say you are for putting a rifle of the latest and best pattern behind the door of every citizen, you can not escape the conclusion that when you have given every man a rifle it is your duty to teach him how to use it, and that is universal military training.

Now, I do not think this country is quite up to universal military training yet, but this bill is simply the start of an experiment, and a change from the system that we have now to the system that we are going to have sometime; and that reconciles almost anybody to vote for it.

It is not really necessary to read the bill. We are not going to make the bill here. We are simply going to pass it. In another place they are going to take the "innards" out of the bill and put in an entirely different set of works, and then we will appoint a conference committee, and they will change all that. We are simply the mechanics that are starting the operation. [Laughter.]

I just wanted to say in my five minutes that the great State which the gentleman from the twelfth district and myself and

41 others on the floor have the honor to represent here is for adequate national defense to the limit. [Applause.] The foreign born are for adequate national defense as well as the native born. Yesterday I received the following from a respected citizen of Italian birth in my district:

BRONX, N. Y., March 15, 1916.

Hon. WILLIAM S. BENNET, Washington, D. C.,  
Congressman of Twenty-third Congressional District, New York.

DEAR MR. BENNET: I wish for you to support the national defense resolution adopted at St. Louis March 4, 1916, or something along that line, which would secure the liberty and peace of this great Nation of ours.

Wishing you health and prosperity.

Respectfully, yours,

S. AMANNA.

Mr. Amanna is but typical of our foreign-born citizens.

Returning to the question of universal military training, I find the following arguments in its favor:

First. It is fair and democratic. The son of the millionaire and the son of the toiler by manual labor are placed on an equality.

Second. It is effective. It would give us a constant army of about 450,000 and an educated reserve of about 5,000,000. This would probably mean that we would be secure from attack.

Third. It is economical in a financial way. If we trained every available boy at, say, 19 for one year, we probably would not pay him wages. It would be his contribution to the country.

Fourth. It is economical of men. Fighting wars with untrained men is wasteful. We raised 527,000 men in this country to fight the War of 1812. Great Britain never had more than 16,000 men on this continent at any one time during that conflict.

Fifth. It would save tremendously on pensions. Our huge pension rolls result very largely from the fact that, fighting with untrained men, we have to have so many.

Sixth. A year of training would be good for most boys. Many wealthy men give their boys military training because they realize its worth. The sons of poor men would be benefited by the same opportunity.

Many other reasons could be given, but I am indicating rather than arguing.

On the other hand is the very real danger of developing a military class. No one wants that. We have now 5,300 officers in the Regular Army. I doubt if they have influenced us much toward a war-like spirit. To a war-like spirit a central permanent power devoted to its propagation is necessary, and that central permanent power can not exist in a President holding office for but four years.

My hope is for universal and lasting peace. In 1910 I introduced and had passed the following resolution:

Joint resolution authorizing the appointment of a commission in relation to universal peace.

*Resolved, etc.*, That a commission of five members be appointed by the President of the United States to consider the expediency of utilizing existing international agencies for the purpose of limiting the armaments of the nations of the world by international agreement and of constituting the combined navies of the world an international force for the preservation of universal peace and to consider and report upon any other means to diminish the expenditures of government for military purposes and to lessen the probabilities of war.

President Taft never appointed the commission. I have always regretted that he did not. I have reintroduced the resolution in this Congress and intend pressing for its passage. It expresses my hopes and aspirations. But we are not yet at universal peace. Until we are we will need a national police force, and I am going to vote to make it an effective and efficient one.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, I yield five minutes to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MILLER].

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania is recognized for five minutes.

Mr. MILLER of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, prior to November 11 last I had received a great many letters from constituents on the question of preparedness. A great majority of them protested against a large expenditure in that direction.

We have in our county a company of the Sixteenth Regiment of the National Guard of Pennsylvania, and let me say that they have a most excellent and well-equipped armory in Grove City. I am well acquainted with Capt. Kennedy, the captain of Company M, and I wrote to him and asked him in my letter why it was not possible to have the National Guard constitute part of the Army of the United States, and suggesting that in case of war they could be utilized, instead of having this large continental army that was talked about in the newspapers. About that time I wrote a letter to the honorable Secretary of War, Mr. Garrison, on the subject, in answer to a circular that I had received from him, which I think was sent to me as it was to all other Congressmen, and I ask leave, without taking the time to read that letter, to insert it in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection that privilege will be granted.

There was no objection.

Following is the letter referred to:

MERCER, PA., November 16, 1915.

To the honorable SECRETARY OF WAR,  
Washington, D. C.

DEAR SIR: I acknowledge the receipt of your "Outline of the Proposed Military Policy," dated November 1, 1915. There is much in the "outline" that I approve. It is possible that it is not in good taste for me, a civilian, to criticize what you propose, but the only way you can obtain the opinion of the general public, the majority of whom are civilians, is through one of their number.

I am in favor of reasonable "preparedness," although I do not think there is any danger within the next 25 years, at least, of the United States being engaged in war with any foreign nation, unless she is the aggressor. In every war that has occurred in which the United States was a party during the past 100 years, with a single exception, the United States brought on the war.

There are three classes of representative citizens who are in favor of "preparedness," and you could scarcely make the "preparedness" too large for them:

1. The professional politician.
2. The manufacturers of munitions, and allied manufacturers.
3. A large portion of the newspapers.

As a rule the common people are not in favor of "preparedness." They feel that they are already taxed in many ways that they never were before except in time of war. That already there is a large deficiency which can only be wiped out by increased taxation. That if preparedness is to be adopted on a large scale it means a bonded indebtedness in a time of peace for a purpose that they do not believe is necessary.

I believe that the officers and enlisted men in the Regular Army should be increased to at least 150,000, and I believe with this force and that of the National Guard the United States would have sufficient available force. The National Guard already consisting of 129,000 officers and enlisted men could, I think, easily be increased to 150,000 and possibly 200,000 men. To encourage this, in my opinion, the pay of the enlisted men and officers in the National Guard should be at least 20 per cent of the annual pay of the Regular Army, on condition that each officer and man drills each week an average of at least — hours, and that every officer and man be required to attend every drill, unless excused on account of sickness, and pass an examination each year. In my opinion the National Government should provide arms for this force, provide a full equipment of clothing, ammunition, etc., for the force, which should be stored and only used by the force when called out by the National Government, the National Government also to decide upon the nature and character of the organization and prescribe its discipline. I have no fear that in case of war between the United States and any foreign nation but what the National Guard would promptly respond to the call of the Government.

You will pardon my writing this letter. The probability is you will not have time to read it, but if one of your clerks reads it, it will not take him nearly as long to read it as I have taken to write it.

Yours, very truly,

S. H. MILLER.

Mr. MILLER of Pennsylvania. On November 17 I received a letter from Capt. Kennedy, of Grove City, in answer to the one I had written him on November 11, in which he stated that he heartily agreed with what I had written to him, and that he believed the National Guard would be a most efficient force if it were constituted as a part of the Regular forces of the United States. Without taking the time to read that letter, I ask unanimous consent to include it as a part of my remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be so ordered.

The letter is as follows:

GROVE CITY, PA., November 17, 1915.

The Hon. S. H. MILLER, Member of Congress,  
Mercer, Pa.

MY DEAR SIR: Your letter of November 11 received, and it gave me more satisfaction to read same to the members of Company M than anything I have received for a long time. I am inclosing a pamphlet with a speech or lecture by Col. William Wallace that he gave us at officers' school last June at Mount Gretna that will be of use to you when some of the Army officers try to tell you that a continental army is the solution of our unpreparedness in the United States. Col. Wallace is one of the experts in the Regular Army, and he shows in this lecture that you can not make a first-class fighting man in two months' intensive training, as per continental guard idea. The bill for pay for drill in National Guard asks for pay for enlisted men and officers of 20 per cent of the annual pay of the Regular Army, which makes it possible for an enlisted man to earn \$52 per year, and non-commissioned officers and commissioned officers in their several grades get from \$80 to as high as \$380 per year, provided they attend every drill and pass the examinations each year. This requires a man to drill each night 2½ hours and school 30 minutes one night per week, and I believe that if the bill gets through we will make the Regular Army go some to keep out of our road in efficiency. I am going to make it a point to have you attend our annual encampment next year and see for yourself the work that the Pennsylvania National Guard puts on. I believe that every live legislator like you should have a chance to investigate this question by seeing the work done. With kindest personal regards, I am,

Yours, very truly,

J. A. KENNEDY.

Mr. MILLER of Pennsylvania. Capt. Kennedy inclosed with his letter a most excellent address on the question of military training, delivered by Maj. William Wallace, of the United States Army, at the camp of instruction at Mount Gretna, Pa., June 8, 1915, to the National Guard of the State of Pennsylvania. I ask leave to print that address as a part of my remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it will be so ordered.

The address is as follows:

MILITARY TRAINING.

[By Maj. William Wallace, United States Army.]

(Delivered at Camp of Instruction, Mount Gretna, Pa., June 8, 1915.)

"Military training is a term much in vogue to-day. Comparatively few of our people know in what such training consists or how absolutely necessary it is to the conduct of modern war. The antiquated idea that any man in a uniform with a gun is a soldier is distressingly prevalent. The fact is, that such a man without at least one year's solid and strict apprenticeship to the skilled trade of arms is very likely to be more of a drawback to his friends than a menace to any creditable foe.

"It is asked if a year is necessary for this training. It is all too short in which to learn and have confirmed the multitudinous details in which a trained soldier must be skilled. However, young Americans who have undergone the mental training of the average public school and who enter upon the duty earnestly and willingly will master the rudiments of soldiering in that time, provided they are properly put to it.

"To show the nature of the training necessary, we will suppose that 100,000 young men of the above description had volunteered and assembled for military instruction on one of our great Indian or forest reservations in Arizona or New Mexico, where outdoor work is possible the year round, and ask—

"What course would they pursue?"

"Roughly this:

"The first month would be consumed in the recruit finding himself—a process having many of the aspects of losing himself. He must be divested of every ounce of superfluous baggage and be fitted and provided with uniform and equipment. An uncomfortable pack or pair of shoes are soul-destroying afflictions, where, if properly adjusted, they soon become matters of small concern. The care of himself, of kit, and equipment, when, where, and how these are obtained, their cost, his responsibility for them, and their arrangement for various instructions are all matters requiring time to learn. Then there are the Articles of War, the application of military justice, his relation to the Army, the Government, and to civildom to be learned. There are also the various fatigues—work required other than that which is strictly military—to be explained and performed. From the start 'setting-up' exercises and drills without arms must take place, and regularity and precision insisted upon.

"The second month the recruit should be given his rifle, and the handling and care of it taught. Squad, platoon, and company close-order drills, calisthenics, swimming, riding, etc., would fill each day with the physical instruction necessary. The study of the vital parts of Army Regulations, the duties of sentinels on various guards, the carrying and correct delivery of orders, and lectures on hygiene and sanitation would consume the rest of the time.

"The third month would advance into the battalion and regimental close-order drills and ceremonies, the physical exercises continued, and first aid, signaling, and how to cook for himself taken up. Lectures on simple tactics and the relation of the various branches of the service to each other should be given here, and, also, preparatory to the coming month, talks on camp expedients, marching, and the use of field ration.

"Altogether for the uninitiated no small three months' work. For the individual, if not the hardest, they are the most trying. Homesickness usually sets in, rendering mind and body sensitive and irritable, and, though the ills he is undergoing are mostly imaginary, they are to him none the less real for being so. For this reason these months should be spent in simple barracks and simple comforts provided. Also such barracks would prevent much of the disease usually attendant upon an abrupt change from home to camp life. A study of our concentration camps during the Spanish War shows that no effort should be spared to make the transition from civil to military employment as gradual as possible. Three months in airy barracks with an occasional camp won't prevent all sickness but will prevent much of it and lessen its severity.

"The fourth month would be spent in camp and all that goes to make such a life not only endurable but enjoyable put into effect. Extended order drills should be the rule, with the study and practice of patrolling, scouting, road sketching, and general reconnaissance. Short marches without pack should be frequent, and lectures and examples given of simple entrenchments, the construction of obstacles, demolitions, the effects of rifle and cannon fire, the knowledge and use of cover, and the elements that enter into successful assaults.

"The fifth month should have longer marches, light packs and frequent changes of camp site. Simple tactical problems should be solved, with lectures and practice in advance and rear-guard

actions, outpost, and convoy operations. The soldier must know and be familiar with the nature of the duty he is performing in order to act intelligently. For instance, what would be proper action, as the point of an advance guard might be suicidal with a convoy, and vice versa.

"The sixth month's operation should be by brigade and the marches and problems extended into a terrain of hills, defiles, and rivers. Map making, bridging, and construction of temporary and permanent entrenchment taught and put into effect through simple problems of offense and defense between brigades.

"The seventh and eighth months should be devoted to the division, that all-important tactical unit upon which battles to-day depend. Hard and zealous preliminary training by all of its components is necessary in order that the division may start unhandicapped. Here, in war, there is little or no time for individual training. Men, squads, companies, battalions, regiments, and brigades must know their business or confusion reigns, and order—that primary requisite of human as well as mechanical machines—fail and ruin results. Moreover, it is in division exercises that officers receive the experience to fit them for actual war. Here their commands become themselves, and they must shoulder the blame for all deficiencies in them, and in the life and death game of war censure for inefficiency is not likely to be long delayed or particularly pleasant when it comes. After a few division problems intelligent officers and men plainly see that they must keep themselves up to the top notch of efficiency if they are not only to win the cause but save themselves severe and needless suffering. It aids discipline by compelling it throughout all ranks, and discipline is to human masses what cohesion is to the atoms of materials, and as these are soft or hard, weak or strong, in accordance with the intensity of this principle, so are armies in proportion to the strictness of discipline that pervades them. Discipline is not instinctive, but rather a matter of habit, easily acquired and falling lightly on those who are amenable, but nettlesome, often beyond endurance, to the egotistical and the vanity stricken. From the very first, in the exactions of promptitude, precision, and close attention, it has been instilled with gradually increasing rigor, until in the heaving and straining of the great human mass—the division—it finally becomes confirmed. Discipline is absolutely indispensable to order, and no matter how intelligent or individually well trained a man may be, as a soldier he is worse than useless, a danger, until he has learned to obey unhesitatingly and without question the orders of his superiors. The superior is responsible, the subordinate isn't, and in divisions superiors are very likely to have the fact driven home.

"It is here also that officers have the opportunity to put into constant practice their absorptions of the classroom, and, weighing well their knowledge, to separate the essential from the mass of nonessential. In the military art practice is the only true knowledge producer. The division problems would call into play all the previous training of all the troops. Time off should be devoted to noncommissioned officers' schools for the purpose of familiarizing large classes with army administration, paper work, etc. Not a moment should be lost.

"The ninth month should see the command divided into opposing armies of some 50,000 each, operating against each other with all the particularity of actual war in an area large enough to make a small theater of war with bases, lines of communication, screens, using heavy and horse artillery, air craft, pontoons, the wonderful signaling apparatus, and the many other devices essential to modern warfare, and which can only be brought into play with great bodies of troops, and whose skilled handling can only be perfected in time of peace. This would be the hard month of forced marches, sleepless nights, of hunger and thirst and dirt, but altogether the most important and interesting, and, with the time which peace practice allows for corrections, before it is over the armies should move with clock-like precision. The lives and money this precision would save us in war would compensate the cost, trouble, and perhaps temporary hardships to attain it in peace, a thousand times over.

"The study and practice of shooting would occupy the tenth and eleventh months. The idea still prevails that shooting consists in hitting a big black spot on a big white piece of paper a known distance away. Of course this practice is essential in order to teach men the use of sights, positions of firing, and general familiarity with his weapon. Farther than that it is of small avail in battle firing. Here the target is rarely visible and the range problematical and to be figured by range finders and communicated to the firers by signals. Results are obtained here as everywhere else in militarism only by strict obedience—by discipline—and this is one of the main reasons for placing this part of the training last. Untrained men will not obey instinctively in the excitement of a field firing problem—not willfully disobey, but they will not have acquired the habit of

attention so essential to intelligent and concerted action. Moreover, at first they would not have been familiar with the signals for movements and firing, and the voice can not be heard.

"As all can not shoot at once, much time during this month can be devoted to reviews of the subjects they have learned and imparting many things to the men which the curriculum of a soldier should include, the rules of warfare, for instance.

"In the twelfth and last month examinations should be held which, with due consideration of records made during the year should determine the standing of every member of the Army.

"After this the bars should be let down and civilians welcomed and entertained with games, festivities of all kinds, including military exercises and ceremonies."

Mr. KAHN. I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. DYER].

Mr. DYER. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, the high esteem in which the chairman and members of this committee are held by this House insures the most earnest consideration for this bill. I believe that it will be enacted into law substantially as it has been prepared by this splendid committee.

With the increase provided for the Army, as set out in this bill, with the assistance that is given to the National Guard of the various States, as the bill provides, and with the men in our country who are now trained, who have had experience, and who are willing and ready to render assistance in time of need, I believe the country will be fully prepared for all possible conditions or emergencies that may arise which may call for the defense of our country.

One of the most agreeable things to me in this bill—and I know to a great portion of the American people—is the fact that the National Guard of the various States are to receive at last from the hands of Congress just recognition and consideration; and I am pleased to note, in the report of the committee, that they are fully satisfied that the Congress has the power and authority to make regulations and provisions for the efficiency of the National Guard. They set out in their report the opinion of the military counsel of the State of Missouri, which is a clear expression of the power of the Federal Government over the militia under the Constitution. I hope that the Members of this House will read that report with care, not only because it comes from Missouri and because some of you ought to be shown, but because it is a most splendid and clear expression of the law and the powers of the Congress under the Constitution respecting the militia.

Mr. Chairman, one of the things that the Congress ought to consider carefully in the enacting of legislation affecting the Army is with respect to the men themselves who go into the Army and who render the service that the Army is created to render to the country. There has been in the past not a too friendly spirit shown by the Congress for the men who have served well and faithfully. There has also been some lack and some neglect on the part of Congress with reference to providing for the men in the service, proper, just, and equitable rights with reference to retirement.

I have introduced a bill (H. R. 12956) upon that subject, "Creating an Army reserve," and I want to call it to your special attention. It is as follows:

*Be it enacted, etc.,* That an Army reserve be formed from the men who have served in the United States Army. Men who have served 15 years to retire on one-half pay of the rank and grade held by them at the time of retirement and the allowances as now provided by the law, and to serve with the reserves for a period of 15 years; men who have served 20 years to retire on two-thirds pay of the rank and grade held by them at the time of retirement and the allowances as now provided by law, and to serve with the reserves for a period of 10 years; men who have served 25 years to retire on three-fourths pay of the rank and grade held by them at the time of retirement and the allowances as now provided by law, and to serve with the reserves for a period of five years: *Provided,* That in computing length of service for retirement credit for double time shall be given to those who honorably served 90 days or more in the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps of the United States, either as a regular or volunteer, during the War with Spain or the Philippine insurrection or in China, between April 21, 1898, and July 4, 1902, inclusive, service to be computed from date of enlistment to date of discharge.

We have in this country a great many men who have seen service and who are able and willing to come to the rescue of the Government at any time when there is need. There are at least 50,000 members of the United Spanish War Veterans physically able and ready to serve their country again.

I beg to call attention to a letter from the Canal Zone upon this subject, as follows:

THE PANAMA CANAL,  
DEPARTMENT OF OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE,  
Cristobal, Canal Zone, March 1, 1916.

Hon. L. C. DYER,  
House of Representatives, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR COMRADE AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF: You probably have been talked deaf, dumb, and blind on the subject of preparedness; but in

looking over the different articles that have been submitted by various persons and associations it seems that the most practical solution to get a fair amount of men together who would be available at a moment's notice and who have all the requirements of the trained soldier and sailor could be found in the organization of the United Spanish War Veterans. This organization is composed of men who have had actual experience under fire, and as a body, on the whole, would probably represent a better force than the majority of our regular standing Army of to-day.

It would seem that the right road toward preparedness, to begin with, would be legislation whereby Congress would furnish the members of the United Spanish War Veterans with suitable meeting places, with sufficient arms from the surplus carried in the different arsenals, regulation uniforms, and a small monthly payment that would cover a small amount of traveling expenses, which would help a great many to join who are not members now who would require a small amount of travel. This amount would be payable at the expiration of each month on the proof of attendance of at least one evening a week at meetings. A part of the meetings would be given to certain instructions along military lines to refresh and put members in an up-to-date condition. It might also be a good idea to make it arbitrary that, if practicable, one day a month be used for outside practice drills, hikes, and formations.

Along these lines the Government would supply a sufficient amount of ammunition so that at least once a month a small amount of target practice could be carried on, and once a year each State would have at least two weeks of a general encampment to carry out military maneuvers, the expenses to be borne by the United States Government and to cover all expenses involved.

It is believed in most cases the ordinary lodge has a sufficient number of members to form a company. In case it is impossible to acquire enough for a company additional men of good standing in the community could be voted on to make up the deficiency and become a member of the different posts along the lines of an honorary member or such. Officers of the different posts would assume the relative position of officers of the company. It is believed that the different posts have the men for these different positions, and they should receive compensation from the Government to make it worth their while to keep interest up and to carry out such orders as are necessary to keep the company in a first-class condition at all times. Their reward would also be, in case they were called upon to serve, that they would be embodied in the Volunteer service with provisional appointments covering their different positions.

I have no statistics showing the membership of the organization of the United Spanish War Veterans, but I believe it is safe to assume that there must be at least 50,000 able-bodied men at the present time who would pass any medical examination required for such service. That would mean 50,000 men as good as they are to be found in the United States standing army of to-day, with the additional actual experience under fire that they have all had as a whole, whereas the standing army is continually being filled up with recruits.

If this thing can be put through, it is believed in 30 days thereafter 25,000 more men who are eligible to join would join, as now there are a great many who can not, as their means would not allow them to reach the various posts.

Yours, very truly,

C. C. SNEDEKER.

This matter of retirement is intelligently discussed in a letter to me from a soldier now serving in Hawaii. He writes me as follows:

The viewpoint of a Spanish War veteran, who is also a Regular Army man, on the bill H. R. 10412.

SCHOFIELD BARRACKS,  
Hawaii, March 8, 1916.

To Comrade L. C. DYER,  
Commander in Chief U. S. W. V., Washington, D. C.:

1. I have just seen a copy of H. R. 10412, a bill introduced by a Mr. DYER. I do not know if you are the author of the bill or not. I do know, however, that the provisions of this bill as regards credit for double time are not what the service members of the United Spanish War Veterans want. So I hope you will pardon me if I take the liberty of addressing you at some length on the matter (not as a soldier addressing a Member of Congress, but as a comrade, in good standing, of the United Spanish War Veterans addressing his commander in chief), and I shall be happy if you will attentively read what I have to say.

2. I am unable to say authoritatively just when or under what conditions retirement was first offered as an inducement to desirable enlisted men to remain in the service. It is a matter of historical record that as far back as the latter part of the eighteenth century officers and enlisted men who had rendered honorable service to the country during the Revolutionary and other wars were, upon their discharge from the service, presented by the Government with homesteads consisting of a stated number of acres of land as a special reward for their service in war. During the years following the practice of specially honoring and rewarding those who served the country in war was kept up under one form or another.

The first provision for the retirement of enlisted men of which I have found authentic record was made by an act of Congress approved February 14, 1885, which was published to the Army February 27, 1885, in General Order No. 18, Headquarters of the Army. The act is as follows:

*"Be it enacted, etc.,* That when an enlisted man has served as such 30 years in the United States Army or Marine Corps, either as a private or as a noncommissioned officer, or both, he shall, by making application to the President, be placed on the retired list hereby created, with the rank held by him at the date of retirement; and he shall thereafter receive 75 per cent of the pay and allowances of the rank upon which he was retired."

This law continued to govern the retirement of enlisted men until 1890, when it was amended by act of Congress approved September 30, 1890, which act was published to the Army October 11, 1890, in General Order No. 121, Headquarters of the Army. The act is as follows:

*"Be it enacted, etc.,* That chapter 67 of volume 23 of the Statutes at Large of the United States, being 'An act to authorize a retired list for privates and noncommissioned officers of the United States Army who have served as such 30 years or upward,' approved February 14, 1885, be amended to read as follows: 'That when an enlisted man has served as such 30 years in the United States Army or Marine Corps, either as a private or as a noncommissioned officer, or both, he shall, by application to the President, be placed on the retired list hereby created, with the rank held by him at the date of retirement, and he shall receive

thereafter 75 per cent of the pay and allowances of the rank upon which he was retired: *Provided*, That if said enlisted man had war service with the Army in the field, or in the Navy or Marine Corps in active service, either as a Volunteer or Regular, during the War of the Rebellion, such war service shall be computed as double time in computing the 30 years necessary to entitle him to be retired.

This, I believe, was the first enactment by Congress of a law allowing double time for war service. After this law had been in operation for some time the question was raised as to what constituted "war service" under this act. A decision was accordingly handed down by the Secretary of War on January 5, 1891, and published to the Army March 10, 1891, in Circular No. 2, Headquarters of the Army, to the effect that the War of the Rebellion began April 15, 1861, and ended August 20, 1866, and that all service rendered with the Army in the field between those dates was considered war service and would be doubled in computing the 30 years necessary for retirement—a total of 5 years 4 months and 5 days.

This retirement law was further amended by act of Congress approved May 26, 1900, and published to the Army in General Orders, No. 76, War Department, June 1, 1900, as follows:

"*Provided*, That hereafter, in computing the length of service for retirement, credit shall be given the soldier for double the time of his actual service in Porto Rico, Cuba, or the Philippine Islands."

The act of February 14, 1885, modified to embrace its several amendments, was published to the Army in General Orders, No. 140, A. G. O., War Department, 1901, as an amendment to paragraph 146, Army Regulations, as follows:

"When an enlisted man shall have served as such for 30 years, either in the Army or the Marine Corps and the Army, he may apply to The Adjutant General of the Army for retirement. Upon the approval of the application an order will be issued from The Adjutant General's Office transferring him to the retired list and directing that transportation in kind to his home and commutation of subsistence during the necessary travel be given him. Length of war service with the Army in the field, or with the Navy or Marine Corps in active service—either as Volunteer or Regular—during the War of the Rebellion, and actual service in Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippine Islands, will be doubled in computing the 30 years necessary to entitle him to be retired. In the computation of war service and service in Cuba, Porto Rico, and the Philippine Islands service as an enlisted man only will be counted."

The act of August 24, 1912, provides in part:

"That in computing length of service for retirement credit for double time for foreign service shall not be given to those who hereafter enlist: *And provided further*, That nothing in this provision shall be so construed as to forfeit credit for double time already accrued."

The act of February 14, 1885, with its various amendments, and other acts affecting credit for double time, are summed up in paragraph 134 of the Army Regulations, which is here quoted, in part:

"Service as a commissioned officer of the United States Volunteers, organized in 1898 and 1899, or of the Porto Rico Provisional Regiment of Infantry, or of the Philippine Scouts, will count for the purpose of retirement as an enlisted man as though rendered as such, and length of war service with the Army in the field, or with the Navy or Marine Corps in active service—either as Volunteer or Regular—during the War of the Rebellion, and actual service in China, Cuba, the Philippine Islands, the Island of Guam, Alaska, or Panama, or, prior to April 23, 1904, in Porto Rico, will, for men enlisting prior to August 24, 1912, be doubled in computing the 30 years' service necessary to entitle an enlisted man to be retired."

32. From the foregoing it will be seen that ever since the Army was organized Congress has given special recognition in some form or another to those soldiers who remained with the colors in time of war and fought their country's battles; the system of giving double time for service in war being first inaugurated by the act of September 30, 1890, under which law a period of five years four months and five days was doubled for the benefit of those who served in the War of the Rebellion.

4. From the wording of this bill (H. R. 10412) it is the evident intention to take away credit for all double time already accrued except for those who enlisted during the War with Spain. Under this construction a soldier who was already in the service at the outbreak of the war would get no double time. Taking my own case as an example, I was serving at the outbreak of the war on an enlistment entered upon in January, 1898; during this enlistment I served through the campaign at Santiago de Cuba and went back to Cuba the second time with the army of occupation, serving nearly two and one-half years in Cuba on this enlistment. Under the proposed bill I would not get a single day's double time; yet a man who enlisted after the outbreak of the war in an organization which never left its own permanent station would have his whole enlistment doubled for the purpose of retirement. Surely the injustice of such a provision must be apparent to all who give it serious thought.

Further, I believe it would undoubtedly work an injustice to take away any of the double time, credit for which has already been given; a consideration which the Nation's lawmakers enacted and ordained that we should hereafter enjoy; a consideration which, unquestioningly accepted by us in good faith, has caused a number of us to remain in the service and give to it the best part of our lives.

There is no doubt in my mind that as many veterans of the War with Spain have already been retired from the service as there are yet in the service who will attain the retired list. Those already retired did so with the help of the double time they had accumulated. They are no better men than their comrades still on the active list. The proposed bill, however, contains no provision to forfeit their double time and bring them back to the active service.

A large percentage of the men now in active service who served during the War with Spain have accumulated to their credit (counting their subsequent tours of insular service) from five to seven years' service which counts double for retirement. The proposed bill would require them to serve from six months to two years longer to earn their retirement than would be the case were no such bill enacted.

Probably of those who have earned credit for double time under the law not more than 1,500 to 2,000 will ever reach the retired list. It is not much in comparison with the hardships most of them have undergone to expect that faith be kept with them in the matter of double time already placed to their credit.

5. If the proposed bill were amended to something like this, it would be something like what the service members of the United Spanish War Veterans believe they have a right to expect:

Strike out beginning with fourth word, first line, second page, to end of bill, and substitute therefor:

"*Provided*, That nothing in this bill shall be so construed as to forfeit credit for double time already accrued."

6. In conclusion, I beg to assure you that I am not speaking for myself alone, but for a large number of service members of the United Spanish War Veterans whose views I have obtained on this subject.

Yours, in F. P. and H.,

E. J. McELLANEY,

Past Department Commander United Spanish War Veterans.

I have introduced a bill along this line that ought to be passed. It is as follows:

A bill (H. R. 8808) authorizing the issuance of arms to rifle clubs, and for other purposes.

*Be it enacted, etc.*, That the Secretary of War is hereby authorized to issue, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, such arms as may be available for the purpose to rifle clubs organized by posts of the Grand Army of the Republic or camps of the United Spanish War Veterans and Sons of Veterans, United States of America. Such clubs shall be designated by the name of the posts, camps, or garrisons organizing them.

SEC. 2. That such clubs shall consist of 10 or more native or naturalized citizens of the United States of America of ages between 18 and 45, inclusive, and who are physically fitted for service in the field. They shall be enrolled for a period of six months and take an oath of allegiance to the United States as against all enemies and opposers whatsoever, foreign or domestic.

SEC. 3. That on the first day of each calendar month the commander of such club shall transmit to the War Department a report of these enrollments, with a description of each individual; also all changes in the membership and the attendance at all meetings and exercises of the club. Such reports shall become part of the records of the War Department.

SEC. 4. That such clubs shall be encouraged to unite with other similar clubs in contiguous territory to form companies and regiments. Upon request the Secretary of War may assign officers of the Regular Army on the retired list to commands in such organization.

SEC. 5. That six months after enrollment and after having made a record of attendance upon 75 per cent of the meetings and exercises a member may withdraw and receive a certificate of service. The Secretary of War may prescribe a score of efficiency. Members not attaining this may be dropped upon notice being given.

SEC. 6. That the Secretary of War is authorized to establish a bureau of rifle clubs, to be administered by an officer of field rank, whose duty it shall be to keep the records, direct the organization, furnish the supplies, hold accountability for the same, and have periodical inspection of all clubs organized under this act.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the boys of our country should be taught military tactics and things that will go to make them good and efficient soldiers when the country needs their services. We ought to have a better and a larger trained body of men in our citizenship than we have had in the past.

Some of you gentlemen of the House recall the condition in which we entered the War with Spain. You will recall that it was necessary for the President to call for volunteers to be hastily organized and brought together without training, without experience, and without equipment. That was due to the fact that our Army was so small and it was necessary to have the volunteers at once. You gentlemen will recall the fact that the men who had charge of organizing regiments were largely unable and unfitted to do the work, and the result was that men went to the camps without equipment, and without medical or other officers in charge competent and qualified to look after the men.

The result of that course was that many of the men lost their lives because of the fever-stricken camps, real pest holes, such as Chickamauga and other camps in this country. Hence it is no wonder that many men sickened and died from exposure in many of these camps. That, gentlemen, ought never to have been permitted in a great country like this. Men who come forward to serve their country—full of patriotism—ought to have every consideration that will make it possible for them to retain their health.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the men who enlist in the Army should receive more consideration than they have received in the past. I am glad therefore to see in the bill some provisions intended to improve the service, all of which will encourage young men to enlist and serve their country. [Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. KAHN. Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MOORE].

Mr. MOORE of Pennsylvania. Mr. Chairman, an appeal from the Christian ministers of Philadelphia has been forwarded to me, and it has so direct a bearing upon the problem now under discussion that I ask unanimous consent to extend it in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Pennsylvania asks unanimous consent to extend his remarks in the RECORD. Is there objection?

There was no objection.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Chairman, I move that the committee do now rise.

The motion was agreed to.

Accordingly, the committee rose; and the Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. GARRETT, Chairman of the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union, reported that that committee had had under consideration the bill (H. R.

12766) to increase the efficiency of the Military Establishment of the United States, and had directed him to report that they had come to no resolution thereon.

#### SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION REFERRED.

Under clause 2, Rule XXIV, Senate concurrent resolution 16 was taken from the Speaker's table and referred to its appropriate committee, as indicated below:

#### Senate concurrent resolution 16.

*Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring).* That there be printed and bound, under the direction of the Joint Committee on Printing, the proceedings in Congress, together with the proceedings at the unveiling in Statuary Hall, upon the acceptance of the statue of Henry Mower Rice presented by the State of Minnesota, 16,500 copies, with suitable illustration, of which 5,000 shall be for the use of the Senate and 10,000 for the use of the House of Representatives, and the remaining 1,500 copies shall be for the use and distribution of the Senators and Representatives in Congress from the State of Minnesota—

to the Committee on Printing.

#### DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR APPROPRIATION BILL.

Mr. FLOOD, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, by direction of that committee, reported a bill (H. R. 13383, H. Rept. 372) making appropriations for the Diplomatic and Consular Service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1917, which, with accompanying papers, was referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

Mr. MANN reserved all points of order on the bill.

#### DISPOSITION OF USELESS PAPERS.

Mr. TALBOTT, from the Joint Select Committee on Disposition of Useless Papers in the Executive Departments, reported that that committee had examined the useless files and papers in the following departments and found that they are not needed in the transaction of current business of such departments and bureaus and have no permanent value or historical interest, and submitted reports thereon, which were ordered to be printed:

Treasury Department (H. Doc. 363, H. Rept. 373);  
Post Office Department (H. Doc. 523, H. Rept. 374);  
Department of Commerce (H. Doc. 613, H. Rept. 375);  
Navy Department (H. Doc. 675, H. Rept. 376);  
Department of Labor (H. Doc. 662, H. Rept. 377); and  
Department of the Interior (H. Doc. 649, H. Rept. 378).

#### ADJOURNMENT.

Mr. HAY. Mr. Speaker, I move that the House do now adjourn.

The motion was agreed to; accordingly (at 5 o'clock and 55 minutes p. m.) the House under the rule adjourned until tomorrow, Saturday, March 18, 1916, at 11 o'clock a. m.

#### REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 2 of Rule XIII, bills and resolutions were severally reported from committees, delivered to the Clerk, and referred to the several calendars therein named, as follows:

Mr. CARAWAY, from the Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the bill (S. 377) providing for the establishment of a term of the district court for the middle district of Tennessee, at Winchester, Tenn., reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 370), which said bill and report were referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

Mr. OGLESBY, from the Committee on Patents, to which was referred the bill (H. R. 11798) providing for the temporary employment of typewriters in the Patent Office, reported the same without amendment, accompanied by a report (No. 371), which said bill and report were referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

#### CHANGE OF REFERENCE.

Under clause 2 of Rule XXII, committees were discharged from the consideration of the following bills, which were referred as follows:

A bill (H. R. 7469) granting a pension to J. L. Smith; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions discharged, and referred to the Committee on Pensions.

A bill (H. R. 10930) granting a pension to Moses A. Coleman; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions discharged, and referred to the Committee on Pensions.

#### PUBLIC BILLS, RESOLUTIONS, AND MEMORIALS.

Under clause 3 of Rule XXII, bills, resolutions, and memorials were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. EDMONDS: A bill (H. R. 13339) to establish a fish hatchery on the lower Delaware River; to the Committee on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries.

By Mr. JAMES: A bill (H. R. 13340) requiring all public-building bills to be submitted to the Secretary of the Treasury for investigation and report as to whether proposed buildings and sites are needed and the expenditure justified, and as to the lowest cost at which buildings found necessary may be erected with economy and efficiency; to the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds.

By Mr. FARR: A bill (H. R. 13341) to further promote the efficiency of the Naval Reserve of the United States, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

By Mr. BEALES: A bill (H. R. 13342) to improve and maintain certain public roads and parts thereof included within the limits of the national park at Gettysburg, as defined by the act of Congress entitled "An act to establish a national military park at Gettysburg, Pa.," approved February 11, 1895, and making an appropriation therefor; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. STEPHENS of Texas: A bill (H. R. 13343) directing the Secretary of the Treasury to investigate and report as to the advisability of erecting public buildings in certain towns and cities in Texas; to the Committee on Public Buildings and Grounds.

By Mr. BLACKMON: A bill (H. R. 13344) to require all common carriers engaged in interstate and foreign commerce to collect, accept, receive, transmit, and deliver all express packages not exceeding in weight 50 pounds; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. SAUNDERS: A bill (H. R. 13345) to amend section 553 of the act entitled "An act to establish a code of law for the District of Columbia," approved March 3, 1901; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. SINNOTT: A bill (H. R. 13346) to authorize an investigation of the power possibilities near The Dalles, Oreg., for the purpose of establishing a Government-built power plant in connection with the fixation of atmospheric nitrogen; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. CAREW: A bill (H. R. 13347) to extend to certain publications the privileges of third-class mail matter; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. SMITH of New York: A bill (H. R. 13348) to amend the provision regarding newspapers in clause (b) of section 25 of an act entitled "An act to amend and consolidate the acts respecting copyrights," approved March 4, 1909, as amended by an act approved August 24, 1912, and also to amend section 40 of said act; to the Committee on Patents.

By Mr. FLOOD: A bill (H. R. 13383) making appropriations for the Diplomatic and Consular Service for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1917; to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union.

By Mr. RANDALL: Resolution (H. Res. 175) requesting certain information in regard to the petroleum resources of the United States; to the Committee on Mines and Mining.

By Mr. HUDDLESTON: Resolution (H. Res. 176) to provide for the reprint of the Jefferson County (Ala.) soil survey; to the Committee on Printing.

Also, resolution (H. Res. 177) to provide for the reprint of the Perry County (Ala.) soil survey; to the Committee on Printing.

By Mr. KINKAID: Joint resolution (H. J. Res. 183) providing for one year extension of time to make installment payments for the land of the former Fort Niobrara Military Reservation, Nebr.; to the Committee on the Public Lands.

By Mr. KENT: Concurrent resolution (H. Con. Res. 21) authorizing the appointment of a representative of the United States Government to appear at the celebration of the landing of Sir Francis Drake on the coast of California; to the Committee on Industrial Arts and Expositions.

#### PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally referred as follows:

By Mr. ASHBROOK: A bill (H. R. 13349) granting an increase of pension to James K. Jennings; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. AUSTIN: A bill (H. R. 13350) granting a pension to Lemiel A. Ragan; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. BEALES: A bill (H. R. 13351) granting a pension to Mary J. Hamilton; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 13352) granting a pension to Charles C. Cooper; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 13353) granting an increase of pension to Martin Frey; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 13354) to compensate Thomas G. Allen for injuries received while employed in the General Land Office of the United States and making an appropriation therefor; to the Committee on Claims.

By Mr. BURNETT: A bill (H. R. 13355) for the relief of the heirs of George W. Bush; to the Committee on War Claims.

By Mr. CAREW: A bill (H. R. 13356) to correct the military record of Chester H. Southworth; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. CLARK of Missouri: A bill (H. R. 13357) granting an increase of pension to Isaac Lambert; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. COADY: A bill (H. R. 13358) granting a pension to Henry P. McElroy, alias Patrick McElroy; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. DILLON: A bill (H. R. 13359) granting a pension to B. F. Longenecker; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. FIELDS: A bill (H. R. 13360) granting a pension to David S. Williams; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. GRAY of Indiana: A bill (H. R. 13361) granting a pension to Orla Cure; to the Committee on Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 13362) to correct the military record of Thomas Weaver; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. HICKS: A bill (H. R. 13363) for the relief of Jennette Hooker Powell; to the Committee on the Public Lands.

By Mr. KIESS of Pennsylvania: A bill (H. R. 13364) granting a pension to Thomas J. Connor; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. McCULLOCH: A bill (H. R. 13365) for the relief of John W. Seaver; to the Committee on War Claims.

Also, a bill (H. R. 13366) granting an increase of pension to John Fagley; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 13367) granting an increase of pension to Curtis C. Griffin; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. MEEKER: A bill (H. R. 13368) granting a pension to Joseph Lingenbrink; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. OAKLEY: A bill (H. R. 13369) granting an increase of pension to Sarah E. Nearing; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. PARKER of New York: A bill (H. R. 13370) granting a pension to Walter V. Haskell; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. SANFORD: A bill (H. R. 13371) for the relief of Matthew J. McDermott; to the Committee on Claims.

Also, a bill (H. R. 13372) for the relief of Henry C. Romaine; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. SLEMP: A bill (H. R. 13373) for the relief of the legal representative of D. C. Dunn, deceased; to the Committee on Claims.

By Mr. SMITH of New York: A bill (H. R. 13374) granting an increase of pension to Hattie A. Grant; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. STEELE of Iowa: A bill (H. R. 13375) granting an increase of pension to David R. Edmonds; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. STEPHENS of California: A bill (H. R. 13376) to reinstate Cecil Floyd Charlton as a passed assistant surgeon in the United States Navy; to the Committee on Naval Affairs.

By Mr. TAGGART: A bill (H. R. 13377) granting an increase of pension to James A. White; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 13378) granting an increase of pension to George W. Denison; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. TALBOTT: A bill (H. R. 13379) granting a pension to Adelaide McGreevey; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, a bill (H. R. 13380) to carry out the findings of the Court of Claims in the case of the Sanford & Brooks Co.; to the Committee on Claims.

By Mr. TAYLOR of Arkansas: A bill (H. R. 13381) for the relief of the heirs of Hyder Lindsey; to the Committee on Claims.

By Mr. WATSON of Pennsylvania: A bill (H. R. 13382) granting an increase of pension to Charles L. Loney; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

#### PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of Rule XXII, petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and referred as follows:

By the SPEAKER (by request): Petition of citizens of Pike and Audrain Counties, Mo., favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also (by request), two memorials in regard to cotton-futures bill; to the Committee on Agriculture.

Also (by request), petition of Wood Memorial Free Baptist Church, of Lawrence, Mass., favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ASHBROOK: Papers to accompany House bill 13236, for relief of Mary Green; to the Committee on Pensions.

By Mr. BEALES: Petitions of Warrington quarterly meeting of Society of Friends, of Floradale; Lower Marsh Creek Presbyterian Church, of Adams County; Society of Friends of Floradale; Loyal Sons Class of First Lutheran Church of New Oxford; First Lutheran Church, of 198 people, of New Oxford; Young People's Society of Christian Endeavor, of 55 people, of the First Lutheran Church of New Oxford, all in the State of Pennsylvania, favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, papers to accompany bill for relief of Thomas G. Allen; to the Committee on Claims.

By Mr. BYRNS of Tennessee: Petition of Rust Memorial Baptist Church, of Nashville, Tenn., favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. CAREW (by request): Petition of New York Board of Trade and Transportation on the matter of interstate and foreign commerce; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. CURRY: Petition of United Baptist Church, of 50 people, of Rejon; Woman's Christian Temperance Union, of 30 people, of Lathrop, both in the State of California, favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. DALE of New York: Petition of John A. Harley, of Yonkers, N. Y., indorsing House bills 6915 and 7656; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

Also, petition of Francis Blossom, of New York, indorsing Senate bill 3946 and House bill 10845; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, memorial of Presidents' Association of the Farmers' Educational and Cooperative Union of America, in re the Smith-Lever cotton-futures bill; to the Committee on Agriculture.

By Mr. DOOLITTLE: Two petitions of citizens of Wabunsee, Kans., containing 118 names, in favor of a Christian amendment to the Constitution of the United States; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ELLSWORTH: Petition of First Methodist Episcopal Church of Redwood Falls; J. D. Vinding, of Storden; 17 citizens of Beaver Creek, all in the State of Minnesota, favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. EMERSON: Memorial of city council of the city of Cleveland, Ohio, on parcel post; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. ESCH: Memorial of Trades and Labor Council of La Crosse, Wis., indorsing the Raker bill (H. R. 10398) and other similar bills; to the Committee on Reform in the Civil Service.

Also, memorial of Trades and Labor Council of La Crosse, Wis., protesting against the passage of any resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution providing for national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, memorial of Trades and Labor Council of La Crosse, Wis., indorsing House resolution 137; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. FLYNN: Petition of Francis Blossom, of New York, in reference to Senate bill 3946 and House bill 10845; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, petition of John A. Hurley, of Yonkers, N. Y., indorsing House bills 6915 and 7656; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. FULLER: Petition of Charles Kliber and 85 others, of De Kalb, Ill., protesting against the passage of House bills 491 and 6468, to amend the postal laws; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. GARRETT: Petition of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union of Halls, Tenn., favoring prohibition in the District of Columbia; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

Also, petition of Farmers' Union College of Halls, and of sundry citizens of Union City, all in the State of Tennessee, favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, petition of sundry citizens of Tennessee, indorsing the Stevens standard-price bill; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. GRIEST: Petition of Victor Engstrom and sundry citizens, of Ridgway, Pa., protesting against the enactment of any law looking toward the abridgment of the freedom of the press; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

Also, memorial of H. M. Hoover and sundry citizens, of Lancaster, Pa., urging congressional action authorizing the printing for free distribution of copies of the final report and testimony of the United States Commission on Industrial Relations; to the Committee on Printing.

By Mr. HADLEY: Petitions of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union of 100 people of Lynden; Presbyterian Church of Everson; Woman's Christian Temperance Union of Everson;

First Presbyterian Church of Snohomish; Woman's Christian Temperance Union of Dungeness; Congregational Church of Edmonds; Woman's Christian Temperance Union of Anacortes; Woman's Christian Temperance Union of Hamilton; Swedish Church of Pleasant Ridge, Mount Vernon; 45 people of Everett; Sunday school people of Big Lake, all in the State of Washington, indorsing national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, petitions of the Woman's Christian Temperance Union of Edmonds; Free Methodist Church of Edmonds; Woman's Christian Temperance Union of Everett; and 22 voters of Hamilton, all in the State of Washington, favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HAMILTON of New York: Papers to accompany House bill 13304, for relief of Hiram Ellis; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, papers to accompany House bill 1303, for relief of Samuel Massey; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. HAMLIN: Papers to accompany House bill 13305, for relief of Phyllis Channels; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

By Mr. HELVERING: Petition of various citizens of Abilene, Kans., asking for an embargo on munitions; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. HILL (by request): Petitions of Horeb Lodge, No. 25, New Haven, and the Associated Hungarian Societies of Bridgeport, Conn., protesting against the passage of the Burnett immigration bill; to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

By Mr. HOLLINGSWORTH: Petition of business men and citizens of Steubenville, Mingo Junction, Brilliant, Toronto, Holloway, Neffs, Bridgeport, Irondale, Lisbon, Salineville, Washingtonville, Salem, East Palestine, East Liverpool, Columbiana, New Waterford, Letonia, and Garrettsville, in the eighteenth Ohio congressional district, in support of bill to provide a tax on interstate mail-order business; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. HUMPHREY of Washington: Petition of sundry citizens of Spokane, Wash., protesting against Senate bill 645; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

Also, petition of sundry citizens of Washington, opposing House bills 491 and 6468; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. IGOE: Petition signed by Dave E. J. Noonan, Peter Young, G. H. Tubbesing, C. A. Bailey, A. J. Horn, Charles H. Mesenbrink, William G. Happel, John Stein, D. S. Phelan, P. F. McBearty, James Noonan, Leo E. Noonan, Dan Foley, Edward Heffernan, Paul F. Buttiger, Tim Dolan, Charles J. Becker, Joseph Delabar, and Thomas A. King, all retail business men of St. Louis, Mo., urging the passage of House bill No. 9671, known as the Stephens-Ayers bill, and protesting against the use of trading stamps and urging the adoption of legislation that would prevent their use; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. KENNEDY of Rhode Island: Memorial of Woonsocket, R. I., Central Labor Union, favoring passage of Nolan bill, Senate bill 632, and House bill 10398; to the Committee on Reform in the Civil Service.

Also, petition of H. J. Pettengill, jr., of Woonsocket, R. I., favoring passage of House bill 10845, providing for the extension of military training in civil educational institutions; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, memorial of Woonsocket, R. I., Central Labor Union favoring passage of Burnett immigration bill; to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

By Mr. KIESS of Pennsylvania: Petition of Methodist Episcopal Church and sundry citizens, both of Rutland, Pa., favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. LINDBERGH: Petitions of Mrs. C. Jacobson, Hewitt, Minn., and others protesting against the passage of House bills 491 and 652; to the Committee on the Post Offices and Post Roads.

By Mr. MCGILLICUDDY: Petition of manufacturers of Lewiston, Me., and Auburn, Me., favoring House bill 702, the dyestuff bill; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. MAPES: Petition by members of Peach Plains Grange No. 1476, of Ottawa County, and other citizens of Michigan, protesting against the adoption by Congress of any plan of military or naval expansion providing for a larger expenditure annually, except in case of actual war, than has been appropriated and used for that purpose in recent years; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. MEEKER: Petition of St. Louis Grocers' Association, of St. Louis, Mo., praying for the passage of the Stevens-Ayres

standard-price bill; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

Also, petition of 26 citizens of St. Louis, Mo., protesting against the passage of House bill No. 652, which provides for the closing of barber shops, etc., on Sundays in the District of Columbia; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

Also, petitions of citizens of Kirkwood and of Webster Groves, Mo., praying for the passage of House bill No. 270; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

Also, resolutions adopted by the National Defense Conference of Mayors and Municipal Representatives of the Country at St. Louis, Mo., March 3 and 4, 1916, urging the passage of preparedness measures; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. NORTH: Petitions of 175 people of Apollo, 216 people of Apollo, and Grace Lutheran Church of Leechburg, all of the State of Pennsylvania, favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, petition of Rev. T. A. Himes, G. J. Cline, M. M. McCormick, Margerite Frederick, George L. Nolf, George A. Harmar, S. H. Young, H. E. McCormick, Ellen McCormick, John A. Small, James R. Hill, Fred E. Hill, James Smith, H. L. George, S. F. Stull, W. P. M. Kunkle, William G. Hall, Ward Stitt, Paul E. Cline, Saura Stitt, Mrs. James Smith, Laura H. Stull, Mrs. Lizza L. Hill, and Mrs. H. L. George, all of Leechburg, Pa., favoring the nation-wide prohibition amendment; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, petition of G. K. Say, Karns City, R. D. 2; J. Homer Binford, Karns City, R. D. 2; Harry Plimkark, Parkers Landing; Samuel J. Binherd, Karns City, R. D. 2; G. T. Keitr, Parkers Landing, R. D. 69; George H. Wagner, Karns City, R. D. 2; Oliver Hiles, Karns City, R. D. 2; Glen Ward, Petrolia; Pierce Sheakley, Petrolia; W. E. Henderson, Petrolia; E. J. Shakley, Karns City, R. D. 2; C. W. Byers, Karns City, R. D. 2; John Fisher, Petrolia; J. W. Grove, Karns City, R. D. 2; R. J. Lewis, Queenstown; John W. Fure, Karns City, R. D. 2; R. H. Crawford, Karns City, R. D. 2; Andy Crozier, Karns City, R. D. 2; J. B. Jordan, E. N. Tracy, R. J. Mildren, D. C. Miller, W. G. Miller, John Jennings, Earl Baiger, W. S. Cox, N. H. Peters, W. J. Mildren, R. W. Hermon, T. L. Hooks, H. W. Shelling, A. W. Reedy, and O. Y. Childs, all of Queenstown; G. P. Yockey, Parkers Landing, R. D. 69; W. E. Thomas, Parkers Landing, R. D. 69; and John Crawford, Karns City, R. D. 2, all in Perry Township, Pa., favoring the nation-wide prohibition amendment; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, petition of the following voters of Indiana, Pa., for the nation-wide prohibition amendment: W. O. Moorhead, E. G. Livingston, L. G. Clark, F. J. Swan, Samuel Highland, H. S. Daugharty, J. W. Wiggins, T. M. McKee, J. T. Stewart, Rev. C. G. Morrow, J. Wilson Thompson, J. A. Miller, A. W. Mabon, H. S. Simpson, E. E. Dickie, Anderson Fowler, J. Sloan Agey, A. L. Stuchell, J. T. Stewart, T. E. Wachob, John L. Getty, A. L. Mabon, Charles A. Nichol, J. M. Glassfor, W. F. Simpson, P. B. Anderson, A. A. Calhoun, D. M. C. Freedline, N. R. Calhoun, John M. Maunkey, S. T. Kanarr, Harry Carson, D. J. Fiscus, J. Irwin Long, Mortimer Kanarr, Charles W. Duncan, J. A. Simpson, William N. Liggett, Frank M. Smith, R. H. Cunningham, J. C. Forsythe, James Bowman, J. W. Wiggins, G. P. McCartney, John S. Fiscus, A. R. Moorhead, Clark Winemar, J. M. Waerwle, J. S. Jamison, P. L. Hamill, E. McLaughlin, J. Day Brownlee, W. B. Pattison, Eli Johnston, B. F. Wolford, J. A. Mart, Ernest Work, J. C. Anderson, H. L. Lowry, B. W. Stewart, Daniel S. Rankin, John Russell, James Heedy, R. Agey, Harry A. Bowland, A. B. Gracy, J. M. Bryan, A. S. Laney, M. A. Williams, S. T. McHany, C. McAdoo, M. R. Robinson, John Oyeal, Milton Laney, and F. M. Smith; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. OAKLEY (by request): Petition of citizens of Connecticut, protesting against House bills 6468 and 491; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

Also (by request), petition of citizens of Southington, Conn., favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also (by request), petition of Farmington Young People's Society of Christian Endeavor, of Farmington, and Enighet Lodge, International Order of Good Templars, of South Manchester, Conn., favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. RANDALL: Petition of Azusa Avenue Baptist Church of Azusa, Cal., favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ROWLAND: Petition of United Brethren Church, of Coalport; Christian Endeavor Society of United Brethren Church, of Beaver Valley; and United Brethren Churches of

Cambria and Clearfield, Pa., favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SCHALL: Resolutions from Minneapolis, Excelsior, Buffalo, Braham, Rock Creek, Rush City, and Pine City, all of Minnesota, favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SIMS: Petition of citizens of Westport, Tenn., favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SLOAN: Two protests of sundry citizens against House bills 6458 and 491; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

Also, petition of George S. Schwab and 27 others of Sutton, Nebr., in re interstate shipment of prison-made goods; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. SMITH of Texas: Petition of citizens of Taylor County, Tex., against military preparedness; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, petition of public meeting of 250 people of Aspermont, and public meeting of 200 people of Hamlin, Tex., favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. SNYDER: Petition of Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employees of Utica, N. Y., favoring the enactment of the Burnett immigration bill; to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

Also, petition of Fort Stanwix Chapter Daughters of the American Revolution, of Rome, N. Y., favoring the establishment of a national park on the site of the Battle of Oriskany; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

Also, petition of A. P. Seaton, chairman of the Oneida County (N. Y.) Board of Supervisors, favoring the establishment of a national park at the Oriskany battle ground; to the Committee on Military Affairs.

By Mr. STEENERSON: Petition of 23 citizens of Minnesota and Iowa, protesting against the passage of House bills 491 and 6468; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

Also, petition of 18 citizens of Oregon, protesting against the passage of House bills 491 and 6468; to the Committee on the Post Office and Post Roads.

By Mr. SULLOWAY: Petition of members of Hudson Grange, No. 11, of Hillsborough County; 33 Woman's Christian Temperance Union people of Rochester; 60 people of Laconia; Freewill Baptist Church, of Gonic; 600 members of Merrimack County Pomona Grange, all in the State of New Hampshire, favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. TALBOTT: Petitions of Church of the Brethren, 275 people, of New Windsor; 55 people of Baltimore; 126 people of Baltimore; 85 people of Baltimore; 100 people of Cartersville; 50 people of Cartersville; 200 people of Towson; 180 people of Westminster; 78 people of Baltimore; 600 people of Baltimore; and 300 people of Westminster, all in the State of Maryland, favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. TEMPLE: Papers in support of House bill 13156, granting increase of pension to John G. W. Book; to the Committee on Invalid Pensions.

Also, letter from Mr. Jacob Goldfair and 37 other citizens of Washington, Pa., protesting against the passage of the immigration bill; to the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization.

Also, petition signed by Rev. J. M. Foster and 18 other citizens of New Wilmington, Pa., favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, petition signed by Prof. W. S. Hertzog and 25 others, of California, Pa., favoring the Susan B. Anthony amendment for woman suffrage; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, resolution adopted by the Shakespeare Club, of Canonsburg, Pa., numbering 50 ladies, favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, resolution adopted by the Methodist Episcopal Church of New Wilmington, Pa., numbering 100 people, favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, resolution adopted by the Francis Willard Union, of New Castle, Pa., numbering 200 people, favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

Also, petition signed by Rev. M. B. Riley, in behalf of the Methodist Episcopal Church of New Wilmington, Pa., favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. YOUNG of Texas: Petition of Christian Endeavor Society of Terrell, Tex., favoring national prohibition; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

## SENATE.

SATURDAY, March 18, 1916.

The Chaplain, Rev. Forrest J. Prettyman, D. D., offered the following prayer:

Almighty God, our fathers trusted in Thee and were not confounded. The ministry of Thy grace has come to us through the influence of the faithful and the achievements of those who have trusted in Thy holy name. The light of Thy glory has not grown dim with the ages. When we have doubted it has been by the influence of the things which we doubt; when we have mistrusted God it has been by the ministry of the things which we ourselves have mistrusted.

Grant us to-day a clear and personal vision of Thy face, that we may know Thy glory, and may know that over all there is a hand that guides and governs and rules, the hand of our God. Let Thy blessing abide with us to this end. For Christ's sake. Amen.

## NAMING A PRESIDING OFFICER.

The Secretary (James M. Baker) read the following communication:

UNITED STATES SENATE, PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE,  
Washington, D. C., March 18, 1916.

To the Senate:

Being temporarily absent from the Senate, I appoint Hon. LEE S. OVERMAN, a Senator from the State of North Carolina, to perform the duties of the Chair during my absence.

JAMES P. CLARKE,  
President pro tempore.

Mr. OVERMAN thereupon took the chair as Presiding Officer and directed the Secretary to read the Journal of the proceedings of the preceding day.

The Secretary proceeded to read the Journal of yesterday's proceedings, when, on request of Mr. MARTIN of Virginia, and by unanimous consent, the further reading was dispensed with and the Journal was approved.

## NATIONAL DEFENSE.

Mr. WORKS. Mr. President, I give notice that on next Thursday I shall submit some remarks on the subject of preparedness for peace.

## STRATEGICAL IMPORTANCE OF NAVAL STATIONS (S. DOC. NO. 344.)

Mr. TILLMAN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have the article I send to the desk printed as a public document. It was prepared by Admiral John R. Edwards, and sent to the United States Naval Institute in competition for a gold medal given by that body. I heard of it and asked to see it, and Admiral Edwards kindly sent it to me. Its viewpoint is so different from that of the average naval officer at the department and so much in consonance with my own ideas and belief that I want to give it the widest possible publicity; or, at least, put it in the archives of the Government so that it can not be lost. Whether the policy he advocates be followed or not, those who read it now or in future years must realize the breadth of view and the patriotic statesmanship he has shown in writing it.

For the purpose of letting people know who Admiral Edwards is, as he is very modest and not self-assertive at all, I will state that he is a retired admiral of the United States and is an accomplished engineer, and that he graduated at the Naval Academy in the engineer force in 1874. He has been at sea on all sorts of naval vessel 16 years, all told. His shore duty has also been varied, and while serving for three years as professor of mechanical engineering at the South Carolina University, where I first knew him, he graduated in law. He was assistant for six years to Admiral Melville, who everybody in Congress knows was a very able engineer. His extensive travel and habit of reading give him very wide acquaintance with all activities connected with our own and foreign navies. He served for two years as president of the Board of Inspection for Shore Stations, to which he was appointed by Mr. Meyer. This specially fits him for discussing the matters in the article mentioned. He takes a broader view and one more philosophical than many naval officers far more prominent in naval circles. Although born in the North he has not allowed sectionalism in any way to interfere with his study of the Navy's needs, from a southern as well as a northern standpoint.

The most striking thing about this article is his antithetical statement that the advocacy of preparing a great fleet involved as a necessary corollary the provision of yards, piers, and so forth, to repair that fleet and take care of it in war and peace. To prepare and not provide for repair is in his judgment shortsighted and dangerous. His only fault as a writer is his anxiety to "tell it all," which makes him use too many words;